Congressional Research Service Report: 'Changes in Arctic – Background & Issues for Congress' (Part 5 of 6)

WASHINGTON, Oct. 13 (TNSRep) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following report (No. R41153) on Oct. 12, 2021, entitled "Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress":

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(Continued from Part 4 of 6)

Basic Navigation Infrastructure Is Lacking

Considerable investment in navigation-related infrastructure would be required if trans-Arctic shipping were to become a reality. Channel marking buoys and other floating visual aids are not possible in Arctic waters because moving ice sheets will continuously shift their positions. Therefore, vessel captains would need to rely on marine surveys and ice charts. For some areas in the Arctic, however, these surveys and charts are out of date or not sufficiently accurate./215 To remedy this problem, aviation reconnaissance of ice conditions and satellite images would need to become readily available for ship operators./216 Ship-to-shore communication infrastructure would need to be installed where possible. Refueling stations may be needed, as well as, perhaps, transshipment ports where cargo could be transferred to and from ice-capable vessels at both ends of Arctic routes. Shipping lines would need to develop a larger pool of mariners with ice navigation experience. Marine insurers would need to calculate the proper level of risk premium for polar routes, which would require more detailed information about Arctic accidents and incidents in the past.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, along with the state of Alaska, has studied the feasibility of a "deep-draft" port in the Arctic (accommodating ships with a draft of up to 35 feet). The northern and northwestern coastlines of Alaska are exceptionally shallow, generally limiting harbor and near-shore traffic to shallow-draft barges. Coast Guard cutters and icebreakers have drafts of 35 to 40 feet while NOAA research vessels have drafts of 16 to 28 feet, so at present these vessels are based outside the Arctic and must sail considerable distances to reach Arctic duty stations.

Supply vessels supporting offshore oil rigs typically have drafts over 20 feet. A deep-draft port could serve as a base of operations for larger vessels, facilitating commercial maritime traffic in the Arctic./217 The study concluded that the existing harbors of Nome or Port Clarence on Alaska's west coast may be the most suitable for deepening because of their proximity to the Bering Strait and deeper water./218 However, at a July 2016 hearing, the Coast Guard indicated its preferred strategy was to rely on mobile assets (vessels and aircraft) and seasonal bases of operation rather than pursue a permanent port in the Arctic./219

The U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System, a Cabinet-level committee of federal agencies with responsibilities for marine transportation, identified a list of infrastructure improvements for Arctic navigation in a 2013 report.220 The report prioritizes improvements to information infrastructure (weather forecasting, nautical charting, ship tracking) and emergency response capabilities for ships in distress.

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215 In July and August 2010, NOAA surveyed the Bering Straits area in order to update its charts but stated that it will take more than 25 years to map the prioritized areas of navigational significance in U.S. Arctic waters. See http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2010/20100720_fairweather.html.

216 Ice reporting that currently exists is intended for scientists not mariners.

217 For further information, see http://www.poa.usace.army.mil/en/cw/AKPortsStudy.htm, and FY2013 USACE Budget Justification, p. POD-5.

218 Alaska Deep-Draft Arctic Port System Study, March 2013; http://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Library/ReportsandStudies/AlaskaRegionalPortsStudy.aspx. The navigation channel at Nome presently ranges from 10 to 20 feet in depth. Much of the harbor at Port Clarence has a natural depth of 35 to 40 feet; http://www.charts.noaa.gov/ OnLineViewer/AlaskaViewerTable.shtml.

219 Oral testimony of Admiral Charles D. Michel, Coast Guard Vice Commandant, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Coast Guard Arctic Implementation Capabilities, July 12, 2016.

220 U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System, U.S. Arctic Marine Transportation System: Overview and Priorities for Action, 2013; http://www.cmts.gov/downloads/CMTS_Arctic_MTS_Report_Narrative.pdf.

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Regulation of Arctic Shipping

Due to the international nature of the shipping industry, maritime trading nations have adopted international treaties that establish standards for ocean carriers in terms of safety, pollution prevention, and security. These standards are agreed upon by shipping nations through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a United Nations agency that first met in 1959./221 Key conventions that the 168 IMO member nations have adopted include the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS), which was originally adopted in response to the Titanic disaster in 1912 but has since been revised several times; the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), which was adopted in 1973 and modified in 1978; and the Standards for Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (SCTW), which was adopted in 1978 and amended in 1995. It is up to ratifying nations to enforce these standards. The United States is a party to these conventions, and the U.S. Coast Guard enforces them when it boards and inspects ships and crews arriving at U.S. ports and the very few ships engaged in international trade that sail under the U.S. flag.

Like the United States, most of the other major maritime trading nations lack the ability to enforce these regulations as a "flag state" because much of the world's merchant fleet is registered under so-called "flags of convenience." While most ship owners and operators are headquartered in major economies, they often register their ships in Panama, Liberia, the Bahamas, the Marshall Islands, Malta, and Cyprus, among other "open registries," because these nations offer more attractive tax and employment regulatory regimes. Because of this development, most maritime trading nations enforce shipping regulations under a "port state control" regime--that is, they require compliance with these regulations as a condition of calling at their ports. The fragmented nature of ship ownership and operation can be a further hurdle to regulatory enforcement. It is common for cargo ships to be owned by one company, operated by a second company (which markets the ship's space), and managed by a third (which may supply the crew and other services a ship requires to sail), each of which could be headquartered in different countries.

New Arctic Polar Code

While SOLAS and other IMO conventions include provisions regarding the operation of ships in ice-infested waters, they were not specific to the polar regions. To supplement these requirements, a new IMO polar code went into effect on January 1, 2017./222 The code applies to passenger and cargo ships of 500 gross tons or more engaged in international voyages. It does not apply to fishing vessels, military vessels, pleasure yachts, or smaller cargo ships. The polar requirements are intended to improve safety and prevent pollution in the Arctic, and they include provisions on ship construction, ship equipment related to navigation, and crew training and ship operation. The code requires ships to carry fully or partially enclosed lifeboats. The code requires that the crew have training in ice navigation. Nations can enforce additional requirements on ships arriving at their ports or sailing through their coastal waters. For instance, U.S. Coast Guard regulations largely follow IMO conventions but mandate additional requirements in some areas. U.S. coastal states can require ships calling at their ports to take additional safety and pollution prevention safeguards./223 Canada and Russia have additional pollution regulations for Arctic waters exceeding MARPOL.

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221 See http://www.imo.org/ for more information.

222 http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Pages/default.aspx.

223 For example, see Alaska State Legislature, HJR 19, Arctic Marine Safety Agreements; http://www.akleg.gov/basis/Bill/Detail/30?Root=HJR%2019.

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The U.S. Coast Guard has studied and has recommended a specific vessel traffic separation scheme for the Bering Strait between Alaska and Russia, which experiences over 400 transits per year./224 The U.S. Coast Guard is seeking IMO approval of this routing scheme.

Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration/225

Decreases in summer polar ice may alter options for oil, gas, and mineral exploration in Arctic offshore and onshore areas. Offshore of Alaska, the U.S. outer continental shelf (OCS) covers more than 1 billion acres,/226 including some areas with high oil and gas potential. Even with warmer temperatures, exploration and development in the Arctic are still subject to harsh conditions, especially in winter. This makes it costly and challenging to develop the infrastructure necessary to produce, store, and transport oil, gas, and minerals from newly discovered deposits. Severe weather poses challenges to several ongoing offshore operations as well as to new exploration.

Offshore oil and gas exploration is affected by efforts to map the margins of the U.S. OCS. Shrinking sea ice cover in the Arctic has intensified interest in surveying and mapping the continental margins of multiple countries with lands in the Arctic. Delineating the extent of the continental margins beyond the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) could lead to consideration of development on substantial amounts of submerged lands. Mapping projects are underway, by individual countries and through cooperative government studies, to support submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, including for areas that may contain large amounts of oil, natural gas, methane hydrates, or minerals.

With respect to onshore energy and mineral development, warming temperatures result in thawing permafrost and can result in higher transportation and infrastructure costs. Warming temperatures could potentially reduce sea ice to a level that allows sea access to remote development sites.

Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration

The shrinking Arctic ice cap, or conversely, the growing amount of ice-free ocean in the summertime, has increased interest in exploring for offshore oil and gas in the Arctic. Reduced sea ice in the summer means that ships towing seismic arrays/227 can explore regions of the Arctic Ocean, Chukchi Sea, Beaufort Sea, and other offshore regions for longer periods of time with less risk of colliding with floating sea ice. Less sea ice over longer periods compared to previous decades also means that the seasonal window for offshore Arctic drilling remains open longer in the summer, increasing the chances for making a discovery.

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224 82 Federal Register 11935, February 27, 2017.

225 This section prepared by Laura Comay, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division; Caitlin Keating-Bitonti, Analyst in Natural Resources Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division; and Brandon Tracy, Analyst in Energy Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division.

226 This region includes some areas within the Arctic boundary as defined by the ARPA (15 U.S.C. 4111; see Figure 1), such as the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, and some areas outside that boundary, such as Cook Inlet.

227 A seismic array is typically a long string or streamer of geophones--acoustic devices used for recording seismic signals--towed behind a ship while the ship traverses a prospective oil and gas-bearing portion of the seafloor. The seismic signals are processed and interpreted to give a cross-section or three-dimensional image of the subsurface.

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In addition to the improved access to larger portions of the Arctic afforded by shrinking sea ice, interest in Arctic oil and gas was fueled by a 2008 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) appraisal of undiscovered oil and gas north of the Arctic Circle./228 The USGS stated that the "extensive Arctic continental shelves may constitute the geographically largest unexplored prospective area for petroleum remaining on Earth."/229 In the report, the USGS estimated that 90 billion barrels of oil, nearly 1,700 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids may remain to be discovered in the Arctic (including both U.S. and international resources north of the Arctic Circle)./230 This would constitute approximately 13% of the world's undiscovered conventional oil resources and 30% of natural gas, according the U.S. Energy Information Administration./231 In terms of U.S. resources specifically, DOI's Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) estimated in 2021 that the Alaska portions of the U.S. OCS contain undiscovered, technically recoverable resources of approximately 25 billion barrels of oil and 124 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (although not all of these resources may be economically viable to recover)./232

Despite the warming trend in the Arctic, severe weather and sea ice continue to pose challenges to exploration. In addition, any discovery of new oil and gas deposits far from existing storage, pipelines, and shipping facilities could not be developed until infrastructure is built to extract and transport the petroleum.

Some have expressed interest in expanding America's ocean energy portfolio in the region. Currently, among 15 federal planning areas in the region, the Beaufort Sea and Cook Inlet are the only two areas with active federal leases,/233 and only the Beaufort Sea has any producing wells in federal waters (from a joint federal-state unit)./234 The Trump Administration had stated its interest in promoting offshore development in the region, and had issued a draft five-year offshore oil and gas leasing program for 2019-2024 that would have scheduled lease sales in all 15 Alaska planning areas, including three sales in the Beaufort Sea and three in the Chukchi Sea./235

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228 See USGS Fact Sheet 2008-3049, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/, hereinafter referred to as "USGS 2008 Fact Sheet." 229 USGS 2008 Fact Sheet.

230 USGS 2008 Fact Sheet, p. 1.

231 U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Today in Energy: Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Resources," January 20, 2012, at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4650.

232 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, "Assessment of Undiscovered Technically Recoverable Oil and Gas Resources of the Nation's Outer Continental Shelf, 2021," at https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/documents/oilgas-energy/resource-evaluation/2021_National_Assessment_Map_BTU.pdf. BOEM defines technically recoverable resources as "oil and gas that could be produced as a consequence of natural pressure, artificial lift, pressure maintenance, or other secondary recovery methods, but without any consideration of economic viability " (BOEM, "Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Nation's Outer Continental Shelf, 2021," at https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/documents/oil-gas-energy/resource-evaluation/2021%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf).

BOEM's 2019-2024 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Draft Proposed Program (January 2015, chapter 5, at https://www.boem.gov/NP-Draft-Proposed-Program-2019-2024/, hereinafter cited as "BOEM 2019-2024 Draft Proposed Program") estimates a range of resources that would be economically recoverable under various oil and gas price points and cost conditions.

233 Although part of BOEM's Alaska region, Cook Inlet lies outside the Arctic boundary as defined by the ARPA (15 U.S.C. 4111; see Figure 1).

234 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, "BP Exploration (Alaska) (BPXA)--Northstar," at http://www.boem.gov/ About-BOEM/BOEM-Regions/Alaska-Region/Leasing-and-Plans/Plans/BP-North-Star.aspx.

235 BOEM 2019-2024 Draft Proposed Program, p. 8.

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The draft program did not advance further in the Trump Administration, and the Biden Administration has not released a five-year offshore program proposal. Current lease sales on the Alaska OCS are governed by the Obama Administration's leasing program for 2017-2022, which included one lease sale in the Cook Inlet (scheduled for 2021) and none in other Alaska planning areas./236 In August 2021, the Department of the Interior announced that it would proceed with environmental review of the scheduled Cook Inlet lease sale, after work on this sale had been halted in response to President Biden's Executive Order 14008, which directed a pause and review of the federal oil and gas leasing program broadly./237

Offshore oil and gas activities in the region have fluctuated as industry weighs changing oil prices, development costs, and regulations. For example, in 2015, Shell Oil Company announced its decision to cease exploration in offshore Alaska for the foreseeable future. Shell cited several reasons for the decision, including insufficient indications of oil and gas at its Burger J well in the Chukchi Sea, the high costs associated with Arctic exploration, and the "challenging and unpredictable" federal regulatory environment./238 BOEM also reported that, between February and November 2016, companies relinquished more than 90% of leases they had held in the Beaufort and Chukchi Sea planning areas, in the midst of a slump in oil prices./239 While there were 450 active leases in the Chukchi Sea planning area at the end of 2015, as of August 2021 there were none./240 In the Beaufort Sea, active leases dropped from 77 at the end of 2015 to 19 in August 2021./241

Despite these changes, some activities have indicated ongoing industry interest in the region. For example, in November 2017, the Trump Administration approved an application for permit to drill (APD) on a lease in the Beaufort Sea held by the Eni U.S. Operating Company. 242 In October 2018, BOEM issued conditional approval to Hilcorp Alaska LLC for an oil and gas development and production plan in the Beaufort Sea, which would be the region's first production facility entirely in federal waters; however, the approval was vacated in December 2020 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.243 Recent discoveries onshore and in state waters on Alaska's North Slope also have contributed to ongoing interest in the region.

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236 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 2017-2022 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Proposed Final Program, November 2016, at https://www.boem.gov/2017-2022-OCS-Oil-and-Gas-Leasing-PFP/, hereinafter cited as "BOEM 2017-2022 Proposed Final Program."

237 President Joseph Biden, Executive Order 14008, " Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad," January 27, 2021, 86 Federal Register 7619, at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/02/01/2021-02177/tackling-theclimate-crisis-at-home-and-abroad. On February 4, 2021, BOEM had canceled public meetings and a public comment period related to the Cook Inlet sale as a result of the executive order (BOEM, " BOEM Cancels Comment Period, Virtual Meetings for Proposed Lease Sale Offshore Alaska," press release, February 4, 2021, at https://www.boem.gov/boem-cancels-comment-period-virtual-meetings-proposed-lease-sale-offshore). On August 16, 2021, DOI announced that BOEM would now issue and take comments on a draft environmental impact statement analyzing the Cook Inlet sale (DOI, " Interior Department Files Court Brief Outlining Next Steps in Leasing Program," August 24, 2021, at https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/interior-department-files-court-brief-outlining-next-steps-leasing-program").

238 Royal Dutch Shell, PLC, "Shell Updates on Alaska Exploration," press release, September 28, 2015, at http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/media/news-and-media-releases/2015/shell-updates-on-alaskaexploration.html.

239 BOEM 2017-2022 Proposed Final Program, p. S-3.

240 For 2015 data, see BOEM, "Combined Leasing Report, as of January 1, 2016," at https://www.boem.gov/ Combined-Leasing-Reports-2016/. For August 2021 data, see BOEM, "Combined Leasing Report, as of August 1, 2021," at https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/documents/regions/pacific-ocs-region/Lease%20stats%208-121.pdf.

241 Ibid.

242 Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), "BSEE Approves New Drilling Operations in Arctic," press release, November 28, 2017, at https://www.bsee.gov/newsroom/latest-news/statements-and-releases/pressreleases/bsee-approves-new-drilling-operations-in. The BSEE Director stated in the press release that "responsible resource development in the Arctic is a critical component to achieving American energy dominance."

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The evolving federal regulatory environment for Arctic offshore activities has been shaped by concerns about industry's ability to respond to potential oil spills, given the region's remoteness and harsh conditions. The section of this report on "Oil Pollution Implications of Arctic Change" discusses this issue in greater detail. In July 2016, BOEM and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) released final safety regulations for Arctic exploratory drilling that include multiple requirements for companies to reduce the risks of potential oil spills--for example, the requirement that companies have a separate rig available at drill sites to drill a relief well in case of a loss of well control./244 Some Members of Congress and industry stakeholders opposed the regulations as overly prescriptive and unnecessarily burdensome, while other Members and environmental organizations asserted that the rules did not go far enough in protecting the region from potential environmental damage and addressing the potential contributions of Arctic oil and gas activities to climate change./245 Legislation was introduced in the 115th Congress both to repeal the Arctic rule and, conversely, to codify it in law./246 In December 2020, the Trump Administration published a proposed revision to the rule, 247 but in June 2021 the Biden Administration withdrew the proposed revision./248

Concerns about the impacts of oil and gas activities have led in the past to bans by both Congress and the President on leasing in certain Arctic Ocean areas deemed especially sensitive./249 For example, congressional and presidential moratoria since the 1980s effectively banned federally regulated planning and permitting in the Bristol Bay area of the North Aleutian Basin. Congress allowed most statutory bans in the region to expire in 2004./250

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243 Concerning the approval, see Department of the Interior press release, "Interior Approves Long-Awaited First Oil Production Facility in Federal Waters Offshore Alaska," October 24, 2018, at https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/ interior-approves-long-awaited-first-oil-production-facility-federal-waters-offshore. On May 29, 2019, NOAA's National Marine Fisheries Service issued a proposed rule to govern the taking of marine mammals incidental to the construction and operation of the project's drilling and production island (84 Federal Register 24926). Public comments were accepted through July 31, 2019 (84 Federal Register 32697). For the December 2020 decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacating the approval, see https://legacy-assets.eenews.net/open_files/assets/2020/12/08/ document_ew_02.pdf.

244 Department of the Interior, "Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf," 81 Federal Register 46477, July 15, 2016.

245 For differing congressional viewpoints, see, e.g., U.S. Congress, House Committee on Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources, hearing on Arctic Resources and American Competitiveness, 114th Cong., 1stsess., June 16, 2015, at http://naturalresources.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=398713.

246 For example, in the 115th Congress, H.R. 4239, the SECURE American Energy Act, would have provided that the Arctic rule would have no force or effect. Conversely, S. 2720, the Clean Coasts Act, would have enacted the regulation into law. These measures were not enacted, and no similar legislation was introduced in the 116th Congress or to date in the 117th Congress.

247 BSEE, "Oil and Gas and Sulfur Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf--Revisions to the Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf," 85 Federal Register 79266, December 9, 2020.

248 BSEE, "Oil and Gas and Sulfur Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf--Revisions to the Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf," 86 Federal Register 34172, June 29, 2021.

249 Section 12(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. Sec.1341(a)) authorizes the President to, "from time to time, withdraw from disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental Shelf." 250 FY2004 DOI Appropriations (P.L. 108-108). Furthermore, the Continuing Appropriations Resolution 2009 (P.L. 110-329) did not extend the annual congressional moratorium on oil and gas leasing activities in the lower 48 states. On March 11, 2009, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8) was enacted without moratorium provisions, confirming that the congressional oil and gas development bans in federal waters along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, parts of Alaska, and the Gulf of Mexico that had been in place since 1982 had not been restored in 2009 appropriations measures.

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President Obama reinstated the moratorium in the North Aleutian Basin, indefinitely withdrawing acreage located in Bristol Bay from eligibility for oil and gas leasing./251 Also, in December 2016, President Obama indefinitely withdrew from leasing disposition other large portions of the U.S. Arctic, including the entire Chukchi Sea planning area and almost all of the Beaufort Sea planning area./252 President Obama separately withdrew from leasing consideration planning areas in the North Bering Sea./253 In April 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13795, which modified President Obama's withdrawals so as to open all of these areas for leasing consideration except for the North Aleutian Basin./254 However, in a March 2019 court decision, the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska vacated this provision in President Trump's executive order, ruling that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act gives the President the authority to make withdrawals, but not to revoke prior presidential withdrawals./255 Additionally, in January 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 13990, reinstating President Obama's Arctic withdrawals in their original form./256

Extent of the Continental Margin

Increased interest in developing offshore resources in the Arctic has sparked efforts by Arctic coastal states to map the extent of their continental margins beyond the 200-mile EEZ limit. As discussed earlier, under Article 76 of UNCLOS, nations can make a submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) concerning the extent of their continental shelves. Under Article 76, the extent of the continental margin beyond the 200-mile limit depends on the position of the foot of the continental slope, the thickness of sediments, and the depth of water. Also, the continental margin could include geologic features that extend from the continent out to sea, which may include undersea ridges continuing for hundreds of miles offshore. The three major Arctic Ocean ridge systems are the Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge, the Lomonosov Ridge, and the Gakkel Ridge. Disputes over maritime boundaries involving these ridge systems or other regions of the Arctic seafloor (e.g., extended continental shelf submissions) must be resolved between the nations involved in the disagreement because the Commission has no mandate to establish boundaries or resolve disputes and cannot prejudice the resolution of boundary disputes.

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251 Presidential Memorandum, "Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer Continental Shelf from Leasing Disposition," December 16, 2014, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/16/presidentialmemorandum-withdrawal-certain-areas-united-states-outer-con. Earlier, President Obama had withdrawn the area from leasing for a time-limited period. Presidential Memorandum, "Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer Continental Shelf from Leasing Disposition," March 31, 2010, at http://www.doi.gov/whatwedo/energy/ocs/upload/2010alaska-mem-rel.pdf.

252 Presidential Memorandum, "Withdrawal of Certain Portions of the United States Arctic Outer Continental Shelf from Mineral Leasing," December 20, 2016, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/20/presidentialmemorandum-withdrawal-certain-portions-united-states-arctic. Earlier, President Obama had indefinitely withdrawn from leasing disposition certain smaller areas in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, including the Hanna Shoal region of the Chukchi Sea and other areas. Presidential Memorandum, "Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer Continental Shelf Offshore Alaska from Leasing Disposition," January 27, 2015, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2015/01/27/presidential-memorandum-withdrawal-certain-areas-united-states-outer-con.

253 Executive Order 13754, "North Bering Sea Climate Resilience," December 9, 2016, at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ pkg/FR-2016-12-14/pdf/2016-30277.pdf.

254 Executive Order 13795, "Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy," April 28, 2017, at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-05-03/pdf/2017-09087.pdf. For additional discussion, see CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1799, Trump's Executive Order on Offshore Energy: Can a Withdrawal be Withdrawn?

255 League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 363 F.Supp.3d 1013 (D.Alaska 2019). The President's withdrawal authority is contained in Section 12(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. Section 1341(a)).

256 Executive Order 13990, "Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science To Tackle the Climate Crisis," January 20, 2021, at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-25/pdf/2021-01765.pdf.

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Arctic coastal states have conducted complex investigations needed to support submissions to the Commission for an extended continental shelf (ECS) in the Arctic. All Arctic coastal states except for the United States, which is a non-party to the UNCLOS, have made submissions to the Commission. Arctic coastal states with submissions yet to receive an action from the Commission include Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland), and the Russian Federation./257

Russia's initial 2001 UNCLOS submission included the Lomonosov Ridge, an undersea feature spanning the Arctic from Russia to Canada, as an extension of its continental margin. The submission demonstrated Russia's bid to extend political activities and potentially establish security infrastructure in Arctic regions. The Commission found the Russian Federation's 2001 submission to have insufficient scientific evidence. The Russian Federation presented a revised submission in 2015 to the Commission that included not only the Lomonosov Ridge but also the Mendeleev Rise and Chukchi Plateau--additional subsea features claimed by Russia to be natural parts of its continental margin./258 The United States communicated no objections to the Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea regarding Russia's 2015 revised submission./259 In late March 2021, the Russian Federation submitted two addenda to its 2015 revised submission, presenting evidence for the Gakkel Ridge and the Nansen and Amundsen Basins to be components of the extended Russian continental shelf.260 In total, Russia's ECS submission would capture approximately 70% of the Arctic Ocean beyond its EEZ, extending into both Canada's and Greenland's EEZs./261 Thus far, no country has submitted a formal response to the Commission regarding Russia's 2021 addenda. The Commission has not rendered a decision on the Russian Federation submission as of August 2021.

In December 2014, the Kingdom of Denmark with the Government of Greenland submitted a recommendation on the Northern Continental Shelf of Greenland to the Commission./262 Their submission presented data suggesting that the Lomonosov Ridge, the Gakkel Ridge, the Alpha Mendeleev ridge complex, and the Chukchi Borderland are morphologically continuous with the land mass of Greenland. As of August 2021, the Commission has not rendered a decision for this submission.

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257 Iceland, though not an Arctic coastal state, has filed a submission regarding waters in the vicinity of the Arctic Circle. Source: United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, "Submissions, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, pursuant to article 76, paragraph 8, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982," updated April 1, 2021, at https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm. See also Department of State, "Frequently Asked Questions--U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project," at https://www.state.gov/frequently-askedquestions-u-s-extended-continental-shelf-project/. For additional information, see Appendix H.

258 United Nations, "Partial Revised Submission of the Russian Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Respect of the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Ocean," 2015, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01_rev15/2015_08_03_Exec_Summary_English.pdf.

259 Department of State, "Receipt of the Partial Revised Submission made by the Russian Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf," at https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01_rev15/2015_11_02_US_NV_RUS_001_en.pdf.

260 UN, "Addendum to the Partial Revised Submission of the Russian Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in the Area of the Gakkel Ridge, Nansen and Amundsen Basins," 2021, at https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01_rev15/Addendum_1_2021_Executive_Summary_Gak kel_Ridge_English.pdf.

261 ArcticToday, "Russia Extends Its Claim to the Arctic Ocean Seabed" April 4, 2021, at https://www.arctictoday.com/russia-extends-its-claim-to-the-arctic-ocean-seabed/?wallit_nosession=1.

262 UN, "Partial Submission of the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark together with the Government of Greenland to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf The Northern Continental Shelf of Greenland," 2014, at https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/dnk76_14/dnk2014_es.pdf.

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In 2019, Canada made a partial submission to the Commission for the consideration of areas of the Central Arctic Plateau, which included the Lomonosov Ridge, Alpha Ridge, and Mendeleev Rise, providing evidence that these areas are natural components of its continental margin./263 Canada's submission includes potentially overlapping areas with the United States' continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean. Through regular consultations, the United States does not object to the consideration of Canada's submission on the Arctic Ocean and communicated such to the Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea on August 28, 2019./264 The Commission has not rendered a decision on the partial submission of Canada as of August 2021. (For additional information on ECS submissions by Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, and the Russian Federation to the Commission, see Appendix H.)

The United States has started to gather and analyze data to determine the extent of its continental shelf through a U.S. federal initiative called the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project that is consistent with international law./265 The U.S. ECS Project has also assisted more than 30 countries with their efforts to delineate their extended continental shelves worldwide./266 Canada and the United States share overlapping regions of the seabed as part of the extended continental margin of both nations. Much of the data to delineate the ECS for both countries was collected in a two-ship operation involving the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy and the Canadian Coast Guard ship Louis S. Saint Laurent./267 The two-ship operation collected more than 13,000 linear kilometers (about 8,078 miles) of seismic data over four field seasons in the Arctic beginning in 2007. The data collected will help each country delineate the extent of its own ECS, which should then enable the countries to determine the amount of overlap in the seabed and ultimately establish a maritime boundary in the Arctic./268

The United States also has potentially overlapping ECS areas with Russia. Russia (then the Soviet Union) and the United States agreed to a maritime boundary in 1990, and so far Russia has not asserted its ECS in any areas that might be considered part of the U.S. ECS./269

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263 UN, "Partial Submission of Canada to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regarding its Continental Shelf in the Arctic Ocean," 2019, at https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/ can1_84_2019/CDA_ARC_ES_EN_secured.pdf.

264 Department of State, "Receipt of the Partial Submission Made by Canada to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf," at https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/can1_84_2019/2019_08_28_USA_ NV_UN_001.pdf.

265 The purpose of the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) Project is to establish the full extent of the continental shelf of the United States, consistent with international law. The work to delineate the ECS is coordinated by the ECS Task Force, located at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) National Centers for Environmental Information in Boulder, CO. The Department of State, U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and NOAA conduct the majority of work on the project. NOAA has the lead in collecting bathymetric data. USGS has the lead in collecting seismic data. For more information, see the project's website at https://www.state.gov/u-s-extendedcontinental-shelf-project/.

266 U.S. ECS Project, https://www.state.gov/international-support-and-cooperation-u-s-extended-continental-shelfproject/.

267 Ibid.

268 Ibid.

269 The Senate gave advice and consent t o ratify the maritime boundary agreement in 1991. Although the Russian Duma has not approved the agreement, both countries continue to provisionally apply the boundary agreement. See U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project, https://www.state.gov/frequently-asked-questions-u-s-extended-continentalshelf-project/.

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Onshore Energy and Mineral Development

A warming Arctic means new opportunities and challenges for energy and mineral exploration and development onshore./270 Longer summers could extend exploration seasons for areas that are only accessible for ground surveys during the warmer months.

Many factors affect the economic viability of an onshore energy or mineral development; one key factor is transportation costs. Onshore energy and mineral developments require transportation access to deliver machinery and supplies, and to transport the product to market. Generally, onshore developments in temperate climates can be accessed by roads; the rugged terrain and harsh climate in parts of the Arctic can result in sites being inaccessible by permanent roads. Some responses to these unusual transportation challenges include the use of sea transport and seasonal roads.

In some parts of the Arctic, less sea ice could allow ships to transport heavy equipment to remote locations, and to transport ore from mines to markets. Such potential improvements in access would be limited by the onshore development's proximity to a suitable sea harbor. Current infrastructure in the Arctic that supports energy and mineral development includes the construction and use of ice roads, which are built and used when temperatures fall and remain below a threshold. As temperatures rise, the roads weaken, ultimately to a point at which they can no longer be used. Warmer Arctic temperatures are shortening the ice road transport season and creating transportation challenges, while changes in the technologies employed to build and manage ice roads are acting to extend the ice road season./271

Another factor that could affect onshore energy and mineral developments is the thawing of the permafrost. Permafrost, which is ground, soil, rock, or other material that remains frozen from year to year, has historically served as a solid foundation base for infrastructure, including roads. Thawing permafrost creates many challenges, as roads, buildings, and other infrastructure can become unstable and collapse. These changes can result in higher costs to onshore energy and mineral developments, potentially leading existing developments to close, or rendering new projects unfeasible to pursue.

Oil Pollution and Pollution Response/272

Oil Pollution Implications of Arctic Change

Climate change impacts in the Arctic, particularly the decline of sea ice and retreating glaciers, has led to increased human activities in the region, some of which have the potential to create oil pollution./273

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270 For information on the oil and gas program for the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and related issues, see CRS Report RL33872, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR): An Overview.

271 See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, "Arctic Change," at https://www.pmel.noaa.gov/arcticzone/detect/land-road.shtml.

272 This section prepared by Jonathan L. Ramseur, Specialist in Environmental Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division.

273 For further discussion of issues relating to oil spills in general, see CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills: Background and Governance.

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A primary concern is the threat of a large oil spill in the area. Although a major oil spill has not occurred in the Arctic, potential economic activity, such as tourism (cruise ships), oil and gas exploration, and cargo transportation, increases the risk of oil pollution (and other kinds of pollution) in the Arctic./274 Significant spills in high northern latitudes (e.g., the 1989 Exxon Valdezspill on the southern coast of Alaska and spills in the North Sea) suggest that the "potential impacts of an Arctic spill are likely to be severe for Arctic species and ecosystems."/275

Risk of Oil Pollution in the Arctic

A primary factor determining the risk of oil pollution in the Arctic is the level and type of human activity conducted in the region. Although changes to the Arctic climate are expected to increase access to natural resources and shipping lanes, the region will continue to present logistical challenges that may hinder human activity in the region. For example, unpredictable ice conditions may discourage trans-Arctic shipping. If trans-Arctic shipping were to occur frequently, it would likely represent a considerable portion of the overall oil pollution risk in the region. In recent decades, many of the world's largest oil spills have been from oil tankers, which can carry millions of gallons of oil./276

Offshore oil exploration and extraction activities in the Arctic may present a risk of oil pollution. Interest in these activities in the region has fluctuated in recent years. Historically, oil well blowouts from offshore oil operations have been a source of major oil spills, eclipsing the largest tanker spills. The largest unintentional oil spill in recent history was from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico./277 During that incident, the uncontrolled well released (over an 87-day period) approximately 200 million gallons of crude oil./278 The second-largest unintentional oil spill in recent history--the IXTOC I, estimated at 140 million gallons--was due to an oil well blowout in Mexican Gulf Coast waters in 1979./279

Until the 2010 Deepwater Horizon incident, the spill record for offshore platforms in U.S. federal waters had shown improvement from prior years./280 A 2003 National Research Council (NRC) study of oil and gas activities on Alaska's North Slope stated "blowouts that result in large spills are unlikely."/281 Similar conclusions were made in federal agency documents regarding deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico before the 2010 Deepwater Horizon event./282

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274 Arctic Council, Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group, Guide to Oil Spill Response in Snow and Ice Conditions, 2015, at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/403; see also Brian Dunn, "Report on 12th Arctic Shipping Summit, Montreal, February 21-22," Canadian Sailings, March 12, 2018, pp. 34-36.

275 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Arctic Oil and Gas 2007, 2008.

276 For example, the Exxon Valdez spilled approximately 11 million gallons of oil, but its carrying capacity was approximately 60 million gallons.

277 Larger oil spills occurred during the 1991 Iraq War, but many of those spills were deliberate. A 1910 -1911 onshore oil blowout in the California San Joaquin Valley is reported to have spilled 9.4 million barrels of crude oil (almost 400 million gallons).

278 An estimated 17% of this oil did not enter the Gulf environment but was directly recovered from the wellhead by the responsible party (British Petroleum, BP). See the Federal Interagency Solutions Group, Oil Budget Calculator Science and Engineering Team, Oil Budget Calculator: Deepwater Horizon-Technical Documentation, November 2010; and CRS Report R42942, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Recent Activities and Ongoing Developments.

279 National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies of Science, Oil in the Sea III: Inputs, Fates, and Effects, 2003.

280 See CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills: Background and Governance; and Dagmar Etkin (Environmental Research Consulting), Analysis of U.S. Oil Spillage, Prepared for American Petroleum Institute, August 2009.

281 National Research Council of the National Academies of Science, Cumulative Environmental Effects of Oil and Gas Activities on Alaska's North Slope, 2003.

282 See, for example, Minerals Management Service (MMS), Outer Continental Shelf Oil & Gas Leasing Program: 2007-2012, Final Environmental Impact Statement, 2007, chapter 4; MMS, Proposed Gulf of Mexico OCS Oil and Gas Lease Sale 206, Central Planning Area, Environmental Assessment, 2007.

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Some would likely contend that the underlying analyses behind these conclusions should be adjusted to account for the 2010 Gulf oil spill. However, others may argue that any activities in U.S. Arctic waters present less risk of an oil well blowout than was encountered by the Deepwater Horizon drill rig, because the proposed U.S. Arctic operations would be in shallower waters (150 feet) than the deepwater well (approximately 5,000 feet) that was involved in the 2010 Gulf oil spill. In addition, some have pointed out that the pressures in the Chukchi Sea would be two to three times less than they were in the well involved in the 2010 Gulf oil spill./283 Regardless of these differences, even under the most stringent control systems, oil exploration and extraction activities would present some level of oil spill risk in the region, as some accidents are likely to occur from equipment failure or human error. In addition, as discussed below, an oil spill in the Arctic would present unique response and cleanup challenges.

Potential Impacts

No oil spill is entirely benign. Even a relatively minor spill, depending on the timing and location, can cause significant harm to individual organisms and entire populations. Regarding aquatic spills, marine mammals, birds, bottom-dwelling and intertidal species, and organisms in early developmental stages--eggs or larvae--are especially vulnerable. However, the effects of oil spills can vary greatly. Oil spills can cause impacts over a range of time scales, from only a few days to several years, or even decades in some cases.

Conditions in the Arctic may have implications for oil spill impacts that are less understood than in the more temperate regions./284 According to a 2016 study, "oil spill science in ice-covered waters is at an ad hoc level."/285 For example, information on the long-term effects of oil and its environmental persistence within the Arctic is limited./286 In addition, the historical data for the region do not provide reliable baselines to assess current environmental or ecosystem states,/287 presenting challenges to those tasked with measuring impacts.

Response and Cleanup Challenges in the Arctic

Conditions in the Arctic impose unique challenges for personnel charged with (1) oil spill response, which is the process of getting people and equipment to the incident, and (2) cleanup duties, either recovering the spilled oil or mitigating the contamination so that it poses less harm to the ecosystem. These challenges may play a role in policy development for economic activities in the Arctic.

* * *

283 Letter from Marvin E. Odum, President, Shell Oil Company to S. Elizabeth Birnbaum, Minerals Management Service (May 14, 2010). Cited in a staff paper from the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling ("The Challenges of Oil Spill Response in the Arctic," 2011).

284 National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies of Science, Responding to Oil Spills in the U.S. Arctic Marine Environment, 2014 (hereinafter, NRC Report, 2014).

285 Mawuli Afenyo, "A State-of-the-Art Review of Fate and Transport of Oil Spills in Open and Ice-Covered Water," Ocean Engineering, 2016.

286 NRC Report, 2014.

287 Ibid.

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Spill Response Challenges

Response time is a critical factor for oil spill recovery. With each hour, spilled oil becomes more difficult to track, contain, and recover, particularly in icy conditions, where oil can migrate under or mix with surrounding ice./288 Most response techniques call for quick action, which may pose logistical challenges in areas without prior staging equipment or trained response professionals.

Many stakeholders are concerned about a "response gap" for oil spills in the Arctic./289 A response gap is a period of time in which oil spill response activities would be unsafe or infeasible. A 2016 study (prepared for the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement) estimated response gaps for two locations in the U.S. Beaufort and Chukchi Seas during the summer and winter seasons, and for the year overall./290 The study found that during the summer months (July-October), open water oil recovery would not be "favorable" approximately 33% of the time./291 By comparison, that estimate increases to 75% and 95% for the year overall and for the winter months (November-June), respectively. The response gap for the northern Arctic latitudes is likely to be extremely high compared to other regions./292

In the event of an oil spill, the Coast Guard has response authority in the coastal zone./293 A Coast Guard official would serve as the On-Scene Coordinator with the authority to perform cleanup immediately using federal resources, monitor the response efforts of the spiller, or direct the spiller's cleanup activities. According to a 2014 National Research Council (NRC) report, "the lack of infrastructure in the Arctic would be a significant liability in the event of a large oil spill."/294 The logistics in the Arctic were described as a "tyranny of distance" by the Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard./295

The Coast Guard has no designated air stations north of Kodiak, AK, which is almost 1,000 miles from the northernmost point of land along the Alaskan coast in Point Barrow, AK./296 Although some of the communities have airstrips capable of landing cargo planes, no roads connect these Arctic communities to the main highway systems or large communities in Alaska./297 Vessel infrastructure is also limited. The nearest major port is in the Aleutian Islands, approximately 1,300 miles from Point Barrow.

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288 World Wildlife Fund, Oil Spill: Response Challenges in Arctic Waters (2007).

289 Coastal Response Research Center, Opening the Arctic Seas: Envisioning Disasters and Framing Solutions (2009), partnership between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the University of New Hampshire.

290 Nuka Research and Planning Group, Estimating an Oil Spill Response Gap for the U.S. Arctic Ocean, 2016; study funded by the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement.

291 A 2017 study stated that most of the marine activities in the Arctic region occur during the summer months. See Jeremy Wilkinson, et al., "Oil Spill Response Capabilities and Technologies for Ice-Covered Arctic Marine Waters: A Review of Recent Developments and Established Practices," Ambio, 2017.

292 A 2007 estimate of Prince William Sound (PWS) also may be instructive. A 2007 study found a response gap for PWS of 38% for the time of the study period (65% during the winter season). Note that PWS has existing infrastructure for response, while the more remote Arctic areas do not. Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC, Response Gap Estimate for Two Operating Areas in Prince William Sound, Alaska (2007), Report to Prince William Sound Regional Citizens' Advisory Council.

293 For more details, see CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills: Background and Governance.

294 NRC Report, 2014.

295 Admiral Ray Charles, Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, December 12, 2019, https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2019/12/expandingopportunities-challenges-and-threats-in-the-arctic-a-focus-on-the-u-s-coast-guard-arctic-strategic-outlook.

296 G.M. Sulmasy and A.P. Wood, U.S. Coast Guard Academy, "U.S. Coast Guard Activity in the Arctic Region," Law of the Sea Institute, Occasional Paper #6, 2014; and U.S. Coast Guard, Report to Congress: U.S. Coast Guard Polar Operations, 2008.

297 NRC Report, 2014.

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A 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report identified further logistical obstacles that would hinder an oil spill response in the region, including "inadequate" ocean and weather information for the Arctic and technological problems with communications./298 A 2014 GAO report highlighted steps taken by some groups (e.g., the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) to improve some of these logistical elements./299 The U.S. Coast Guard includes an initiative to "strengthen marine environmental response in the Arctic" as part of its Arctic Strategy Implementation Plan./300 A 2016 GAO Report provided an initial assessment of these efforts./301 In 2019, the Coast Guard issued its Arctic Strategic Outlook, which stated one of its objectives was to "enhance capability to operate effectively in a dynamic Arctic."/302

In addition, the Department of the Interior's BOEM and BSEE issued a final rule in 2016 requiring certain safety measures for drilling operations in the Arctic, but, as discussed above, the status of that rulemaking is uncertain./303

The costs of an oil spill response would likely be significantly higher than a similar incident in lower latitude locations of comparable remoteness. This could place a relatively larger burden on the oil spill liability and compensation framework./304 Pursuant to the Oil Pollution Act (OPA),/305 parties responsible for an oil spill may be liable for cleanup costs, natural resource damages, and specific economic damages./306 OPA provided both limited defenses from liability and conditional liability limits for cleanup costs and other eligible damages./307 The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) provides an immediate source of funds for federal responses to oil spills and compensation for certain damages./308 The OSLTF can be used if a responsible party's liability limit is reached, but the fund can only provide $1 billion per incident./309

Oil Spill Cleanup Challenges

The history of oil spill response in the Aleutian Islands highlights the challenges and concerns for potential spills in the Arctic:

'The past 20 years of data on response to spills in the Aleutians has also shown that almost no oil has been recovered during events where attempts have been made by the responsible parties or government agencies, and that in many cases, weather and other conditions have prevented any response at all.'/310

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298 Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard: Efforts to Identify Arctic Requirements Are Ongoing, but More Communication about Agency Planning Efforts Would Be Beneficial, GAO-10-870, 2010.

299 Government Accountability Office, Key Issues Related to Commercial Activity in the U.S. Arctic over the Next Decade, GAO-14-299, 2014.

300 U.S. Coast Guard, Arctic Strategy Implementation Plan, 2015, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5pw/Arctic%20Policy/CGAS%20IPlan%20Final%20Signed.pdf?ver=2017-08-25-075935-927.

301 Government Accountability Office, Arctic Strategy Is Underway, but Agency Could Better Assess How Its Actions Mitigate Known Arctic Capability Gaps, GAO-16-453, 2016.

302 U.S. Coast Guard, Arctic Strategic Outlook, 2019, https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/ Arctic_Strategic_Outlook_APR_2019.pdf.

303 See the section above titled "Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration."

304 For more information on this framework, see CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills: Background and Governance.

305 P.L. 101-380, primarily codified at 33 U.S.C. Sec.2701 et seq.

306 33 U.S.C. Sec.2702.

307 33 U.S.C. Sec.2703 and Sec.2704.

308 33 U.S.C. Sec.2712.

309 26 U.S.C. Sec.9509.

310 Transportation Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences, Risk of Vessel Accidents and Spills in the Aleutian Islands: Designing a Comprehensive Risk Assessment (2008), Special Report 293, National Academies Press. Washington, DC.

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The behavior of oil spills in cold and icy waters is not as well understood as oil spills in more temperate climates./311 In addition, in the summer months, the sea ice zone is a particularly challenging environment because the concentration of ice floes within a region is continuously changing./312 The 2014 NRC report highlights some recent advancements in understanding oil spill behavior in the Arctic climate. At the same time, the report recommends further study on a range of related issues.

The 2014 NRC report states that in colder water temperatures or sea ice, "the processes that control oil weathering--such as spreading, evaporation, photo-oxidation, emulsification, and natural dispersion--are slowed down or eliminated for extended periods of time."/313 In some respects, the slower weathering processes may provide more time for response strategies, such as in situ burning or skimming. On the other hand, the longer the oil remains in an ecosystem, the more opportunity there is for exposure to humans and other species in the ecosystem.

In addition, the 2014 report states the following:

'Arctic conditions impose many challenges for oil spill response--low temperatures and extended periods of darkness in the winter, oil that is encapsulated under ice or trapped in ridges and leads, oil spreading due to sea ice drift and surface currents, reduced effectiveness of conventional containment and recovery systems in measurable ice concentrations, and issues of life and safety of responders.'

Oil Spill Policy-Regional Framework

The existing framework for international governance of maritime operations in the Arctic combines broader maritime agreements and agreements that focus on the geographic region. In terms of broader frameworks, the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) and other International Maritime Organization (IMO) conventions include provisions regarding ships in icy waters, but the provisions are not specific to the polar regions.

The IMO's International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) entered into force in 2017 and is mandatory under SOLAS and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (known as MARPOL)./314 The Polar Code addresses a range of issues, including environmental protection.

In 2013, the member states of the Arctic Council signed an Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic./315 The agreement's objective is to "strengthen cooperation, coordination, and mutual assistance ... on oil pollution preparedness and response in the Arctic." The agreement entered force in 2016./316 A 2018 Coast Guard document describes the agreement as "binding."/317

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311 NRC Report, 2014.

312 Jeremy Wilkinson, et al., "Oil Spill Response Capabilities and Technologies for Ice-Covered Arctic Marine Waters: A Review of Recent Developments and Established Practices," Ambio, 2017.

313 NRC Report, 2014.

314 See the above section titled "Regulation of Arctic Shipping."

315 Available at http://www.arctic-council.org. The agreement is sometimes described as the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Spill Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (MOSPA).

316 Arctic Council, Status of ratification of Agreements negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council, 2016.

317 U.S. Coast Guard, Marine Environmental Response and Preparedness Manual, 2018, https://media.defense.gov/ 2018/Oct/01/2002046527/-1/-1/0/CIM_16000_14A.PDF.

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The agreement includes multiple requirements for the parties, including oil spill notification, a process for requesting assistance and seeking reimbursement for costs, and joint preparation activities. Pursuant to the agreement the Arctic nations have conducted several joint training exercises./318

In addition, the United States has separate bilateral agreements with Canada and Russia that address oil spill response operations. The agreement with Canada was established in 1974 for the Great Lakes and has been amended several times to add more geographic areas, including Arctic waters./319 According to the 2014 NRC report: "formal contingency planning and exercises with Canada have enabled both the United States and Canada to refine procedures and legal requirements for cross-border movement of technical experts and equipment in the event of an emergency."

The U.S.-Russian agreement was made in 1989 and applies to oil spill-related activities in Arctic waters. The 2014 NRC report asserted that the agreement has not been tested to the same extent as the U.S.-Canada agreement. In 2018, officials from both nations reportedly held a tabletop exercise for an oil spill scenario in the Bering Strait./320

* * *

318 See Arctic Council, Emergency Prevention Preparedness and Response Working Group, Planning Guidance for MOSPA Exercises, 2019; see also Michael LeVine et al., "Oil Spill Response in the North American Arctic," in Managing the Risks of Offshore Oil and Gas Accidents: The International Legal Dimension , edited by Gunther Handl and Kristoffer Svendsen, 2019.

319 For more information, see U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Oil Spill Preparedness, Prevention, and Response on the Alaska OCS, 2019.

320 World Wildlife Federation, "Russia and the United States Hold Joint Exercises to Respond to Oil Spills in the Bering Strait," November 2018, https://wwf.ru/en/resources/news/bioraznoobrazie/rossiya-i-ssha-proveli-sovmestnyeucheniya-po-reagirovaniyu-na-razlivy-nefti-v-beringovom-prolive/.

Continues with Part 6 of 6

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View report at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41153