A Judge Advocate’s Guide to Operational Planning

By O'Connor, Michael J

Proquest LLC

"No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength." 1

I. Introduction

As staff officers, whether at brigade or higher headquarters, judge advocates (JAs) are frequently pulled into ad hoc meetings and planning sessions. Frequently, it starts with the executive officer or operations officer saying something like, "Hey Judge, get your stuff and go to the brigade conference room. We are doing some planning. We are going to start with some mission analysis (MA),2 go into wargaming,3 course of action development (COA DEV),4 and then work the orders piece with future operations (FUOPs)."5 This is the start to operational planning, and the JA must be well-versed in its terms and procedures to succeed as an effective advisor to the command. Hence, serving as a junior JA on a staff consisting of senior, post Command and General Staff College (CGSC) majors,6 many of whom have spent time as planners, can be an overwhelming experience.

Operational planning is the process of analyzing operational requirements, command intentions, and other factors to develop executable plans to accomplish the defined operational end-state or military objective.7 Put simply, operational planning is the way a commander and his staff determine how to accomplish a particular task or achieve a specified military objective. From conducting a weapons range or unit urinalysis to complex, multi-echelon, joint combat operations, operational planning provides the means to align available forces, equipment, and capabilities in time and space in a concerted effort to obtain a desired end-state.

Over time, the Army has moved from the simple "sand table"8 approach to plan and execute missions to an increasingly complex approach involving numerous power point presentations and slideology.9 Unfortunately, from a training standpoint, many JAs on headquarters' staff frequently do not have the same foundational training-from West Point,10 Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC),11 the Officer Basic Course (OBC),12 the Captains Career Course,13 to Intermediate Level Education14-as other staff officers. This article seeks to help JAs understand the basics of staff work with a focus on operational planning.

Overall, this article focuses on current operational planning theory and practices while offering practical information for JAs new to staff roles in operational units. Part II provides an overview and description of operational planning and its importance to the successful application of military power. Part III focuses on the key players involved in the planning process, their roles in various stages of mission planning and execution, and the role of primary and special staff officers. Part III also describes the Warfighting Functions (WFFs) involved in operations. Part IV describes campaign design, while Part V discusses Operational Planning and the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). Part VI focuses on the role of JAs in the planning process. It also outlines Legal Analysis of the Operational Mission, which details the importance of legal authorities, both as enabling and limiting factors, to the conduct of the proposed mission, as well as the Operational Analysis of the Legal Mission, which examines operational factors, such as geography, unit disposition, and legal manning, in order to provide legal support to the command. Part VII discusses Legal Annexes and Operations Order reviews. Part VIII details the need for JAs to have continued involvement in the operations process. Finally, Part IX concludes with a discussion on the need for JAs to embrace their role in operational planning and to capitalize on their unique, law school-trained analytical skills to help staffs in the formation of plans.

II. Planning Overview

In preparing for battle, I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is invaluable.15

Planning "is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing about that future."16 It is one of the major steps in the operations process, along with preparing, executing and assessing, and serves as the foundation for staffing and conducting operations.17 Planning incorporates the commander's intent, situational awareness of the environment, and potential courses of action, both friendly and enemy, in order to prioritize efforts and task organized military forces to meet specified objectives.

Planning occurs at all levels, from the strategic to the tactical, and consists of three distinct parts: campaign design using Army Design Methodology (at the strategic level), operational planning using MDMP (at the operational level), and troop leading procedures (at the tactical level).18 Campaign design is the overall approach to meeting the strategic and military goals of the command; operational planning is the process of changing desired goals, articulated in the campaign, into actionable tasks, which can be properly executed and measured. Troop Leading Procedures (TLP) is a small-unit planning model, typically for a company-sized element with no supporting staff, involving the commander, first sergeant and executive officer.19 Due to its limited planning, TLP will not be discussed in this article. However, operational design and operational planning are discussed below.

III. Key players

The best executive is the one who has sense enough to pick good people to do what he wants done, and self-restraint to keep from meddling with them while they do it.20

Planning the actions of a military organization involves various key players, depending on the position of the organization in the overall military hierarchy. From a squad level, involving a squad leader and two team leaders, to the joint staff, involving hundreds of planners, the level of responsibility and the complexity of the anticipated plan will dictate the scope of the planning effort and the amount of personnel involved. At the company level, planning would typically involve the company commander, first sergeant, executive officer (XO), and platoon leaders/platoon sergeants. Organizations above company level will involve the commander, XO, the operations officer, and other staff elements, involving subject matter experts (SMEs) in key areas and WFFs,21 as discussed below.

The typical structure of a unit is:22

A. Commander

The commander is responsible for the actions of his unit. Through mission command, a commander exercises authority to employ forces to achieve stated objectives.23 Commanders focus on mission command and execution of the plan. Essentially, the commander owns the plan.24

A commander will shape the initial planning effort by articulating his intent, which is based on a commander's evaluation of the tactical situation and his desired end- state.25 The commander will then assess his available assets and forces and designate the key tasks needed to achieve the end-state as defined. The commander will then issue planning guidance which serves as the basis for staff planning efforts.

Throughout the planning process and into the execution phase, the commander will tailor the plan, approve changes, and prioritize efforts across the command. Future tailoring of the planning effort could occur in large meetings or smaller meetings between the commander, executive officer and the operations officer.

B. Chief of Staff or Executive Officer26

The chief of staff (COS) at division or higher headquarters, or the XO at battalion or brigade, owns the planning effort. He is responsible for synchronizing and supervising staff efforts to meet the commander's needs. He sets the planning timeline and ensures staff compliance with meeting it. He also supervises the staff's involvement in planning and their production of planning products. Field Manual 5-0 states that "[t]he COS (XO) manages and coordinates the staff's work and provides quality control . . . [t]he COS (XO) must clearly understand the commander's intent and guidance because COSs (XOs) supervise the entire process."27 The COS will interact with the staff and, in particular, the operations officer to ensure that the commander's intent is understood and incorporated into the planning process.28

C. Operations Officer/S3

In Animal Farm, George Orwell wrote, "All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others."29 On a staff, the Operations Officer (or the "S3" or simply "the 3") is "more equal than others." While assigned as a staff member, he is not equivalent to other staff members, particularly in the planning arena. The S3 has tasking authority, derived from the commander, over all other staff elements. He is also responsible for the majority of the efforts within the organization and has a staff appropriate to that scope of responsibility.30 These include an operations sergeant major,31 future operations (FUOPS) personnel, current operations (CUOPS) personnel, battle captains, and other staff members.

1. FUOPS and the Plans Cell ("The Planners")32

There are two sets of planners on a staff: future operations and the plans cell. The plans cell focuses efforts on the long-range planning effort, while the (near) future operations focuses planning for the mid-range planning efforts.33 While not specifically defined in regulation, these two areas vary based on proximity to the present time and the level of uncertainty (see Figure 2 below).34 At a brigade, FUOPS and plans will usually be combined into one element.

Working with the S3, FUOPS participates in operational planning through the MDMP. Logically, FUOPS is responsible for summarizing current situation reports (SITREPs)35 of all units, working task organization, developing operational timeline, completing S3 mission analysis products, and consolidating other staff products for inclusion into the complete mission analysis. They monitor ongoing operations in the event that they impact future planned operations. They also continue to refine existing plans, based on updated information, and brief the commander as needed.

Upon completion and approval of a plan, FUOPs will coordinate with staff sections for ongoing estimates and reviews of products, such as fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) and operations orders (OPORDs),36 and then conduct a "battle handover" to CUOPS. When the operational plan (OPLAN) enters the execution window, the OPLAN is transferred to the CUOPS, or the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) floor, to apply their execution matrix37 and monitor the execution of the plan.

2. Current Operations Integration Cell and Current Operations Section (COIC and CUOPS)

The Current Operations Section is responsible for ongoing operations within the organization. Current Operations, through the battle captains38 and assigned noncommissioned officers (NCOs), maintains the operational picture for the command, conducts information sharing with higher headquarters and subordinate units, and tracks execution of plans and orders. In addition, the COIC coordinates with neighboring headquarters to deconflict actions and synchronize efforts to the greatest extent possible.

Typically, the COIC consists of representatives from each of the staff elements. For example, the COIC, or TOC, has representatives from the S1, S2, Fires, etc., in order to support operations. They are also tasked with monitoring incoming orders, FRAGOs, etc., and disseminating the information to the commander and staff.39

D. Primary, Special, and Personal Staff

The staff of a battalion headquarters, or any higher echelon, consists of different types of staff officers: primary staff officers, also known as coordinating staff officers; special staff officers; and personal staff officers.40 The role of the staff is to serve as SMEs advising the commander on matters in their particular area or warfighting function. Thus, ATTP 5-0.1 states, "All staff sections, to include personal and special staff, have common responsibilities to provide advice and support to the commander in their area of expertise,"41 including staff analysis, assessment of operations, etc.

At the battalion or brigade, the primary staff consists of personnel (S1), intelligence (S2), operations (S3), logistics (S4), signal/communications (S6), inform and influence activities (IIA) (S7), and civil affairs (S9). Additionally, higher headquarters have a separate plans section (G5) and Resource Management (RM) (G8), among others. Special staff typically consists of the aviation officer, engineer, provost marshal officer (PMO), and other specialists. Personal staff consists of the chaplain, safety officer, and JA, among others.42 Despite their designation, all of these staff members are expected to use their expertise to support planning efforts.43

E. Warfighting Functions

In addition to fulfilling the staff functions specified above, the staff also comes together to make up different functional areas, called warfighting functions. A WFF is a "group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions."44 There are six WFFs: (1) intelligence, (2) movement and maneuver, (3) sustainment, (4) fires, (5) protection, and (6) command and control.45 Each WFF involves different members of the staff, from primary to special staff officers. For example, the sustainment WFF typically involves the personnel, logistics, financial management, engineer and Surgeon, while the protection WFF involves the Engineer (for force protection), the anti-terrorism/force protection officer, the PMO, and others.46 Regardless of its composition, the WFF is responsible for synchronizing efforts and managing resources within the WFF. While doctrinally distinct, these areas frequently overlap and require varying degrees of legal support.

1. Intelligence47

The intelligence WFF is tasked with leveraging information to provide situational understanding to the commander, as well as to analyze data and to offer predictions on future enemy courses of action.48 The goal is to obtain as much information about the tactical situation and the enemy, while also denying the enemy access to information related to friendly forces. The intelligence WFF involves collection, analysis, and counter-intelligence functions, and develops the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), as discussed in Part IV.B. below.

Intelligence also provides support to force protection (FP).49 While FP is tasked with developing base defense plans, improving base defenses, and running force protection programs and battle drills, intelligence provides "threat warnings" and analytics to help identify "inside-the-wire threats."50 Intelligence also works to identify trends, indicators, and behaviors related to "green-on-blue"51 incidents to provide the force with warning signs to better protect the force.

2. Movement and Maneuver52

The movement and maneuver WFF has distinct responsibilities, based on force projection, depending on the phase of the operation. Prior to the operation, the movement WFF is responsible for the mobilization and deployment of a combat-capable force.53 This includes identifying training and deployment requirements, scheduling movement of personnel, and conducting reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI)54 operations.

During operations, movement WFF is responsible for employment of forces. This involves movement and maneuver, terrain access and denial operations, terrain occupation, and employment of direct fires.55 This WFF is directly tasked with employing forces to take and hold territory while denying the enemy freedom of movement.56

Following completion of the mission, the movement and maneuver WFF has the task of redeploying the force to home station.57 In addition to redeployment, the movement and maneuver WFF is responsible for the management of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle within the unit. The ARFORGEN cycle focuses on resetting and training the unit to prescribed standards so that it may return to a ready and available status for future operations.58

3. Sustainment59

The Sustainment WFF incorporates the Combat Service Support responsibility to "feed, fuel, and arm" the force.60 It extends the capability of the combat force and provides systems to resupply the force with supplies and personnel. It also supports the health of the force, including the mental, medical, and spiritual health of personnel.61 Sustainment activities include logistics, resource management, the Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP), religious support, personnel matters, and health support.62

At a Combat Arms brigade, such as a Stryker Brigade Combat Team, the majority of the sustainment functions are handled by the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB), while the planning efforts related to the operational mission will be handled at both the brigade and BSB.63 Legal planners should engage the sustainment planners, such as the BDE S4, early in the process and attend their logistics synchronization meetings, if possible.

4. Fires64

The Fires WFF involves the employment of lethal and non-lethal effects against approved targets. The Fires WFF is "the related task and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting process."65 Joint Publication 3-09, Fires, states, "Fires are the use of weapons systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target,"66 while "[j]oint fires are fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a common objective."67

Lethal fires, such as mortars, rockets, and artillery, are employed against authorized enemy targets to destroy enemy personnel, equipment or infrastructure or to conduct shaping operations in support of the movement and maneuver WFF. By contrast, nonlethal fires or effects can include targeting of combatant and non-combatants. Non-lethal effects involve the use of a variety of means, including information operations, electronic warfare, and psychological operations, against identified targets. For example, information operations could target the local population with efforts and messages directed at building confidence in their government or at encouraging the local population to turn from the enemy or vote in an election, for example.

5. Protection68

The protection WFF focuses on protecting the combat force from enemy actions and to mitigate risks to U.S. personnel.69 "Protection determines the degree to which potential threats can disrupt operations and counters or mitigates those threats. Emphasis on protection increases during preparation and continues throughout execution. Protection is a continuing activity; it integrates all protection capabilities to safeguard bases, secure routes, and protect forces."70

Frequently, the protection WFF is consolidated into a protection cell led by the PMO and the engineer. The protection cell "is generally responsible for integrating or coordinating the tasks and systems that fall under the protection warfighting function. Protection cells help craft protection strategies that are reflected in the concept of protection included in the base order and appropriate annexes and appendixes."71 The protection WFF includes engineer activities, anti-terrorism and force protection, personnel recovery, operations security (OPSEC), and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) activities.72

6. Command and Control/Mission Command73

While a specified WFF, mission command is a function that unifies and synchronizes the other WFF. "Through command and control, commanders integrate all warfighting functions to accomplish the mission."74 Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.75 Mission command involves the processes and system to execute operations and to control the force. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, states that mission command involves "tasks and systems that support commanders in exercising authority and direction."76 The Mission Command WFF incorporates the commander's use of the operations process, communication and information management systems, inform and influence activities (IIA), and other activities, tasks, and systems that allow for "directing and leading subordinates"77 and the employment and control of a military unit.78

All of these areas require legal support in different ways.79 For example, the Fires WFF focuses on the employment of lethal and non-lethal effects and targeting. For the legal planner, this will require knowledge of the Rules of Engagement, Targeting, Collateral Damage Assessments (CDA)80 and Estimates (CDE),81 and IIA.82 The Sustainment WFF focuses on sustaining a force capable of performing the assigned mission, including personnel support, logistics, medical, and legal support. For the legal planner, this involves conducting an analysis on how to provide legal support to the command throughout the area of operations. Ultimately, the legal planner has to provide support across WFF; but in order to do that, JAs must understand operational design, planning, and mission analysis.

IV. Campaign Design

Operational design consists of command and staff efforts to develop and implement actions, strategies and provide instructions to subordinate units to meet strategic and operational objectives.83 Design is a "bridge between the strategic end-state and the execution of tactical tasks."84 Specifically, operational design consists of (1) the specific goals (strategic, operational and tactical), (2) the desired end-state, and (3) an operational concept to meet these goals.85 It involves problem framing, formulating the design, and then refining the design as situations change.86 For example, an operational design could consist of a desired end-state, such as a stable, secure Afghanistan; specific strategic goals, such as a legitimate government, capable security forces, etc., and operational goals, such as decimation of enemy forces in the area and an increase in the operational capability of security forces in a particular province.

A. Problem Framing87

The first step in operational design is framing the problem. It involves an assessment of the operational area, the anticipated mission and timeline, and the overall purpose of the operation. Utilizing the campaign plan or design of a higher headquarters, the unit should determine the objectives that must be achieved and the effects needed to advance the plan within their operating area, as well as to synchronize, or "nest," their efforts within the larger plan.88

In conducting an assessment of the operational area, a commander focuses on the geographical data, historical trends and analysis, mission variables, commonly called METT-TC,89 enemy information (critical capabilities, critical requirements, critical vulnerabilities, and centers of gravity),90 as well as the human and societal facts that might impact the operation. Planners review the operational and mission variables, as well as civil considerations, involving human and societal factors. These areas are analyzed by looking at political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time (PMESII-PT) (pronounced pem-e-SEE) (which applies to operational variables), METT-TC (which applies to mission variables, including mission, enemy, terrain, and troops available) and ASCOPE (defined as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events and pronounced A scope),91 which involves the political, military, economic and other societal and infrastructure factors, known as civil considerations.92

During problem framing, all staff officers are expected to contribute to the assessment. Staff members review higher headquarters' orders and design and contribute relevant information from their WFF. Judge advocates can expect to contribute information on legal authorities in the area of operations (AOR), the rules of engagement, targeting information, as well as information in areas of PMESII, including political structures, legal entities, and legal systems that might assist the commander in developing an operational approach to meet mission requirements.

B. Formulating the Design

Once the initial assessment has been conducted, the commander gives guidance on the operational approach to be taken.93 The operational approach varies depending on the mission. For counterinsurgency (COIN) missions, the operational approach could focus on displacing insurgents and marginalizing their effect on the local populace. For direct combat operations, the operational approach would be to close with and destroy the enemy through direct engagement of an enemy force, destruction of enemy capabilities, and securing territory.

Finally, the design develops lines of operation (LOOs) and lines of effort (LOEs) that serve as a basis for tactical plans, thereby "putting troops to task" to meet the commander's intent towards particular centers of gravity.94 For example, if a center of gravity is the populace, the operational approach could be to directly engage the populace, with IIA efforts,95 community "outreach" and key leader engagements (KLEs),96 while simultaneously targeting insurgents and undermining their support mechanisms, such as community and financial support. For the JA practicing rule of law, it may focus on creating and bolstering institutional legal systems to eliminate "shadow 97 courts."

C. Lines of Effort98

Lines of effort are derived from a commander's desired end-state, or those specified in the orders of a higher headquarters. Working backwards from the desired end- state, planners attempt to develop strategic lines that will achieve the end-state. Once the strategic lines are created, planners break down these lines into objectives, or milestones, which should be obtained en route to the end- state, i.e., in furtherance of the LOEs.99 Commanders use these objectives to plan actions, through the planning process, that meet the stated objectives.

For example, in Figure 3, below, planners may determine that governance is a LOE in a greater COIN100 campaign. The lead action officer for governance will frequently be the Non-Lethal Effects Chief,101 with the JA, PMO, Department of State (DOS) representative, etc., in support.102 These planners would then evaluate the elements of adequate governance and how to best create or improve these elements. Once the overall elements of governance have been determined, planners would then dissect the LOE into smaller objectives that would further the LOE. For governance, the objectives could be (1) establishing a district center, (2) holding successful elections, (3) having town meetings or shuras, etc. The objectives, based on the LOE elements, can be numerous; in addition, they can be narrow or broad depending on the intent of the commander. The commander could directly task subordinate units to carry out specific actions or could provide his command intent and the overall LOE, thus empowering his subordinate commanders to determine the actions necessary to meet that intent. See the example below:103

D. Lines of Operation

Lines of operation are the tactical-level actions that support the LOEs; LOOs involve aligning available forces and synchronizing their efforts to advance objectives along specified LOEs.104 Lines of operation are nested with the LOEs to advance command objectives.105 For example, if a LOE is to protect the populace, then the LOOs could involve orders to subordinate units to develop plans to attack enemy strongholds, displace insurgents, establish checkpoints, conduct joint patrols with host nation forces, etc. For planners, LOOs are the foundation for specific plans to achieve LOEs.

E. Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance

Once the LOEs and LOOs have been determined, the staff element responsible for the particular LOE will create measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs).106 These are assessment tools to evaluate proposed concept of operations (CONOPs)107 relative to the LOEs. Once plans are developed and executed, MOEs will help to determine whether objectives have been performed as instructed, and whether the successful achievement of the objective has been effective in advancing the LOE.108 These MOEs can exist at various levels, from strategic to tactical, to inform the appropriate commander of the progress toward a particular LOE. Figure 4 is a sample of measures of effectiveness:

Upon establishment of LOOs, MOEs, and MOPs, the campaign design is ready to serve as a foundation for actual operational planning efforts using the MDMP.

V. Operational Planning using the Military Decision Making Process

Once a command has received the campaign design, operational-level planners will develop plans to meet the objectives of the design. These plans can be short-range or longer-range operations depending on the complexity of the overall operation. In order to facilitate planning, multi- echelon, concurrent or otherwise, the Army follows a standardized process, known as the military decision making process,109 which provides a step-by-step process for conducting staff planning.

Since 1972, MDMP has provided an established framework, and "common language," for planning that allows staff efforts to be synchronized between echelons of command and across WFF. The MDMP consists of seven steps: (1) receipt of mission, (2) mission analysis, (3) course of action (COA) development, commonly called COA DEV, (4) COA analysis/war gaming, (5) COA comparison, (6) COA approval, and (7) Orders production. The figure below details the steps of MDMP, key inputs, and the key outputs for the staff:110

A. Receipt of Mission

Upon receipt of the mission, the FUOPS cell notifies the XO and S3. Concurrently, planners begin by preparing the initial IPB.111 The IPB focuses on analyzing the threats, battlefield environment, battlefield effects, and potential enemy courses of action within the geographical area of operations, all of which serves as the foundation for further planning. The IPB is led by the Intelligence Officer (S2) and his staff. Staff officers contribute to the IPB within their areas of expertise. Following the IPB, the FUOPS Cell issues a Warning Order (WARNO) to the unit and subordinate units. The IPB will serve as the foundation for mission analysis that follows.

B. Mission Analysis in Detail

Planners conduct an analysis of the mission as articulated by the commander in his initial guidance. Using the commander's guidance and the IPB, staff officers begin mission analysis by developing initial staff estimates.112 The initial staff estimate contains

an assessment of the situation and an analysis of those courses of action a commander is considering that best accomplishes the mission. It includes an evaluation of how factors in a staff section's functional area influence each [course of action (COA)] and includes conclusions and a recommended COA to the commander.113

This staff estimate also includes a review of the tasks that must be accomplished, critical facts and assumptions, available assets and resources, and any constraints on mission accomplishment.

1. Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks

Specified tasks are those that have been directed by higher headquarters; this can occur through an order114 or during collaborative planning sessions. They can also be requirements by regulation. Implied tasks are tasks that are required to complete specified tasks.115 An example of a specified task is an order that states "Occupy area XX." Implied tasks related to that specified task could be maneuver by road from point YY to area XX, set up security, etc. Essential tasks are those specified and implied tasks that must be performed to complete the assigned mission.116 For a legal planner, a specified task could be "all operations will comply with the LOAC," with an implied task being "train soldiers on LOAC" or "JAG reviews all CONOPs for compliance with the LOAC."

2. Critical Facts and Assumptions

All plans and decisions rely on their underlying facts. Facts are statements of truth, or believed to be true at the time that they are made.117 In mission analysis, facts form the foundation for understanding the operational area and informing the decision-maker. Facts are constantly reviewed to ensure their continued validity and their relevance to planning efforts. By contrast, an assumption is a "supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events."118 Since the operational area is ever evolving, assumptions complement facts in contributing to the commander's understanding of the environment, mission, threats, and other operational variables. Throughout the planning process, staff members should be working to validate assumptions, by determining them to be true and therefore facts, or to invalidate assumptions and replace them with valid facts or assumptions.

3. Assets and Resources

Planners review the task organization of the unit, its current capabilities, supporting or supported relationships,119 and potential shortfalls. In addition to the capabilities organic to the unit in question, planners also evaluate the capabilities of higher headquarters, subordinate and adjacent units, civilian agencies, as well as joint and coalition partners.120 They review command and operational relationships to evaluate assets, resources and levels of support across the area of operations. This can include assets that can be tasked or requested, or even ones that can "assist" without tasking, such as assets from other agencies (for instance, DOS, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), etc. Staff officers also review capability shortfalls and provide recommended solutions to the commander.121 For example, a brigade JA could conduct mission analysis, determine the need for a third attorney, and provide a "sourcing solution"122 to the brigade commander.

4. Constraints

During mission analysis, staff officers identify all applicable constraints and develop viable options to meet mission objectives while complying with the constraints.123 Simply put, constraints are limitations on a commander's authority and thus restrict independent action by a commander.124 They are either directive or restrictive. For example: "Conduct an assault on Objective Alpha no later than a specified time" is directive, while "No houses will be entered or searched during nighttime" or "No fires beyond phase line delta" are restrictive. Common examples include rules of engagement (ROE)/rules on the use of force (RUF), law of war (LOW) limitations, limitations on targeting and weapon systems, and detainee handling requirements.

In addition to their individual staff estimates, planners conduct mission analysis and produce the following: a proposed mission statement, initial commander's intent, initial planning guidance, updated IPB, essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs), and commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs), as demonstrated in Figure 5 above.125 While EEFI consists of information that, if compromised, would jeopardize the mission,126 CCIRs are elements of information that directly impact the mission and consist of priority information requirements (PIR) and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs).127 The products are presented to the commander for approval during the mission analysis briefing.

C. COA DEV/Wargaming and Approval

Upon completion of mission analysis, the commander receives briefings on the analysis and issues refined guidance to the staff. The staff incorporates the stated intent into planning efforts and begins to develop COAs, which are simply proposed solutions to the overall "problem set."128

Staff members "war-game" the COAs to assess their viability.129 Formally called COA analysis and comparison, the XO runs the war game to review available assets, align forces against objectives, and determine the supportability of the each COA. When there are COAs that cannot be supported or that fail to adequately meet the commander's intent, they are discarded. For the JA, the war game is a chance to work as a staff officer and apply critical thinking to proposed COAs. In addition, JAs must be involved to ensure that the staff "does not go down the rabbit hole" by pursuing a COA without supporting legal authority.

When the staff completes the war-game, or COA comparison, the surviving COAs are packaged for a COA briefing to the commander. At that briefing, the commander assesses the COAs, staff recommendations, and his understanding of higher headquarters guidance, and selects the most appropriate COA to meet his intent.130 The commander makes a decision, and the S3/FUOPS, with staff input and reviews, develops the approved COA into an order for the unit to execute.131

Upon issuance of an order, CUOPS monitors execution of the operation, while staff planners may potentially begin or resume other planning efforts.132 Staff planners also monitor the operation execution within their WFF, update their running estimates, and prepare to conduct post- operation assessments. With this understanding of general staff responsibilities in the MDMP, this article now turns its focus on the specific role of JAs in the planning process.

VI. Judge Advocates in the Planning Process/MDMP

Judge advocates must be involved in the planning process for two reasons. First, JAs advise commanders and must therefore remain operationally aware and relevant.133 While not initially conversant in all of these Army acronyms, JAs are particularly suited to conduct planning utilizing MDMP. While the methodology and terminology may seem foreign to JAs, the underlying processes are also used in analyzing legal issues. Comparatively, the steps of MDMP and standard legal analysis follow:

Similar to reviewing a case file or investigation, legal planners must review all available information pertaining to operations. This review should include review of higher headquarters' policies and orders, the IPB (discussed above), base order, and all annexes to ensure that sufficient legal authority supports the contemplated COAs. In the event that a COA does not have sufficient legal authority, the legal planner should provide alternatives or the means to request the required authority.

For mission analysis, legal planners should pay particular attention to two areas: operations and sustainment. Legal tasks, specified and implied, can be contained in any part of the order or cited authorities. However, they are most frequently found in the operations annex and the sustainment annex. The operations portion is where the legal authorities and limitations, to include the rules of engagement and detainee handling information, to military operations are contained. Sustainment is where the plan for legal support to the organization is contained. These areas are discussed below.

A. Operations-Legal Analysis of the Operational Mission ("Authorities Law")

"Judge, what are my authorities?"134

Because orders and policies provide the authority to conduct military actions, operational law could easily be viewed as "authorities" law.135 Commanders want to bring all elements, including military, civilian and interagency, to bear on a particular mission. However, the commander must understand his specified and inherent command authorities, the limitations of those authorities, and the means to request the appropriate authorities to affect his battle plan. For example, in coalition operations, a commander may want to direct actions of coalition forces, share intelligence, arm coalition or security forces, or spend money to support coalition activities. Without the proper authorities, the commander will overstep his bounds, undermine his command and control, and jeopardize his battle plan (along with getting relieved from command). JAs can assist their commanders by being involved early in the planning process and coordinating for the authorities that the battle plan may require or to identify the impermissible activities so that the plan can be adjusted accordingly.

Since the battle plan can encompass many functional areas, legal planners should be prepared to analyze the entirety of the operational environment, to include analysis in cooperation with the staff officers of different WFF. This requires reviews of annexes, and the authorities on which they are based, to ensure that the proposed actions are legally permissible. The areas of particular focus are discussed below.

1. Intelligence

Support to intelligence operations includes legal reviews of "special programs,"136 routine intelligence operations, and counter-intelligence (CI) operations. Given their unique capabilities of intelligence operations, legal planners must employ a multi-dimensional approach to legal support.137 Legal planners need to be familiar with the fiscal authorities related to intelligence collection, counter-intelligence authorities, commander's force protection authorities, labor law, and a host of other authorities across the spectrum of legal practice that can be impacted by intelligence collection activities.

Examples of common contributions by JAs during mission analysis include the following:

a. Only certified interrogators can conduct interrogations

b. Special programs in effect

c. CI activities robust and require legal oversight

d. Detainee transfer requests within 24 hours (requires Brigade Commander signature)

e. Small rewards program in effect

2. Movement and Maneuver

Legal support in this area is dependent on the phase of the operation. Prior to the operation, legal support will focus on the training and readiness requirements as directed by higher headquarters. This will include current LOW, law of armed conflict (LOAC) training, ROE training, and legal readiness processing (wills, powers of attorney, etc.). During the operation, legal support will focus on ROE and compliance with the LOW/LOAC. It can also focus on refresher training of these areas, investigations, and the requirement to report violations.

Examples of common contributions by JAs during mission analysis include the following:

a. Soldier Readiness Program (SRP) must include legal readiness and ROE/LOAC training

b. Restricted travel near X

c. No Escalation of Force (EOF) with laser pointers

d. Movement restricted within 25 km of border

e. Claims card are required for all vehicles

3. Sustainment

Legal support to sustainment requires review of authorities to conduct various activities in support of operations. Primarily in the areas of fiscal and administrative law, these issues require working with other staff sections, including the S1, S4, and the Resource Management Officer (RMO).138 Legal planners must identify contracting requirements, timelines, and fiscal limitations on planned activities such as contracting for security or food services. In addition, depending on the type of mission, sustainment, coupled with operations, could involve humanitarian assistance (HA), funding and equipping other forces through security force assistance, exercise support, and other areas.

In addition to the support to Logistics, planners must also provide support to the personnel management system. Along with unit leaders, legal personnel must identify "legal non-deployables" and give that information to the S1. This information is critical for the commander to understand the actual force capability at his disposal.

Personnel support also requires the planner to identify requirements related to personnel management. From Line of Duty (LOD) and Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 investigations to combat injury or death battle drills, planners must provide analysis of authorities and requirements related to serious injuries and combat and non- combat related deaths, and other personnel matters. Legal planners must anticipate events and draft appropriate AR 15- 6 investigation policies that should be incorporated into the final order. For example, planners must identify the commander's serious incident report (SIR)139 requirements and make sure that they are distributed to subordinate units.

Examples of common JA contributions for mission analysis include the following:

a. Contracts above $XXX go to the Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB)

b. Humanitarian assistance requires CG approval

c. AR 15-6s require O4 Investigating Officer (IO) for GoB Killed in Action (KIA) cases

d. MED ROE (Rules of Eligibility) in effect

e. Money as a Weapons System (MAAWS) in effect

4. Fires

In order to support the Fires WFF, planners must understand the targeting process. The targeting process, involves deciding on targets, detecting them, delivering the effect, and assessing the outcome of that effort.140 Planners must understand the restrictive measures, LOW/LOAC, ROE, and other limitations on the employment of force. Legal planners should be involved in Fires and Non-Lethal Effects Working Groups to provide legal guidance to the use of fires, including the ROE.

Legal planners should work with the fire support officer (FSO), IIA officer, and FIRES cell to ensure that effects are legally permissible and carried out in accordance with policy and law. Legal planners must be able to work with the FSO to evaluate target selection, the weapon system to be employed, and other factors related to the employment of effects. In order to properly advise on targeting and fires, legal advisors must know the authorities for all available weapon systems, and limitations on employment authority.

Examples of common JA contributions for mission analysis include the following:

a. Indirect fires limited to Troops in Contact (TIC) or approved concept of operations (CONOP)

b. Battle damage assessments required unless not tactically feasible

c. No fire zones are in effect in Area Y

d. All structures, including grape huts, are to be considered civilian and occupied until established otherwise

e. Fires within 300M of a structure require O6 approval

5. Protection

Support to the protection WFF includes legal reviews of proposed building projects, safety investigations, force protection activities, and use of force issues. Legal planners need to be familiar with the various authorities related to anti-terrorism and force protection activities, detainee operations, safety, and fiscal issues related to force protection. Depending on the nature of the operation, legal planners will have to provide advice on the ROE/RUF, "installation-type" law, including searches, base policies, and authorities related to Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD personnel residing on military installations.

This can include reviewing base defense plans and policies, conducting investigations into "inside the wire" allegations and incidents, and providing legal support to safety investigations as appropriate. In addition, legal personnel should be familiar with the operations of the Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) as well as take part in battle drills.

Examples of common JA contributions for mission analysis include the following:

a. Detainees require two escorts each

b. Released detainees must be returned to point of capture or home

c. Detainees must be moved to temporary holding facility (THF, pronounced TIFF) within 24 hours

d. Non-lethal munitions are authorized

e. RCAs are only authorized in rear areas

6. Command and Control/Mission Command

The most important element of mission command is command relationships. Because command and control (C2) relationships are used to direct the employment of forces and to influence the operational environment, it is vital that judge advocates understand command relationship and how C2 is exercised within an organization.

7. Command Relationships

There are several types of C2: operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and administrative control (ADCON) being particularly important. Understanding the type of command authority that goes with the particular relationship is vital to the JA. These relationships will dictate authority over operations, tactical employment of troops, responsibility for sustainment, responsibility for life support, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authority, etc.

8. Operational Control and Tactical Control

A commander with OPCON has the authority to "organiz[e] and employ[] commands and forces, assign[] tasks, designat[e] objectives, and giv[e] authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish the mission."141 The most important element of OPCON is the authority of a commander to "plan for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the actions of subordinate forces."142 Notably, OPCON also provides the "authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions." However, the delegation of OPCON over forces does not automatically provide ADCON over those forces.

Contained within a commander's operational control is tactical control, defined as is "controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets."143 Additionally, TACON is limited in duration and scope, usually limited to a particular approved CONOP or mission. This type of control is directive in nature, such as, "Unit X will move to point X and establish a security checkpoint." When TACON is exercised, the granting unit retains all other types of control.

9. Administrative Control

Administrative control refers to the provision of supplies, services and support.144 Thus, ADCON includes: resourcing and equipping the force, administration, personnel management, logistics, unit and individual training, mobilization, military discipline, and other readiness functions.145 Sometimes, ADCON may also be referred to as "Title 10 authority." This type of control can be split among different organizations. For JAs, ADCON is very important for the exercise of UCMJ, the authority (for a commander) to appoint and approve AR 15-6, LOD, and financial liability investigation of property loss (FLIPL) investigations, and other administrative and training requirements.146

10. Attached and Assigned

Another consideration in understanding command relationships is the designation of units. Units can be organic, assigned or attached to their higher headquarters. Organic units, "are assigned to and form[] an essential part of a military organization," are part of the unit's headquarters, are on the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE),147 and are under the OPCON of the parent unit. Similar to organic units, assigned units are used for situations that are "relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls or administers the unit or personnel for the primary functions of the unit."148 Assigned units are also under the OPCON of the unit. By contrast, attached units are temporary additions to the higher headquarters to perform a specific task or for a specific duration.149 An example of an attached unit would be a Id.

deployed unit that receives a platoon of military police to support a particular operation. Upon completion of the operation, the military police platoon would be "released" from the unit and return to the control of their parent unit. During the period of attachment, "the commander of the unit that receives the attachment is responsible for the sustainment and logistics support that is beyond the capability of the attached unit."150 Attachment orders must specify whether or not UCMJ authority is part of the attachment (see discussion above related to ADCON).

11. Support Relationships

There are other types of relationships that are used to coordinate and prioritize command efforts. These relationships are support relationships.151 They do not have command authority, like ADCON and OPCON discussed above. Instead, a higher headquarters creates support relationships where one unit (supporting unit) is tasked to support the efforts of another unit (supported unit). This allows for making one unit the "lead" with other units in support.

There are several types of support relationships: general support: general support reinforcing: reinforcing: and direct support.152 Field Manual 3-0 states that "support relationships are graduated" based on the level of coordination and support that is required for a particular mission. The designation of a support relationship does not alter ADCON. For planners, support relationships are important to understand where assets are coming from and what other units are involved in operations.

12. Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH)153

When DIRLAUTH is used, it means that a commander has granted permission or authority to a subordinate, either on his staff or a subordinate unit, to coordinate with entities outside the organization. Frequently, the commander will limit the authority to certain entities, such as coordination with a higher or neighboring unit. Therefore, DIRAUTH is a coordination tool, and does not have command authority, i.e., decision-making authority.

An example of the complexity of command relationships is reflected in the employment of Security Force Assistance Teams (SFATs).154 These are small units of advisors whose primary mission is to assist the development of national security forces, in countries such as Afghanistan.155 Further, SFATs are usually part of one brigade tasked with providing a large number of SFATs. Once deployed, the SFATs are routinely attached to the battle space owner (BSO),156 which is a different brigade with whom they often have no habitual relationship.

In the usual case of SFATs, the supported brigade has OPCON, the brigade's subordinate battalion has TACON, and ADCON can be split between the supported brigade and the organic brigade. For example, ADCON would specify that personnel replacements would come from the organic brigade, while deployed awards, evaluations, UCMJ authority, and other "in theater" personnel actions would be handled by the supported brigade.

A similar example is the employment of combat arms, or conventional, battalions with Special Forces in support of village stability operations (VSO).157 The battalion would be OPCON to the Special Operations Task Force (SOTF), with TACON to the supported A Company, with ADCON split between the SOTF and the originating brigade. The SOTF would be responsible for most ADCON functions, primarily supply, with the brigade providing personnel replacement and some other personnel functions.

Mission analysis requires knowledge of operational considerations, including command relationships, proposed task organization (TASKORG), WFFs, and applicable authorities and their impacts on the proposed mission. With this knowledge, planners can develop legally supported courses of action that can be war-gamed and approved. Legal planners can also use this knowledge to understand the nature and expanse of the operation that will require legal support. As legal planners conduct mission analysis of the proposed operation, they must also examine how the legal assets will be used to support operations.

B. Sustainment-Operational Analysis of the Legal Mission (Legal Support to Operations)

"Judge, how are we going to court-martial guys downrange?"158

While conducting mission analysis on the operational mission, legal planners must also conduct an operational analysis of the legal mission. The previous section focused on the authorities to conduct operations. This section focuses on the capabilities required to support operations. In other words, legal planners must analyze how they are going to meet the legal needs of the unit while it conducts operations. This section sets forth an analysis of the supported unit, its operational requirements, its location in relation to other units capable of providing legal support, as well as forecasting or planning for future operations and events that may occur.

Legal support planning follows the same steps as operational mission planning. First, planners receive the mission. The mission is dictated by the commander and the orders that he has been given. As such, planners should review the orders and policies from their higher headquarters. For the legal mission, planners should review all orders, including subsequently published FRAGOs and policies that apply to their unit. Policies covering topics such as the ROE, targeting, detainee operations, and AR 15- 6 investigation requirements are particularly important to determine that amount of legal support that will be required.

Upon receipt of the mission, planners should go into mission analysis. Legal planners should prepare a staff estimate for legal support, one for operational issues, or combine the two into one staff estimate. Practically, since legal support may be briefed independent of the operational mission analysis, it is best to conduct a separate staff estimate solely for the legal support plan.

Planners must evaluate and determine facts and assumptions that relate to legal support. These facts and assumptions provide the basis for determining how limited legal assets will be employed to provide support to operations, and support to the force. These should include things like location of units, personnel and staffing requirements, and ongoing legal missions, such as Rule of Law and claims.

Examples of facts and assumptions include the following:

a. TOC requires 24 hour support

b. BDE will be dispersed over the entire Kandahar region

c. Claims have remained consistent and require a JA in support

d. Civil Affairs/CERP projects require legal reviews

Once the underlying facts and assumptions are complete, planners should develop their lists of specified, implied, and essential tasks. Many tasks are included in the operations annex and the legal support appendix of the sustainment annex.159 These tasks are requirements that the legal section must satisfy or be prepared to support. For example, the operations annex may have tasks such as "all targeting packets must comply with ROE," which has an implied task that they will be legally reviewed prior to submission. Planners should also include reporting and investigating requirements since they will require legal support.

Examples of tasks could include the following:

a. Ensure all plans, orders, target lists, policies, and procedures comply with applicable law and policy, including the law of war and ROE

b. Component commanders will ensure that a JA reviews all target lists to ensure compliance with the LOW and ROE, and that a JA is a member of the component's targeting cell

c. Each subordinate brigade will have a Single Member Foreign Claims Commission appointed by the U.S. Army Claims Service.

d. Provide support and services in all legal disciplines and operational law

After determining the legal requirements, planners must review the assets and resources available. Planners should review the unit strength, assigned and authorized positions of manning documents, and personnel replacement forecasts with the S1. Assets can include legal and non-legal assets. For example, a claims mission will require both types of assets. A claims mission requires a JA to adjudicate the claims, paralegal support, as well as pay agents in the field and possibly a security detail.

Planners should also determine available assets that are not contained within the organic unit. These will include centralized legal assistance offices, Trial Defense Services, other in-theater and garrison legal support, as well as SMEs from other agencies, such as USAID and DOS for Rule of Law missions. When reviewing assets, or capabilities, it is important to identify shortfalls and research possible sources of additional assets and capabilities.160

Examples of assets could include the following:

a. District HQ has a DoS Rule of Law SME

b. Two inbound 27Ds will bring unit to 100%

c. DIV prepared to support with personnel during leave period, if needed

d. Third attorney augmentation available (takes three months to source)161

Using the facts, assumptions, tasks, and resources, legal planners should evaluate any area that constrains the legal mission. Constraints could be based on requirements, logistics, geography, personnel staffing, and even the experience of personnel. Identifying these constraints, and viewing the legal team as a legal office, helps to identify means to address and overcome these limitations.

Planners should consider what authorities or policies could be needed to facilitate the mission. For example, the commander may want to put specific AR 15-6 reporting requirements and SIRs in place. Additionally, it could be useful to obtain a delegation of authority from the commander to the XO to appoint AR 15-6 investigating officers.

Examples of constraints could include the following:

a. AR 15-6 policy requires O4 IOs for death investigations

b. Courts-martial will only be held at Forward Operating Base (FOB) X

c. Trial Defense Service (TDS) only available at Camp Victory

d. Legal assistance is limited within the brigade (support available at HHQ)

Once mission analysis is complete, legal planners should continue following the MDMP and develop courses of action to support operations. These COAs will vary in their complexity depending on mission. For a brigade, the COAs could be as simple as having a consolidated versus geographically dispersed legal office, requesting additional manning, while also planning support for the rear detachment. By comparison, for a division or corps, the COAs could include conducting split operations, establishing dispersed legal offices, requesting TASKORG changes to add legal assets, and a host of other issues.162 These COAs should also be war-gamed to assess their viability and then a proposed legal support plan should be presented to the commander for approval.

VII. Legal Annex Development and OPORD Review

The final step of the MDMP is orders production, which turns an approved course of action into an order for units to execute. Staff planners, with FUOPS, prepare portions of orders along their WFF. The legal planner must prepare two parts of the order: the ROE, Appendix 11 of the Operations Annex, and the Legal Support Appendix, Tab C, Appendix 2 of the Sustainment Annex.163 After the draft order has been produced, all staff sections review the document before it is provided to the Commander. The Legal Support Appendix and the process to legally review an OPORD are discussed below (for a discussion on ROE, refer to the Operational Law Handbook164).

A. Legal Support Appendix (Sustainment Annex)

The Legal Support Appendix (LSA) is the JA's opportunity to turn a concept of support into an actual order from the commander. A standard order includes the following sections: mission, execution, concept, tasks, coordinating instructions, administration, and command and control. Subsequent orders and FRAGOs will also contain these sections but reference the base order. Judge advocates should follow this format to lay out the legal support plan and requirements to subordinate units.

For the legal planner, the mission section should include a general statement regarding the provision of legal support. This section can also include particular focus areas of legal support that are relevant to the operation. For example, "On order, the Brigade Operational Legal Team, 2nd CAB provides direct legal support to operations, including, but not limited to targeting, the ROE, detainee operations, and provides legal support to commander and his staff on all matters related to Operation X."

The execution section should include a scheme of support, which details how the legal section is going to execute their mission. This section should also include the location of all legal assets within the TASKORG of the originating command. The execution section can also include tasks to subordinate units, such as provide office space, computer, etc., for assigned paralegals or "provide one officer or senior NCO to serve as claims pay agent."

The task section should include specific guidance on functional areas that are involved in the operation. Legal tasks will include compliance with international law, claims, handling of confiscated weapons, detainee policies, military justice, and a host of other issues. This section should provide detailed instructions and references on these issues.

Coordinating instructions can be used to specify responsibilities for assisting in the legal support mission. They can include requirements for staff sections or subordinate units to inform and coordinate certain activities with the legal office, including appointing Summary Court- Martial Officers (SCMO), initiating FLIPLs, and reviewing SIRs prior to submission. In addition, they can be used to address logistical matters related to legal operations. For example, coordinating instructions can detail that one battalion could coordinate with another battalion to assist with soldiers visiting TDS, Legal Assistance, etc., at their FOB.

The administration section of the order is the place to specify reporting requirements. This section should incorporate AR 15-6 reporting requirements, senior leader misconduct notification, sexual assault reporting requirements, and other requirements specified in regulation or policy. This section should also be used for other JA- specific reports that must be filed, such as reports on claims and Military Justice Online (MJO).</p>

By utilizing orders, JAs can ensure that legal requirements and a support plan become prescriptive in nature. The use of a support plan, incorporated into an order, can address possible areas of contention with subordinate units to avoid problems during operations. Once a commander issues such an order, subordinate leaders and units are required to comply. This places command emphasis on the order. Since orders are a commander's exercise of his authority, all staff officers, particularly the JA, must ensure the order is proper.

B. Reviewing OPORDS165

Staff planners review the orders of higher headquarters during the mission analysis phase of operational planning. When conducting OPORD review, staff planners should review these again and reconcile the current proposed order with the higher orders. The JA should review the higher order, current order, and all appropriate policies and ensure that they are providing sufficient legal basis for the order. The current order will be derivative of the higher order, but will also provide greater specificity in terms of tasks.

Judge advocates should begin their review with a review of authorities. There are two types of authorities contained in orders that form the basis for an OPORD: authority to conduct the mission and authority to order units. The authority to conduct a particular mission is based on the orders of a higher headquarters, domestic policy, and domestic and international law, such as the LOAC. The authority to order units derives from a commander's authority over his forces. To ensure proper authority, JAs must understand the TASKORG and delineated command relationships.166

Following the review of general authorities, JAs should review the specific authorities contained in the reference section. These references will provide the framework for the operation and should be thoroughly reviewed. The JA should then review the proposed mission and mission statement for compliance with the regulatory and legal authorities contained in the references. For example, in a humanitarian assistance mission, JAs would ensure that the commander's authority meets the stated mission, including the provision of supplies, who can receive assistance, interagency support, and allocation of funds.

After reviewing the base order, JAs should review the individual annexes. Judge advocates must pay particular attention to the operations and sustainment annexes, but other annexes should also be reviewed. It is important to ensure that there is sufficient authority for the proposed actions within each annex. Upon completion of the orders review, staff officers work with the XO, S3, and FUOPS to address any outstanding issues. Then, FUOPS obtains the commander's approval and publishes the order through operations channels.

VIII. Continuing Involvement in the Operations Process

The conclusion of the planning effort and the review and issuance of an OPORD does not end the involvement of staff officers. In particular, JAs must continue to be involved in the other phases of the operations process. Also, JAs must continue to advise during the execution phase of the operation. This includes advising on targeting, detainee issues, the ROE, and a host of other issues across all WFFs. The JA continues to be involved in the assessment's phase, including updating estimates, conducting assessments, and running battle drills.

A. Running Estimate

Throughout the planning and execution phases of operations, staff members should continually assess the current operational environment and its relationship to the original staff estimate. This ongoing assessment, known as the running estimate,167 is conducted throughout the process and results in a continually evolving operational picture. It is not a "snapshot in time," but rather an analysis of trends as they relate to the ongoing execution. It is intended to provide the decision-maker, the commander, with information to assist in his decision-making process.

The legal running estimate should be focused on legal issues as they impact operations. This is not simply an opportunity to show statistics; instead, it requires ongoing activities, trend analysis of events and an evaluation of their effects on operations. Examples include the following:

1. ROE changes ("There have been five times, all following civilian casualties (CIVCAS), where indirect fire was restricted. The restriction lasted for 72 hours. In the event of CIVCAS in any province, we can expect to have restrictions.")168

2. Increase in amount of detainees

3. Increase in releases of detainees by review boards (increases need for escorts, thereby decreasing combat power)

4. Claims have increased in X province (could affect outreach in the area, but proves that IA activities regarding the community centers is reaching the population)

5. Court-martial in A Company (will require air travel to Kandahar, involving 10 members of 1st Platoon, reducing A Company to 75% of combat power; also involves 3 other senior leaders from other battalions, who are serving as court-martial members)

B. Assessments

Regardless of the WFF, staffs must continue to assess the outcome of operations. One of the most critical assessments is using the MOPs/MOEs discussed in Part IV.E. above to evaluate progress toward the campaign's desired end-state. This is the area where statistics, assessments, staff oversight and trackers come into play. For MOPs, this could involve mission back-briefs,169 after action reviews (AARs),170 reporting requirements, staff visits, and, in the case of contracted projects, such as CERP171 and Civil Affairs projects, inspections by the contracting representative or engineer. Regarding MOEs, it focuses on the effect of the unit's efforts to advance a particular LOE. For example, governance MOEs can involve number of civilian trials, visits to district centers, availability of attorneys, etc. which can be measured with empirical data. Frequently, the JA may work with Civil Affairs, Rule of Law personnel, and Law Enforcement Professionals (LEPs)172 to measure these data points. Also, JAs should consider incorporating subjective questions regarding local populace opinions and support for governmental efforts into Civil Affairs or Human Terrain Team (HTT)173 assessments and surveys.

Simultaneous with conducting assessments along the MOPs/MOEs, JAs should also be assessing the quality of legal support provided to the command. Operations process for legal support involves planning support, preparing and executing the legal mission, and assessing the provision of legal support.

Assessments can also include analysis of AR 15-6 investigation findings and publishing that information to the unit via FRAGO or other command means. As an example: "Of 30 negligent discharges, 20 occurred with M249s, an open bolt weapon" would be helpful to unit leaders to identify training requirements, and, in the process, potentially reduce legal requirements, including initiating and reviewing AR15-6 investigations and processing general officer memorandums of reprimand (GOMORs).

C. Battle Drills

Another helpful assessment tool is the battle drill.174 At the headquarters level, battle drills are established procedures that detail the actions a staff will take in response to a given situation. It is used to test command and legal systems and to improve command responsiveness. Judge advocates should review the organization's battle drills and insert legal requirements as appropriate. This can involve actual actions to be taken by legal personnel, notification requirements or other areas based on legal requirements. For example, a Troops in Contact (TIC) battle drill would involve notification of the JA to provide advice, if needed, on ROE and targeting, while a LOAC violation battle drill would involve notification of a JA, initiating SIRs, notifying Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and higher headquarters, and providing forces to secure the scene, if needed.

Legal planners should also consider developing internal battle drills for legal support. For example, JAs and paralegals could develop battle drills on the steps to take when notified of a servicemember's death, either combat- or non-combat-related. This could include coordinating for a SCMO, an AR 15-6 IO, drafting appropriate appointment memorandums, sending out information and forms, and scheduling a time to conduct in-briefs for the appointed officers.

By using running estimates, assessments, and battle drills, JAs can identify shortcomings in the operational plan in terms of authorities and provide a means to overcome the limitations. These will also identify limitations in operational processes and procedures and allow for future efforts to address them. Combined, these can provide valuable lessons learned for future operational planning.

IX. Conclusion

Operational planning can be an uncomfortable area for JAs. Like walking into a court hearing for the first time, it can cause anxiety. However, JAs possess finely honed analytical skills that serve them well in mastering the planning process and becoming an active planner in an operational headquarters. Ultimately, by understanding the planning process, JAs will be able to better advise their commanders, interact on equal footing with the staff, and, ultimately, become a "force enabler" in support of the command's mission.

1 2 HELMUTH KARL BERNHARD GRAF VON MOLTKE, MILITAERISCHE WERKE pt. 2, at 33-40, in MOLTKE ON THE ART OF WAR: SELECTED WRITINGS (Daniel Hughes, ed. 1993). In the authors opinion, this idea can be applied to a JAs time with a brigade as - The best plan does not survive contact with the Brigade staff.

2 See infra Part V.B.

3 See infra Part V.C.

4 See infra Part V.C.

5 See infra Part III.C.1.

6 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR REG. 350-1, COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE COURSE CATALOG 7 (Sept. 29, 2010), available at http:// www.cgsc.edu/ile/summary.asp (last visited Aug. 6, 2014). Post-ILE (Intermediate Level Education) majors are field grade officers who have completed ILE or Command and General Staff College (CGSC), if attended in residence at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Intermediate Level Education is a military school for field grade officers with approximately thirteen years of commissioned service. The school's

purpose is to prepare all field grade officers with a warrior ethos and warfighting focus for leadership positions in Army, Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-national organizations executing full spectrum operations. The CGSC faculty also educates and trains branch officers attending the ILE credentialing course, Advanced Operations Course (AOC). Its purpose is to develop operations career field officers with a warfighting focus for battalion and brigade command capable of conducting full scale operations in Joint, interagency, and multinational environments, and educate officers so they have the requisite competencies to serve successfully as division through echelon-above- corps-level staff officers.

Id. See also U.S. ARMY OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., JAGC PUB. 1-1, PERSONNEL POLICIES sec. 7-7A1b, at 36 (1 Jan. 2014) (stating that "CGSC is the Army's preparatory course for successful service as staff officers in division through echelons-above-corps. Though CGSC is not a prerequisite for any position, it is excellent preparation for service in key positions at divisions, corps, and higher headquarters.") Id.

7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 342 (7th ed. 2011). Military planning is defined as "[t]he devising of plans for military operations and other actions by military forces, to include the thorough coordination of such plans and activities with all concerned agencies."

8 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 296 (rev. ed. 2007). Sand table is defined as "a table bearing a relief model of a terrain built to scale for study or demonstration especially of military tactics."

9 See generally NANCY DUARLE, SLIDE:OLOGY: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF CREATING GREAT PRESENTATIONS (O'Reilly Media, Inc., Aug. 8, 2008) (detailing the use and creation of effective power point presentations).

10 See U. S. MILITARY ACADEMY AT WEST POINT, available at http://www.usma.edu/dmi/SitePages/Home.aspx (last visited May 15, 2014).

11 See RESERVE OFFICER TRAINING CORPS HOMEPAGE, available at http:// www.goarmy.com/rotc/courses-and-colleges/curriculum.html (outlining Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) objectives and curriculum) (last visited May 15, 2014).

12 See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 350-1, ARMY TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT (RAR 4 Aug. 2011) (detailing officer training programs). See also U. S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC), REG. 350-10, INSTITUTIONAL LEADER TRAINING AND EDUCATION (12 Aug. 2012) [hereinafter TRADOC REG. 350-10]. See also Officer Basic Course, available at http://usmilitary.about.com/library/milinfo/arofficerinfo/ blcompanygrade.htm (last visited May 15, 2014). It states:

The Officer Basic Course (OBC) marks the beginning of an officer's formal military professional development training following commissioning. The branch OBC prepares officers for their first duty assignment and provides instruction on methods for training and leading individuals, teams, squads and platoons. Additionally, the course provides officers with a detailed understanding of equipment, tactics, organization and administration at the company, battery or troop level.

Id.

13 TRADOC REG. 350-10, supra note 12, at 33. The Captains Career Course has two phases. The branch phase consists of eighteen weeks of branch-specific technical and tactical training with integrated common core instruction. This training prepares officers to command and train at the company, battery, or troop level and to serve as staff officers at the battalion and brigade levels. The six-week staff process phase prepares officers to function as staff officers at battalion, brigade, and division levels. The course goals are to improve an officer's ability to analyze and solve military problems, improve the ability to interact and coordinate as a member of a staff, improve communication skills, and understand Army organizations, operations, and procedures. Id.

14 See supra note 12.

15 RICHARD NIXON, SIX CRISES (Richard Nixon Library ed., Touchstone Publishers 1990) (quoting Dwight D. Eisenhower).

16 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY DOCTRINE PUB. 3-0, UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS 10 (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter ADP 3-0].

17 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY DOCTRINE PUB. 5-0, THE OPERATIONS PROCESS 2-5 (May 2012) [hereinafter ADP 5-0] (stating that "A plan is a continuous, evolving framework of anticipated actions that maximize opportunities and guide subordinates through each phase of the operation.").

18 See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., JOINT PUB. 5-0, JOINT OPERATION PLANNING (11 Aug. 2011) [hereinafter JP 5-0]. For those assigned to Joint Commands, judge advocates will need to become familiar with the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP). The JOPP operates in a similar fashion to the Army planning model. Id.

19 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES (ATTP) 5-0.1, COMMANDER AND STAFF OFFICER GUIDE 5-1 (14 Sept. 2011) [hereinafter ATTP 5-0.1] (detailing troop leading procedures (TLP) and comparing it to the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)).

20 Theodore Roosevelt, available at http://theodorerooseveltclub.com/ index.php/theodore-roosevelts-legacy/ (last visited June 5, 2014).

21 See Part III.E (discussing war fighting functions (WFF)).

22 ATTP 5-0.1, supra note 19, fig.2-1 (detailing command structure).

23 ADP 3-0, supra note 16, at 10.

Commanders are the central figures in mission command. Under the mission command warfighting function, they perform three primary tasks to integrate all military functions and actions: Drive the operations process through their activities of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations; Develop teams, both within their own organizations and with joint, interagency, and multinational partners; and Inform and influence audiences, inside and outside their organizations."

Id.

24 ATTP 5-0.1, supra note 19, para. 2-27, at 2-4.

Commanders are responsible for all their staffs do or fail to do. A commander cannot delegate this responsibility. The final decision, as well as the final responsibility, remains with the commander. When commanders assign a staff member a task, they delegate the authority necessary to accomplish it. Commanders provide guidance, resources, and support. They foster a climate of mutual trust, cooperation, and teamwork.

Id.

25 ADP 5-0 supra note 17, at 3-5.

The commander's intent links the mission and concept of operations. It describes the end-state and key tasks that, along with the mission, are the basis for subordinates' initiative. Commanders may also use the commander's intent to explain a broader purpose beyond that of the mission statement. The mission and the commander's intent must be understood two echelons down.

Id.

26 ATTP 5-0.1, supra note 19, at 2-28.

Division and higher units are assigned a COS. Brigade and battalions are assigned an XO. They are responsible to coordinate and direct the work of the staff, to include: Establish and monitor the headquarters battle rhythm for effective planning support, decision-making, and other critical functions; Represent the commander when authorized; Formulate and disseminate staff policies; Ensure effective liaison exchanges with higher, lower, and adjacent units and other organizations as required; Supervise the sustainment of the headquarters and activities of the headquarters and headquarters battalion or company; Supervise staff training and integration programs; and In division through Army Service component command headquarters, the COS personally supervises the knowledge management, operations research and system analysis, red team, and special staff sections.

Id.

27 Id. at B-2.

28 Frequently, divisions and higher commands have a deputy commanding general (DCG) assigned who may supervise the planning effort, while the chief of staff (COS) or executive officer (XO) supervises the staff in non- planning related activities. Brigades may also have deputy commanding officers (DCOs) assigned.

29 GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (Secker & Warburg, London, England 1945).

30 ATTP 5-0.1, supra note 19, at 2-51.

The G-3 (S-3) has responsibilities for plans and operations. Overall, this officer prepares, coordinates, authenticates, publishes, reviews, and distributes written operation orders and plans. This includes the command [standard operating procedure (SOP)], plans, orders (including fragmentary orders and warning orders), exercises, terrain requirements, and products involving contributions from other staff sections. The G-3 (S-3) provides coordination, integrates reconnaissance and surveillance, and allocates resources.

Id.

31 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED PUB. 08- 15, BATTLE STAFF NCO HANDBOOK 6 (Mar. 2008) (detailing job description for an operations sergeant major). See also Job Description for Operations Sergeant, available at http://www.ehow.com/list_6556166_ duties-s3-operation-sergeant.html (last visited June 4, 2014).

While not discussed in detail in the text, the Operations Sergeant Major (Ops SGM) is a vital member of the Operations Section. The S3 Operation Sergeant is the senior non-commissioned officer, monitoring and supervising the performance of the enlisted staff. He assists the S3 Operations Officer. He prepares, authenticates and publishes the overall tactical Standard Operating Procedures from regiment through battalion level, and recommends priorities regarding allocation of resources. He monitors the army's surveillance activities and coordinates all aspects of maneuver, such as boundaries, locations of command posts, and areas for putting up quarters. He prepares operational records and reports, and ensures the implementation of administrative policies and procedures. The S3 unit ensures the readiness of the whole command. The S3 Operations Sergeant identifies internal and external training programs. He carries out training programs according to the proposed syllabus and exercises. He conducts training tests, inspections and evaluations, and is responsible for recording and compiling training records and reports. After the implementation of the training programs, he assesses the readiness of the units and reports results to the S3 Operations Officer. The S3 Operations Sergeant Major maintains statistics of the unit's capabilities and performance. He is involved in assigning, attaching and detaching teams and units. He documents the force and makes recommendations regarding organization and equipment. He recommends, establishes and equips unit forces with the proper unit members, and organizes the command unit's records.

Id.

32 ATTP 5-0.1, supra note 18, at 3-41. The future operations (FUOPS) cell is responsible for planning operations in the mid-range planning horizon. It focuses on adjustments to the current operation-including the positioning or maneuvering of forces in depth-that facilitates continuation of the current operation. The cell consists of a core group of planners led by an assistant operations officer (the chief of future operations). All staff sections assist as required. Divisions and higher headquarters have a future operations cell. Battalion and brigade headquarters do not. See also id. 3- 42, which provides,

In many respects, the future operations cell serves as a fusion cell between the plans and current operations integration cells. The future operations cell monitors current operations and determines implications for operations within the mid-range planning horizon. In coordination with the current operations integration cell, the future operations cell assesses whether the ongoing operation must be modified to achieve the current phase's objectives. Normally, the commander directs adjustments to the operation, but the cell may also recommend options to the commander. Once the commander decides to adjust the operation, the cell develops the fragmentary order necessary to implement the change. The future operations cell also participates in the targeting working group since the same planning horizons normally concern them both. The future operations cell updates and adds details to the branch plans foreseen in the current operation and prepares any orders necessary to implement a sequel to the operation.

Id.

33 Id. fig.3-2 (Defining mid-range as weeks to months in the planning horizon.).

34 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY TECHNIQUES PUB. (ATP) 4-94, THEATER SUSTAINMENT COMMAND fig.2-2 (28 June 2013).

35 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 6-99, ARMY REPORTS AND MESSAGE FORMATS app. A (Aug. 2013), available at http://armypubs. army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm6_99.pdf (last visited May 15, 2014) (detailing types of reports including situation reports (SITREPs)).

36 See Appendix A (Plans and Orders) (providing types of orders); see also Appendix B (Sample Army OPLAN/OPORD Format).

37 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY DOCTRINE REFERENCE PUB. 5-0, THE OPERATIONS PROCESS (May 2012) [hereinafter ADRP 5-0].

An execution matrix is a visual and sequential representation of the critical tasks and responsible organizations by time. An execution matrix could be for the entire force, such as an air assault execution matrix, or it may be specific to a warfighting function, such as a fire support execution matrix. The current operations integration cell uses the execution matrix to determine which friendly actions to expect forces to execute in the near term or, in conjunction with the decision support matrix, which execution decisions to make.

Id. para.4-21.

See also U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 101-5, STAFF ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS, at H-8 (31 May 1997) (stating "An execution matrix depicts when and where specific supporting actions must occur.").

38 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-21.20, THE INFANTRY BATTALION 9-15 (13 Dec. 2006) (describing duties and responsibilities of battle captains).

39 ADP 5-0, supra note 17, app. B, at B-4. "As soon as a unit receives a new mission (or when the commander directs), the current operations integration cell alerts the staff of the pending planning requirement." Id. at B-16.

40 ATTP 5-0.1, supra note 19, at 2-5.

41 Id. at 2-30. Each staff section has specific duties and responsibilities by area of expertise.

However, all staff sections share a set of common duties and responsibilities: Advising and informing the commander; Building and maintaining running estimates; Providing recommendations; Preparing plans, orders, and other staff writing; Assessing operations; Managing information within area of expertise; Identifying and analyzing problems; Coordinating staff; Conducting staff assistance visits; Performing composite risk management; Performing intelligence preparation of the battlefield; Conducting staff inspections; Completing staff research; Performing staff administrative procedures; and Exercising staff supervision over their area of expertise.

Id.

42 Id. at 2-5 to 2-28 (discussing primary and special staff officers and their responsibilities).

43 Id. para. 2-4, at 2-1.

[E]ach staff section provides control over its area of expertise within the commander's intent. While commanders make key decisions, they are not the only decisionmakers. Trained, trusted staff members, given decision-making authority based on the commander's intent, free commanders from routine decisions, enabling commanders to focus on key aspects of the operations. These staff members support and advise the commander by assisting the commander within their area of expertise.

Id.

44 ADP 3-0, supra note 16, at 11.

45 Id. at 9.

46 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY DOCTRINE REFERENCE PUB. 3-0, UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS ch. 3 (May 2012) (describing the composition of the WFFs).

47 For an introduction to this area, the author recommends reading the following in order: U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 381-10, U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (3 May 2007); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 381- 20, THE ARMY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (15 Nov. 1993); U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIR. 5240.1-R, PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF DOD INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS THAT AFFECT US PERSONS (25 Apr. 1988); U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIR. (DODD) 5200.27, ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (7 Jan. 1980); U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIR. (DODD) 5205.7, SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM (SAP) POLICY (1 July 2010); and U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUB. 2-01.3, JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (16 June 2009). See also UNITED STATES ARMY OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'S LEGAL CENTER AND SCH. (TJAGLCS), INTELLIGENCE LAW COURSE INFORMATION, available at https://www.jagcnet2.army.mil/8525736A005BC8F9/0/84843E08984787C 18525735500653845?opendocument&noly=1 (last visited May 15, 2014).

48 AR 381-10, supra note 47, at 3.

49 Id.

50 See id.; AR 381-20, supra note 47.

51 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY REG. 381-12 THREAT AWARENESS AND REPORTING PROGRAM (4 Oct. 2012); Insider Threats in Partnering Environments: A Guide for Military Leaders, GA 90-01-031 (FOUO), Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)(June 2011), available at https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=6744

52 For an introduction to this area, the author recommends reading the following in order, ADP 3-0, supra note 16; ADP 5-0, supra note 17; U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-93, THEATER ARMY OPERATIONS (15 July 2010) [hereinafter FM-3-93]; and U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC), TRADOC PAM. 525-3-6, THE UNITED STATES ARMY FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT FOR MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER (13 Oct. 2010) [hereinafter TRADOC PAM. 525-3-6], available at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/ pams/tp525-3-6.pdf.

53 See ADP 3-0, supra note 16.

54 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., JOINT PUB. 3-35, DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS, at VI-6 (31 Jan. 2013) [hereinafter JP 3-35], available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_35.pdf (detailing Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI)).

55 FM 3-93, supra note 52.

56 TRADOC PAM. 525-3-6, supra note 52.

57 JP 3-35, supra note 54, at VI-6.

58 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 525-29, ARMY FORCE GENERATION (ARFORGEN) para. 1-17 (14 Mar. 2011).

The ARFORGEN process is the structured progression of unit readiness over time to produce trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of (ISO) the combatant commander (CCDR) and other Army requirements. The ARFORGEN process is the Army's core process for force generation, executed with supporting-to-supported relationships, that cycles units through three force pools: RESET, Train/Ready, and Available. Each of the three force pools contains a balanced force capability to provide a sustained flow of forces for current commitments and to hedge against unexpected contingencies. ARFORGEN establishes the basis to plan and execute Army-wide unit resourcing. As a model, ARFORGEN supports the Army's planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process. As a process, it synchronizes the Army's efforts to provide land forces and other capabilities required by our Nation.

Id. See also id. para. 1-7, at 1 ("The Army is transforming its units into modular theater armies and theater subordinate commands, corps and division headquarters, brigade combat teams (BCTs), and multifunctional and functional support brigades (BDEs) based on standardized organizational designs for the Active Army (AA) and Reserve Component (RC)."). Id. The ARFORGEN cycle typically involves reset, train and ready periods. For active army units, the reset period is six months while the train and ready is twenty-four months, followed by a twelve-month period of availability, i.e., available to deploy or be tasked. For reserve army units, the reset period is twelve months while the train and ready is thirty-six months, followed by a twelve-month period of availability, i.e., available to deploy or be tasked. See id. fig.1-2, at 7. The reset period consists of manning units, fielding new equipment, conducting individual and institutional training, and reintegrating Soldiers. The train and ready period consists of continuing to man units and field equipment, conducting collective unit training, and participating in a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) at a Combined Training Center, such as the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, or the Joint Military Readiness Center, Fort Polk. The available period consists of actions to prepare to deploy or actual deployment of units if ordered. See id.

59 For an introduction to this area, the author recommends reading the following: U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 1-04, LEGAL SUPPORT TO THE OPERATIONAL ARMY 4-2 (Mar. 2013) [hereinafter FM 1-04]; U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY DOCTRINE REFERENCE PUB. 4-0, SUSTAINMENT (July 2012) [hereinafter ADP 4-0], U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES (ATTP) 4-0.1. ARMY THEATER DISTRIBUTION (20 May 2011); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 1-01, GENERATING FORCE SUPPORT FOR OPERATIONS (2 Apr. 2008); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 1-05, RELIGIOUS SUPPORT (18 Apr. 2003); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-04.111 AVIATION BRIGADES (7 Dec. 2007), U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-05, ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (1 Dec. 2010); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-28, CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS (20 Aug. 2010): U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-34, ENGINEER OPERATIONS (4 Aug. 2011); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-35, ARMY DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT (21 Apr. 2010); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-93, THEATER ARMY OPERATIONS (12 Oct. 2011); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 4-90, BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION (31 Aug. 2010); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 4-92, CONTRACTING SUPPORT BRIGADE (12 Feb. 2010); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 4-94, THEATER SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (12 Feb. 2010); and U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY TECHNIQUES PUBLICATION (ATP) 4-93.2, SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE (Aug. 2013) [hereinafter ATP 4-93.2], available at http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine.

60 ADP 4-0, supra note 59, at 4.

61 See generally ADP 4-0, supra note 59.

62 See id.

63 See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 4-90, BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION 40 (31 Aug. 2010). See also ATP 4-93.2, supra note 59, at 32.

64 For an introduction to this area, the author recommends reading the following: U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (July 1956); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY DOCTRINE PUB. 3-09, FIRES (Aug. 2012 ) [hereinafter ADP 3-09]; U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC), TRADOC PAM. 525-73, CONCEPT FOR NON-LETHAL CAPABILITIES IN ARMY OPERATIONS (1 Dec. 1996); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 6-20-10, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR THE TARGETING PROCESS (8 May 1996); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-05.40, CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS (29 Sept. 2006); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-05.401, CIVIL AFFAIRS TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES (5 July 2007); and U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-13, INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES (25 Jan. 2013) [hereinafter FM 3-31], available at http://armypubs.army.mil/ doctrine.

65 ADP 3-0, supra note 16, at 1.

66 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., JOINT PUB. 3-09, JOINT FIRE SUPPORT, at I-1 (30 June 2010), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_09.pdf (last visited June 4, 2014).

67 Id. at I-2.

68 For an introduction to this area, the author recommends reading the following: U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY DOCTRINE REFERENCE PUB. 3-37, PROTECTION (31 Aug. 2012) and U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY TECHNIQUES PUB. 5-19, RISK MANAGEMENT (22 Apr. 2014), available at http://army pubs.army.mil/doctrine.

69 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-37, PROTECTION 1-1 (30 Sept. 2009), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-37.pdf (last visited June 4, 2014).

70 Id. para. 5-1.

71 Id. para. 5-2.

72 See id.

73 For an introduction to this area, the author recommends reading the following in order: U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY DOCTRINE REFERENCE PUB. 6-0, MISSION COMMAND (28 Mar. 2014) [hereinafter ADRP 6-0]; U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 6-0. MISSION COMMAND: COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ARMY FORCES (11 Aug. 2003) (superceded by U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY DOCTRINE PUB. 6-0, MISSION COMMAND (May 2012) [hereinafter ADP 6-0]; U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. (AR) 600-20, ARMY COMMAND POLICY (18 Mar. 2008); U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., JOINT PUB. 1, DOCTRINE FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES (2 May 2007) [hereinafter JP- 1] (incorporating C1, 20 Mar. 2009); U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., JOINT PUB. 3-0, JOINT OPERATIONS (11 Aug. 2011); and ATTP 5-0.1, supra note 19. These publications are, available at http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine.

74 ADP 3-0, supra note 16, at 3. See also Mission Command WFF, Ctr. for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), available at http://usacac.army. mil/cac2/call/thesaurus/toc.asp?id=33287.

75 Mission Command, supra note 74, at 1.

76 ADRP 6-0, supra note 73, at 1-2.

77 Id.

78 Mission Command, supra note 74, at iv. The Mission Command System involves (1) personnel, (2) facilities and equipment, (3) networks, (4) information systems, and (5) processes and procedures. See also id. at 8 ("Although staffs perform many tasks, they use knowledge and information management practices to provide commanders the information they need to create and maintain their understanding and make effective decisions.") In order to meet these requirements, staff members must understand the systems that the command uses to communicate, such as Command Post of the Future (CPOF), transverse, BFT, etc. Id.

79 See infra Part VI (discussing the legal support provided to each WFF).

80 ADP 3-09, supra note 64, at 15.

81 Id.

82 See Part III.A.

83 ADP 5-0, supra note 17, paras. 2-46 to 2-48 (discussing the Design and the Military Decision Making Process Interface). See also U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK (2013) [hereinafter OPLAW HANDBOOK].

84 See ADP 3-0, supra note 16, at 9. See also id. at 9-10 (stating "Operational art-the creative expression of informed vision to integrate ends, ways, and means across the levels of war-is fundamental to the Army's ability to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative while concurrently creating and preserving the conditions necessary to restore stability."). Id.

85 See id.

86 T.C. Greenwood, War Planning for Wicked Problems, Where Joint Doctrine Fails, ARMED FORCES J. (Dec. 2009), available at http://www. armedforcesjournal.com/?s=com/?s=Greenwood (last visited Aug. 28, 2014).

87 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES (ATTP) 5-0, OPERATIONS 24 (15 Mar. 2010) ("It identifies what the command must accomplish, when and where it must be done and, most importantly, why-the purpose of the operation.").

88 ATTP 5-0.1, supra note 19, at 4-4 to 4-6.

89 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL INSTR. (FMI) 3-42.1, TACTICS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 1-6 (12 Mar. 2009) [hereinafter FMI 3-42.1] (discussing mission variables). Mission variables include: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations, commonly called mission, enemy, terrain, and troops available (METT-TC). Id.

When commanders and staff receive a specific mission, or identify a particular problem, they can draw relevant information from their ongoing analysis of their OE (using operational variables) to further complement their analysis of mission variables. Use of the mission variables, combined with the knowledge of the operational variables, enables leaders to understand the threat, act effectively, and anticipate the consequences of their operations before and during mission execution.

Id.

90 Id. at 1-3 n.75 (describing centers of gravity). See also ADP 3-0, supra note 16 (stating that COG is "the set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act.") Note this description does not only apply to an adversary, but rather any system, such as an economic or political system. Id. See also Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier, A Logical Method for Center-of-Gravity Analysis, MIL. REV., Sept.-Oct. 2007, available at http://challenge2050.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/ends-ways-means_- militaryreview_20071031_art009.pdf (last visited May 15, 2014) (describing center of gravity analysis in operational planning). See also Richard G. Pierce & Robert C. Coon, Understanding the Link Between Centers of Gravity and Mission Accomplishment, MIL. REV., June-Aug. 2011, available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dmspo/Publications /Center%20of%20Gravity%20Article.pdf (last visited May 15, 2014) (describing center of gravity and articulating need to review approaches to mission accomplishment by attacking enemy centers of gravity).

91 FMI 3-42.1, supra note 89, at 1-3 (defining PMESII-PT as Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information-Physical Environment and Time) and id. at 1-8 (defining Ascope as Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events). Id. at 1-3 PMESII-PT is used to understand the "operational environment," in which operations will take place. Id. Field Manual Instruction 3-42.1 also states that "During intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the commander and staff analyze civil considerations from several perspectives-the population, the insurgents, and the counterinsurgents-to determine the effects on friendly and enemy courses of action." Id. at 1-8. See also The Targeting Process: D3A and F3EAD, SMALL WARS J. (July 16, 2011), available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/ 816-gomez.pdf (defining targeting considerations).

92 FMI 3-42.1, supra note 89.

93 ADRP 5-0, supra note 37, at 1-4.

94 ADP 3-0, supra note 16, at 6-72. It states:

Commanders use both lines of operations and lines of effort to connect objectives to a central, unifying purpose. Lines of operations portray the more traditional links between objectives, decisive points, and centers of gravity. However, lines of operations do not project the operational design beyond defeating enemy forces and seizing terrain. Combining lines of operations and lines of effort allows commanders to include nonmilitary activities in their operational design. This combination helps commanders incorporate stability tasks that set the end-state conditions into the operation. It allows commanders to consider the less tangible aspects of the operational environment where the other instruments of national power dominate. Commanders can then visualize concurrent and post- conflict stability activities. Making these connections relates the tasks and purposes of the elements of full spectrum operations with joint effects identified in the campaign plan. The resulting operational design effectively combines full spectrum operations throughout the campaign or major operation.

Id.

95 See id.

96 Id.

97 See generally U.S. ARMY OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES (2011). See also Stephanie Nijssen, The Taliban's Shadow Government in Afghanistan (Sept. 2011), available at https://www.cimicweb.org/ Documents/CFC%20AFG%20Governance%20Archive/CFC_AFG_Shado w_Governance_September11.pdf (last visited June 20, 2014). Shadow courts are quasi-judicial courts run by the Taliban. It states

The Taliban has offered an alternative to GIRoA's justice system, which the . . . is often viewed with mistrust. The Taliban drafted a new Constitution of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in December 2006 and also makes use of mobile courts. The mobile courts appoint an individual, frequently a religious leader, to serve as the judge. This judge makes decisions on criminal matters after which the Taliban will offer assistance in implementing any sentence which is determined."

Id.

98 CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED, available at http:// usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/thesaurus/toc.asp?id=33845.

Lines of effort has replaced "logical lines of operations." A line of effort links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose and "cause and effect" to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. Lines of effort are essential to operational design when positional references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance. In operations involving many nonmilitary factors, lines of effort may be the only way to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the desired end-state. Lines of effort are often essential to helping commanders visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of national power. Commanders use lines of effort to describe how they envision their operations creating the more intangible end-state conditions. These lines of effort show how individual actions relate to each other and to achieving the end-state. Ideally, lines of effort combine the complementary, long-term effects of stability or civil support tasks with the cyclic, short- term events typical of offensive or defensive tasks.

Id.

99 Id.

100 FM 3-42.1, supra note 89.

101 ATTP 5-0.1, supra note 19, at 2-11. The Non-Lethal Effects Chief, usually the S5 or S7, is the lead for non-lethal targeting, including using Inform and Influence Activities (IIA), PSYOPs, Military Deception, Civil Affairs, etc. Id. Paragraph 2-12 states:

G-5 (S-5) is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning civil-military operations (CMO). The G- 5 (S-5) establishes the civil-military operations center, evaluates civil considerations during mission analysis (identifying the civil centers of gravity), and prepares the groundwork for transitioning the AO from military to civilian control. The G-5 (S-5) advises the commander on the military's effect on civilians in the AO, relative to the complex relationship of these people with the terrain and institutions over time. The G-5 (S-5) is responsible for enhancing the relationship between Army forces and the civil authorities and people in the AO. The G-5 (S-5) is required at all echelons from battalion through corps, but authorized only at division and corps. Once deployed, units below division level may be authorized an S-5.

Id. See also id. at 2-13 (describing the duties of the S7).

The ACOS, G-7 (S-7) is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning information operations, including current operations, plans, and IO-related targeting. . . . Synchronizing and coordinating offensive and defensive IO with the overall operation; Assessing the effects of offensive and defensive IO throughout the operations process; recommending IO adjustments as required; Coordinating and synchronizing tactical IO with theater-strategic and operational-level IO; Coordinating IO elements and related activities for the COS (XO); Integrating intelligence from the G-2 (S-2) into IO; Coordinating the attachment of the 1st IOC(L) Field Support Team and other specialized IO teams; Monitoring execution of IO tasks to ensure delivery of massed information effects when needed. G-7 (S-7) responsibilities related to targeting include: Participating in targeting meetings and [R]ecommending IO effects to influence adversary perceptions, decisions, and actions. The G-7 (S-7) has the following staff planning and supervisory responsibilities: Establishing and supervising an IO cell; Coordinating IO with other agencies (such as the US Information Agency, US Agency for International Development, and US ambassador.

Id.

102 Id.

103 Id.

104 ADRP 5-0, supra note 37, at 5-10.

105 Id.

106 Id.

107 See Appendix A.

108 ADRP 5-0, supra note 37, at 5-10.

A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end-state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). MOEs help measure changes in conditions, both positive and negative. MOEs help to answer the question "Are we doing the right things?" MOEs are commonly found and tracked in formal assessment plans.

Id. Thus, MOPs are used to determine how well a task has been completed, while MOEs are measures of the effect of that task, or other tasks, on the desired end-state. Id.

109 Id. at 2-11; U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 5-0, ARMY PLANNING AND ORDERS PRODUCTION 3-1 (20 Jan. 2005) [hereinafter FM 5-0] (superseded by ADRP 5-0, supra note 37). The MDMP is an

established and proven analytical planning process . . . that establishes procedures for analyzing a mission, developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of action against criteria of success and each other, selecting the optimum course of action, and producing a plan or order." MDMP "is an iterative planning methodology that integrates the activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and other partners to understand the situation and mission; develop and compare courses of action; decide on a course of action that best accomplishes the mission; and produce an operation plan or order for execution.

Id.

110 ATTP5-0.1, supra note 19, fig.4-1, at 4-3. See also Christopher R. Paparone, U.S. Army Decisionmaking: Past, Present and Future, MIL. REV., July-Aug. 2001 (detailing the history of military planning and the development of the MDMP process).

111 ATTP 5-0.1, supra note 18, at 4-4 ("Staff officers carefully review the reference sections . . . of the higher headquarters' OPLANs and OPORDs to identify documents (such as theater policies and memoranda) related to the upcoming operation.").

112 ADRP 5-0, supra note 37, para. 3-37, at 3-10. "A staff estimate is an assessment of the situation and an analysis of those courses of action a commander is considering that best accomplishes the mission. It includes an evaluation of how factors in a staff section's functional area influence each COA and includes conclusions and a recommended COA to the commander." Id.

113 See id. Using their specialized WFF knowledge, planners provide initial input regarding the initial commander's intent and proposed COAs. Id.

114 ATTP 5-0.1, supra note 19, at 12-3 (detailing types of orders and formats). See also OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 81, at 460-62 (discussing reviews of orders). See also Appendix A (illustrating types of orders).

115 ATTP 5-0.1, supra note 19, at 4-8.

116 JP5-0, supra note 18, at IV-8 and IV-9 (discussing specified tasks, implied tasks, and mission statements and providing a sample). Specified tasks can be included in the mission statement. Id.

117 Id. at IV-10.

118 See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., JOINT PUB. 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS (8 Nov. 2010 (as amended 15 February 2014) (defining assumptions). If an assumption is not necessary to the decision-making process, it should be discarded. Id.

119 See supra Part V.A.6.a.

120 ATTP 5-0.1, supra note 19, at 4-8 and 4-16.

121 Id.

122 FM 1-04, supra note 59. The typical sourcing solution is to request a third attorney, either active duty or an activated Reserve judge advocate, through the Personnel, Plans, and Training Office (PPTO).

123 JP 5-0, supra note 18, at IV-10.

124 Id.

125 Id. at IV-4.

The primary inputs to mission analysis are: the higher headquarters' planning directive; other strategic guidance; and the commander's initial planning guidance . . . . The primary products of mission analysis are staff estimates, the mission statement, a refined operational approach, the commander's intent statement, updated planning guidance, and the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs).

Id

126 ADRP 6-0, supra note 73, at 9.

127 Id. at 8.

Commanders determine information requirements and set information priorities by establishing commander's critical information requirements. Commanders and staff interpret information received to gain understanding and to exploit fleeting opportunities, respond to developing threats, modify plans, or reallocate resources. Staffs use information and knowledge management practices to assist commanders in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information. This cycle of information exchange provides the basis for creating and maintaining understanding.

Id. See also KEITH W. WILSON (MAJOR), THE OPERATIONS PROCESS: A GUIDE TO THE MDMP FOR BRIGADE AND BATTALION STAFFS (n.d.), available at http://www.benning. army.mil/mcoe/dot/mc3/reserve/content/pdf/A%20Guide%20to %20the%20MDMP.pdf.

Information requirements are all information elements the commander and staff require to successfully conduct operations; that is, all elements necessary to address the factors of METT-TC (FM 6- 0). Some IRs are of such importance to the commander that they are nominated to the commander to become a commander's critical information requirement (CCIR).

Id. See also U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., JOINT PUB. 2-0, JOINT INTELLIGENCE 16 (22 Oct. 2013) (defining PIR). Priority information requirements (PIR) consist of "those intelligence requirements stated as a priority for intelligence support that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or the operational environment." Id. See also ADRP 5-0, supra note 37, at 1-6 (defining friendly force information requirements (FFIR)). Similar to essential elements of friendly information (EEFI), FFIR consist of "information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities." Id.

128 ATTP 5-0.1, supra note 19, 4-14.

129 Id. at 4-22 to 4-25 (detailing the war gaming process).

130 Id. at 4-34.

131 See Appendix A (providing various types of orders and plans).

132 See ATTP 5-0.1, supra note 19, at 4-39.

133 FM1-04, supra note 59, para. 6-10. "Judge advocates support the design process by developing an understanding of the operational environment and collaborating with the commander and other staff sections to assist in framing the environment and the problem." Id.

134 This is a common question posed to operational judge advocates.

135 See Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Hernandez, Tips on Planning at the Strategic Level for Judge Advocates, JAGCNET.ARMY.MIL (24 Mar. 2009), available at www.jagcnet.army.mil.

136 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIR. (DODD) 5205.7, SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM (SAP) POLICY (1 July 2010); and U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUB. 2-01.3, JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (16 June 2009).

137 Ensure legal personnel have the appropriate clearances and are read onto all of the programs available to the command.

138 An example of this could be the resource management annex which will highlight the approval thresholds for various "pots of money." To a lesser extent, sustainment mission analysis requires the legal planner to review authorities related to the provision of medical care (MED ROE or Medical Rules of Eligibility), chaplaincy, and rear detachment activities (including family readiness groups).

139 See FM 6-99 supra note 35.

140 ADP 3-09, supra note 64, at 3-1 (describing targeting and mission planning relationship).

141 JP-1, supra note 73, at V-6.

142 Id.

143 Id.

144 JP 5-0, supra note 19, at 6.

ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. ADCON is synonymous with administration and support responsibilities identified in Title 10, USC. This is the authority necessary to fulfill Military Department statutory responsibilities for administration and support.

145 Id. at 6 (detailing Title 10 responsibilities).

146 See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 220-1, ARMY UNIT STATUS REPORTING AND FORCE REGISTRATION-CONSOLIDATED POLICIES (15 Apr. 2010), available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r220_1.pdf. This includes providing "legal non-deployable" information to the Unit Status Report (USR). Id.

147 See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 71-32, FORCE GENERATION AND DOCUMENTATION (1 July 2013), available at http://www.apd. army.mil/pdffiles/r71_32.pdf.

148 ADRP 5-0, supra note 37, glossary.

149 See Charles T. Barry, Jr., Understanding OPCON (3 May 2010), available at http://www.army.mil/article/38414/Understanding_OPCON/. See also http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/overview.htm. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., JOINT PUBLICATION 0-2, UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES (UNAAF) (10 July 2001) [hereinafter JP 0-2].

Organic assets are assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization. Organic assets are those listed in the unit's MTOE, and are in this command relationship when conducting missions in support of their own unit.

Assigned is to place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls or administers the unit or personnel for the primary functions of the unit. As in organic, units will have this relationship when C2 is exercised by their parent headquarters.

Attached is the placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary. The commander of the unit that receives the attachment is responsible for the sustainment and logistics support that is beyond the capability of the attached unit.

Id.

150 Id.

151 JP 0-2, supra note 14 at III-9 (discussing support relationships).

152 Id.

153 FM 1-04, supra note 59, at 4-8 (detailing relationships between judge advocates at different echelons). It states that "[u]nder Title 10, U.S. Code, section 806(b) (2010), the [Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)] or legal officer of any command is entitled to communicate directly with the SJA or legal officer of a superior or subordinate command, or with [The Judge Advocate General (TJAG)]." Id. Essentially, Judge Advocates (JAs) s have direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH)-like authority given through the technical channel via regulation.

154 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-381, SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE: MORE DETAILED PLANNING AND IMPROVED ACCESS TO INFORMATION NEEDED TO GUIDE EFFORTS OF ADVISOR TEAMS IN AFGHANISTAN 3 (Apr. 4, 2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/ assets/660/654289.pdf (last visited May 15, 2014). See generally COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE, JOINT CENTER FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE (14 July 2008), available at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/Materials/SFA.pdf (last visited June 4, 2014).

155 See Pete Escamilla & Eric Lopez, Securing the Security Force Assistance Advisors in Afghanistan, SMALL WARS J. (Sept. 10, 2013), available at http:// smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/securing-the-security- force-assistance-advisors-in-afghanistan (discussing SFATs and the threats against them).

156 DOCTRINE UPDATE 2-12, COMBINED ARMS CTR. 5 (3 Apr. 2012), available at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/adp/Repository/Army%20Doctrine %20Update%202-12.pdf (last visited June 4, 2014) (defining BSO).

157 See Colonel Ty Connett & Colonel Bob Cassidy, Village Stability Operations: More than Village Defense, U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CTR. & SCH., available at http://www.soc.mil/swcs/ swmag/archive/SW2403/SW2403VillageStabilityOperations_MoreThanVil lageDefense.html (last visited June 4, 2014) (describing how Special Operations Forces conduct VSO).

158 This is a common question posed to operational JAs.

159 OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 83, at 464-69 (providing an example).

160 See FM 1-04, supra note 59. "When faced with situations where the brigade legal section cannot provide the proper breadth of service, the brigade judge advocate should use the brigade chain of command and JAGC technical channels to address shortfalls." Id.

161 For example only. Sourcing timeline is determined by timeliness of submission and availability of assets.

162 These COAs could include support to detainee operations, Rule of Law efforts, etc.

163 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 6-0, COMMANDER AND STAFF ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS (May 2014).

164 Id.

165 For a discussion, see id. at 462-64.

166 Judge advocates must also ensure that the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) jurisdictional memo, and supporting assignment and attachment orders, reflects that TASKORG.

167 ATTP 5-0.1, supra note 19, at 6-1.

A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if planned future operations are supportable (FM 5-0). The commander and each staff section maintain a running estimate. In their running estimates, the commander and each staff section continuously consider the effects of new information and update the following: Facts, Assumptions, Friendly force status, Enemy activities and capabilities, Civil considerations, and Conclusions and recommendations.

Id. See also id. at 6-2.

The base running estimate addresses information unique to each functional area. It serves as the staff section's initial assessment of the current readiness of equipment and personnel and of how the factors considered in the running estimate affect the staff's ability to accomplish the mission. Each staff section identifies functional area friendly and enemy strengths, systems, training, morale, leadership, and weather and terrain effects, and how all these factors impact both the operational environment and area of operations. Because the running estimate is a picture relative to time, facts, and assumptions, each staff section constantly updates the estimate as new information arises, as assumptions become facts or are invalidated, when the mission changes, or when the commander requires additional input. Running estimates can be presented verbally or in writing.

Id.; see also Appendix D (Sample Deployment Staff Estimate).

168 A helpful tool is to use a Stoplight Chart in the concept of operations (CONOPs) and in the COIC to demonstrate current ROE in effect. See Appendix E (Sample ROE Stoplight Chart).

169 ATTP 5-0.1, supra note 19, at 8-2.

170 See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 11-33, ARMY LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM (ALLP) (17 Oct. 2006), available at http://www.apd.army.mil/ pdffiles/r11_33.pdf (last visited June 4, 2014) (detailing AARs and their value).

171 OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 83, at 238-40; see also Appendix C (Sample NEO Quad Chart).

172 See Timothy Hsia, Law-Enforcement Professional and the Army, ARMY COMBINED ARMS CTR. (July 2008), available at http://usacac.army. mil/cac2/call/docs/11-20/ch_6.asp(last visited June 4, 2014) (discussing LEP program).

173 See generally HUMAN TERRAIN TEAM HANDBOOK (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.vho.org/aaargh/fran/livres9/humterrainhandbo.pdf (last visited June 4, 2014). Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) consist of five to nine personnel deployed to support field commanders. Id. These teams fill the socio-cultural knowledge gap in the commander's operational environment and interpret key events in his operating area. Id.

174 ATTP 5-0.1, supra note 19, at 3-5 (discussing typical battle drills).

175 See id. at 12-2 to 12-5.

176 ATTP 5-0.1, supra note 19.

177 Non-Combatant Evacuations Operations.

178 Developed by author.

179 Created by 3-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team Legal Section.

Major Michael J. O'Connor*

* Judge Advocate, U.S. Army. Presently assigned as Deputy Chief, International and Operational Law, U.S. Army-Europe, Wiesbaden, Germany.

(ProQuest: Appendix omitted.)

Copyright:	(c) 2014 Superintendent of Documents
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