Recent Studies from Columbia University Add New Data to Economics (The Unitary Executive and the Federal Reserve): Economics

2026 JUN 09 (NewsRx) -- By a News Reporter-Staff News Editor at NewsRx Policy and Law Daily -- Investigators publish new report on Economics. According to news reporting originating from New York City, New York, by NewsRx editors, the research stated, “The U.S. Supreme Court may soon embrace an interpretation of the U.S.”

Our news editors obtained a quote from the research from Columbia University, “Constitution that would significantly expand the power of the president over federal administrators and invalidate key provisions in dozens of federal statutes. A critical question is whether this interpretation-known as the unitary executive theory (UET)-would also render unconstitutional central bank independence (CBI), an arrangement where a country’s monetary policy is formulated by a semiautonomous body of experts insulated from partisan political pressure. Several justices have suggested that it would not, and a growing scholarly literature has proposed ways for the Court to distinguish the country’s central banking apparatus from the rest of the administrative state. This Article examines these proposals and concludes that none are tenable. It then explains why UET is fundamentally inconsistent with CBI: the Federal Reserve’s independence from the president reflects a wholly different, and incompatible, approach to the separation of powers. It further suggests that since the regulation of money and banking is one of the most important functions of the modern state, the conflict with UET is arguably sufficient, standing alone, to reject the theory.”

According to the news editors, the research concluded: “Relatedly, it argues that if the Court wishes to preserve statutory limits on the president’s power to remove Federal Reserve officials without repudiating UET outright, it has only one viable option: stare decisis.”

This research has been peer-reviewed.

For more information on this research see: The Unitary Executive and the Federal Reserve. Fordham Law Review, 2026;94(6):2089-2149. Fordham Law Review can be contacted at: Fordham Univ, School Law, 140 W 62ND Street, New York, NY 10023, USA.

The news editors report that additional information may be obtained by contacting Lev Menand, Columbia University, Law, New York, NY 10027, United States.

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