Review of fatal jump leads to discipline for six

Oct. 05--An investigation into the death of Col. Darron Wright during a training jump on Fort Bragg last year led to the discipline of six people and prompted more than 20 changes across airborne operations, including planning, parachute packing procedures and medical coverage at drop zones.

The findings and recommendations were outlined in a 219-page investigative report by Brig. Gen. Christopher Cavoli, then-deputy commanding general for operations for the 82nd Airborne Division. The report was obtained by The Fayetteville Observer under the Freedom of Information Act.

Wright, an 18th Airborne Corps assistant chief of staff, died Sept. 23, 2013, in a training jump at Sicily Drop Zone.

Wright, 45, of Mesquite, Texas, was part of a small group of command staff using MC-6 parachutes.

All but two of the recommended changes to operations have been completed, according to Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson, commanding general of Fort Bragg and the 18th Airborne Corps. The two remaining recommendations are related to parachute packing procedures.

In a phone interview from Afghanistan last month, Anderson voiced his displeasure that policies were violated on the day of Wright's jump.

"I wasn't happy about a series of things," Anderson said. "I was not happy, as the commander, that we had not followed our procedures and policies. All that does is cause confusion, which was a recurring theme throughout the investigation."

Wright's death was caused by his improper exit from the aircraft and failing to control his canopy, according to the report. The investigator noted violations in procedures, although he said they did not figure directly into Wright's death.

They were:

A VIP culture of entitlement among high-ranking soldiers at Fort Bragg that enabled Wright to skip procedures that lower-ranking soldiers must follow.

Problems with the parachute, including the fact it did not meet up-to-date standards and had not been repacked in a timely manner.

Problems with organization and operation of the 11th Quartermaster Company, which packs the parachutes, including being understaffed and requiring knowledge to pack a range of parachutes.

Problems with airborne planning and administration, including a lack of guidance on use of steerable parachutes.

Wright's poor exit and failure to control his canopy were blamed on his lack of relevant or recent experience, inadequate training and the insufficient drop altitude for the parachute he was using, the report said.

Wright returned to Fort Bragg in 2013 when Anderson recruited him to be a staff planner at the 18th Airborne Corps.

The two had known each other for nine years. In 2004, the brigade Wright was a part of replaced Anderson's brigade in Iraq. Wright also was a student in one of Anderson's classes at the Naval War College.

"He was a versatile infantryman," Anderson said of Wright. "He was a tactically and technically involved officer."

Wright's career took him from the former Fort Ord, California, to Korea; Fort Bragg; Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Polk, Louisiana; and what is now Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington; according to the report.

He deployed to Iraq three times for a total of 37 months, earning the Bronze Star Medal with valor.

Although Wright was a senior-rated jumpmaster with 63 jumps on his log, he had not jumped in four years and was inexperienced with the MC-6 parachute, which he used during his final jump, according to the investigative report.

Cavoli said Wright's parachute experience "came in discrete periods."

Wright completed 32 jumps during a previous stint at Fort Bragg, and he completed the Army jumpmaster course in 1996. The next year, he earned the senior parachutist badge.

In 1999, Wright was involved in a parachute mishap so serious that it knocked him unconscious for 15 minutes. He would not jump again until 2007, when he assumed control of 1st Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment, at Fort Polk.

He completed 24 jumps through 2009.

He was not on jump status through 2013 while he was stationed at Joint Base Lewis-McChord. Later that year, he returned to Fort Bragg and back to jump status.

Gaps between jumps are not alarming, Anderson said.

"I left Bragg as a battalion commander in 1999 and didn't jump again until 2014," he said. "It's fairly common. You've got to deal with that, but you've got to deal with appropriate steps to make sure you're prepared to execute airborne operations."

When Wright returned to Fort Bragg last year, he completed a basic airborne refresher special course. The course required a jump from a high-performance Air Force aircraft within 30 days, or the class would have to be retaken.

Shortly after, Wright attended a training course geared toward MC-6 steerable parachutes.

Col. William "Tommy" Steele, who jumped with Wright in September 2013, said Wright was excited to advance his jump experience.

"Darron was happy and motivated to jump, as this was No. 64 and would put him within one jump of his master wings," according to Steele's sworn statement dated Sept. 30, 2013.

But by the time of the Sept. 23 jump, 40 days had passed and Wright's jump status had expired. He did not report the expiration, and there were inadequate administrative procedures in place to catch the problem, according to the investigative report.

"No. 1, it's an individual responsibility," Anderson said. "His (refresher course) did expire; that was a problem. The bottom line is, it was not properly monitored. If it wasn't caught by the time the clock ticked to 30 days after the (refresher course), it should have been caught. He should have been required to go back to (the refresher course) before he got manifested."

Wright also wore the wrong-size parachute, asked how to steer it and struggled to disconnect the static line snap from the reserve carrying handle inside the aircraft, according to the report.

"Although Col. Wright was a senior-rated jumpmaster with 63 jumps on his log, he was inexperienced with the MC-6 parachute and had not jumped in over four years," Cavoli wrote in the report.

His lack of relevant and recent experience could have been overcome with training, but the basic airborne refresher special course he took did not cover the necessary parachute skills, the report said.

The special course, reserved for officers ranking lieutenant colonel or higher and for sergeants major, was abbreviated. It did not include a jump from the 34-foot jump tower.

"Senior people do multiple assignments, so (the refresher) special is geared toward people who have jumped several times," Anderson said.

Parachute guidelines

The investigator also said an insufficient altitude caused problems with Wright's jump.

"The jump occurred 200 feet below the recommended drop altitude, robbing Col. Wright of additional seconds to deploy his reserve," Cavoli wrote.

At the time, the 18th Airborne Corps and the 82nd Airborne Division did not have policies in place for MC-6 parachutes, including a modified drop altitude. As a result, soldiers relied on policies already in place to dictate use of MC-6 parachutes.

"I find this to be a significant oversight that contributed to the error in jump altitude on 23 September 13," Cavoli wrote.

Anderson said that issue has been corrected by addressing it in the airborne standard operating procedures that will drive the altitude for MC-6 parachute jumps in the future.

"It's a fairly new parachute, so there was no doctrine on what the jump altitude is supposed to be," he said. "They routinely drop at 1,000 feet. I think they defaulted to what everybody was used to."

After Wright's death, investigators recommended 25 changes in planning airborne operations, parachute packing procedures and medical coverage of airborne operations. Anderson asked for weekly updates to ensure those recommendations were on task.

Among completed recommendations, the importance of following the air letter was emphasized to soldiers, a medical coverage plan for drop zones was developed to ensure medics have necessary medication to prevent infection and treat pain, and MC-6 parachutes are individually tagged to show the pack date to easily identify when a parachute has exceeded its packed shelf life.

Most of the recommendations have been completed; just two remain in progress, Anderson said. Those two related to parachute packing operations.

The first is to identify strengths, variety of skills and nonrigging missions for the unit, among other things.

Although that continues to be monitored, in October 2013, 12 parachute riggers were added to the unit's roster.

Second, a review of the distribution of parachute riggers on Fort Bragg is ongoing. The 11th Quartermaster Company will staff its platoon sergeant positions at 100 percent, which is four people. As of July, it was at 50 percent, Anderson said. A third person is expected to arrive in December, officials said.

That unit was so undermanned and overworked, it was universally called a "sweat shop."

Other factors

Investigators also found four factors that did not trace directly to Wright's death.

First, a VIP culture in the 18th Airborne Corps was determined as a casual factor in Wright's death. The culture allowed VIPs to skip pre-jump training with the rest of the paratroopers, pass over training on how to exit the aircraft and acquire MC-6 parachutes without question.

"A large number of my conversations with jumpmasters and soldiers during this investigation revealed resentment towards what they perceive to be a sense of entitlement among VIPs," Cavoli wrote. "The VIP culture enabled much of the trouble described in this report."

The VIPs were Wright, Col. Robert Morschauser, Morschauser's executive assistant and Col. William "Tommy" Steele.

"It's not acceptable behavior," Anderson said. "The culture is something that we as leaders have to enforce, just like anything else we'd have to do."

Because jumpmasters can sometimes be outranked, Anderson said it can be intimidating for them to enforce policies or procedures, such as removing a soldier from the manifest. After the investigative report was released, Anderson said airborne planning policies were emphasized to reassure jumpmasters they have the power to make those decisions.

"So the issue is, reinforce to the jumpmasters that we have their back and we're giving them authority," Anderson said. "They're responsible for what happens on that aircraft and everybody's safety."

The investigative report also cited problems with Wright's parachute. The MC-6 he used did not meet up-to-date standards and had not been repacked in a timely manner.

The control lines for steering were 10 inches too short and, therefore, susceptible to tearing in flight, although that did not happen. And his parachute was packed April 29, 2013 -- which, by the time of the Sept. 23 jump, would be more than 120 days past due for repacking.

Significant organization and operational problems with the 11th Quartermaster Company also were revealed. The investigator said the unit is undermanned, lacked structure with sufficient leadership to handle its size and had officers who were under stress.

In some cases, riggers were required to know how to pack more than one type of parachute while juggling a large workload. Eliminating the T-10 model parachute alleviated some of the workload, but the unit was still sorely undermanned, Anderson said.

"The unit was struggling from top to bottom," he said.

After the investigative report was released, Anderson said the Army provided help with troop-to-task leadership and increasing staffing levels.

"We were shortchanged NCOs and riggers," he said. "To decrease the workload, we had to make sure we weren't being shortchanged. How we manage that population is still a challenge for the Army."

The investigative report cited problems with airborne planning and administration. Wright's jump file, for example, was invalid and there was a lack of guidance on use of steerable parachutes.

His jump log was invalid because he certified his own jumps, and the last 20 were not certified at all. There were systems in place to maintain jump logs properly, but they were not enforced with Wright or other senior leaders in the 18th Airborne Corps, according to the report.

The report recommended that six people be disciplined.

A noncommissioned officer in charge was relieved of his parachute issue facility duties for issuing parachutes that exceeded the 120-day shelf life, according to the report. That soldier's name was redacted in the report.

Another person was reprimanded for failing to reconsider the planned drop altitude when the MC-6 parachutes were added to the manifest. That soldier's name also was redacted.

A third person was reprimanded for not properly receiving or maintaining the MC-6 parachutes and then allowing the parachutes to remain packed and subsequently issued beyond the shelf life. That person's name was redacted.

The battalion commander, whose name was redacted, was reprimanded for knowingly permitting violations of regulations and policies during the operation. He did not conduct proper composite risk management for the operation and knowingly allowed soldiers to jump without attending all aspects of mandatory training.

Col. William "Tommy" Steele and Col. Robert Morschauser received general officer reprimands. Recommendations for reprimand cited the officers for knowingly violating polices and being inconsiderate of the effect rank would have on the airborne commander.

Staff writer Amanda Dolasinski can be reached at [email protected] or 486-3528.

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