Study Findings on Insurance Economics Are Outlined in Reports from Tianjin University (A reinsurance and investment game between two insurance…

Study Findings on Insurance Economics Are Outlined in Reports from Tianjin University (A reinsurance and investment game between two insurance companies with the different opinions about some extra information)

By a News Reporter-Staff News Editor at Insurance Weekly News -- Current study results on Economics - Insurance Economics have been published. According to news reporting out of Tianjin, People's Republic of China, by VerticalNews editors, research stated, "The work studies a reinsurance and investment game between two insurance companies which have different opinions about some extra information. We assume that the goal of each insurance company is to maximize its utility of the difference between its terminal surplus and that of its competitor at the terminal time T. Moreover, at the beginning of the game, two insurance companies acquire some information about the future realization of the claims process."

Our news journalists obtained a quote from the research from Tianjin University, "However, they treat with it differently, since one company trusts it while its competitor does not. Our focus is to study how the companies are affected by this information. By utilizing the dynamic programming principle and the enlargement of filtration techniques, the existence of the Nash equilibrium solutions can be verified. For the exponential utility, we derive three kinds of the candidate forms for the equilibrium strategies in the special situations and also provide the numerical method for the general situation."

According to the news editors, the research concluded: "Some numerical examples are presented to illustrate how the reinsurance strategies change when the information level and other parameters vary."

For more information on this research see: A reinsurance and investment game between two insurance companies with the different opinions about some extra information. Insurance Mathematics & Economics, 2017;75():58-70. Insurance Mathematics & Economics can be contacted at: Elsevier Science Bv, PO Box 211, 1000 Ae Amsterdam, Netherlands.

Our news journalists report that additional information may be obtained by contacting M. Yan, Tianjin Univ Finance & Econ, Coordinated Innovat Center Computable Modeling Manag, Tianjin 300222, People's Republic of China. Additional authors for this research include F.Y. Peng and S.H. Zhang.

Keywords for this news article include: Tianjin, People's Republic of China, Asia, Insurance Economics, Economics, Tianjin University.

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