House Education & Workforce Subcommittee Issues Testimony From Families USA Senior Director Tripoli
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Chairs Good and Foxx, Ranking Members DeSaulnier and Scott, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today at this critical hearing focused on health care affordability, transparency, and competition. It is an honor to be with you this afternoon. My name is
Today's hearing is urgently needed. Our health care system is in crisis, evidenced by a lack of affordability and poor quality.1 And it is going to take all of us working together, across political party and health policy philosophy, from rural and urban communities alike, to fix it.
At its core, our nation's affordability crisis is driven by a fundamental misalignment between the business interests of the health care sector and the health and financial security of our nation's families - a business model that allows industry to set prices that have little to do with the quality of the care they offer. These high and irrational prices are largely due to trends in health care industry consolidation that have eliminated competition and allowed monopolistic pricing to push our nation's families to the brink of financial ruin.2 The good news is that you and your colleagues in
Health Industry Consolidation Driving High Prices
America's health care affordability crisis stems from high, rising, and variable prices across a wide range of health care goods and services, including prescription drugs and diagnostic tools such as MRIs and CT scans. For example, the price of Humira -- a drug used to treat arthritis -- is more than four times as expensive in our country as in the
* Hospital consolidation: Hospital mergers are occurring more frequently both within and across health care markets, leading to higher prices in both cases. According to the
* Insurance consolidation: Insurance markets are not as highly concentrated as providers, but there is evidence of markets with little competition between insurers. Between 2006 and 2014, the four-firm concentration ratio -- the extent of market control held by the four largest firms,
* Vertical Integration: The number of hospital-acquired physician practices grew from 35,700 in 2012 to more than 80,000 in 2018.29 Over this same time period, the percentage of physicians employed by a hospital or health system nearly doubled, from 25% to 44%.30 Recent research found that over 55% of physicians are now employed in hospital-owned practices.31 This trend was accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which exacerbated the financial vulnerabilities of independent and smaller physician practices and threatened the near collapse of entire sectors of the health care system -- particularly primary care.32 Nearly 23,000 physicians left independent practice to work for a hospital or other corporate entity after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, while hospitals and other corporate entities acquired nearly 21,000 additional physician practices from 2019 to 2020, representing a 25% increase in corporate-owned practices.33
* Mergers and Vertical Integration of Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs), Insurers, and Pharmacies: Though big drug companies bear the lion's share of the responsibility for our high and rising drug costs, other industry players also contribute.34 Just as consolidation in hospitals and large health care corporations causes price increases, similar trends in consolidation among PBMs, insurers, and pharmacies can lead to increased costs for patients who are trying to access and afford their medications.35 The top three PBMs, all of which are affiliated with major insurers and/or pharmacies, control 80% of the market: CVS, including Caremark and
Hospital Pricing Abuses
Nowhere is the negative impact of consolidation more evident than the rising cost of hospital stays and services, which have increased dramatically in the last decade and make up a large portion of increasing health care costs overall.41,42,43 These cost increases have occurred despite lower hospital utilization and are largely due to escalating prices, which are the result of hospitals buying other hospitals and community doctors to eliminate competition and form big health care corporations and medical monopolies.44,45 Americans in many communities have watched as their local hospitals became health systems, and those health systems were bought by large health care corporations. What most in the public and policymaking community have not realized is how much this has destroyed any real competition in our health care sector, allowing hospitals to dramatically increase their prices every year.46,47 Between 1990 and 2023, hospital prices have increased 600% - and just since 2015, hospital prices have increased as much as 31% nationally, now accounting for nearly one-third of
In
Importantly, hospital prices are not only high, but have become essentially irrational:
* In 2020, across all hospital inpatient and outpatient services, employers and private insurers paid on average 224% of what Medicare pays for the same services.53
* Prices at hospitals in concentrated markets are 12% higher than those in markets with four or more rivals without any demonstrated improvement in the quality or access to care.54,55,56 All the while, the workforce in these concentrated markets suffers - wages for nurses and other health care workers decrease significantly after mergers and acquisitions.57 - Prices for the exact same service vary widely, sometimes even within a single hospital system:
* A colonoscopy at a single medical center in
* At one health system in
* Across the country, the average price for a knee replacement ranges from
* The price of an MRI at
What's more, consumers and employers, who are the ultimate purchasers of health care, have limited insight into what the prices of health care services are until after they've received a bill. For the majority of Americans - 66% - who receive health care through private insurance,62 health care prices are established in closed-door negotiations between large hospital corporations and health plans based on who has more market power.63 These health care prices, often referred to as the negotiated rate, are buried in proprietary contracts without allowing for insight into or oversight over the price of health care services by the public and policymakers.64 Health care is one of the only markets in the
It does not have to be this way. We know what the major drivers of high and irrational health prices are, and we know how to fix them. As federal lawmakers, you have an obligation to carefully steward our national health care resources and taxpayer dollars. We urge the Committee to consider well-vetted, bipartisan, and commonsense legislation that would remedy some of the most obvious health system failings, and to take on rising health industry consolidation among hospitals, insurers, and other health care organizations that enables anticompetitive behaviors, prevents healthy competition in markets and results in monopolies that set outrageous and unjustifiable prices. Policymakers should also ensure there is a great deal more transparency around both the cost of care and health care outcomes, including for vulnerable populations living in rural America, people of color and people living with disabilities.
Price Transparency
One crucial way this Committee can address provider consolidation and encourage competition in the health care system is through price transparency. Unveiling prices is a critical step towards achieving truly affordable health care, improved health, and more competitive health care markets across the
Site of Service Payment Differentials and Dishonest Billing
We also encourage the Committee to crack down on industry practices that take advantage of market inefficiencies that come from site-specific payment rates. This broken financial incentive that pays hospitals higher reimbursement rates for outpatient services than for the exact same services provided at independent physician offices are a significant problem, a major driver of unaffordable care for America's families, and if addressed comprehensively could save American families and payers billions of
Currently, hospitals are able to purchase off-campus doctors' offices and use their hospital national provider number to charge Medicare and private insurance plans at hospital rates. An analysis by
These practices negatively impact real people every day, all across our country.
In 2021, Roman's pediatrician referred him to
We also urge the Committee to take a close look at anticompetitive practices and clauses in health care contracting agreements, which when occurring between providers and insurers give large entities in highly consolidated markets the upper hand in contract negotiations to build networks and set prices. As a result, many of these contracts include terms that limit access to higher-quality, lower-cost care.
Drug Pricing and PBM Transparency
This Committee can also play a role in building on last year's historic reforms to address high drug costs. While the unscrupulous business models of big drug corporations are most squarely to blame for our drug costs crisis, PBMs also have played an important role in driving unaffordable drug prices.80 As third party administrators designed to serve as intermediaries between health insurance providers and drug manufacturers, the key function of a PBM is to negotiate drug price concessions from pharmacies and drug manufacturers to lower prescription drug costs for health plans and employers.81 To be clear, some drug costs are lower than they otherwise would be because of PBMs - and pharmaceutical corporations have taken particular aim at PBMs because of their role in negotiating a better price.
However, there is far too much opaqueness in the functioning of PBMs and certain business practices that are good for PBMs are bad for consumers. PBMs receive rebates and discounts from drug companies in exchange for formulary placement, or a place of the list of drugs a PBM has agreed to cover.82 Importantly, although PBMs negotiate rebates, their revenue is based on a percentage of the drug's list price.83 The result is that PBMs have a strong financial incentive to prioritize higher cost drugs. In many plan designs, PBMs pocket a percent of the rebate they get for consumers, making it advantageous for them to negotiate a higher rebate for a higher priced drug than a lower overall list price.84 Pharmaceutical companies, then, raise both the list price and the rebate year after year making the overall cost of the drug higher.85 A 2020 study showed that for every
Beyond these immediate steps, policymakers should focus on a broader redesign of the economic incentives of the health care sector to align with consumers and families. Ultimately, policy solutions should reorient health care payment and delivery to the goal that we all have -- improved health for ourselves and our families that is affordable and economically sustainable.
Once again, the American people want action. Large majorities of voters support a range of policies to lower prices. Voters from both sides of the aisle broadly support:88,89
* Requiring all health care organizations to publicly disclose their prices (87%)
* Limiting outpatient fees to the same price charged by doctors in the community (85%)
* Preventing hospitals from engaging in business tactics that reduce competition (75%)
* Limiting mergers and acquisitions (74%)
Thank you again for holding this hearing today.
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Footnotes:
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5 NORC at the
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8 "Vast Majority of Large Employers Surveyed Say Broader Government Role Will Be Necessary to Control Health Costs and Provide Coverage, Survey Finds,"
9
10
11
12 "Racism and Health,"
13
14 From 1970 to 2019 the percentage of hospitals that were part of hospital systems rose substantially, from 10 percent to 67 percent, including a moderate increase from 58 percent to 67 percent between 2009 and 2019. For more information, see Fulton BD, Arnold DR, King JS, Montague AD, Greaney TL, Scheffler RM. The rise of cross-market hospital systems and their market power in the US. Health Aff (
15 William H. Shrank,
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17
18
19
20
21
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23
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25 "Chart 2.9: Announced Hospital Mergers and Acquisitions, 1998-2015," TrendWatch Chartbook 2016: Trends Affecting Hospitals and Health Systems (
26 Chart 2.9: Announced Hospital Mergers and Acquisitions, 2005-2017," TrendWatch Chartbook 2018: Trends Affecting Hospitals and Health Systems (
27
28 Leemore S. Dafny, "Evaluating the Impact of Health Insurance Industry Consolidation: Learning from Experience,"
29 "Updated Physician Practice Acquisition Study: National and Regional Changes in Physician Employment, 2012-2018,"
30 PAI, "Physician Practice Acquisition Study."
31 Venkatesh, Shruthi. 2019. "The Impact of Hospital Acquisition on Physician Referrals." Unpublished manuscript,
32
33 Ibid.
34 Frederick Isasi Testimony,
35 Cooper, Z., Craig, S., et al, The Price Ain't Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured,
36 The Top Pharmacy Benefit Managers of 2021: The Big Get Even Bigger, Drug Channels,
37 Bhatnagar, S., High Drug Prices: Are PBMs the Right Target?,
38 Bhatnagar, S., High Drug Prices: Are PBMs the Right Target?,
39 Freed, Z., the Pharmacy Benefit Mafia: The Secret Health Care Monopolies Jacking Up Drug Prices and Abusing Patients and Pharmacists,
40 Carrier, M., A Six-Step Solution to the PBM Problem, Health Affairs,
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53 Whaley, C. et al. Prices Paid to Hospitals by Private Health Plans. RAND. 2022. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1144-1.html
54 Cooper, Z. et al. The Price Ain't Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured.
55 Gaynor, M. Diagnosing the Problem: Exploring the Effects of Consolidation and Anticompetitive Conduct in Health Care Markets. Statement before the Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administration Law.
56 The Impact of Hospital Consolidation on Medical Costs. NCCI Insights. 2018. https://www.ncci.com/Articles/Pages/II_Insights_QEB_Impact-of-Hospital-Consolidation-on-Medical-Costs.aspx
57 Prager,
58 Kliff,
59 Ibid.
60 National Chartbook of Health Care Prices.
61 Kliff,
62 US Census, Health Insurance Coverage in
63 Kliff,
64
65
66
67
68 "Transparency in Coverage Final Rule Fact Sheet (CMS-9915-F),"
69
70
71 Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, Moving to Site Neutrality in Commercial Insurance Payments,
72 Ibid.
73 Hannah T.
74 Ibid. See also,
75 https://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/our-work/working-papers/2015/ipr-wp-15-02.html
76
77 https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/04/01/hospital-facilities-telehealth-fees/
78 MedPAC, Medicare and the Health Care Delivery System, Report to the
79 Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, Moving to Site Neutrality in Commercial Insurance Payments,
80 Pharmacy Benefit Managers and Their Role in Drug Spending,
81 Pharmacy Benefit Managers,
82 Bhatnagar, S., High Drug Prices: Are PBMs the Right Target?,
83 Pharmacy Benefit Managers and Their Role in Drug Spending,
84 Yeung, K., Dusetzina, S., Basu, A.,
86 Sood, N., Ribero, R., et al, The Association Between Drug Rebates and List Prices, USC Schaeffer,
87 Pharmacy Benefit Managers,
88
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Original text here: https://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/tripoli_testimony.pdf
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