Findings from University of Nebraska Update Knowledge of Management Research (Strategic Risk and Lobbying: Investigating Lobbying Breadth As Risk Management)

2021 JUN 18 (NewsRx) -- By a News Reporter-Staff News Editor at NewsRx Policy and Law Daily -- Current study results on Business - Management Research have been published. According to news reporting out of Lincoln, Nebraska, by NewsRx editors, research stated, “Despite many studies investigating how lobbying expenditures enhance performance outcomes, limited attention has been given to understanding the underlying mechanisms driving firm lobbying behaviors-and, particularly, where firms target their lobbying expenditures. We argue lobbying breadth serves as a risk management strategy to both hedge against possible government intrusion and minimize disapproval of firm actions from government officials.”

Our news journalists obtained a quote from the research from the University of Nebraska, “As such, we posit firms’ strategic risk will positively relate to breadth of lobbying firms’ target. Further, if lobbying breadth serves as risk management strategy, then other aspects that affect decisions about the amount of risk protection a firm may need should also affect this relationship. We argue that CEOs’ ownership and firms’ political uncertainty may exacerbate exposure from firm risk taking to government actions, thus strengthening the insurance relationship. Similarly, we argue available slack, as a form of internal insurance against government actions, will weaken the relationship between strategic risk taking and lobbying breadth. We find support for most of our arguments in a sample of U. S. manufacturing firms. This research extends understanding of lobbying beyond the predominant focus on expenditures and securing beneficial outcomes.”

According to the news editors, the research concluded: “Exploring how lobbying breadth serves an important risk management role also offers insights into firm nonmarket strategy.”

This research has been peer-reviewed.

For more information on this research see: Strategic Risk and Lobbying: Investigating Lobbying Breadth As Risk Management. Journal of Management, 2021. Journal of Management can be contacted at: Sage Publications Inc, 2455 Teller Rd, Thousand Oaks, CA 91320, USA.

Our news journalists report that additional information may be obtained by contacting Mirzokhidjon Abdurakhmonov, University of Nebraska, 730 N 14TH St, Lincoln, NE 68588, United States. Additional authors for this research include Jason W. Ridge, Aaron D. Hill and Holly Loncarich.

The direct object identifier (DOI) for that additional information is: https://doi.org/10.1177/01492063211011762. This DOI is a link to an online electronic document that is either free or for purchase, and can be your direct source for a journal article and its citation.

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