House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Hearing
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"Nuclear Weapons Modernization Programs: Military, Technical, and Political Requirements for the B61 Life Extension Program and Future Stockpile Strategy."
Introduction
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and distinguished members of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on "Nuclear Weapons Modernization Programs: Military, Technical and Political Requirements for the B61 Life Extension Program and Future Stockpile Strategy." I am
Sandia is a multiprogram national security laboratory owned by the
While nuclear weapons represent Sandia's core mission, the science, technology, engineering, and business professional capabilities required to support this mission position us to support other aspects of national security as well. Indeed, there is natural, increasingly significant synergy between our core mission and our broader national security work, including research and development in synergistic defense products, cyberspace, nuclear assessments and warning, and global nuclear dangers. Examples of areas where Sandia has applied its expertise with a direct nexus between nuclear weapons (NW) work and non-NW benefits for the nation include the development of tools for the warfighter to use in order to safely disable improvised explosive devices. This achievement was made possible by the deep expertise in explosives required for our NW mission, global monitoring systems for nuclear material detection, and our contributions to cyber defense, which are enabled by our long-standing work in the command and control of nuclear weapons.
My statement today before this subcommittee will focus on the requirements driving the B61 LEP and the current program status. I also will touch on Sandia's role in the overall "3 + 2" future stockpile vision.
Ms. Creedon is representing the U.S. policy perspective at this hearing,
1. In order to sustain high confidence in the safety, security, and reliability of the B61 into the next decade, it is our technical judgment that we must complete the life extension program currently being executed.
2. We are well into the full-scale engineering development phase of this program, with the baseline design review scheduled for
3. To date, we have costed
4. At Sandia, we met all major FY13 program milestones for the B61 LEP on (or under) cost although sequestration caused some of the work scope to be deferred to FY14.
5. We put in place rigorous project management expertise to ensure ongoing adherence to plan for all our modernization efforts.
6. We have drawn upon resources and expertise nurtured through interagency work on broader national security challenges to meet the urgent demands of our core nuclear weapons mission.
7. However, the impacts--both to schedule and lifecycle cost--of ongoing FY14 budget decisions have yet to be established. It is likely that we will have delays in schedule and higher costs.
The B61 LEP: Sustaining the B61 Safety, Security, and Reliability
Every year, the directors of the three NNSA national security laboratories and the commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) are required by law to assess the state of health of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Based on an extensive technical evaluation, Sandia's director submits a letter to the secretaries of Energy and Defense and the chairman of the
Regarding the B61, in recent years, my letters have documented concerns related to technology obsolescence and aging. While the B61 is currently safe and secure, these concerns continue to increase. For example, in the past three years, we have observed time-dependent degradation not seen before in electronic, polymer, and high-explosive components. This observation is not surprising given the age of the B61 weapon system, the oldest units of which were manufactured and fielded in the late 1970s with some components dating back to the 1960s. As planned, the B61 LEP we are currently executing addresses all known aging-related issues.
The program is also addressing technology obsolescence. Electronic components of the B61 were designed and manufactured decades ago. Outdated technologies, such as vacuum tubes, are exhibiting performance degradation and are difficult to evaluate and assess with confidence. The new radar for the B61 LEP will be based on the modern technology of radio-frequency integrated circuits.
This life extension also contains an explicit approach to trusted design. For example, we are manufacturing all application-specific integrated circuits in Sandia's trusted foundry.
Encryption algorithms, which are fundamental to the security of the B61, are assessed by the
The B61 receives important signals from the aircraft used to deliver it, and the aircraft interface of the B61 needs to be updated from analog technology to an adaptable interface that can also accommodate digital technology to ensure compatibility with planned future aircraft upgrades and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
Following direction from the
B61 LEP updates, including Mod consolidation into just one weapon type, will overall dramatically reduce the amount of special nuclear material for this weapon type. Updated safety and security features also will be included in the B61-12, consistent with presidential directives and national policy.
In summary, the B61 LEP includes a prudent mix of the following:
(1) Requalification and reuse of existing components that we can certify for an additional 20-year lifetime,
(2) Remanufacture of some existing component designs, and
(3) Replacement with new designs, where required.
This approach to the program reduces the number of components to be developed and reduces the technical and programmatic risk associated with the life extension, but it does add lifetime risk to the B61-12. The resulting B61-12 design is the minimum that
* Meets threshold military requirements, including compatibility with future digital aircraft interfaces,
* Addresses known end-of-life and technology obsolescence issues,
* Updates safety and security over the currently fielded systems, and
* Consolidates the B61 Mods 3, 4, 7, and 10 into a single B61 Mod 12.
Cost and Schedule Performance on the B61 LEP
NNSA has provided to
Thus, from our perspective, the most relevant cost number for the B61 LEP work at Sandia is
The B61 LEP can be thought of as having three major phases--design, component and system qualification, and production. We are currently approximately 60% complete on design, with baseline design review scheduled for
There has been considerable discussion about schedule slip or cost growth on the B61 LEP. With respect to this topic, I can only address Sandia's role; however, as the predominant design agent for the LEP, we recognize the impact of our work on the overall enterprise schedule.
Regarding schedule, there are two overarching causes for slip: technical issues and budgetary changes. With respect to technical risk, I have the highest level of confidence that technical issues will NOT cause impact to Sandia's schedule performance. I say this for two reasons. First, we do not view this program as inherently high technical risk, especially when compared with other product development programs conducted at Sandia. The B61 LEP does not involve significant changes to environmental or functionality requirements; therefore, the inherent technical risk is lowered. Second, we manage our contingency funds (~10%) in a manner that continuously buys down risk against a formalized risk register. So, for example, higher risk elements of the program, such as Tail Kit integration or component reuse, receive early and enhanced focus. As mentioned, we are well into program execution, and early success supports our confidence. For example, at the start of our full-scale engineering development, the radar component was high on our risk register. As you may be aware, in August we tested our new radar for the B61-12. The test of the new design was so successful that we have decided to eliminate two additional tests that were originally planned, saving an estimated
With respect to budgetary changes, I cannot be as sanguine. In FY13, sequestration impacts caused some technical activities to be moved into FY14. We estimated the schedule impact of those shifts to be relatively small--on the order of 2 to 3 months over the life of the program (within overall schedule contingency). However, at the time of this testimony, we are operating against a FY14 resource allocation that, on an annual basis, is at least 23% below the FY14 requirement, as contained in the most recent NNSA-approved Baseline Change Requests to the Selected Acquisition Report, approved in
Another aspect of cost growth is labor rates. We are committed to managing labor costs and have confidence in our forward pricing rates used in our cost estimate, which take into account upcoming changes in pension and health care cost obligations. Once again, our initial performance validates our confidence as our labor costs for FY13 and now FY14 are modestly below the forward pricing rates we used in our cost estimate.
Achieving a High Level of Programmatic Performance
As illustrated by data in the section above, we have achieved a high level of programmatic performance on the B61 LEP and, indeed, the same is true of the two other modernization programs in full-scale engineering development at Sandia--the W88 ALT 370 and Mk21 Fuze Replacement. This achievement was the result of the deliberate and focused efforts of our leadership over the past several years.
Among these efforts are collocation of the core design teams, enhancements to our classified networks reflective of the volume of work, and most significantly, staffing and training of the workforce. The staffing requirement for these modernization efforts exceeds 1,000 people. I am pleased to report that, despite numerous periods of budget uncertainty over the past two years, we have been extremely successful at staffing the program against a very aggressive staffing plan. Two staffing approaches have allowed us to achieve the required staffing levels for the modernization programs: (1) internal staff movements from other Sandia programs that require skills synergistic with those for the nuclear weapons program and (2) external hiring. Since 2010, we have hired some 500 advanced-degree scientists and engineers. The overall number of members of the workforce at the Laboratory remained essentially flat through this period. Of those we hired new to Sandia, approximately 58% are early in their professional careers. The modernization program provides opportunities for these new technical staff to work closely with our experienced designers: from advanced concept development to component design and qualification, and ultimately to the production and fielding of nuclear weapon systems. It is very important that we provide individuals such as these with an environment where they can undertake the multiyear learning it takes to technically steward the nation's nuclear stockpile now and into the future, after the modernized warheads are in the stockpile. We have a new and strong contingent of scientists and engineers prepared to take on that challenge, and we must strive to provide the stability, focus, and national commitment that will enable their success.
Finally, another major effort of our leadership has been implementing an increased level of project management rigor. Our technical experts are partnered with project management professionals, skilled practitioners using a suite of formal tools, such as resource-loaded schedules, requirements tracking systems, and sophisticated risk management and mitigation methods. We are moving to an Earned Value Management System (EVMS), which is a way of quantitatively measuring where one is in the execution of a project regarding schedule and cost. While these approaches add to execution overhead, they provide essential insights and early indicators for a project of this scope and duration. With EVMS, we can use tailored assessments to look at cost and schedule performance indicators on a monthly basis, examine each subsystem, and track more accurately how each team is doing in developing those subsystems--and we can make immediate, early changes if necessary, applying more or fewer resources to each particular element of the project, as required.
We believe Sandia has an achievable plan, and today we continue to be on schedule and on budget relative to the
Further Modernization Efforts at Sandia
The B61 LEP is the first and most urgent in a series of LEPs and ALTs required to sustain the U.S. nuclear stockpile into the future, in keeping with the "3+2" strategic vision of the stockpile codified in the NWC-approved baseline plan. We share the vision of a 3+2 stockpile, although the pace and sequencing of the path to that vision are not yet fully known and will be driven by global security imperatives and moderated by fiscal realities.
Our successful record of using common technologies and components across multiple systems that have been deployed in the U.S. stockpile has helped reduce development risk and manage development costs. We are extending this approach to development of the Arming, Fuzing, and Firing (AF&F) system. Today, a modular AF&F design is being developed for the W88 ALT 370, the Mk21 Fuze Replacement, and potentially for the W78/88-1 LEP. By capitalizing on work we have done over the past decade on modular warhead architectures and adaptable nonnuclear components, Sandia is supporting the NWC's plan for stockpile modernization cost-efficiently and with reduced risk. Although not directly interchangeable to accommodate missile interface differences, the underlying technologies and components are eminently adaptable to each of these warhead applications and thus result in cost savings and reduced risk. In addition to the ballistic missile warhead applications, these same technologies and, in some cases, nearly identical components are being used in the B61 LEP. As in the past, rigorous performance testing in qualification, production, and surveillance mitigates the common-mode failure risks attendant to this approach. In addition, the microelectronics fabrication complex at Sandia and the Kansas City Plant provide the nation with a secure, responsive infrastructure for addressing production or design issues if they arise.
W88 ALT 370
Sandia is currently executing full-scale engineering development (Phase 6.3) on the W88 ALT 370, which involves replacing the AF&F system. The current FY19 FPU schedule for the W88 ALT 370 is driven by the overall
Mk21 Fuze Replacement
Together, the B61 LEP, W88 ALT 370, and Mk21 Fuze Replacement, provide substantive required upgrades to all three legs of the U.S. nuclear weapons triad. That force posture has been consistently reaffirmed through official U.S. national security policy reviews and most recently in the updated Guidance for Nuclear Forces Employment transmitted to
W78/88-1 LEP
With a longer time horizon, we are working with NNSA and the
Additional Modernization Efforts
We delivered to NNSA preliminary reports on the options and considerations for the Long-Range Standoff Cruise Missile or Air-Launched Cruise Missile replacement.
Sustaining the Current Stockpile
Sandia, together with the other two NNSA national security laboratories, has key responsibilities in ensuring the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nation's nuclear deterrent. The stockpile surveillance and assessment program plays a crucial role in establishing that required confidence in our nuclear deterrent. It is through stockpile surveillance that nuclear weapons are taken apart to test the components. Test results provide the necessary data to help us assess the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile.
Stockpile Surveillance and Assessment
Findings from conducting this program provide the technical basis for our annual stockpile assessment reported to the President of
Multiple drivers heighten the importance of the surveillance program. Among them are the following: an unprecedented age of the stockpile, which includes many subsystems that were not originally designed for extended life; smaller stockpile numbers, which heighten the importance of individual warhead reliability; scoping decisions for stockpile life extensions; and for at least the next 20 years, surveillance of a stockpile that will contain simultaneously both our oldest weapons and life-extended weapons. The latter group must be examined for possible birth defects and for further aging of reused components.
The FY13 funding allocation after sequestration impacts required that we constrain surveillance efforts; current indications are that the FY14 funding for Sandia will impose additional constraints on our surveillance program. Despite funding constraints, Sandia is committed to fully support the flight test program with the DoD. However, we cannot provide annual laboratory testing, as historically we have done, for each system in the stockpile. The testing period will have to be stretched out. At the same time, our efforts to implement the component testing and new diagnostics and models fall further behind. These capabilities provide understanding of margins, uncertainties, and trends needed to (1) ensure the stockpile is safe, secure, and effective; (2) understand the lead times necessary to respond to aging issues that would have the potential to reduce stockpile safety, security, or reliability; and (3) support decisions on scoping for stockpile life extensions. Furthermore, several of our key surveillance facilities located in
Advancing the Tools of Stewardship
During the stewardship era, the quintessential challenge was the elimination of underground testing. The sustained support received for stewardship has allowed us to make enormous progress in our understanding of nuclear weapons function in the absence of underground testing and has enabled us to attract talented staff. We must continue to advance and apply the tools of stewardship during today's modernization era.
Science-Based Infrastructure and Capabilities
Sandia's capabilities are essential to its full life-cycle responsibilities for the stockpile: from exploratory concept definition to design, development, qualification, testing, and ultimately to ongoing stockpile surveillance and assessment.
The FY13 funding for the recapitalization of our silicon fabrication facility, the requirements for which I have addressed in prior testimony, enabled us to replace the single most-expensive and highest-risk item in the facility. The FY14 budget must support the recapitalization program at the planned level.
I will restate that Sandia stewards for the nuclear weapons program, as well as for the
In addition to the silicon fabrication facility, we have significant recapitalization needs at various experimental and test facilities critical to the success of the B61 LEP, W88 ALT 370, and future LEPs, particularly at the
Sandia's high-performance computing capabilities are vital tools for our mission responsibilities in stockpile surveillance, certification, and qualification, and they continue to prove to be indispensable to our broader national security work. Current indications are that the FY14 budget negatively impacts our high-performance computing capabilities.
I want to emphasize that the investments in our stewardship tools over the past 15 years enable cost reductions in our modernization efforts through increased use of computational simulation, which reduces the amount of qualification testing; allows, for the first time, confident qualification of some components without either nuclear testing or expensive aboveground facilities; and affords important insights into the challenge of predictive aging for our older stockpile.
Synergy between Our
Today's national security challenges are complex and highly diverse. The NNSA laboratories are contributing solutions to those challenges. To energize and sharpen its nuclear weapons competencies, Sandia relies on its broader national security work. The symbiotic relationship between the nuclear weapons mission and broader national security missions prevents insularity and creates a challenging, vigorous scientific and engineering environment that has helped us attract and retain the new talent we need. Such an environment is essential for us to succeed against the challenges we now face. Let me give you two examples that highlight the way in which this symbiotic relationship works at Sandia.
First, I will give a technology example. Sandia has led the development of real-time processing and high performance-to-volume ratio technologies for synthetic aperture radar (SAR). Both technologies were made possible by our extensive radar design and development work for nuclear weapon fuzing. The technologies have been leveraged and are currently used by the DoD. The extensive SAR work has sharpened our radar design competencies and kept Sandia aligned with advances in radar technology, such as radio-frequency integrated circuits. We applied these modern technologies to the design of the replacement radar for the B61 LEP, the W88 Alt 370, and the Mk21 Fuze Replacement with a high degree of commonality, which leads to cost savings.
My second example is Sandia's satellite program, which spans about five decades and has grown steadily with numerous customers. This program, which provides our nation with critical national security capabilities, has brought with it a very rigorous program-management environment for moving advanced technology within tight schedule requirements. We have leveraged the knowledge accumulated in these areas to our nuclear weapons program.
I strongly believe that today it is not possible for my Laboratory to deliver consistently on the commitments to the nuclear weapons program without the synergistic interagency work that attracts top talent, hones our skills, and provides stability through the cycles of the nuclear weapons program.
Government commitment to the broad national security work of the laboratories is essential for
Conclusions
We are committed to continuing to provide the leadership and management expertise and attention required for successful execution of the stockpile modernization programs consistent with national security policy, NWC authorization, military requirements, NNSA direction, and congressional funding. As a
We appreciate the many ways in which
We continue to struggle with the uncertainty associated with possible continuing resolution and sequestration outcomes, and the numerous and wide-ranging funding scenarios for support of this program in FY14 and beyond. Timely resolution of these issues is critical to sustaining morale and retention of our staff, and to staying on track with the scope and schedule required to support U.S. nuclear deterrent objectives. We welcome continued communication between congressional committees and the national laboratories so we can be fully aware of possible and probable outcomes and can plan accordingly.
Finally, I want to end on a personal note. In a professional career now spanning more than 37 years, I have had the extraordinary privilege to work at three institutions whose core responsibility is nuclear weapons: the Atomic Weapons Establishment in the
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Read this original document at: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS29/20131029/101355/HHRG-113-AS29-Wstate-HommertP-20131029.PDF
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