Reports Summarize Insurance Findings from Zhongnan University of Economics & Law (Does Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Enhance Corporate Tax Compliance? Evidence From Chinese A-share Listed Companies): Insurance

2026 MAR 04 (NewsRx) -- By a News Reporter-Staff News Editor at NewsRx Policy and Law Daily -- Investigators publish new report on Insurance. According to news originating from Wuhan, People’s Republic of China, by NewsRx correspondents, research stated, “Directors’ and Officers’ (D&O) liability insurance is a key component of modern corporate governance, and assessing its impact is crucial to enhancing corporate governance. This study uses data from Chinese A-share listed companies to examine how corporate D&O liability insurance affects tax compliance.”

Our news journalists obtained a quote from the research from the Zhongnan University of Economics & Law, “The findings show that purchasing D&O insurance significantly increases corporate tax avoidance. Mechanism tests show that D&O insurance provides an effective risk-sharing mechanism for senior executives, which increases their risk appetite and reduces their management intensity, thus increasing tax noncompliance. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the impact of D&O insurance on tax avoidance is significant in firms with stronger internal audits and external financial supervision but insignificant in firms with weaker internal and external oversight. These findings provides insights into improving the D&O insurance system and reducing corporate tax non-compliance.”

According to the news editors, the research concluded: “This study indicates that while developing the D&O liability system, we must also consider its potential negative impacts on corporate governance.”

This research has been peer-reviewed.

For more information on this research see: Does Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Enhance Corporate Tax Compliance? Evidence From Chinese A-share Listed Companies. Finance Research Letters, 2026;91. Finance Research Letters can be contacted at: Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science, 525 B St, Ste 1900, San Diego, CA 92101-4495, USA. (Elsevier - www.elsevier.com; Finance Research Letters - http://www.journals.elsevier.com/finance-research-letters/)

The news correspondents report that additional information may be obtained from Fangyuan Ding, Zhongnan University of Economics & Law, School of Law, Wuhan, People’s Republic of China.

The direct object identifier (DOI) for that additional information is: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2026.109472. This DOI is a link to an online electronic document that is either free or for purchase, and can be your direct source for a journal article and its citation.

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