Findings from Columbia University Update Understanding of Economics (Estimating Equilibrium In Health Insurance Exchanges: Price Competition and Subsidy Design Under the Aca): Economics

2024 AUG 13 (NewsRx) -- By a News Reporter-Staff News Editor at Health Policy and Law Daily -- Current study results on Economics have been published. According to news reporting out of New York City, New York, by NewsRx editors, the research stated, “Regulations to design private yet publicly sponsored health insurance markets are increasingly adopted in many OECD countries. Here I combine data and economic theory to analyse the interaction between insurers’ competition and the design of premium subsidies in determining equilibrium outcomes.”

Financial supporters for this research include Kapnick Foundation (Stanford University), Becker Friedman Institute Health Economics Initiative (University of Chicago).

Our news journalists obtained a quote from the research from Columbia University, “My empirical model includes adverse selection, rich heterogeneity in preferences for vertically and horizontally differentiated plans and accommodates alternative assumptions on pricing conduct. In the context of the Affordable Care Act in the U.S., I estimate the joint distribution of preferences and expected cost using Californian administrative records on 3.4 million plan choices between 2014 and 2017, combined with plan and survey data on medical claims. An empirical horse race between conduct assumptions favours oligopoly pricing over perfect competition.”

According to the news editors, the research concluded: “Considering alternative subsidy designs shows that, in equilibrium, shifting subsidy generosity toward the ‘young invincibles’ would lower premiums for all enrolees while increasing enrolment and profits.”

This research has been peer-reviewed.

For more information on this research see: Estimating Equilibrium In Health Insurance Exchanges: Price Competition and Subsidy Design Under the Aca. The Review of Economic Studies, 2024. The Review of Economic Studies can be contacted at: Oxford Univ Press, Great Clarendon St, Oxford OX2 6DP, England.

Our news journalists report that additional information may be obtained by contacting Pietro Tebaldi, Columbia University, Dept. of Economics, New York, NY 10027, United States.

The direct object identifier (DOI) for that additional information is: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae020. This DOI is a link to an online electronic document that is either free or for purchase, and can be your direct source for a journal article and its citation.

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