Feds: State employee got unemployment while still working, hacked accounts
She was supposed to help struggling people get unemployment benefits during the pandemic. Instead she scammed them and the system to enrich herself, federal officials say.
In what prosecutors describe as an inside job at the
"This case is about a corrupt contract employee working for the
According to the complaint, 28-year-old
Mims did this, authorities said, by changing people's method of contact with the unemployment agency, including switching their authentication email addresses, passwords and bank account information. She then certified additional claims under the hacked unemployment accounts and diverted payments to a new bank account that she had access to, investigators said.
"In other words," the
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According to court records, Mims collected nearly
Mims, one of a dozen Michiganders charged with unemployment fraud tied to the pandemic, could not be reached for comment Thursday. Her lawyer,
According to the complaint, Mims was hired in
Prosecutors said that shortly after Mims was hired she began using her insider access to fraudulently process claims in the names of third parties without their knowledge or authorization.
To pull off the scam, they said, Mims fraudulently opened unauthorized bank accounts in the names of third parties, had bogus unemployment claims deposited into those illegitimate accounts, and then pocketed a portion of the stolen money. Mims also was collecting unemployment insurance benefits for herself by pretending she was unemployed.
"These charges show our continued commitment to prosecuting those who attempt to use the COVID-19 crisis to steal taxpayer funds and fraudulently enrich themselves," Acting U,S. Attorney
Added
Mims is no longer employed with the unemployment agency.
According to court records, here is what led to the charges against Mims:
In June, federal and state investigators began investigating Mims after the unemployment agency noticed several anomalies in Mims' work activity, including that many of the claims she was accessing were not assigned work items. Furthermore, Mims was using her access to make changes to claimants' unemployment accounts with no evidence that she had spoken with that person, or that the claimant had contacted the agency.
Investigators linked the activity to Mims through her unique unemployment user name, "mimsa" in the state computer system. Mims did not report to the office daily, but rather worked virtually from home.
According to state unemployment records, in approximately
Then, in
But state records show that S.M. did not certify for any additional weeks of unemployment benefits. Meanwhile, an audit found that in February, Mims used her employee access to search for unemployment claims that were associated with a specific address in
State audit records show that Mims accessed multiple claims associated with this apartment building, including S.M.'s claim, though S.M.'s unemployment claim had never been assigned by the state to be reviewed by Mims.
Still, authorities allege, Mims accessed S.M.'s claims and stole her personal information to help create new claims and get through the two-factor authentication system that the state uses to prevent fraud.
For example, when setting up an unemployment claim, the claimant designates the way they wish to receive the authentication code from the state in order to access their account. When accessing their account, a claimant inputs their username and password, receives the authentication code from the state in the preferred manner, enters this authentication code, and is then granted access to their account.
Mims used her insider-status to change the authentication email associated with S.M.'s account, which allowed her to access the account and open certifications for more unemployment benefits.
In order to get benefits, a person has to certify weeks that they are eligible for benefits. If this process is completed online, as happened in this case, the claimant accesses their unemployment account and electronically "certifies" their claim in the system.
But S.M. never requested additional benefits, authorities said, noting this was confirmed during interviews with S.M.
According to state records, on
Two days later, records show, Mims accessed S.M.'s unemployment account and changed the bank account to which the agency was to deposit the unemployment benefits.
Red flags went up. That same day, the state's fraud detection system triggered an investigation and identity verification request on S.M.'s unemployment claim.
Mims caught on.
Three days latter, Mims accessed S.M.'s account again and dismissed the fraud investigation and identity verification request, which made her fraudulent claims eligible for more benefits.
The next day, three weeks of unemployment benefits certified by Mims herself were deposited into a Bancorp account. The total amount paid was
This happened several more times, with different IP addresses being used to access S.M.'s account.
According to court records, S.M. contacted the unemployment agency on
On
Agents also discovered a receipt that showed the debit card associated with the Bancorp account in S.M.'s name. It had been used to make a retail purchase, though not by S.M.
Anyone with information about allegations of attempted fraud involving COVID-19 can report it by calling the
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