CSIS: 'New Framework for U.S. Leadership on Climate Migration'
The issue brief was co-authored by Erol Yayboke, deputy director and senior fellow with the Project on Prosperity and Development,
The Issue
Climate migration is poised to be one of the biggest human development and security challenges of the next several decades, yet policymakers and the research community are just now understanding the myriad impacts of climate change on human mobility. A new framework for addressing these challenges is needed--one defined by
Introduction
Our understanding of the impact of climate change on human mobility is in its early stages. We know sea level rise threatens coastal communities around the world and that heat waves, storms, drought, and wildfires made more frequent and severe by climate change will shape global migration patterns. Research on the scale and geographic distribution of climate migration is still nascent, as is the development of potential policy responses. Properly understanding the interplay between climate change and migration is of critical importance for policymakers. Getting our understanding and responses right--or wrong--has enormous implications not only for hundreds of millions of migrants and forcibly displaced people, but also for security and human development.
Despite evidence indicating climate change is already impacting human mobility--and will do so with even greater regularity and severity the longer global temperatures continue to climb--scientists, legal scholars, and policymakers have yet to come to a consensus on what defines a climate migrant. Neither is there an adequate strategy, either internationally or within
This policy brief presents a new framework for
1. What is the relationship between climate change and human mobility?
2. What recourse and protections are currently available to climate migrants?
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A Note on the Term "Climate Migration"
For the ease of our narrative and in the absence of a broadly accepted alternate designation, this brief refers to people for whom climate change was an important factor in leaving home as "climate migrants." The authors acknowledge that a person's designation matters greatly for the type of support they will or will not receive; in using this label, we are also acknowledging the limitations, inadequacy, and even unfairness of doing so. Though in many cases the plight of these so-called climate migrants is similar to forced displacement--and indeed this brief refers often to "displacement"--labeling these people "climate refugees" is misleading since they are not typically afforded the same status and protections as refugees in the international system.
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Temporary, Permanent, and Indirect Impacts
Increasing global temperatures due to rising atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has the potential to shape global migration patterns in myriad ways.
The First Assessment Report published by the
Though myriad climate- and non-climate-related variables are considered by climate migrants before leaving home, their journeys can be broadly grouped into three categories: temporary displacement, permanent displacement, and indirect displacement. For most climate migrants--though not all--climate change is a contributing rather than singularly causal factor.
Temporary Displacement
Extreme weather events are by far the leading cause of forced displacement around the world. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center estimates that 21.5 million people per year on average over the past decade have had to flee their homes due to storms, floods, wildfires, droughts, and other weather events (see figure X). This represents nearly three times more than those internally displaced due to conflict and nearly nine times more than those who apply for asylum in other countries due to a fear of persecution at home.
Content omitted: Figure 1. Average Annual Forced Displacement by Category, 2010-2019
Climate change alone does not cause any particular storm, flood, or wildfire, but higher global temperatures due to rising GHG emissions are increasing the frequency and severity of a range of extreme weather events, including tropical cyclones, inland flooding, drought, and wildfires. These are considered "temporary" in this brief because most displaced by these extreme weather events have the opportunity to return home; however, the authors acknowledge that this is not always the case and, for many living in high threat areas with limited resilience to such shocks, recurrent temporary displacement--which could lead to permanent displacement--is not uncommon.
Tropical Cyclones
Tropical cyclones (also called hurricanes or typhoons) displace millions of people each year. In 2008, Hurricane Ike displaced 2.6 million people in
Content omitted: Figure 2: Geographic distribution of hurricane risk. Recorded historical hurricane activity by maximum wind speed
The greatest tropical cyclone displacement risk exists in the
Content omitted: Table 1: Average Increase in Frequency of Major Tropical Cyclones (relative to 1986-2005)
Inland Flooding
Though often the most vividly portrayed by reporters with their backs to the ocean during a hurricane, coastal storm surge is not the only source of climate change-influenced flood risk. Warmer atmospheric temperatures are increasing the amount of annual rainfall that occurs during extreme precipitation events, which creates flood risks for inland communities as well as landslides and riverbank erosion. Fluvial (riverine) and pluvial (surface) flooding can be as significant a source of displacement as tropical cyclones. For example, 2010 floods in
Drought
Tracking and attributing displacement from drought is more challenging than from storms or floods, but IDMC has recently developed a methodology for doing so, estimating that drought was associated with the internal displacement of nearly 800,000 people each year on average since 2017. This includes large 2017-2019 droughts in
Wildfires
According to the IDMC database, wildfires have displaced over 200,000 people per year on average globally over the past decade. Nearly three-quarters of this has been in
Permanent Displacement
This brief categorizes the above climate-amplified weather disasters as "temporary displacement" events because of the possibility (albeit not certainty) that those displaced can return home to their communities, especially when efforts are made to adequately rebuild, improve resilience, and redevelop the economy. Other climate triggers will result in more permanent displacement whereby return home is significantly less likely or impossible. The most significant of these triggers are sea level rise, human heat thresholds, and agricultural tipping points, all of which are more clearly attributable to climate change, unlike with temporary displacement.
Sea Level Rise
Climate change is warming the oceans and melting ice sheets, both of which lead to sea level rise. Global average sea levels have risen by 8 to 9 inches since pre-industrial levels and by more than 3 inches since 1993 alone (the fastest rate in the past 6,000 years). Eight Pacific islands have already been submerged and two more will be submerged shortly, forcing the inhabitants to permanently relocate. Scientists predict that between 2000 and 2100, sea levels will rise by between 2 and 3.3 feet under a high emissions scenario, but with modest levels of ice sheet melt. That would put the current homes of roughly 120 million people--from
Human Heat Thresholds
Climate change is pushing temperatures in parts of the world to levels unsafe for humans. Humid heat in particular limits the human body's ability to cool itself through perspiration. At a certain threshold, even a healthy person fully resting will die within hours without air conditioning. Climate change has already increased the number of people experiencing at least one day a year with unsafe humid heat by 178 million. Even under a moderate emissions scenario, this is projected to grow to 1.1 billion by the end of the century. Under a high emissions scenario, climate-driven heat waves could kill more people globally than HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria combined, with many developing countries facing climate-driven death rates several times the global average. As heat waves become increasingly unbearable, many will look to relocate to regions with a more habitable climate.
Content omitted: Figure 3: Geographic distribution of humid heat risk. Number of days of unsafe humid heat (WBGT of greater than 33 C) per year by 2100 under a high emissions scenario
Agricultural Tipping Points
Like humans, plants and animals have temperature thresholds. Climate change is increasing agricultural productivity in colder countries but threatening the viability of both crop and livestock production in hotter countries. Drought-driven declines in agricultural production can drive temporary migration patterns, as has occurred over the past few years as poor yields increased the number of Central Americans migrating to
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Spotlight on
Situated along the Eurasian and Australian tectonic plates,
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Indirect Displacement
In addition to the climate migration triggers discussed above, climate change also indirectly impacts the number of people forcibly displaced by conflict. Just as with extreme weather events, climate change is not solely responsible for any individual conflict but can increase the probability that conflict occurs. For example, heat waves and drought can reduce agricultural output and water availability, both of which increase the risk of community-level instability and interethnic conflict. During a 2017 drought in the
States with high levels of fragility are at the highest risk for exposure to climate hazards. Fragile states often do not have the resources or the capacity to respond to the challenges created by climate change-related environmental degradation. As agricultural production falls due to droughts, floods, or other climate-related events, intercommunal conflict over resources increases. Governments in fragile states often lack the ability to provide employment or resource alternatives or to intervene once the violence has started. In many cases, the government lacks even a state presence--particularly a civilian presence--in conflict-prone areas. When the state is unable to provide resources for agricultural communities in times of intense droughts or flooding and violence increases as a result, many people are forced from home.
Conducting a meta-analysis of over 50 existing quantitative studies, Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel (2015) find that higher temperatures meaningfully elevate the risk of both interpersonal and intragroup conflict. Analyzing the relationship between weather variations across 103 source countries and asylum applications in the
Paradoxically, the greatest opportunity for international protection and support for climate migrants exists in this indirect displacement category. The
Existing Frameworks
In part because of the difficulty of attributing climate change to human mobility as a singular--or even predominate--causal factor, climate migrants have little recourse within existing international frameworks and systems, or domestic
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On Terminology: Words Matter
Despite the rising number of people displaced by catastrophic environmental and climate change-related disasters each year and growing empirical evidence directly linking the adverse effects of climate change and human mobility, an official recognition or consensus has yet to be reached regarding terminology. The
The term "climate refugee" deserves particular attention, in part to point out its current technical inaccuracy. The term "refugee" holds great significance and has a specific definition in the international system, carrying with it special protections, formal status, and the opportunity for third-country resettlement. According to the international architecture based on the 1951 convention and 1967 protocol, a refugee is defined as someone who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country." Though many are directly or indirectly forced from home and thus would qualify for access to refugee-like protections, even climate migrants who cross international borders do not have formal status under current international refugee law.
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The
Though climate migrants are not afforded the rights and privileges offered to those granted official refugee or asylee status,
Since 2017, IOM has been asked by member states to report on "migration, environment and climate change." This led to the creation of the Migration, Environment and Climate Change Division, which has a mandate to oversee and support all policy projects on environment- and climate change-related migration. Similar to the aforementioned refugee-focused compact, a large majority of the UNGA adopted the Global Compact for Migration which identifies "climate change impacts as drivers of contemporary migration." IOM's goals in managing environmental migration include preventing forced migration due to environmental factors to the extent possible, providing assistance to affected populations during a disaster, and facilitating migration as a climate change adaptation strategy, all while enhancing the resilience of affected communities. IOM partners with
Under current
There are a few statutory provisions through which
When coupled with well-documented denial of the scientific evidence pointing to the negative impacts of climate change, the inadequacy of current
Climate Migrants Fall through the Cracks
It is difficult to define and to estimate the number of global climate migrants. As stated previously, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center estimates that 21.5 million people per year on average over the past decade have had to flee their homes due to storms, floods, wildfires, droughts, and other weather events. Climate change may have had a role in some of these disasters--at least in their severity and frequency--but it would be inaccurate to say that all of these displaced people are climate migrants. In a widely cited 2018 study, the
A major difficulty in determining the global number of climate migrants is, of course, the inability of the international community to come to a consensus about terminology and measurement: who should be considered a climate migrant and, once so determined, what protections and support they should qualify for. Further complicating matters is the difficulty in attributing decisions people make to leave home directly to climate change. For example, a tropical cyclone that destroys one's village clearly results in people fleeing to the nearest town or city. Though climate change may have contributed to the frequency of cyclones generally and the severity of that specific cyclone, it typically cannot be said that an individual storm is caused entirely by climate change. It is thus similarly difficult to say that all the people displaced from the cyclone-hit village are climate migrants, though some may never return home and be in need of prolonged assistance to which they currently do not have access. This is compounded by the fact that reasons people cite for leaving home are generally varied and multidimensional, and policymakers are often divided on how to treat migrants citing multiple reasons for displacement.
What is clear is that even if there were to be a global framework addressing these challenges and offering some people protected status and support, some people would still fall through the cracks.
The reluctance to recognize climate migrants--however one was to define them--under international law also comes from the obligations (largely of developed countries) that would be expected should climate migration be brought under existing--or new--frameworks. Most climate migrants are displaced internally, placing them into an already wide gap in international forced migration frameworks; countries wary of outside intervention are generally less willing to accept outside support for internally displaced people. Additionally, climate migration will--like other effects of climate change--disproportionately negatively affect the developing world which emits significantly less greenhouse gas emissions than developed countries.
Regardless of the complexity of the issue set and the exact number and types of people affected, climate migration is real and will continue to pose real challenges for policymakers the world over, not to mention for climate migrants themselves. It is time for a new framework for dealing with climate migration, one that
A New Framework for
Climate migration is a challenge disproportionately impacting the worlds' poorest and most vulnerable countries.
(1) Reduce Drivers of Climate Migration
Reduce Emissions
Evidence suggests that future levels of climate migration depend on how much GHGs the United States and other major economies emit in the years ahead. The single most effective step
Invest in Resilience
Even under the most aggressive emission reduction scenarios, global temperatures will continue to increase and sea levels will continue to rise for the next few decades due to inertia in the climate. Kulp and Strauss estimate that roughly 40 million people's homes will be affected by rising seas between now and 2050 regardless of the global emissions scenario.
(2) Accommodate Climate Migrants
Climate change is unequivocally affecting the environment. While
Create Climate Temporary Protected Status
As part of the Immigration Act of 1990,
Create Climate Migrant Resettlement Program
A new climate migrant resettlement program should be created for those permanently displaced by rising sea levels, human heat thresholds, and/or agricultural tipping points. This program would operate similarly to the current refugee and asylum processes in
Note on indirect displacement: A new program for those displaced by conflict made more likely by climate change is not recommended. Current refugee and asylum programs should be evaluated to assess adequacy in light of potential climate-driven increases in conflict around the world in the years ahead, but the current refugee architecture allows for refugee status designation and protection if conflict and/or violence are involved. Thus, these forcibly displaced people should be assisted through strengthening the existing refugee admissions processes, not by creating a new program.
(3) Lead the Strengthening of International Frameworks
Rejoin the Paris Agreement
The Trump administration has signaled its intent to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, but this withdrawal does not come into effect until
Strengthen Existing Frameworks Using Evidence
Though
Negotiate a Regional Compact on Permanent Cross-Border Displacement
Many experts and policymakers are wary of expanding the legal architecture around refugees at a time of growing backlash against migrants and refugees in some developed countries, and for good reason. The fear is that any expansion of the legal architecture would require revisiting any existing protections or statuses afforded to forcibly displaced people and asylum seekers. Policymakers should indeed be wary of this trap, but this fear should not stop these institutions--and their donor, recipient, and member states--from seeking additive reforms.
A Western Hemisphere regional compact provides a promising pathway to start expanding the international legal architecture to address climate migrants. Much as the Cartagena Declaration of 1984 expanded upon the 1951 convention and 1967 protocol refugee frameworks, so too should a new regional compact be planned to address those who are permanently displaced for reasons clearly linked to climate change. Though this may not immediately result in greater resettlement opportunities (countries typically use the 1951 convention definition for resettlement), it would expand protections and status. Not all climate migrants should be under consideration for the reasons discussed in this brief, namely because (1) most climate migrants do not cross international borders and thus would not qualify anyways for refugee status and (2) most climate migration should be considered via a contribution rather than attribution lens. Hence, a regional compact should start by focusing on affording refugee status to those permanently displaced over an international border due to sea level rise, human heat thresholds, or agricultural tipping points. Addressing the clearest examples of the impact of climate change on human mobility in a regional context could provide support to vulnerable forcibly displaced people while creating the broader momentum needed to strengthen institutional frameworks around climate migration.
Though resettlement may not be possible for all climate migrants (only 63,726 refugees were resettled in 2019 out of 26 million), refugee designation would still provide those permanently displaced by climate change the protection, formal status, and opportunity for resettlement that, depending on the context, could lead to financial assistance, housing, healthcare, access to the labor market, and more.
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Erol Yayboke is deputy director and a senior fellow with the Project on Prosperity and Development at the
This brief is made possible by the generous support of the
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ISSUE BRIEF, FIGURES and CHARTS: https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-framework-us-leadership-climate-migration
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