Congressional Research Service Report: 'Cuba – U.S. Policy in 116th Congress & Through Trump Administration' (Part 2 of 4)

WASHINGTON, Jan. 23 -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following report (No. R45657) entitled "Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress and Through the Trump Administration":

(Continued from Part 1 of 4)

Among other international organizations, Cuba was a founding member of the World Trade Organization, but it is not a member of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, or the Inter-American Development Bank. Cuba is a member of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), officially established in December 2011 to boost regional cooperation, but without the participation of the United States or Canada.

Cuba was excluded from participation in the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1962 because of its identification with Marxism-Leninism. In 2009, however, the OAS overturned that policy in a move that eventually could lead to Cuba's reentry into the regional organization in accordance with the practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS. Although the Cuban government welcomed the OAS vote to overturn the 1962 resolution suspending Cuba's OAS participation, it asserted that it would not return to the OAS. /81

U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

Background on U.S.-Cuban Relations/82

In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro began to build a repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward close relations with the Soviet Union. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-Cuban relationship is illustrated by such events and actions as U.S. covert operations to overthrow the Castro government culminating in the ill-fated April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis, in which the United States confronted the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba; Cuban support for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments in Africa and the Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans to the United States in the so-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than 30,000 Cubans who were interdicted and housed at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Panama; and the 1996 shootdown by Cuban fighter jets of two U.S. civilian planes operated by the Cuban-American group Brothers to the Rescue, which resulted in the deaths of four U.S. crew members.

Beginning in the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba consisted largely of seeking to isolate the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions, including an embargo on trade and financial transactions. President Kennedy proclaimed an embargo on trade between the United States and Cuba in February 1962,/83 citing Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), which authorizes the President "to establish and maintain a total embargo upon all trade between the United States and Cuba."/84

At the same time, the Treasury Department issued the Cuban Import Regulations to deny the importation into the United States of all goods imported from or through Cuba./85

The authority for the embargo was later expanded in March 1962 to include the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)./86

In July 1963, the Treasury Department revoked the Cuban Import Regulations and replaced them with the more comprehensive Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR)--31 C.F.R. Part 515-- under the authority of TWEA and Section 620(a) of the FAA./87

The CACR, which include a prohibition on most financial transactions with Cuba and a freeze of Cuban government assets in the United States, remain the main body of Cuba embargo regulations and have been amended many times over the years to reflect changes in policy. They are administered by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and prohibit financial transactions as well as trade transactions with Cuba. The CACR also require that all exports to Cuba be licensed or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), under the provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. Appendix 2405(j))./88

The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) are found at 15 C.F.R. Sections 730-774./89

Congress subsequently strengthened sanctions on Cuba with enactment of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA; P.L. 102-484, Title XVII), the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114), and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA; P.L. 106-387, Title IX).

* Among its provisions, the CDA prohibits U.S. foreign subsidiaries from engaging in trade with Cuba and prohibits entry into the United States for any seaborne vessel to load or unload freight if it has been involved in trade with Cuba within the previous 180 days unless licensed by the Treasury Department./90

* The LIBERTAD Act, enacted in the aftermath of Cuba's shooting down two U.S. civilian planes in February 1996, combines a variety of measures to increase pressure on Cuba and provides for a plan to assist Cuba once it begins the transition to democracy. Most significantly, the act codified the Cuban embargo as permanent law, including all restrictions imposed by the executive branch under the CACR. This provision is noteworthy because of its long-lasting effect on U.S. policy options toward Cuba. The executive branch is prevented from lifting the economic embargo without congressional concurrence through legislation until certain democratic conditions set forth in the law are met, although the President retains broad authority to amend the regulations therein. Two other significant sanctions include Title III of the law, which holds any person or government that traffics in property confiscated by the Cuban government liable for monetary damages in U.S. federal court, and Title IV, which denies admission to the United States to aliens involved in the trafficking of confiscated U.S. property in Cuba. (For additional information, including Trump Administration action on these sanctions, see "Property Claims and Titles III and IV of the LIBERTAD Act," below.)

* TSRA authorizes U.S. commercial agricultural exports to Cuba, but it also includes prohibitions on U.S. assistance and private financing and requires "payment of cash in advance" or third-country financing for the exports. The act also prohibits tourist travel to Cuba.

In addition to these acts, Congress enacted numerous other provisions of law over the years that imposed sanctions on Cuba, including restrictions on trade, foreign aid, and support from international financial institutions. The State Department also designated the government of Cuba as a state sponsor of international terrorism in 1982 under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act and other laws because of the country's alleged ties to international terrorism, although as noted below, the Obama Administration rescinded Cuba's designation in 2015./91

Beyond sanctions, another component of U.S. policy has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people. This support includes U.S. private humanitarian donations, medical exports to Cuba under the terms of the CDA, U.S. government support for democracy-building efforts, and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. The enactment of TSRA by the 106th Congress also led to the United States becoming one of Cuba's largest commercial suppliers of agricultural products. Authorization for purposeful travel to Cuba and cash remittances to Cuba has constituted an important means to support the Cuban people, although significant congressional debate has occurred over these issues for many years.

Despite the poor state of U.S.-Cuban relations, several examples of bilateral cooperation took place over the years in areas of shared national interest. Three areas that stand out are alien migrant interdiction (with migration accords negotiated in 1994 and 1995), counternarcotics cooperation (with increased cooperation dating back to 1999), and cooperation on oil spill preparedness and prevention (since 2011).

Obama Administration: Shift Toward Engagement

In December 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a major policy shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba, moving away from sanctions toward a policy of engagement and the normalization of relations. President Obama said that his Administration would "end an outdated approach that, for decades, has failed to advance our interests." He maintained that the United States would continue to raise concerns about democracy and human rights in Cuba but stated that "we can do more to support the Cuban people and promote our values through engagement." /92

The policy change included three major steps: (1) the rescission of Cuba's designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism in May 2015; (2) the restoration of diplomatic relations in July 2015 (relations had been severed in January 1961 by the Eisenhower Administration); and (3) steps to increase travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba. The third step required the Treasury and Commerce Departments to amend the CACR and EAR respectively; the two agencies issued five rounds of amendments to the regulations in 2015-2016 that eased restrictions on travel, remittances, trade, telecommunications, and banking and financial services. They also authorized certain U.S. companies or other entities to have a physical presence in Cuba, such as an office, retail outlet, or warehouse.

After the restoration of relations, U.S. and Cuban officials negotiated numerous bilateral agreements, including in the following areas: marine protected areas (November 2015); environmental cooperation on a range of issues (November 2015); direct mail service (December 2015); civil aviation (February 2016); maritime issues related to hydrography and maritime navigation (February 2016); agriculture (March 2016); health cooperation (June 2016); counternarcotics cooperation (July 2016); federal air marshals (September 2016); cancer research (October 2016); seismology (December 2016); meteorology (December 2016); wildlife conservation (December 2016); animal and plant health (January 2017); oil spill preparedness and response (January 2017); law enforcement cooperation (January 2017); and search and rescue (January 2017). The United States and Cuba also signed a bilateral treaty in January 2017 delimiting their maritime boundary in the eastern Gulf of Mexico. Bilateral dialogues were held on all of these issues as well as on other issues including counterterrorism, claims (U.S. property, unsatisfied court judgments, and U.S. government claims), economic and regulatory issues, human rights, renewable energy and efficiency, trafficking in persons, and migration.

President Obama visited Cuba in March 2016 with the goals of building on progress toward normalizing relations and expressing support for human rights. In a press conference with Raul Castro, President Obama said that the United States would "continue to speak up on behalf of democracy, including the right of the Cuban people to decide their own future." /93 During a speech that was televised to the Cuban nation, President Obama spoke out for advancing human rights, stating his belief that citizens should be free to speak their minds without fear and that the rule of law should not include arbitrary detentions./94

In October 2016, President Obama issued a presidential policy directive on the normalization of relations with Cuba. The directive set forth the Administration's vision for normalization of relations and laid out six medium-term objectives: (1) government-to-government interaction; (2) engagement and connectivity; (3) expanded commerce; (4) economic reform; (5) respect for universal human rights, fundamental freedoms, and democratic values; and (6) Cuba's integration into international and regional systems./95

In January 2017, the Obama Administration also announced another significant policy change toward Cuba. The Administration ended the so-called wet foot/dry foot policy, under which thousands of unauthorized Cuban migrants had entered the United States since the mid-1990s. Pursuant to a 1995 bilateral migration accord, Cuban migrants intercepted at sea attempting to reach the United States were returned to Cuba, whereas those who successfully reached U.S. shore were generally permitted to stay in the United States. Under the 2017 change in policy, Cuban nationals who attempt to enter the United States illegally and do not qualify for humanitarian relief are now subject to removal. (For more, see "Migration Issues, " below.)

Trump Administration: Increased Sanctions

President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in 2017, introducing new sanctions and rolling back some of the Obama Administration's efforts to normalize relations. By 2019, however, the Trump Administration had largely abandoned engagement by increasing economic sanctions significantly to pressure the Cuban government on its human rights record and its support for the rule of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela.

Initial Policy Changes and Some Continuity in 2017-2018

In June 2017, President Trump set forth his Administration's policy in a speech in Miami, FL, where he signed a national security presidential memorandum (NSPM) on Cuba replacing President Obama's October 2016 presidential policy directive that had laid out objectives for the normalization process. The President called for the Cuban government to end the abuse of dissidents, release political prisoners, stop jailing innocent people, and return U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba. He stated that "any changes to the relationship between the United States and Cuba will depend on real progress toward these and other goals." Once Cuba takes concrete steps in these areas, President Trump said "we will be ready, willing and able to come to the table to negotiate that much better deal for Cubans, for Americans."/96

The new policy left many of the Obama-era policy changes in place, including the reestablishment of diplomatic relations and a variety of eased sanctions to increase travel and commerce with Cuba. The new policy also kept in place the Obama Administration's action ending the so-called wet foot/dry foot policy toward Cuban migrants, which, according to the NSPM, had "encouraged untold thousands of Cuban nationals to risk their lives to travel unlawfully to the United States."/97

The most significant policy changes set forth in President Trump's 2017 NSPM included (1) restrictions on financial transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel and (2) the elimination of people-to-people educational travel by individuals. In November 2017, the Treasury and Commerce Departments issued amended regulations to implement the new policy./98

In a demonstration of continuity in policy between the Trump and Obama Administrations, the U.S. and Cuban governments continued to engage on various bilateral issues through meetings and dialogues in 2017 and 2018. The two countries continued to hold semiannual migration talks, which, since 1995, provided a forum to review and coordinate efforts to ensure safe, legal, and orderly migration between Cuba and the United States; talks were held in April and December 2017, and in July 2018.

The United States and Cuba also continued to hold Bilateral Commission meetings that began under the Obama Administration in which the two governments reviewed priorities and areas for engagement. Officials held a sixth Bilateral Commission meeting in September 2017 and a seventh meeting in June 2018. According to the State Department, at the June 2018 meeting, the two countries reviewed such areas for engagement as trafficking in persons, civil aviation safety, law enforcement matters, agriculture, maritime safety and search and rescue, certified claims, and environmental challenges. The State Department maintained that the United States reiterated the urgent need to identify the source of the "attacks" on U.S. diplomats and to ensure they cease (see discussion below), expressed continued concerns about the arbitrary detention of independent journalists and human rights defenders, and acknowledged Cuba's progress in repatriating Cubans with final removal orders while also emphasizing that Cuba needs to accept greater numbers of returnees./99

Cuba's Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained the meeting provided an opportunity to review areas of exchange and cooperation, but it also criticized several aspects of U.S. policy, including the "intensification" of the U.S. embargo and what Cuba viewed as the "political manipulation of the alleged health cases" that became a "pretext" to reduce staff and therefore affect embassy operations in both countries./100

In this period, both countries continued engagement on other bilateral issues. The U.S. Coast Guard and the Cuban Border Guard participated in professional exchanges in July 2017 and January 2018 covering a variety of topics, including search and rescue. The U.S. Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security participated in law enforcement dialogues with Cuban counterparts in September 2017 and July 2018; the 2018 dialogue included such topics as fugitives and the return of Cuban nationals with final orders of removal. Additional bilateral meetings and exchanges were held in 2018 on such topics as cybersecurity and cybercrime, counternarcotics efforts, and counterterrorism in January; anti-money laundering efforts and trafficking in persons in February; search and rescue in March; and agriculture and scientific cooperation related to environmental disaster in April./101

Increased Sanctions from 2019 to 2021

Beginning in 2019, the Administration ramped up economic sanctions significantly to pressure the Cuban government on its human rights record and its support for the government of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela. In particular, the Administration maintained it was targeting Cuba's sources of revenue (tourism and Cuba's foreign medical missions) because of Cuba's involvement in Venezuela. According to a State Department official in January 2020:

'The United States will cut off Cuba's remaining sources of revenue in response to its intervention in Venezuela. We've already eliminated visits to Cuba via passenger and recreational vehicles. We suspended U.S. air carriers' authority to operate scheduled air service between the U.S. and all Cuban airports other than Havana. This will further restrict the Cuban regime from using resources to support its repression of the people of Cuba. Countries in the region have also taken action regarding the Cuban Government's program which traffics thousands of Cuban doctors around the world in order to enrich the regime. Brazil insisted on paying the doctors directly at a fair wage. The Cuban regime in response withdrew the doctors from Brazil. Doctors have also now left Ecuador and Bolivia.'/102

The more confrontational policy stance was foreshadowed by a November 2018 address by then National Security Adviser John Bolton in Miami, FL, that strongly criticized the Cuban government on human rights, stating that "we will only engage with a Cuban government that is willing to undertake necessary and tangible reforms--a government that respects the interests of the Cuban people." Bolton's speech, full of anti-communist political discourse reminiscent of the Cold War era, referred to Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua as a "troika of tyranny" and the "cause of immense human suffering, the impetus of enormous regional instability, and the genesis of a sordid cradle of communism in the Western Hemisphere." He referred to the three countries' leaders as "three stooges of socialism" and as "clownish pitiful figures." Bolton asserted that the Venezuelan regime's repression has been "enabled by the Cuban dictatorship." /103

As the political situation in Venezuela deteriorated in 2019 and the United States increased sanctions on the Maduro government, the Trump Administration increased its criticism of Cuba's support for the regime. In a March 11, 2019, press briefing, Secretary of State Pompeo asserted that "Cuban military and intelligence services are deeply entrenched in the Venezuelan state", and provide physical protection and other support to President Maduro and those around him. Pompeo maintained that Cuba has trained Venezuela's secret police "torture tactics, domestic spying techniques, and mechanisms of repression that Cuban authorities have wielded against their own people for decades."/104

In April 2019, President Trump threatened a "full and complete embargo" on Cuba and "highest-level sanctions" unless Cuba ceased its military support for Maduro's rule./105

Then-National Security Adviser Bolton subsequently stated in numerous interviews that Cuba has some 20,000-25,000 security forces in Venezuela; regional experts say the figure is likely much smaller and the Cubans there do not have combat capability./106

Cuban officials assert that the vast majority of the Cuban personnel in Venezuela are medical workers. /107

In a May 5, 2019, television interview, Secretary Pompeo referred to a smaller number of 2,300 Cuban security personnel in Venezuela, maintaining they were providing security for Maduro./108

U.S. sanctions imposed on Cuba from 2019 to January 2021 included a wide array of restrictions overturning some of the easing under the Obama Administration as well as new prohibitions and limitations. Restrictions on travel included eliminating people-to-people educational travel, limiting air travel between the United States and Cuba, prohibiting cruise ship travel, and prohibiting U.S. travelers from staying at over 400 hotels and private residences for rent.

Restrictions on remittances limited family remittances, eliminated the category of donative remittances, and implemented new regulations that resulted in Western Union (the major company used for transmitting remittances to Cuba) ceasing its operations in Cuba. Other trade and financial sanctions restricted Cuba's access to leased commercial aircraft, reimposed a license requirement for third-country companies exporting goods to Cuba with more than 10% U.S. origin, and eliminated the use of U-turn transactions that allowed banking institutions to process certain funds transfers originating and terminating outside the United States. Sanctions also targeted Venezuela's oil exports to Cuba. Pursuant to the LIBERTAD Act, the Administration allowed lawsuits to go forward against those alleged to be trafficking in confiscated property in Cuba. Visa restrictions also were imposed on several high-ranking Cuban officials, including Raul Castro, for human rights violations. One of the Trump Administration's final actions on Cuba was the January 2021 designation of the Cuban government as a state sponsor of international terrorism. (For more details, see "Key Trump Administration Sanctions and Other Actions," below.)

U.S. Sanctions and the COVID-19 Pandemic.Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, U.N. officials, including the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet, called on the United States to ease or lift restrictions that make it difficult for Cuba to acquire needed equipment, supplies, and medicines to confront the pandemic. /109

Eight nongovernmental organizations supporting engagement with Cuba called for a temporary suspension of sanctions to facilitate the flow of needed humanitarian and medical supplies./110

U.S. officials, however, indicated that the sanctions would not be eased, maintaining that U.S. sanctions already allow for such exports. According to a press report, Secretary of State Pompeo stated in a call to reporters on April 14, 2020, that "there are no restrictions on humanitarian assistance going into [Cuba]." /111

The Treasury Department subsequently issued a fact sheet providing guidance highlighting general and specific licensing available in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations to allow for humanitarian relief and assistance to the Cuban people./112

Some Members of Congress, however, expressed concern about reports that some foreign companies were deterred from providing humanitarian items to Cuba because of burdensome regulatory and reporting requirements and fear of prosecution or penalty under U.S. law. In a letter, 27 members of the Senate and House called on the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury to confirm that "companies and humanitarians around the world are not precluded under U.S. law, regulation, or policy from providing medical equipment, food, other humanitarian items, and public health information to Cuba."/113

Key Trump Administration Sanctions and Other Actions

* Restrictions on Transactions with the Cuban Military. Pursuant to the NSPM, the State Department was tasked with identifying entities controlled by the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel and publishing a list of entities with which direct financial transactions would disproportionately benefit those services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba. The NSPM specifically identified the Grupo de Administracion Empresarial S.A. (GAESA), a holding company of the Cuban military involved in most sectors of the Cuban economy, particularly the tourism sector. The State Department issued a list of restricted entities in 2017, referred to as the "Cuba restricted list," which has been updated several times, most recently January 8, 2021. The Treasury Department forbids financial transactions with these entities, with certain exceptions, including transactions related to air or sea operations supporting permissible travel, cargo, or trade; the sale of agricultural and medical commodities; direct telecommunications or internet access for the Cuban people; and authorized remittances./114

The list currently includes 231 entities and sub-entities, including two ministries, five holding companies and 55 of their sub-entities (including the Mariel Special Development Zone), 111 hotels, two tourist agencies, five marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and 41 entities serving defense and security sectors./115

* Restrictions on Travel. With regard to people-to-people educational travel, the Treasury Department initially amended the CACR in November 2017 to require that such travel take place under the auspices of an organization specializing in such travel, with travelers accompanied by a representative of the organization. Individuals were no longer authorized to engage in such travel on their own./116

In June 2019, the Treasury Department eliminated people-to-people educational travel altogether, and the Commerce Department generally prohibited cruise ships, private and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and fishing boats from going to Cuba./117

The Transportation Department suspended commercial flights to cities other than Havana in December 2019; charter flights to cities other than Havana in January 2020; and private charter flights to Havana in October 2020. In September 2020, the Treasury Department prohibited U.S. travelers from staying at properties identified by the State Department as owned or controlled by the Cuban government./118 (See "Travel Restrictions," below.)

* Restrictions on Remittances. In September 2019, the Treasury Department capped family remittances, which previously were not limited, to $1,000 per quarter per Cuban national and prohibited such remittances to close family members of prohibited Cuban officials and members of the Cuban Communist Party. The Treasury Department also eliminated the category of donative remittances./119

In June and September 2020, the State Department added to its "Cuba restricted list" two Cuban companies that facilitate the processing of remittances. On October 27, 2020, the Treasury Department prohibited, effective November 26, the processing of remittances through any entities on the "Cuba restricted list."/120

This resulted in Western Union--the major financial services company used to transmit remittances to Cuba--announcing on November 13 that November 22 would be the last day to send money to Cuba until a solution could be found to keep its services open. (See "Restrictions on Remittances" section, below.)

* Efforts to Stop Venezuelan Oil Exports to Cuba. Beginning in April 2019, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on several shipping companies and vessels that transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba./121

In July 2019, it imposed sanctions on Cuba's state-run oil import and export company, Cubametales./122

* Lawsuits Related to Confiscated Property. Effective May 2, 2019, the Administration allowed the right to file lawsuits against those trafficking in confiscated property in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the LIBERTAD Act (P.L.104-114). Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national, including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time of the confiscation. Some 32 lawsuits have been filed against U.S. and foreign companies to date, although several lawsuits have been dismissed. (For more, see "Property Claims and Titles III and IV of the LIBERTAD Act," below.)

* Efforts, Including Visa Restrictions, Against Cuba's Medical Missions. Beginning in 2019, the Trump Administration increased efforts to highlight internationally allegations of coercive labor practices in Cuba's foreign medical missions, a major foreign exchange contributor to Cuba's economy. In June 2019 and June 2020, the State Department placed Cuba on the Tier 3 in its Trafficking in Persons Reports, a status referring governments that do not fully comply with the minimum standards for combatting trafficking in persons and are not making significant efforts to do so. The reports maintained that the Cuban government did not take action to address allegations of forced labor in the country's foreign medical mission program. The State Department also announced in 2019 that it had imposed visa restrictions on certain Cuban officials for the alleged exploitative and coercive labor practices associated with Cuba's overseas medical mission. Beginning in 2019, the State Department ramped up its criticism of Cuba for these labor practices and warned other countries that might be considering hosting Cuban medical personnel. (See section on "Trafficking in Persons and Cuba's Foreign Medical Missions," below.)

* Other Trade and Financial Sanctions. In September 2019, the Treasury Department ended the use of U-turn transactions, which allowed banking institutions to process certain funds transfers originating and terminating outside the United States./123

In October 2019, the Commerce Department restricted Cuba's access to leased commercial aircraft; reimposed a 10% de minimis rule (from 25%) requiring a third-country-based company exporting goods to Cuba with more than 10% U.S.-origin content to apply for a license; and imposed licensing requirements for the export of certain donated items to organizations controlled by the Cuban government or Communist Party and exported items for telecommunications infrastructure (unless it was for individual Cubans or the Cuban private sector)./124

* Sanctions Related to Alleged Human Rights Abuses. In 2019 and 2020, pursuant to a long-standing provision in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (SFOPS, currently in Section 7031(c) of P.L. 116-94, Division G), the State Department imposed visa restrictions on three high-ranking Cuban officials and their immediate family members for credible information of their involvement in gross violation of human rights, barring them from entry into the United States. /125

In September 2019, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on Raul Castro (and his four children) for human rights violations in Cuba and in Venezuela under the Maduro government./126

Further 7031(c) visa restrictions were imposed on Cuban Interior Minister Julio Cesar Gandarilla Bermejo (and his two children) in November 2019 (until the minister's death in November 2020) and on Cuban Defense Minister Leopoldo Cintra Frias (and his two children) in January 2020 for gross human rights violations in Venezuela./127

In September 2020, the Treasury Department added Luis Alberto Rodriguez Lopez-Calleja, Raul Castro's former son-in-law and head of GAESA (a holding company of the Cuban military) to its listing of sanctioned individuals for human right abuses, blocking all assets and property./128

On January 15, 2021, the Treasury Department designated Cuba's Ministry of the Interior (MININT) and its minister, General Lazaro Alberto Alvarez Casas, for serious human rights abuses pursuant to Executive Order 13818, blocking all assets and property of the ministry and the minister./129

* Visa Restrictions Related to Alleged Trafficking in Confiscated Property. In February 2020, the Spanish hotel chain Melia confirmed its chief executive officer is prohibited from entering the United States pursuant to Title IV of the LIBERTAD Act, related to the trafficking of property confiscated in Cuba. (For more, see "Property Claims and Titles III and IV of the LIBERTAD Act," below.)

* Internet Task Force. Pursuant to the NSPM, in January 2018, the State Department announced the establishment of a Cuba Internet Task Force (CITF), composed of U.S. government and non-U.S. government representatives, to examine the technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access and independent media in Cuba./130

The task force held two public meetings in February and December 2018 and formed two subcommittees to develop recommendations on the role of media and freedom of information in Cuba and to explore technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access in Cuba./131

The CITF issued its final report in June 2019 that identified four key challenges to internet access in Cuba and recommendations to overcome those challenges. One of the identified challenges was related to U.S. entry into the Cuban market. The report noted that China's major role in the telecommunications sector is a challenge to U.S. firms looking to enter the market, and that U.S. companies maintain "they are often deterred from entering the market by frequent changes to U.S. regulations" and that banks are reluctant "to process payments in Cuba due to the U.S. embargo."/132

* Response to Health Injuries of U.S. Personnel in Havana. From November 2016 to May 2018, 26 U.S. Embassy community members suffered a series of unexplained injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues. The State Department maintains the U.S. investigation has not reached a definitive conclusion regarding possible cause of the injuries, although in early December 2020, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine publicly released a report concluding that the most plausible mechanism for the health symptoms was directed pulsed radio frequency energy. In response to the injuries, the State Department ordered the departure of nonemergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy in September 2017 to minimize the risk of their exposure to harm; embassy staff was reduced by about two-thirds. In October 2017, the State Department ordered the departure of 15 diplomats from the Cuban Embassy in Washington, DC. According to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the action was taken because of Cuba's failure to protect U.S. diplomats in Havana and to ensure equity in the impact on diplomatic operations. Cuba strongly denies responsibility for the injuries. The staff reduction at the U.S. Embassy affected embassy operations, especially visa processing, and made bilateral engagement more difficult. (For more, see "U.S. Response to Health Injuries of U.S. Personnel in Havana," below.)

* Terrorism Designations. In May 2020, the Secretary of State (pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act) added Cuba to the annual list of countries certified as not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts for the first time since 2015./133

On January 11, 2021, the Secretary designated the government of Cuba as a state sponsor of international terrorism (the previous such designation for Cuba was rescinded in 2015). The State Department cited Cuba's harboring from justice of 10 leaders of Colombia's National Liberation Army (a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization), who had traveled to Cuba in 2017 to engage in peace talks with the Colombian government, and several U.S. fugitives since the 1970s (see "U.S. Fugitives from Justice" section, below)./134

The new determinations likely will have little effect, as the economic sanctions required by each decision are, in large part, redundant to other U.S. sanctions already in effect. A terrorism designation, however, requires the Commerce Department to place Cuba on its most restrictive export licensing list, which could impede transactions related to technology. Some sectors, seeking to avoid any perception of sanctions violations, may become more risk averse in transactions with Cuba./135

Debate on the Direction of U.S. Policy

Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objectives of U.S. policy toward Cuba--to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island--there have been different schools of thought about how to achieve those objectives. Some have advocated a policy of keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuing efforts to support the Cuban people. Others have argued for an approach, sometimes referred to as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are hurting the Cuban people and would move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. Still others have called for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo.

In light of Fidel Castro's departure as head of government in 2006 and the gradual economic changes made by Raul Castro, some observers had called for a reexamination of U.S. policy toward Cuba. In this new context, two broad policy approaches were advanced to contend with change in Cuba: an approach that called for maintaining the U.S. dual-track policy of isolating the Cuban government while providing support to the Cuban people and an approach aimed at influencing the attitudes of the Cuban government and Cuban society through increased contact and engagement.

The Obama Administration's change of U.S. policy from isolation to engagement and movement toward the normalization of relations highlighted divisions in Congress over Cuba policy. Some Members of Congress lauded the Administration's actions as in the best interests of the United States and a better way to support change in Cuba, whereas other Members strongly criticized the President for not obtaining concessions from Cuba to advance human rights. Some Members vowed to oppose the Administration's efforts toward normalization, whereas others introduced legislation to normalize relations with Cuba by lifting the embargo in its entirety or in part by easing some aspects of it.

The Trump Administration's policy of rolling back some of the Obama-era changes and introducing new sanctions on Cuba also has highlighted divisions in Congress over Cuba policy, with some Members supporting the President's action because of Cuba's lack of progress on human rights and others opposing it because of the potential negative effect on the Cuban people and U.S. business interests.

Public opinion polls have shown a majority of Americans support normalizing relations with Cuba./136

Among the Cuban American community in South Florida, however, a 2018 poll by Florida International University showed an increase in those supporting a continuation of the U.S. embargo compared to a 2016 poll. In the 2018 poll, although a majority of Cuban Americans in South Florida supported diplomatic relations and unrestricted travel to Cuba by all Americans, 51% polled favored continuing the embargo and 49% opposed it. This contrasts with 2016, when 63% of Cuban Americans in South Florida favored ending the embargo and 37% supported it. /137

In general, those who advocate easing U.S. sanctions on Cuba make several policy arguments.

They assert that if the United States moderated its policy toward Cuba--through increased travel, trade, and dialogue--then the seeds of reform would be planted, which would stimulate forces for peaceful change on the island. They stress the importance to the United States of avoiding violent change in Cuba, with the prospect of a mass exodus to the United States. They argue that since the demise of Cuba's communist government does not appear imminent (despite almost 60 years of sanctions), the United States should espouse a more pragmatic approach in trying to bring about change in Cuba. Supporters of changing policy also point to broad international support for lifting the U.S. embargo, to the missed opportunities for U.S. businesses because of the unilateral nature of the embargo, and to the increased suffering of the Cuban people because of the embargo. Proponents of change also argue that the United States should be consistent in its policies with the world's few remaining communist governments, including China and Vietnam.

On the other side, opponents of lifting U.S. sanctions maintain that the policy of isolating Cuba but reaching out to the Cuban people through measures of support is the best means for realizing political change in Cuba. They point out that the LIBERTAD Act sets forth the steps that Cuba must take for the United States to normalize relations. They argue that softening U.S. policy without concrete Cuban reforms boosts Cuba's communist regime, politically and economically, and facilitates its survival. Opponents of softening U.S. policy argue that the United States should stay the course in its commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba and that sustained sanctions can work. Critics of loosening U.S. sanctions further argue that Cuba's failed economic policies, not the U.S. embargo, are the causes of Cuba's difficult living conditions. More recently, those supporting stronger sanctions on Cuba point to the Cuban government's strong support for the Maduro government in Venezuela, particularly military advisers and intelligence assistance.

Selected Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations

U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances/138

Travel Restrictions

Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious component of U.S. efforts to isolate Cuba's communist government for more than 50 years. The embargo regulations set forth in the CACR do not ban travel itself, but place restrictions on financial transactions related to Cuba. Numerous changes to the restrictions have occurred over time, and for five years, from 1977 until 1982, there were no restrictions on travel. In 2000, Congress prohibited travel to Cuba solely for tourist activities when it enacted TSRA (P.L. 106-387, Title IX); a provision in the law prohibits travel-related transaction for tourist activities, which are defined as any activity not expressly authorized in the 12 categories of travel in the CACR). Under the George W. Bush Administration, enforcement of U.S. restrictions on Cuba travel increased and restrictions on travel were tightened.

Congress took legislative action in March 2009 to ease restrictions on family travel and on travel related to U.S. agricultural and medical sales to Cuba (P.L. 111-8, Sections 620 and 621 of Division D). In April 2009, the Obama Administration went further when the President announced that he was lifting all restrictions on family travel. In 2011, the Obama Administration further eased travel related to religious, journalistic and educational activities, including people-to-people travel exchanges, and allowed U.S. international airports to become eligible for licensed charter flights to and from Cuba.

The Obama Administration's December 2014 shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba included an easing of U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba. As part of the change in policy, the Treasury Department amended the CACR in 2015 to include general licenses for the 12 existing categories of permissible travel to Cuba set forth in the regulations (see text box above). Before the policy change, travelers under several of these categories had to apply for a specific license. /139

Under the regulations, both travel agents and airlines are able to provide services for travel to Cuba without the need to obtain a specific license.

In 2016, the Obama Administration further eased restrictions on travel to Cuba and increased transportation opportunities between the United States and Cuba. In January, the Treasury authorized travel and related transactions for professional media or artistic productions in Cuba (movies, television, music recordings, and creation of artworks). In March, the Treasury Department amended the travel regulations to permit travel to Cuba for individual people-to-people educational travel. Regular air service between the United States and Cuba began in November 2016 following the signing of a U.S.-Cuba bilateral arrangement earlier in that year permitting regularly scheduled air flights as opposed to charter flights. Cruise ship service to Cuba from the United States also began in 2016, and expanded significantly with some 10 companies offering cruises.

In contrast, the Trump Administration reimposed certain restrictions on travel and limited transportation to Cuba from the United States. As noted, the Trump Administration terminated people-to-people educational travel (under the travel category of educational activities) that the Obama Administration restored in 2011. /140

As part of that policy change, in November 2017, the Treasury Department eliminated the authorization for people-to-people travel for individuals, requiring such travel to be under the auspices of an organization specializing in people-to-people travel. Then, in June 2019, the Treasury Department eliminated people-to-people travel altogether. Also in June 2019, the Commerce Department generally prohibited cruise ship travel to Cuba from the United States and prohibited private and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and fishing boats from going to Cuba. The Transportation Department suspended commercial flights to cities other than Havana in December 2019, charter flights to cities other than Havana in January 2020), and all private charter flights to Havana in October 2020 (public charter flights to Havana remain permitted).

In September 2020, the Trump Administration took two actions that further restricted visits to Cuba. First, the Treasury Department prohibited U.S. travelers from staying at properties identified by the State Department as owned or controlled by the Cuban government. The ban includes over 400 hotels (essentially all Cuban hotels) and privately owned residences for rent (casas particulares), if they are controlled by a prohibited government official or Communist Party member (or a close relative). Second, the Treasury Department eliminated general licenses for attending or organizing professional meetings or conferences in Cuba and for participating in public performances, clinics, workshops, certain athletic or nonathletic competitions, and exhibitions. (A general license remains, however, for amateur and semiprofessional international sports federation competitions.) Specific licenses may be issued on a case-by-case basis for transactions related to the above activities, although the amended regulations do not refer to organizing professional meetings.

U.S. Travelers to Cuba. According to Cuban government statistics, the number of Americans traveling to Cuba increased from 92,325 in 2014 to 637,907 in 2018. This figure is in addition to thousands of Cuban Americans who visit family in Cuba each year; in 2018, almost 600,306 Cubans living outside the country visited Cuba, the majority from the United States. /141

Beginning in 2019, the number of Americans traveling to Cuba began to fall significantly, as the Trump Administration eliminated people-to-people travel, prohibited cruise ship travel to Cuba, and restricted flights to Cuba. In 2019, the number of U.S. visitors traveling to Cuba declined by almost 22% (to 498,067 travelers), although the number of Cubans visiting from abroad increased by almost 4% (to 623,972 travelers). In the first two months of 2020, before the imposition of travel restrictions because of the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. travel to Cuba declined by 64% and travel by Cubans living abroad declined by almost 4% compared with the same period in 2019./142

Legislative Initiatives. In the 116th Congress, three bills were introduced that would have lifted restrictions on travel to Cuba. Identical bills H.R. 3960 (McGovern) and S. 2303 (Leahy) would have prohibited most restrictions on travel to or from Cuba by U.S. citizens and legal residents or any transactions incident to such travel. H.R. 2404 (Rush) would have lifted the overall embargo on Cuba, including travel restrictions.

Restrictions on Remittances

Much like U.S. restrictions on travel, U.S. restrictions on sending cash remittances to Cuba have been part of the U.S. sanctions regime and have changed over time. Cash remittances to Cuba reportedly increased from almost $1.7 billion in 2009 to $3.7 billion in 2019, but they are expected to decline to $2.9 billion in 2020 because of COVID-19 restrictions that closed Cuban airports for months./143

In 2019, some 45% of remittances to Cuba reportedly were carried by individuals; the remainder went through remittance forwarding companies./144

The Obama Administration took significant action to ease restrictions on remittances to Cuba. In 2009, the Treasury Department lifted the previous limitation of no more than $300 per quarter for family remittances, imposing no limitation on the amount and frequency of these remittances. In 2011, the Treasury Department authorized remittances to any Cuban national (up to $500 per quarter) and made it easier for religious institutions to send remittances for religious activities. In 2015, the Treasury Department lifted the dollar limit for remittances to any Cuban national, referring to such remittances as "donative remittances to Cuban nationals." The Treasury Department also authorized by general license remittances to individuals and independent nongovernmental organizations to support humanitarian projects; a rapid peaceful transition to democracy; the strengthening of civil society;, and the development of private businesses, including small farms. In 2016, the Treasury Department narrowed the definition of "prohibited Cuban government officials" and "prohibited members of the Cuban Communist party," a significant move because of the prohibition in the CACR against providing remittances to these individuals.

By contrast, the Trump Administration took actions to restrict remittances to Cuba. In 2017, the Treasury Department expanded the definition of "prohibited Cuban government officials," resulting in the prohibition of remittances for such individuals. In 2019, the Treasury Department eliminated the category of donative remittances to Cuban nationals, capped family remittances to any one Cuban national to $1,000 per quarter, and prohibited family remittances to close family members of prohibited Cuban government officials and Cuban Communist Party officials.

In 2020, the Trump Administration further restricted the flow of cash remittances to Cuba. In June and September 2020, respectively, the State Department added to its "Cuba restricted list" two Cuban financial services companies--FINCIMEX and American International Services-- involved in facilitating the processing of foreign remittances to Cuba. In October 2020, the Treasury Department amended the CACR to prohibit, effective November 26, 2020, the processing of remittances through any entities on the "Cuba restricted list." The new regulations resulted in Western Union, which has partnered with FINCIMEX since 2016, to announce that November 22 would be the last day to send money to Cuba until a solution could be found to keep its services open./145

Western Union has been the major financial services company used for transmitting remittances to Cuba, with more than 400 offices on the island.

Legislative Initiatives. In the 116th Congress, H.R. 2404 (Rush) would have lifted the overall embargo on Cuba, including restrictions on remittances.

U.S. Exports and Sanctions

U.S. commercial medical exports to Cuba have been authorized since the early 1990s pursuant to the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA), and commercial agricultural exports have been authorized since 2001 pursuant to the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA), but with numerous restrictions and licensing requirements. For medical exports to Cuba, the CDA requires on-site verification that the exported item is to be used for the purpose for which it was intended and only for the use and benefit of the Cuban people. TSRA allows for one-year export licenses for selling agricultural commodities to Cuba, although no U.S. government assistance, foreign assistance, export assistance, credits, or credit guarantees are available to finance such exports. TSRA also denies exporters access to U.S. private commercial financing or credit; all transactions must be conducted in cash in advance or with financing from third countries. The 2018 farm bill, P.L. 115-334 (H.R. 2) permits funding for two U.S. agricultural export promotion programs--the Market Access Program and the Foreign Market Development Cooperation Program--for U.S. agricultural products in Cuba.

Regulatory changes made to the CACR and EAR in 2015-2016 include several actions designed to facilitate commercial exports to Cuba:

* U.S. financial institutions are permitted to open correspondent accounts at Cuban financial institutions to facilitate the processing of authorized transactions (31 C.F.R. 515.584).

* U.S. private export financing is permitted for all authorized export trade to Cuba, except for agricultural goods exported pursuant to TSRA (31 C.F.R. 515.584).

* The definition of the term cash in advance for payment for U.S. exports to Cuba was revised to specify that it means cash before transfer of title. The change means that payment can occur before an export shipment is offloaded in Cuba rather than before the shipment leaves a U.S. port (31 C.F.R. 515.533).

* Commercial exports to Cuba of certain goods and services to empower Cuba's nascent private sector are authorized, including for certain building materials for private residential construction, and goods for use by private-sector Cuban entrepreneurs (15 C.F.R. 740.21).

* Licenses for certain categories of exports are included under a "general policy of approval." These categories include exports for civil aviation and commercial aircraft safety, telecommunications, U.S. news bureaus, human rights organizations and nongovernmental organizations, environmental protection of U.S. and international air quality, waters, and coastlines, and agricultural inputs (such as insecticides, pesticides, and herbicides) that fall outside the scope of those exports already allowed under TSRA (15 C.F.R. 746.2). In October 2019, however, the Commerce Department amended the EAR to exclude the export or reexport of aircraft leased to state-owned enterprise from its general policy of approval for the export of items for civil aviation and commercial aircraft safety and imposed licensing requirements for the export of certain donated items to organizations controlled by the Cuban government or Communist Party and exported items for telecommunications infrastructure (unless it was for individual Cubans or the Cuban private sector)./146

* Licenses for exports that will be considered on a case-by-case basis include certain items exported to state-owned enterprises, agencies, and other organizations of the Cuban government that provide goods and services for the use and benefit of the Cuban people (15 C.F.R. 746.2). In November 2017, however, the Commerce Department amended the EAR to stipulate that export licenses for exports to state-owned enterprises will generally be denied to export items for use by entities or sub-entities on the State Department's list of restricted entities associated with the Cuban military, police, intelligence, or security services.

* Companies exporting authorized goods to Cuba are authorized to have a physical presence in Cuba, such as an office, retail outlet, or warehouse (31 C.F.R. 515.573).

* Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction generally are authorized to enter into certain contingent contracts for transactions currently prohibited by the embargo (31 515.534).

* Certain consumer goods sold directly to eligible individuals in Cuba for their personal use generally are authorized (15 C.F.R. 740.21).

Cuba purchased $6.3 billion in U.S. products from 2001 to 2019, largely agricultural products. For many of those years, the United States was Cuba's largest supplier of agricultural products. U.S. exports to Cuba rose from about $7 million in 2001 to a high of $718 million in 2008, far higher than in previous years. This increase was in part because of the rise in food prices and because of Cuba's increased food needs in the aftermath of several hurricanes and tropical storms that severely damaged the country's agricultural sector. U.S. exports to Cuba declined considerably from 2009 through 2011, rose again in 2012, and fell every year through 2015, when U.S. exports amounted to $186 million. U.S. exports increased in years after that, amounting to $287 million in 2019 (see Figure 2.) In 2020, however, as Cuba's economic situation has deteriorated amid the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. exports to Cuba have declined 49% from January to September compared with the same period in 2019./147

Content omitted: Figure 2. U.S. Exports to Cuba, 2002-2019

Looking at the composition of U.S. exports to Cuba from 2012 to 2019, the leading products were poultry, soybean oilcake and other solid residue, soybeans, corn, and soybean oil. Poultry has been the leading U.S. export to Cuba since 2012. Beyond agricultural products, other categories of products in recent years have been parts for steam turbines, civilian aircraft engines and parts, pesticides, calcium phosphates, and electrical apparatus and parts for telephone lines. In 2019, leading U.S. exports to Cuba were poultry (66%), soybean oilcake (11%), soybeans (5%), and parts for steam turbines (4%).

U.S. International Trade Commission (USTIC) Reports. The USITC has issued three studies since 2007 examining the effects of U.S. restrictions on trade with Cuba, with its most recent report issued in April 2016./148

According to the findings of its 2016 report, U.S. restrictions on trade and travel reportedly have shut U.S. suppliers out of a market in which they could be competitive on price, quality, and proximity. The most problematic U.S. restrictions cited are the inability to offer credit, travel to or invest in Cuba, and use funds sourced and administered by the U.S. government. Cuban nontariff measures and other factors also may limit U.S. exports to and investment in Cuba if U.S. restrictions are lifted, according to the report. These factors include Cuban government control of trade and distribution, legal limits on foreign investment and property ownership, and politically motivated decision-making regarding trade and investment.

Absent U.S. restrictions, U.S. exports in several sectors likely would increase somewhat in the short term, with prospects for larger increases in the longer term, subject to changes in Cuban policy and economic growth. U.S. exports could increase further if Cuban import barriers were lowered. If U.S. restrictions were removed, U.S. agricultural and manufactured exports to Cuba could increase to almost $1.8 billion annually; if both U.S. restrictions were removed and Cuban barriers were lowered, U.S. exports could approach $2.2 billion annually.

Legislative Initiatives. In the 116th Congress, several bills were introduced related to restrictions on exports to Cuba. S. 428 (Klobuchar) would have repealed certain provisions in the CDA, the LIBERTAD Act, and TSRA as well as regulatory provisions in the CACR and EAR that restrict trade with Cuba. H.R. 1898 (Crawford) would have modified the prohibition on U.S. assistance and financing for certain exports to Cuba under TSRA. S. 1447 (Bennet) would have amended TSRA to allow for the private financing by U.S. entities of agricultural commodities to Cuba. H.R. 2404 (Rush) would have lifted the overall embargo on Cuba.

Democracy and Human Rights Funding

Since 1996, the United States has provided assistance--through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the State Department, and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)--to increase the flow of information on democracy, human rights, and free enterprise to Cuba. USAID and State Department efforts are funded largely through Economic Support Funds (ESF) in the annual foreign operations appropriations bill. From FY1996 to FY2019, Congress appropriated some $364 million in funding for Cuba democracy efforts. /149

In recent years, this funding included $20 million in each fiscal year from FY2014 through FY2019. For FY2018, the Trump Administration, as part of its attempt to cut foreign assistance levels, did not request any democracy and human rights assistance funding for Cuba, but Congress ultimately provided $20 million. For FY2019, the Trump Administration requested $10 million to provide democracy and civil society assistance for Cuba, but Congress again provided $20 million.

Although USAID received the majority of this funding for many years, the State Department began to receive a portion of the funding in FY2004 and in recent years has been allocated more funding than USAID. The State Department generally has transferred a portion of the Cuba assistance that it administers to NED.

USAID's Cuba program has supported a variety of U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations with the goals of promoting a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy, helping to develop civil society, and building solidarity with Cuba's human rights activists./150

NED is not a U.S. government agency but an independent nongovernmental organization that receives U.S. government funding. Its Cuba program is funded by the organization's regular appropriations by Congress as well as by funding from the State Department. According to information provided by NED on its website, its Cuba funding from FY2016 through FY2019 amounted to $19.2 million./151

Continues with Part 3 of 4

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REPORT and FOOTNOTES: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45657