Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7)
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Request for information.
CFR Part: "40 CFR Part 68"
RIN Number: "RIN 2050-ZA07"
Citation: "79 FR 44604"
Document Number: "EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328; FRL-9911-62-OSWER"
"Proposed Rules"
SUMMARY:
EFFECTIVE DATE: Comments and additional material must be received on or before
ADDRESSES: Submit comments and additional materials, identified by docket EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 by any of the following methods:
* http://www.regulations.gov: Follow the on-line instructions for submitting comments.
* Mail: Send comments to: OSWER Docket, EPA Docket Center, Mail Code 2822-1T,
* Hand delivery: Deliver two copies of your comments to:
Instructions: Direct your comments to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328. The
Docket: The
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For more detailed information on specific aspects of this
Electronic copies of this
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Here are the contents of today's notice.
I. Background
A. Statutory Authority
B. Executive Order 13650
C. EPA Risk Management Program Regulations
II. Discussion and Request for Data, Information, and Comments
A. Introduction
B. Potential Costs and Economic Effects of Regulatory and Policy Changes
C. Items in
1. Update the List of Regulated Substances
a. Adding Other Toxic or Flammable Substances
b. Adding High and/or Low Explosives
c. Adding Ammonium Nitrate
d. Adding Reactive Substances and Reactivity Hazards
e. Adding Other Categories of Substances
f. Removing Certain Substances From the List or Raising Their Threshold Quantity
g. Lowering the Threshold Quantity for Substances Currently on the List
2. Additional Risk Management Program Elements
3. Define and Require Evaluation of Updates to Applicable Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices
4. Extend Mechanical Integrity Requirements To Cover Any Safety-Critical Equipment
5. Require Owners and Operators To Manage Organizational Changes
6. Require Third-Party Compliance Audits
7. Effects of OSHA PSM Coverage on RMP Applicability
D. Additional Items for Which EPA Requests Information
1. Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis
2. Emergency Drills To Test a Source's Emergency Response Program or Plan
3. Automated Detection and Monitoring for Releases of Regulated Substances
4. Additional Stationary Source Location Requirements
5. Compliance With Emergency Response Program Requirements in Coordination With Local Responders
6. Incident Investigation and Accident History Requirements
7. Worst Case Release Scenario Quantity Requirements for Processes Involving Numerous Small Vessels Stored Together
8. Public Disclosure of Information To Promote Regulatory Compliance and Improve Community Understanding of Chemical Risks
9. Threshold Quantities and Off-Site Consequence Analysis Endpoints for Regulated Substances Based on Acute Exposure Guideline Level Toxicity Values
10. Program 3 NAICS Codes Based on RMP Accident History Data
11. The "Safety Case" Regulatory Model
12. Streamlining RMP Requirements
I. Background
A. Statutory Authority
The statutory authority for this action is provided by section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) as amended (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)) and by the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), (42 U.S.C. 11001-11050), which was enacted as Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (Pub. L. 99- 499), (SARA).
B. Executive Order 13650
On
Section 6 of the Executive Order is entitled "Policy, Regulation, and Standards Modernization", and among other things, requires certain federal agencies to consider possible changes to existing chemical safety and security regulations. Specifically, section 6(e)(ii) of the Executive Order requires the Secretary of Labor to issue a
While Executive Order 13650 does not specifically direct
Second, the EPA RMP regulation closely tracks the accident prevention measures contained in the OSHA PSM standard because Section 112(r)(7)(D) of the CAA requires
Topics are divided into two categories--those addressed in parallel to the OSHA RFI, and additional topics not raised by
Information collected under this
C. EPA Risk Management Program Regulations
Both EPA's 40 CFR part 68 RMP regulation /1/ and
FOOTNOTE 1 40 CFR part 68 is titled, "Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions," but is more commonly known as the "RMP regulation," the "Risk Management Program," or "the RMP." The RMP may also refer to the document required to be submitted under subpart F of 40 CFR part 68, the Risk Management Plan. This document generally uses RMP or Risk Management Program to refer to 40 CFR part 68. See http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/rmp/ for more information on the Risk Management Program. END FOOTNOTE
The 1990 CAAA added to the accidental release provisions under CAA section 112(r). The statute required
EPA published the RMP regulation in two stages. The Agency published the list of regulated substances and TQs in 1994 (59 FR 4478,
FOOTNOTE 2 Documents and information related to development of the list rule can be found in the
FOOTNOTE 3 Documents and information related to development of the RMP regulation can be found in
FOOTNOTE 4 The 40 CFR Part 68 RMP regulations apply to owners and operators of stationary sources that have more than a TQ of a regulated substance within a process. The regulations do not apply to chemical hazards other than listed substances held above a TQ within a regulated process. END FOOTNOTE
The RMP establishes three "program levels" for regulated processes:
Program level 1 applies to processes that would not affect the public in the case of a worst-case release and with no accidents with specific off-site consequences within the past five years. Program 1 imposes limited hazard assessment requirements and minimal prevention and emergency response requirements.
Program level 2 applies to processes not eligible for Program 1 or subject to Program 3, and imposes streamlined prevention program requirements, including safety information, hazard review, operating procedures, training, maintenance, compliance audits, and incident investigation elements. Program 2 also imposes additional hazard assessment, management, and emergency response requirements.
Program level 3 applies to processes not eligible for Program 1 and either subject to
EPA believes the RMP regulation has been effective in preventing and mitigating chemical accidents in
II. Discussion and Request for Data, Information, and Comments
A. Introduction
This section discusses each RMP item and provides specific questions to collect data, information, and comments. The Agency invites the public to respond to any questions for which they have specific knowledge, data, or information, regardless of their involvement in RMP-covered operations. Note that at several points in this document, we discuss whether modifying, clarifying, strengthening, or making more explicit a requirement is an appropriate way to address an issue. The solicitation of comment on these matters should not be read as
B. Potential Costs and Economic Effects of Regulatory and Policy Changes
As part of this
EPA requests that commenters discuss economic impacts in as specific terms as possible. For example, if a regulatory or policy change would necessitate additional employee training, then helpful information would include the following: The training courses necessary; the types of employees or contractors who would receive the training; topics covered; any retraining necessary; and the training costs if conducted by a third-party vendor or in-house trainer. The Agency invites comment on the time and level of expertise required to implement potential regulatory or policy changes discussed in this
C. Items in
This section discusses items that are the same or related to items in the OSHA RFI that could also apply to or affect the RMP regulation. Each item discussion is followed by specific questions to collect data, information, and comments on each item.
1. Update the List of Regulated Substances
Section 112(r)(3) of the 1990 CAAA authorized
The
The list now consists of two categories of chemicals--77 toxic substances and 63 flammable substances. The regulated substances and TQs are found in 40 CFR 68.130. The list of toxic substances is based on a subset of the EHS acute toxics found in 40 CFR part 355. The RMP list of substances was further limited to gases and volatile liquids (vapor pressure equal to or greater than 10 mm of mercury (Hg) at 25 [degrees] C), focusing accident prevention regulations on those chemicals that were more likely to become airborne and have an adverse effect beyond a facility's fence line in the event of an accidental release.
Flammable gases and volatile flammable liquids with the
The 1994 final list rule included as covered chemicals, any "high explosives" which were explosives classified by the
FOOTNOTE 5 Documents and information related to deleting explosives from the list of RMP-regulated substances can be found in
EPA is requesting information on whether the Agency should modify the list of regulated substances by:
* Adding other toxic or flammable substances
* Adding high and/or low explosives
* Adding ammonium nitrate
* Adding reactive substances and reactivity hazards
* Adding other categories of substances
* Removing certain substances from the list or raising their TQ
* Lowering the TQ for substances currently on the list
Each of these areas is briefly discussed below.
a. Adding Other Toxic or Flammable Substances
EPA is interested in determining whether there are other substances that meet the established acute toxicity or flammability criteria for listing, are in commerce, and are present in sufficient quantities that would present a risk to the community if accidentally released.
EPA requests information on the following questions:
i. What other chemical lists or other sources of information should be reviewed to identify acutely toxic or flammable chemicals meeting the RMP listing criteria?
ii. What chemicals, if any, should
iii. Please provide any information on the annual amount of the individual substance manufactured, imported or used, the extent of its availability in commerce and the types of U.S. industries that manufacture, import, or use the substance.
iv. What would be the economic impacts of adding other toxic or flammable chemicals to the RMP list of substances? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that
b. Adding High and/or Low Explosives
In light of the
EPA listed high explosives on the RMP list in 1994 but removed them on
The 1994 final RMP list rule (59 FR 4478,
EPA chose to list only DOT Division 1.1 explosives because
The Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME) petitioned for judicial review challenging the final listing of high explosives (IME v.
* IME member companies would post at their facilities warning signs at all normal access routes stating, "Danger. Never Fight Explosive Fires. Explosives are stored on this site," and providing an emergency phone number.
* Whenever a new Division 1.1 commercial explosives storage or manufacturing location is established at a temporary job site, IME member companies will notify Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) and other local authorities (e.g., fire departments and law enforcement agencies) of the type, quantity, and location of explosives on site.
* At Division 1.1 commercial explosives storage or manufacturing locations with 5,000 pounds or more of Division 1.1 explosives (not including temporary job sites) where preparation of emergency response plans is not already required, IME member companies would prepare emergency response plans, notify LEPCs and other local authorities of the type, quantity, and location of explosives on site, provide the emergency response plans to local emergency responders, and respond to reasonable requests for information from said authorities.
* IME member companies also would inform their customers and IME would inform other non-IME commercial explosives manufacturers of the contents of the Settlement Agreement and the actions to be taken.
EPA proposed to delist high explosives from the RMP list on
Even after the removal of high explosives from the RMP list, most forms of explosives (not just high explosives) remain subject to hazardous chemical inventory reporting requirements under EPCRA. The owner or operator of any facility with more than a reporting threshold of any hazardous chemical requiring a safety data sheet (formerly material safety data sheet) under the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard is required to submit safety data sheets to their
FOOTNOTE 6 See 40 CFR part 370. END FOOTNOTE
ATF regulates "explosive materials" which are defined as explosives, blasting agents, water gels and detonators. Explosive materials include, but are not limited to, all items in the "List of Explosive Materials," which is published annually. /7/
FOOTNOTE 7 The 2013 List of Explosive Materials can be found at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-10-28/pdf/2013-25370.pdf. END FOOTNOTE
ATF regulations /8/ provide specific construction requirements for storage of explosive materials in magazines and limit the amount of these materials that can be stored in each magazine. Such magazines must be regularly inspected and meet the Table of Distance requirements which specify distances that the materials must be stored away from inhabited buildings, public highways, and passenger railways, to ensure an accidental explosion will not produce blast waves that are hazardous to people at distances where the public could be affected. ATF inspects licensed facilities to ensure the safe and secure storage of explosives, their proper inventory and control, and accurate recordkeeping. However, ATF does not inspect or regulate manufacturing processes. /9/
FOOTNOTE 8 27 CFR part 555, Subpart K. END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 9
OSHA regulates the manufacture, keeping, having, storage, sale, transportation, and use of explosives and blasting agents under its Occupational Safety and Health Standards for explosives and blasting agents (29 CFR 1910.109). Section 1910.109(k)(2) of this standard also requires that explosive manufacturers meet the requirements of the PSM standard (29 CFR 1910.119).
Significant accidents involving explosives have raised questions concerning whether existing safety regulations are adequate. An
FOOTNOTE 10 CSB Report No. 2011-06-I-HI. END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 11 http://ndep.nv.gov/bapc/capp/capmore.html. END FOOTNOTE
EPA is seeking information relating to the potential regulation of explosives under the RMP.
i. Should
ii. Are there other incidents involving the manufacture and processing of explosive materials that should be reviewed to determine if covering these operations under the RMP would decrease the risk of an accidental explosion affecting an off-site community? Does the presence of explosives impose unique risks on rural, disadvantaged, or otherwise environmentally burdened communities?
iii. Should the RMP regulation apply to manufacturers of explosives, end users, and/or explosive recyclers?
iv. If the RMP regulation is amended to cover explosives, should
v. What would be the economic impacts of adding explosives to the RMP list of substances? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that
vi. As an alternative to expanding the scope of the RMP, would expanded use of EPCRA information (such as better integration of information on explosive hazards into local emergency plans) and other governmental and industry programs (including voluntary programs) be able to address safety gaps? What are the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach relative to expansion of the RMP?
c. Adding Ammonium Nitrate
As previously discussed,
Industry manufactures millions of tons of AN annually in
Blasting agents are relatively low sensitivity explosives which cannot be initiated by blasting caps and are unlikely to explode except under special conditions. A blasting agent is a fuel plus oxidizer, intended for blasting, and not otherwise classified as an explosive. Blasting agents are frequently formulated with AN as the oxidizer.
Ammonium nitrate/fuel oil (ANFO or AN/FO) is a blasting agent widely used in coal mining, quarrying, metal mining, and civil construction. Mining and construction sites that use ANFO may not be as likely to have explosions adversely affecting the public because they are often remote.
AN has an
There are several examples of accidents involving AN. As discussed earlier, on
FOOTNOTE 12 Chemical Advisory: Safe Storage, Handling, and Management of Ammonium Nitrate,
The deadliest industrial accident in
On
On
FOOTNOTE 13 http://www.epa.gov/oem/docs/chem/cterra.pdf. END FOOTNOTE
EPA is requesting information on how to best address the safe storage, handling and risk management of AN. Despite its widespread use as an explosive and as a fertilizer, AN explosions are rare, but when they do occur, can result in deaths, injuries, and extensive property damage.
Currently, AN is not a listed substance under the RMP regulation. 29 CFR part 1910.109(k)(2) requires that the manufacture of explosives shall also meet the requirements contained in
ATF regulates the storage and handling of AN as an explosive material (either as part of an explosive or as a blasting agent) (27 CFR 555.201-224). The ATF regulations specify construction requirements for storage magazines, limitations on the type and amount of material that can be stored in each type of magazine and minimum distances that must be maintained between AN in explosive materials and public receptors and between AN and explosives and blasting agents.
OSHA regulates the storage, handling, and transportation of AN when it is used in explosives, water slurries, gels or blasting agents (29CFR 1910.109 (a)-(h), (k)) or when stored on-site with explosives or blasting agents, including their storage at use sites and mixing and packaging operations. The requirements detail various procedures and safeguards that must be followed for these operations. The
OSHA also regulates bulk storage of AN over 1,000 pounds in a building or structure in the form of crystals, flakes, grains, or prills including fertilizer grade, dynamite grade, nitrous oxide grade, technical grade, and other mixtures, but not blasting agents, containing 60 percent, or more, AN by weight, in 29 CFR 1910.109(i). This standard limits the dimensions of piles of bagged AN and bulk AN in storage bins, and specifies the conditions for storage and the type of the construction materials for storage bins. The standard does not specify minimum separation distances between stored AN and public receptors such as are required for explosives and blasting agents. The standard requires separation of AN from incompatible or combustible materials and use of fire-resistive building materials if combustible materials are stored within a certain distance. A building with more than 2,500 tons of bagged ammonium nitrate must be equipped with an automatic sprinkler system.
OSHA's PSM standard covers some reactive chemicals. Ammonium nitrate, although it is a reactive chemical (oxidizer) and met the original criteria that
Because past AN accidents with adverse effects off-site, such as blast waves, have typically involved its storage in large quantities,
FOOTNOTE 14 TNT equivalent-weight calculation is a method for estimating the quantity of an explosive required to produce blast effects at various distances from the source of the explosion. The method uses the scaling law of distances, which relates quantity of explosive material and distance for a given overpressure. For explosives other than TNT, an empirically-derived equivalency factor is used to account for differences between the explosive characteristics of the actual explosive and those of an equivalent weight of TNT. Additional information on
Alternatively, under CAA 112(r)(7)(A),
EPA requests information on the following questions:
i. Are there safety gaps in the current regulations for AN that could be addressed using regulations under CAA section 112(r)? Should
ii. Should
iii. If
iv. Does your facility store, handle, or manage AN? If so, in what form (e.g., solid, liquid) and in what grade (e.g., high density, low density)? If you are not a manufacturer of AN, how does your facility process or use AN? What quantities of AN are typically stored at your facility at one time?
v. Are there any other standards, including consensus standards, applicable to AN storage, handling, and management that your facility follows? If so, which ones?
vi. Please provide any data or information on accidents involving the storage, handling, and management of AN that affected people or property.
vii. Please provide data on the population surrounding AN sites, including socio-economic information and other environmental burdens on surrounding communities.
viii. If
d. Adding Reactive Substances and Reactivity Hazards
Although the chemicals listed in 40 CFR 68.130 were listed based on their toxicity or flammability, a number of them could be considered reactive chemicals based on a variety of metrics, including consensus standard sources. For example, the RMP list currently includes three chlorosilanes listed as toxic substances. /15/ These compounds are included on the list because their levels of acute toxicity based on animal studies met the RMP listing criteria. However, they primarily produce acute toxic effects on exposed populations because of their rapid and intensive reaction with moisture in the air to produce hydrogen chloride, which can cause acute injury to any body tissue contacted as well as nasal, throat, or lung irritation, coughing, wheezing, and shortness of breath. Nevertheless, while certain listed substances such as these are reactive, the RMP list does not specifically focus on reactive chemicals. There are other chemicals that do not meet the RMP listing criteria, but could potentially be listed based on the hazards of their reaction byproducts (e.g., other chlorosilanes that produce hydrochloric acid upon release to the air).
FOOTNOTE 15 These include methyltrichlorosilane (CASRN 75-79-6), dimethyldichlorosilane (CASRN 75-78-5), and trimethylchlorosilane (CASRN 75-77-4). END FOOTNOTE
EPA has long been aware of the hazards associated with reactive chemicals. In the
Serious accidents involving reactive chemicals have called attention to their hazards and raised questions regarding whether reactive chemicals are adequately regulated. In response to a 1995 chemical explosion that killed five workers at
FOOTNOTE 16
In
FOOTNOTE 17 CSB, Hazard Investigation--Improving Reactive Hazard Management,
CSB also recommended that
One approach to regulating reactive hazards is the approach adopted in the New Jersey Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act (TCPA), which includes a "List of Individual Reactive Hazardous Substances," as well as a list of "Reactive Hazard Substances Mixture Functional Groups." /18/ TCPA includes substances with certain functional groups and molecular structures that have been identified as highly reactive, based on scientific research and accident history. Under the TCPA, covered facilities must determine if any of the chemicals they are intentionally mixing include components on the
FOOTNOTE 18 The New Jersey Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act is the state's process safety regulation. It adopts the federal RMP requirements, and includes additional state-level requirements. See http://www.nj.gov/dep/rpp/brp/tcpa/index.htm. END FOOTNOTE
In 2010, the
FOOTNOTE 19 http://www.nfpa.org/catalog/product.asp?pid=40013&cookie_test=1. END FOOTNOTE
EPA is considering including reactive chemicals on the RMP list and is seeking information on potential approaches to addressing reactive hazards, including the approach used in the TCPA, application of the requirements contained in
i. What are the best criteria to use in classifying reactive hazards? How do you identify a reactive chemical or a reactive mixture?
ii. Should
iii. Should
iv. If your facility is covered by the New Jersey TCPA, have those requirements been effective in protecting human health and the environment from reactive hazards? Please describe any economic impacts associated with TCPA coverage (e.g., costs and benefits, cost savings, shifts in usage of reactive chemicals, special circumstances involving small entities, etc.).
v. Should
FOOTNOTE 20 The definition of "reactive hazard substance (RHS) mixture" in the TCPA references a list of chemical functional groups specified in N.J.A.C. 7:31-6.3(a), Table I, part D, Group II. Whether any of the chemical functional groups are present determines in part coverage of an RHS mixture under the TCPA. END FOOTNOTE
vi. Does your facility follow
vii. Has your facility implemented a reactive-hazards management program other than a program specified by the TCPA and
viii. What alternative regulatory approach to TCPA or
ix. Please provide any data or information on accidents, near misses, or other safety-related incidents involving reactive hazards not covered under the existing RMP regulation. What reactive-hazards management requirements might have prevented these incidents if they had been included in the RMP regulation?
e. Adding Other Categories of Substances
This section addresses substances which are not traditionally classified as highly toxic, flammable, or explosive but that have nonetheless caused or contributed to serious accidents. Other categories of substances beyond highly toxic and flammable liquids and gases could cause death, injury, or serious adverse effects to human health or the environment in the event of an accident. For example, certain types of flammable and explosive solids and non-volatile liquids can explode and cause blast waves that have the potential to injure people and cause property damage beyond a facility's fence line. Such explosions or detonations could involve categories of chemicals not currently regulated as RMP substances or previously discussed in this section as potential additions to the RMP list. Examples of these include organic peroxides, oxidizers, combustible dusts or other flammable solids.
EPA requests information on the following questions:
i. Should
ii. If a particular new category of chemicals should be considered for inclusion on the RMP list, what criteria should be used to prioritize the hazard(s) and determine which chemicals should be listed?
iii. If
f. Removing Certain Substances From the List or Raising Their Threshold Quantity
EPA is also seeking information on whether certain substances should be removed from the current list of regulated substances. There are six RMP chemicals (four toxic, two flammable) for which
FOOTNOTE 21 http://www.epa.gov.cdr/. However, manufacturing or production volume data was only required for CDR when 2011 site-specific production volume for reportable chemicals equaled or exceeded 25,000 pounds. Chemicals manufactured only for non-TSCA uses such as pesticides or chemicals regulated by the
FOOTNOTE 22 http://www.epa.gov/enviro/index.html. END FOOTNOTE
One of the sixteen substances mandated by
Toluene, 2,4-diisocyanate CASRN 584-84-9 Toluene, 2.6-diisocyanate CASRN 91-08-7 Toluene diisocyanate, unspecified isomer CASRN 26471-62-5(23M)
Although the vapor pressure for TDI is relatively low at ambient temperature (< 0.5 mm Hg) and does not meet the vapor pressure listing criteria of >/= 10 mm Hg for a regulated toxic substance,
FOOTNOTE 23 This CASRN is used for the "generic TDI" for any mixture of the 2,4-TDI and 2,6-TDI isomers, of varying ratio between the two specific isomers. END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 24
FOOTNOTE 25 See Senate Report at 560 (section 129(c)). END FOOTNOTE
Currently the TQ for all three TDI listings is 10,000 pounds.
FOOTNOTE 26 USEPA.
USEPA.
Applying EPA's TQ ranking methodology, the ranking factor for TDI was 0.73, which was midrange for the toxic substances assigned the TQ of 10,000 pounds. Other toxic chemicals assigned the 10,000 pounds TQ had ranking factors ranging from 0.3 to 0.9. The acute toxicity of TDI is relatively high compared to most of the other toxic chemicals. The LOC toxicity value of TDI is 0.07 g/m3 (10 ppm) and the LOC toxicity values for the other toxic chemicals range from 0.0025 g/m3 to 4.9 g/m3 (the lower the LOC toxicity value, the more toxic the chemical).
Although the vapor pressure of TDI is much less than the cutoff vapor pressure of 10 mm Hg used to select other liquid toxic substances, the air dispersion factor (V) does not use the vapor pressure at ambient temperature to determine the volatilization rate. Instead, the equation for calculating V uses the boiling point of the chemical to reflect worst case conditions of accidental releases that are likely to involve heat (e.g., fires, exothermic runaway reactions, or upset process conditions), which cause more rapid volatilization of the liquid.
To assign TDI a TQ based on its vapor pressure, a different rationale would have to be used for determining the threshold such as using ambient liquid temperature conditions instead of boiling liquid temperatures for calculating the air dispersion factor V.
One consideration for retaining TDI on the list of substances despite its low vapor pressure is that TDI is known as a potent dermal and lung sensitizer. In sensitized individuals, exposure to even small amounts of diisocyanates may cause allergic reactions such as asthmas and severe breathing difficulties. The LOC toxicity value for TDI was based on a 1990 IDLH value of 10 ppm, which has since been revised to 2.5 ppm. /27/ The Acute Exposure Guideline Level-2 (AEGL-2) for a 1-hour exposure has been established at 0.083 ppm /28/ which is a concentration above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse health effects or an impaired ability to escape (see section II.D.9 later for further discussion about AEGLs). However, neither the revised IDHL or AEGL values are based on exposures of individuals or animals sensitized to TDI. Thus, some accidental releases of TDI that would not cause severe acute health effects in most individuals, may trigger breathing problems or severe allergic reactions in sensitized individuals. The sensitizing nature of TDI should be considered when evaluating whether to raise the TQ of TDI and perhaps should be considered as a reason for lowering the TQ instead of raising it.
FOOTNOTE 27 http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/idlh/584849.html. END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 28 http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/pubs/tsd47.pdf. END FOOTNOTE
One of the flammable chemicals on the RMP list, 1,3-pentadiene (CASRN 504-60-9), fails to meet the flammability criteria discussed earlier in this section. Its inclusion in the RMP list of flammable substances was due to a typographical error in the boiling point of the substance as reported by one reference source.
FOOTNOTE 29
FOOTNOTE 30
EPA requests information on the following questions:
i. Would it be appropriate for
ii. If it is not appropriate to delete TDI, would it be appropriate for
<p> iii. If it is not appropriate to delete TDI because it is a sensitizer, should
iv. Are there other listed substances that should have a higher TQ? If so, which ones, what are the appropriate TQs, and why?
v. Should
vi. Is there any reason that
g. Lowering the Threshold Quantity for Substances Currently on the List
EPA is also seeking information on whether the TQ for any substances currently on the list should be reduced:
i. Are the current TQs protective of human health and the environment, or are there certain substances for which the TQ is too high? If so, which substances? For such substances, what TQ should
ii. What would be the economic impacts of any lowering of the TQ which might be warranted? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that
2. Additional Risk Management Program Elements
Approaches to chemical process safety have continued to evolve since both the RMP regulation and OSHA PSM standard were promulgated. New management system elements and best practices are now being used to address human health, worker safety and environmental protection. Lessons learned from data collected in RMP submissions regarding safety management systems have also informed
Like OSHA,
FOOTNOTE 31
The Agency is also requesting information on two additional management-system elements that were identified by
FOOTNOTE 32 http://www.bsee.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Safety-and-Environmental-Management-Systems-SEMS/Fact-Sheet/. END FOOTNOTE
* Developing and implementing a stop work authority that creates procedures and authorizes any and all offshore industry personnel who witness an imminent risk or dangerous activity to stop work.
* Developing and implementing an ultimate work authority that requires offshore industry operators to clearly define who has the ultimate work authority on a facility for operational safety and decision-making at any given time.
While the requirements under SEMS II focus on offshore facilities under the jurisdiction of BSEE, the concept of requiring these elements may be applicable to facilities subject to the RMP regulation. Established procedures for any and all employees on the facility to implement a stop work authority when witnessing an activity that creates a threat of danger, and clearly defined requirements establishing who has the ultimate authority on the facility for operational safety and decision making at any given time could help to better protect human health and the environment.
In addition to the management system elements identified in the OSHA RFI,
Another element contained in the CCPS Guidelines is "process safety culture." CCPS defines process safety culture as "the combination of group values and behaviors that determine the manner in which process safety is managed." Poor safety culture can lead to accidents by allowing production pressures to overshadow safety concerns, or by limiting the free exchange of important safety information among plant personnel. Safety culture has been implicated in recent serious accidents, such as the
FOOTNOTE 33
The BSEE SEMS regulations contain requirements to conduct a "Job Safety Analysis." BSEE indicates that the Job Safety Analysis (JSA) is an operations/task level hazard analysis technique used to identify risks to personnel associated with their job activities. The Agency is requesting public comment on whether these or other additional management system elements should be added to the RMP regulation, and whether and how these elements relate to prevention of accidental releases.
Additionally, the Agency seeks public comment on whether management system elements that are currently contained within the RMP regulation should be modified, clarified or strengthened. For example:
* Contractors are increasingly used in a variety of roles at chemical process facilities, yet the RMP rule imposes fewer safety requirements on contractor owners and operators than on the owners and operators of the regulated stationary source. In
FOOTNOTE 34 CSB, Investigation Report--Xcel Energy Hydroelectric Plant Penstock Fire,
* The RMP rule requires owner/operators to conduct a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) for Program 3 processes and a hazard review for Program 2 processes. PHAs and hazard reviews are intended to identify potential equipment malfunctions or human errors that could cause an accidental release, and safeguards needed to prevent such malfunctions and errors. However, the rule does not explicitly describe the types of failure scenarios or damage mechanisms that must be considered during PHAs and hazard reviews, and during some compliance inspections
* The Pre-Startup Review element (section 68.67) requires the owner or operator to perform a pre-startup review for new stationary sources and for modified stationary sources when the modification is significant enough to require a change in the process safety information. However, the rule does not clearly state what modifications would require a change in process safety information. Also,
EPA requests information on any additional management-system elements or on potentially modifying, clarifying or expanding existing elements, including those discussed in this
a. Does your facility follow any management-system elements not required under part 68 for RMP-regulated operations? If so, please describe the additional management-system elements, the safety benefits, any economic impacts associated with following the elements, and any special circumstances involving small entities.
b. Would expanding the scope of the RMP regulation to require additional management-system elements, or expanding the scope of existing RMP management-system elements, improve the protection of human health and the environment? Should
c. In systems using management and metrics, how do facilities develop useful leading indicators? Do you track the frequency of events such as process upsets, accidental releases, and "near miss" incidents? Does tracking such events allow managers and employees to make changes that prevent accidental releases? What other metrics and indicators do you use, and how do they help prevent releases?
d. Would requiring RMP facilities to conduct periodic safety culture assessments meaningfully strengthen the safety culture incentives that already exist, such as avoidance of deaths, injuries, property and environmental damage, production loss, community impacts, damage to company reputation, etc., that may result from accidents?
e. Would expansion of the RMP employee participation provision to include requirements such as the SEMS II stop-work authority, or other efforts to involve employees in all management-system elements, enhance protection of human health and the environment?
f. Are there any other management-system elements in the existing RMP regulation that
g. Are there any data or information on accidents, near misses, or other safety-related incidents that the facility could have prevented by following management-system elements not currently required under the RMP regulation?
h. What would be the paperwork burden associated with the revisions to management-system elements discussed above? What special skills or training would employees need to implement these elements, including associated reporting and recordkeeping requirements? What would be the costs of additional reporting and recordkeeping requirements, including costs for worker training and any required data management system upgrades?
3. Define and Require Evaluation of Updates to Applicable Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices
The OSHA PSM standard's references to recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP) are almost identical to those contained in Subpart D of 40 CFR part 68 (i.e., Program 3 Prevention Program).
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. What does your facility use as a definition for RAGAGEP? Would adding a definition for RAGAGEP to the RMP rule improve understanding of RMP requirements and prevent accidental releases? If so, what specific definition for RAGAGEP should
b. From what sources (e.g., codes, standards, published technical reports, guidelines, etc.) does your facility select applicable RAGAGEP for operations covered under the PSM standard?
c. Does your facility evaluate updates to its selected RAGAGEP? If so, how does your facility monitor any updates, and how often do you evaluate them?
d. Please provide any data or information on accidents, near misses, or other safety-related incidents involving failure to evaluate and/or implement updates to applicable RAGAGEP for RMP-covered processes. Would requiring employers to evaluate and/or implement updates to applicable RAGAGEP prevent such accidental releases?
e. Should owners or operators covered by the applicable provisions of the RMP regulation be required to evaluate updates to applicable RAGAGEP? Should owners and operators be required to comply with new RAGAGEP requirements that occur after the owner or operator's initial compliance with the applicable provision of the RMP regulation? How would such updates or new requirements be identified? What would be an appropriate time period in which to conduct this evaluation and/or to comply with updated RAGAGEP? What would be the economic impacts of this change?
f. Would a requirement to evaluate updates to applicable RAGAGEP be more appropriate in another paragraph of the RMP rule? For example, should such a requirement become part of the Process Hazard Analysis revalidation requirements at
4. Extend Mechanical Integrity Requirements To Cover Any Safety-Critical Equipment
EPA is interested in receiving information on whether the scope of the mechanical integrity provisions of the RMP rule should be expanded to cover the mechanical integrity of any safety-critical equipment, and whether additional mechanical integrity requirements should be added to the rule's provisions. In its
EPA notes that the RMP Program 2 maintenance requirements, which were intended as a streamlined version of the mechanical integrity requirements for Program 3 processes, apply to all process equipment, rather than being restricted to specific categories of equipment. This potentially causes the unintended result where certain aspects of a process subject to Program 2 must meet more rigorous maintenance requirements than the same equipment located in a Program 3 process.
In addition to expanding the scope of the rule's existing mechanical integrity provisions to cover any safety critical equipment,
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. Should
b. Please provide any data or information on accidental releases, near misses, or other safety-related incidents related to the mechanical integrity of safety-critical equipment not explicitly covered under
c. Would expanding the scope of
d. Should
e. Are there any other provisions of this section that should be enhanced or clarified? Does labeling
f. What would be the economic impacts of revising the mechanical integrity provisions as discussed above? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that
5. Require Owners and Operators To Manage Organizational Changes
In its
The RMP rule contains management of change requirements for Program 3 processes (see
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. What do you consider to be an organizational change within the context of process safety management practices? For example, would you consider the following, or similar, changes to be organizational changes: Reducing the number of operators in a shift; changing from 5-day to 7-day operations; changing from 8-hour to 12-hour operator shifts; replacing a unit manager; reducing the facility operations or maintenance budget; relocating a technical group to a remote corporate location; changing a supervisory or compensation structure; or hiring contractors to do work formerly performed by employees of the regulated facility? Are there other examples of organizational changes that may be relevant to safety management practices?
b. If your facility has established and implemented written procedures for management of organizational changes, please describe any economic impacts associated with the procedures. Please note any implementation challenges that may be associated with requiring that such procedures be developed and followed.
c. Would clarifying
d. Please describe any organizational changes made in your facility that have had the potential to affect process operations. Were management-of-change procedures followed before making the changes?
e. What do you consider to be the best safety practices concerning management of organizational change?
f. Please provide any data or information on accidents, near misses, or other safety-related incidents involving the failure to manage organizational change. Would following management-of-change procedures under
6. Require Third-Party Compliance Audits
Sections 68.58 and 68.79 of the RMP regulation (Program 2 and 3 Compliance Audits) are almost identical in language to that found in 1910.119(o) of the OSHA PSM standard, with PSM's focus on worker safety and RMP's on protecting human health and the environment. Both section 68.58 and 68.79 require that "the owner or operator shall audit the compliance with the provisions of the subpart at least every three years." In addition, both require that "the compliance audit shall be conducted by at least one person knowledgeable in the process." Neither OSHA nor
There may be advantages to third-party audits. For example,
FOOTNOTE 35 United States of
FOOTNOTE 36
Additionally, BSEE's Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS) standard, 30 CFR 250, Subpart S, requires that audits be conducted by independent third-parties subject to BSEE approval, or to avoid conflict of interest, personnel that are considered to be qualified by the employer. In their revisions to the SEMs II final rule, BSEE discussed its third-party-auditing requirements.
EPA seeks information on whether to revise 40 CFR 68.58 and 68.79 to require facility owners and operators to use a third-party for compliance audits, on whether requiring a third-party auditing process would increase protection of human health and the environment, and on whether the existing compliance audit requirements are sufficiently clear or if changes should be made to strengthen the audit requirements. Specifically,
a. Does your facility use a third-party for conducting compliance audits under
b. Please provide any data or information on accidents, near misses, or other safety-related incidents that could have been prevented by conducting more effective compliance audits for operations covered under
c. Would revising
d. Should
e. How should owners/operators of RMP-regulated facilities address the findings of the third-party auditor? Should
f. Should
g. During compliance inspections at multiple-process sources,
h. Does the identity of the auditor (e.g., in-house, contractor, professionally-certified, party licensed by
7. Effects of OSHA PSM Coverage on RMP Applicability
RMP Program 2 applies to processes not eligible for Program 1 or subject to Program 3, whereas Program 3 applies to processes not eligible for Program 1 and either subject to
In its
If OSHA were to change its policy such that only facilities selling small containers, packages, or allotments to the general public would qualify for the retail facilities exemption,
Of the remaining (i.e., non-agricultural) Program 2 processes, over 70 percent are water or wastewater treatment facilities located in states without federally-delegated, state-run occupational safety and health programs. These facilities are generally not subject to PSM requirements because they are operated by state or municipal government employees, who are not subject to federal
Other than bulk agricultural chemical distributors and water and wastewater treatment facilities, there are fewer than 400 RMP facilities currently reporting Program 2 processes to
FOOTNOTE 37 This would mean that formerly Program 2 processes would henceforth be subject to the 5 Program 3 management system elements not required under Program 2 (i.e., Management of change, Pre-startup review, Employee participation, Hot work permits, and Contractors), as well as the more rigorous versions of the 7 Program 3 elements for which there are Program 2 analogs (e.g., Mechanical integrity under Program 3 vs Maintenance under Program 2). END FOOTNOTE
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. Do you currently operate a facility with Program 2 covered processes? Please indicate what type of Program 2 process your facility operates. Do you implement accident prevention measures that go beyond RMP Program 2 for this process? If so, why? What additional prevention elements do you use? Do you believe Program 2 requirements are necessary for the safe operation of this process? Do you have any Program 2 processes that may be adequately managed under Program 1? Please explain the basis for your views.
b. Do you operate a water or wastewater treatment plant that is subject to the RMP regulation? If so, what level of accident prevention requirements do you believe are warranted for such facilities? If you operate a Program 2 process at a water or wastewater treatment plant, how much additional burden would be involved in implementing the additional RMP elements required for Program 3 processes?
c. Should RMP-covered municipal water and wastewater plants that are not eligible for Program 1 always be subject to RMP Program 3, regardless of whether or not they are located in a state with a Federally-delegated
d. If
e. Would eliminating Program level 2 simplify rule compliance for the regulated universe and improve human and environmental health and safety, or does the current three-tiered prevention program framework under the RMP provide an appropriate level of protection?
f. What would be the economic impacts of modifying or eliminating Program level 2? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that
D. Additional Items for Which EPA Requests Information
This section discusses items that were not previously raised in the OSHA RFI. Each item discussion is followed by specific questions to collect data, information, and comments on each issue.
1. Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis
EPA has recognized the importance of considering safer technology and alternatives techniques /38/ that may result in improved process safety.
FOOTNOTE 38 In this document, "safer technology and alternatives" refer to risk reduction strategies developed through an analysis using a hierarchy of controls. END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 39 http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/docs/chem/gdcregionalguidance.pdf. END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 40 See 61 FR 31700. END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 41 Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group, Executive Order 13650 Report to the President--Actions to Improve Chemical Facility Safety and Security--A Shared Commitment,
In July of 2012, a coalition representing 54 organizations and individuals petitioned
FOOTNOTE 42 https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/404584-petition-to-epa-to-prevent-chem-disasters-filed.html, at 10. END FOOTNOTE
A
FOOTNOTE 43 CCPS Final Report: Definition for Inherently Safer Technology in Production, Transportation, Storage, and Use,
The CCPS has also published a guideline book /44/ intended to provide tools and guidance on approaches to implementing inherent safety. Among other information, the book contains an extensive checklist intended to assist industrial facilities with reviewing existing hazards and their safeguards, evaluating the feasibility of inherently safer alternatives, and documenting the results of this analysis.
FOOTNOTE 44
A 2012
FOOTNOTE 45 http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static-assets/materials-based-on-reports/reports-in-brief/MIC-Summary-Final.pdf END FOOTNOTE
There are some state and local governments that have included inherent safety requirements in their regulations. An IST Review Rule was adopted under the New Jersey TCPA program in
FOOTNOTE 46 See: http://www.nj.gov/dep/rpp/brp/tcpa/downloads/IST_guidance.pdf; http://www.njwec.org/PDF/Factsheets/CS_IST_FactSheet.pdf. END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 47 See: http://www.nj.gov/dep/rpp/brp/tcpa/downloads/IST_SUMWEB.pdf. END FOOTNOTE
California's
FOOTNOTE 48 See: http://cchealth.org/hazmat/pdf/iso/2006_iso_official_code_complete.pdf. END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 49 See: http://cchealth.org/hazmat/pdf/iso/iso-report.pdf. END FOOTNOTE
The CSB has released reports for two recent accidents that the Board indicated could have been avoided if safer technologies had been employed. CSB found that the use of a safer material, such as high-chromium steel, would have prevented the accelerated corrosion and failure of carbon steel involved in the equipment rupture at the
FOOTNOTE 50 See: http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/7/Tesoro_Anacortes_2014-May-01.pdf. END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 51 See: http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Chevron_Interim_Report_Final_2013-04-17.pdf. END FOOTNOTE
An additional complication to assessing safer technologies and alternatives is the varying amount and quality of information available regarding their implementation by industry. While some facilities have converted to processes considered to be inherently safer, other facilities may not have sufficient information available to effectively assess the impacts from changing existing processes to ones considered inherently safer. The differences that exist among chemical facilities, in terms of chemical process, facility layout, and ability to finance implementation, may challenge mandatory implementation of safer technologies and alternatives at regulated entities.
EPA is planning the following steps to advance safer technologies and alternatives:
* Publishing a joint alert with
* Publishing a voluntary guidance document with
* Based on the evaluation of feedback from the alert, guidance, and this
* An analysis and documentation of safer technologies and alternatives
* Integration of the safer technologies and alternatives analysis into the PHA
* Implementation of safer technologies and alternatives where feasible;
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. Should
b. How should safer alternatives be defined if it were to be a requirement under CAA section 112(r) regulations? What specifically should a safer alternatives analysis require and how would this differ from what is already required under other provisions of the RMP?
c. How should industries determine if a safer alternative exists for their particular process? What safer alternative chemicals are available for the listed RMP chemicals and for ammonium nitrate?
d. What should facilities consider when determining if such technologies, when identified, are effective, available, and economically justified for their particular process or facility? Can the RMP national database, Lessons Learned Information System /52/ or other federal databases be structured to promote the exchange of information both within industry and with other stakeholders on potentially safer technologies?
FOOTNOTE 52 https://www.llis.dhs.gov/topics/chemical-facility-safety-and-security. END FOOTNOTE
e. If
f. Should
FOOTNOTE 53 CCPS, Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: A Life Cycle Approach, Second Edition (2009), Appendix A. END FOOTNOTE
g. How should
h. Should
i. If
j. What barriers exist for industry to adopt safer alternatives? What incentives can be used by government to have facilities implement safer alternatives? Should the Agency provide special recognition to companies that implement safer alternatives?
k. What are other options (other than regulatory requirements) exist to encourage facilities to investigate, develop or implement safer alternatives and how can
l. If RMP facilities are required to perform safer alternative options analyses and implementation plans, should
m. If RMP facilities are required to consider safer alternative options, what role should local communities have in these analyses? Should facilities be required to disclose these analyses or recommendations resulting from such analyses to local authorities or the public prior to the selection of options? Are there any other disclosure options that will ensure that decisions on implementing safer technologies are made with transparency? Are there any means of oversight other than disclosure that would ensure that safer alternatives analyses are thorough and implementation decisions are appropriate?
n. What would be the economic impacts of requiring facilities to analyze safer alternative options? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that
2. Emergency Drills To Test a Source's Emergency Response Program or Plan
Under Subpart E of 40 CFR part 68, RMP-covered facilities are required to coordinate emergency response actions with local emergency planning and response agencies. RMP facilities with Program 2 and Program 3 processes must also develop and implement an emergency response program in accordance with
Exercising response plans is critical to ensure that response personnel understand their roles, local emergency responders are familiar with the hazards at the facility, and that the emergency response plan is appropriate and up to date. It ensures that personnel are properly trained and can be used to identify future training needs. Other
FOOTNOTE 54 A copy of the National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) Guidelines,
Another example are exercises that the
Finally, industry guidelines recommend conducting exercises and drills. The CCPS Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety /55/ recommend periodically testing the adequacy of emergency response plans and level of preparedness of responders, including contractors and local response agencies.
FOOTNOTE 55
In order to improve coordination with community responders and ensure that facility personnel have practice responding to accidental releases,
In considering this issue,
a. Are RMP-regulated facilities currently exercising their emergency response plans? If so, are they doing these exercises to comply with other federal, state or local regulatory requirements? What references or guidelines were used to develop the exercise program?
b. What should be the scope of an exercise/drill program? Should the exercise/drill program include internal (emergency response, notifications, and evacuation) and external elements (involving community and federal and state responders, as appropriate)? What elements should be exercised as part of the drill/exercise program? For example, should the program include communications, coordination, logistics, and evacuations/accounting for personnel, etc? What response scenarios should be considered for the exercise/drill program?
c. How frequently should drills/exercises be performed?
d. Who should be involved in the exercise program? How should the management team be engaged as part of the drills/exercises? How should contractors be included in the exercise/drill planning and when conducting exercises/drills? Who should be the designated official responsible for coordinating the exercises and drills conducted at the RMP facility? How should other federal, state and local agencies be included in the exercise/drill program?
e. Should all RMP facilities be required to participate in some type of exercise/drill program or only those who are required to develop an emergency response program? Should Program 1 facilities (and Program 2/Program 3 facilities that do not respond to accidental releases with their own employees) be required to conduct external exercises with community responders and test notification procedures? Should Program 2 and Program 3 facilities whose employees respond to accidental releases conduct both internal and external exercises?
f. How should lessons learned and recommendations be documented and addressed? What timeframe should be considered for completing such records? How long should records of exercises/drills be maintained?
g. Should stationary source operators be required to document and address lessons learned and recommendations when they respond to an actual accidental release?
h. Should information such as the date of the most recent exercise involving the emergency response plan be required to be reported to
i. What would be the economic impacts and paperwork burden of requiring an exercise/drill program for all or a subset of RMP facilities? Would such a requirement substantially improve preparedness for dealing with emergency situations? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that
3. Automated Detection and Monitoring for Releases of Regulated Substances
A process hazards analysis is intended not only to identify existing hazards, but also the likelihood that safety and mitigating systems, including detection and monitoring equipment, would function properly to eliminate or reduce the consequences that may occur as a result of those hazards. The RMP Program 3 Prevention Program requires regulated facilities to conduct a process hazard analysis (
The Agency recognizes that even equipment that is properly designed and maintained can sometimes fail. Automated detection and monitoring systems can be used not only to assess the effectiveness of existing control measures, but also to provide early warning of system upsets which could be acted upon to prevent a more serious or catastrophic incident. Linking these with alert systems and proper communications with the public and first responders may enhance emergency response efforts in the event of an incident, resulting in better protection of human health and the environment. For example, large increases in emissions due to a piping leak, a significant tear in a storage vessel seal, or other similar event can signal a process upset. Systems in place to detect leaks (or the conditions that might result in leaks) in a timely manner would allow for corrective measures to be taken more rapidly than if a facility relied solely on traditional monitoring and inspection methods. RMP inspection and enforcement history has shown this to be of concern, particularly for facilities that are not staffed on a full-time basis and which may also be located in close proximity to population centers or environmentally sensitive areas.
While facilities may identify the benefits of installing automated detection and monitoring systems as they conduct their process hazards analysis, or as they develop their emergency response plan, the decision to invest in such equipment may be influenced by many factors. For example, automated detection and monitoring technologies may not be available for particular chemical hazards, or industry standards may not address their proper use. They may also be costly. Nevertheless, the Agency is requesting information on the need for new or expanded requirements for automated detection and monitoring systems that would supplement either the existing process hazard analysis and/or emergency response requirements. Specifically,
a. Should facilities be required to install monitoring equipment or sensors to detect releases of RMP regulated substances, or the conditions that could lead to such a release? Should the systems provide for continuous detection and monitoring? How should any such requirements be crafted to provide appropriate site-specific flexibility?
b. Are there specific issues that need to be considered for unmanned and/or remote facilities?
c. Should an automated mechanism to notify, alert and warn the local responders and surrounding public of an incident be considered as part of any detection and monitoring system requirement? If so, how should the potential for false alarms be addressed within such a requirement?
d. How can a requirement for automated detection and monitoring systems be best coordinated with the community emergency response plan? What are the advantages/disadvantages between continuous monitoring conducted by automated systems in contrast to third-party alarm agencies?
e. How would a requirement for appropriate detection thresholds be best established for activating alarms and/or alerts?
f. How would the significance and appropriate protective response action of the alarms/alerts be best communicated to responders and the public (including shelter-in-place and evacuations)?
g. What involvement should LEPCs and SERCs have in the development of the emergency response plan, particularly with respect to what actions are to be taken in the event of an incident where and alarm/alert is activated?
h. How frequently should monitoring equipment or sensors to detect releases of RMP-regulated substances be tested? How should these tests be documented? How long should records of such tests be maintained? Should automated monitoring records for periods of normal operations be maintained, so that past records may serve as an aid in determining what may have gone wrong prior to an accident (e.g., a gradual increase in emissions)? Should
i. Leak detection and repair programs are common under the CAA's routine emission programs. Can these programs be integrated with the accidental release prevention program to reduce accidental releases and to simplify requirements for stationary sources subject to both the RMP and these other programs? Are there jurisdictional issues that prevent integration?
j. What would be the economic impacts of specifying additional monitoring and detection requirements in the RMP? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that
4. Additional Stationary Source Location Requirements
EPA is considering whether to amend 40 CFR part 68 to provide more specific requirements to address stationary source siting. In 2005, a series of explosions occurred at the
*
* API Recommended Practice 753, Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings, First Edition,
* CCPS, Guidelines for Facility Siting and Layout (2003); and
* CCPS, Guidelines for Evaluating Process Plant Buildings for External Explosions and Fires, and Toxic Releases, 2nd Edition (2012).
Both the siting of processes within a stationary source and the siting of the stationary source itself can affect the impact of an accidental release. Siting within a stationary source can impact the surrounding community not only by the proximity of the accidental release to off-site receptors adjacent to the facility boundary (e.g., people, infrastructure, environmental resources) but also by increasing the likelihood of a secondary "knock-on" release through compromising nearby processes.
Siting of a stationary source itself may allow the potential impact of an accidental release to dissipate depending on the distance from the source to receptors. The lack of sufficient distance between the source boundary and neighboring residential areas was a significant factor in the severity of several major chemical accidents, including, among others, the
FOOTNOTE 56 See Matthews, Joe. "Paying neighbors to move Mossville: Residents of this
Should EPA amend the RMP rule to include more specific siting requirements as part of the PHA by, for example, establishing buffer or setback zone requirements for new covered stationary sources, or by establishing safety criteria for siting of occupancies inside the facility? Would such requirements provide significant incremental protection over current industry practice based on the references cited above? In considering this issue,
a. Would additional specifics on stationary source siting and occupancy siting under the RMP minimize the impacts of chemical accidents to local communities? How should RMP stationary source siting requirements relate to OSHA PSM and other industry standards?
b. What guidance should
c. What information should
d. What administrative processes and controls should be incorporated into stationary source siting requirements?
e. What safety and process devices, instruments and controls should be incorporated into stationary source siting requirements?
f. What criteria are appropriate for siting of occupancies (such as offices, control rooms, cafeterias, etc.) near an RMP-regulated process?
g. How often should stationary source siting be evaluated for effectiveness? What criteria should be used?
h. What documentation should be required for evaluating stationary source siting determinations?
i. Is it appropriate to reflect the environmental burden of the surrounding community in siting criteria for either new facilities or expansions within an existing site? Is it appropriate to consider chronic burdens or only burdens associated with accidental releases?
j. What challenges would the agency face in specifying uniform siting requirements for the wide variety of covered sites? What site specific factors would need to be addressed?
k. If
l. What would be the economic impacts of specifying additional siting requirements? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that
5. Compliance With Emergency Response Program Requirements in Coordination With Local Responders
Subpart E of the RMP regulation offers owners and operators of RMP-covered facilities with Program 2 or 3 processes two emergency response options. For facilities whose employees will respond to accidental releases of regulated substances, section 68.95 of the regulation requires owners or operators to implement an emergency response program that includes an emergency response plan, procedures for the use of emergency response equipment, training for employees, procedures to review and update the response plan, and other elements. These "responding" facilities are also required to coordinate their emergency plan with local response authorities.
For facilities whose employees will not respond to releases, the RMP regulation states that owners and operators of these sources need not comply with the provisions of section 68.95 provided that the source is included in the community emergency response plan (for sources with regulated toxic substances) or has coordinated response actions with the local fire department (for sources with only regulated flammable substances), and that appropriate notification mechanisms are in place to notify emergency responders when there is a need for a response.
Subpart E can be read as offering owners or operators the choice of whether to be a responding or non-responding facility. RMP-regulated facilities indicate within their risk management plan whether or not they are a "responding" facility (i.e., by indicating compliance with mandatory elements of emergency response plans required in section 68.95(a)(1)), and
In some cases, accidental releases have been made significantly worse due to poor emergency response planning and coordination. For example, following the
EPA is considering whether the Emergency Response provisions in Subpart E of the RMP regulation should be revised to state more explicitly that owners and operators of RMP-regulated facilities must comply with the emergency response program requirements of section 68.95 unless local public responders both have the means and agree to respond to releases of regulated substances at the facility, and to describe what facility owners or operators must do to coordinate with local authorities on the development of community emergency response plans.
EPA requests information on the following questions:
a. Do you own or operate an RMP-regulated facility that relies on public authorities to respond to accidental releases of regulated substances at the facility? What steps do you take to ensure that public responders are prepared to properly respond to accidental releases at your facility? Should
b. If your facility uses its own employees or response contractors provided by the facility to respond to emergencies, what factors led to your decision to use your own employees or contractors to conduct emergency response operations? What steps have you taken to coordinate with local responders on emergency response planning?
c. Are you a member of an LEPC, municipal fire department or municipal hazardous materials response team? If so, do you believe that "non-responding" RMP facilities in your jurisdiction have generally provided the appropriate information and support to your organization to ensure an appropriate response to hazardous substance emergencies at those facilities? Is your organization capable of responding appropriately to such events at RMP facilities? How often do you visit RMP facilities in your jurisdiction? Do you conduct emergency drills at RMP facilities? Do you believe that RMP facilities should generally respond to emergencies using their own employees, or rely on public responders? Should
d. Are there certain substances or types of facilities that present particular response challenges for local authorities? If so, which substances or types of facilities? Should such facilities be required to prepare and implement comprehensive emergency response programs instead of relying primarily on public responders? Do public responders in your area have adequate existing authority to require this now?
e. If public responders are not capable of responding to a particular type of chemical or release event at an RMP-regulated facility, should the owner or operator of the facility be required to provide for an effective response, either with the facility's own employees, response contractors, a mutual aid agreement with nearby facilities, or some other means?
f. What would be the economic impacts of expanding the emergency response requirements as discussed above? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that
6. Incident Investigation and Accident History Requirements
Incident investigations and accident history reporting can provide valuable information about potential hazards and the steps needed to prevent future events. Many times, the cause of an incident is the result of a series of other problems that need to be addressed to prevent recurrences. For example, an operator's mistake may be the result of poor training, inappropriate procedures, or poor design of control systems; equipment failure may result from improper maintenance, misuse of equipment (e.g., operating at too high a temperature), or use of incompatible materials. Through incident investigation a facility owner or operator would determine not only the initiating event that led to the release, but more importantly its root cause(s). Accident history reporting provides an avenue to disseminate that information. Thorough investigations and reporting may help facilities identify and address root causes.
The RMP's incident investigation requirements closely track those established in
EPA has encouraged facilities to investigate all accidental releases. However, the focus of the current incident investigation and accident history reporting requirements is limited.
Incident investigations may result in improved process safety through the dissemination of lessons learned and the implementation of recommended corrective actions. Conducting these investigations as soon as possible after an incident may yield better quality data and information, though time may also be required to collect, validate, and integrate data from a range of sources.
FOOTNOTE 57
The Agency is considering whether broadening the incident investigation and accident history requirements to include clear requirements to investigate near misses and determine root causes of accidents, near misses, and process upsets would promote increased safety. The Agency is requesting information on the appropriateness of requiring root cause investigations of incidents, process upsets and near-misses, and of establishing specific time frames for incident investigations to be completed. Specifically, the Agency requests detailed information on the following questions:
a. Are the RMP incident investigation requirements too narrowly focused? Would identifying a broader range of incidents requiring investigation (e.g., near misses) help prevent additional accidental releases? Please provide specific examples where possible.
b. Are there any data or information on process upsets, near misses or other incidents that were not required to be investigated, but where an investigation and resulting changes in management systems might prevent accidental releases?
c. Does your facility routinely investigate incidents not required to be investigated under part 68? If so, please describe the types of incidents investigated, and the effects these investigations have had on facility operations.
d. Would a specific time frame for incident investigations to be completed benefit overall safety? What should be the basis for establishing an appropriate timeframe requirement for an incident investigation to be completed? What are the challenges and limitations to completing an incident investigation within a specified timeframe?
e. Are there benefits from requiring that investigations must be performed even in cases where the owner/operator elects to decommission the process involved, where the process is destroyed in the incident, or where a facility determines there were no actual or potential off-site consequences? Would such a requirement provide a disincentive to decommission potentially risky processes?
f. Would a modification of the definition of "catastrophic release" assist in addressing the concerns regarding the appropriate scope of incidents that require investigation?
g. Would a modification of the accident history reporting requirements to reflect a broader range of incidents being investigated assist in disseminating lessons learned across industry?
h. Should
i. Is it appropriate for facilities to share the results of accident investigations with the local community or alternatively a summary of the accident, and its root cause? Is there an appropriate role for the local community in conducting investigations?
j. What would be the economic impact of broadening the RMP incident investigation requirements to require root cause investigations of near misses? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that
7. Worst Case Release Scenario Quantity Requirements for Processes Involving Numerous Small Vessels Stored Together
Section 68.25(b) of the RMP rule requires the owner or operator to determine a worst-case release quantity. The regulation states that "the worst case release quantity shall be the greater of the following: (1) For substances in a vessel, the greatest amount held in a single vessel, taking into account administrative controls that limit the maximum quantity; or (2) For substances in pipes, the greatest amount in a pipe, taking into account administrative controls that limit the maximum quantity." Based on a review of past RMP submissions and facility inspections,
This type of situation occurred on
EPA seeks information on whether to revise section 68.25(b) of the RMP regulation to better account for processes involving numerous small vessels stored together, such as on pallets, cylinder racks, and in groups.
a. Should
b. Would revising the worst case scenario quantity determination requirement in this manner better represent the true worst case scenario for such processes?
c. Would this change promote stronger process safety controls and help prevent accidents?
d. In situations where numerous small containers are stored together, are there any kinds of protective barriers or other methods of storage that would reduce the likelihood of a release from one container causing additional releases from adjacent or nearby containers? Should such barriers or storage methods be incorporated into the rule's worst case scenario requirements, and if so, how? Would revising
e. If
f. Should
g. What would be the economic impacts of modifying the worst case scenario analysis requirements as discussed above? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that
8. Public Disclosure of Information To Promote Regulatory Compliance and Improve Community Understanding of Chemical Risks
EPA is seeking public comment on whether there are additional steps the Agency could take to improve compliance through increased information disclosure to the public and local authorities. For example, would requiring RMP-covered facilities to post on a company Web site unrestricted (i.e., non-off-site consequence analysis) RMP information, such as the facility's RMP executive summary, emergency contact information, identity of the LEPC, or links to the local emergency response plan and/or the facility's most recent EPCRA Tier II report, lead to improvements in facility safety and better regulatory compliance? Would disclosing a summary of the facility's compliance audit, PHA, or incident investigation reports to the LEPC result in improvements in emergency planning and response? Would such disclosures raise any concerns regarding facility security or proprietary business information?
We note that the RMP rule was published in 1996 before many of the current information-sharing technologies were conceived. While the Agency has modernized mechanisms for reporting and handling risk management plans, we have made only minor adjustments to the RMP rule for new information technologies. We have not systematically reviewed the rule to see if enhanced facility and community interaction through the use of these technologies can promote safer operations, perhaps at a reduced cost of compliance and oversight.
Ensuring that communities, local planners and local first responders have appropriate facility chemical hazard information is critical to the health and safety of the responders and the local community. In response to Executive Order 13650,
a. Should
b. Would requiring facilities to make this information available on the company Web site promote improved regulatory compliance? What additional economic burden would be associated with such a requirement?
c. Do RMP-regulated facility owners/operators have any safety or security concerns with posting the executive summary from the RMP, or linking to EPCRA reports and community response plans on the company Web sites? Please explain any concerns regarding specific elements of this information.
d. Would posting the RMP executive summary on a Web site cause facility owner/operators to remove important information from the executive summary? Does
e. Is there other information (web-based or otherwise) that would assist local communities, emergency planners, and responders in understanding facility risks that should be made publicly available? For example, would disclosure of the facility's PHA or compliance audit to local authorities such as the LEPC result in improved safety?
f. Does your facility interact with community groups (e.g., a citizen advisory panel)? If so, what information do you provide to such groups?
g. Are there other activities or measures that RMP-facility owner/operators can use to ensure that communities, planners, and responders have access to appropriate information?
h. Can the use of social media or other forms of community outreach be incorporated into hazard assessment, prevention, and response to leverage community involvement in oversight? For example, would increased public disclosure of RMP-related information, such as accidental releases, near misses, and subsequent safety enhancements, or increased community involvement in facility emergency response planning, lead to improvements in facility safety? Please identify aspects of the RMP rule where there are opportunities for community involvement.
9. Threshold Quantities and Off-Site Consequence Analysis Endpoints for Regulated Substances Based on Acute Exposure Guideline Level Toxicity Values
EPA is considering the use of Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) /58/ developed by the
FOOTNOTE 58 http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/. END FOOTNOTE
EPA originally set the TQs for the RMP toxic substances using a ranking method similar to that used in developing the threshold planning quantities (TPQs) for the EPCRA EHSs. A factor for each toxic chemical based on its toxicity level of concern "LOC" and its potential to become airborne and disperse "V", was derived and used to develop a ranking factor equal to LOC divided by V. Chemicals with lower ranking factors were assigned lower thresholds. A low numerical LOC value represents a high toxicity and a high value of V represents a high potential for air dispersion. Therefore, the ranking factor was designed such that lower LOC values or higher V values (or both) resulted in lower ranking factors. For example, the V for all gases is assigned a value of 1, which is higher than the calculated values of V for all liquids. For the RMP substances, thresholds were assigned based on order of magnitude ranges in the ranking factor, using TQ categories of 500 pounds, 1,000 pounds, 2,500 pounds, 5,000 pounds, 10,000 pounds, 15,000 pounds and 20,000 pounds (59 FR 4478,
The toxicity LOC was the maximum short term exposure concentration level in air for each chemical that would not lead to serious irreversible health effects in the general population when exposed for a relatively short duration. The Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) value developed by the
The IDLH is defined as the maximum concentration from which one could escape within 30 minutes without any escape-impairing symptoms or any irreversible health effects. The IDLH was presented in the 1990 edition of the NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards and was used where available to develop the LOC toxicity levels for RMP toxic substances. For substances without a published IDLH value, a value equivalent to the IDLH was derived from mammalian toxicity data using a methodology described in Appendix D of the Technical Guidance for Hazard Analysis, Emergency Planning for Hazardous Substances. /59/
FOOTNOTE 59 USEPA/
In some cases, revised or updated toxicity data were used, based on the
EPA is considering recalculating the current IDLH-based TQs for the following reasons:
* The IDLH is based upon response of healthy male worker-population and does not take into account the exposure of more sensitive individuals, such as the elderly, pregnant women, children or people with various health problems.
* The IDLH is based upon a maximum 30-minute exposure period which may not reflect (may underestimate) actual exposures to accidental airborne releases.
* The IDLH may not reflect the concentration that could result in serious but reversible injury because IDLHs were designed only to protect workers against concentrations that would prevent death or irreversible health effects or would prevent other deleterious effects (e.g. disorientation or incoordination) that would prevent escape.
EPA recognized the limitation of using the IDLH values when it developed the TPQs for the EHSs in 1986 and 1987, but the agency was only just beginning the development of more appropriate chemical emergency exposure levels for the general public. Therefore,
FOOTNOTE 60 USEPA.
Due to the limitations outlined above,
FOOTNOTE 61 see: http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/. END FOOTNOTE
A chemical may have up to three AEGLs values, each of which corresponds to a specific tier of health effects. The three AEGL tiers are defined as follows:
* AEGL-1 is the airborne concentration, expressed as parts per million or milligrams per cubic meter (ppm or mg/m3) of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience notable discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic nonsensory effects. However, the effects are not disabling and are transient and reversible upon cessation of exposure.
* AEGL-2 is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m3) of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse health effects or an impaired ability to escape.
* AEGL-3 is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m3) of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience life-threatening health effects or death.
The use of AEGLs to recalculate RMP reporting thresholds would better reflect the potential for adverse effects of an accidental release upon individuals in a community compared to IDLHs because AEGLs take into account the potential exposure of more sensitive individuals, the potential for longer periods of exposure, and the potential for serious but reversible injuries.
In situations where no AEGL exists for a chemical,
FOOTNOTE 62 http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/erpgs. END FOOTNOTE
The three ERPG tiers are defined as follows:
* ERPG-3 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects.
* ERPG-2 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms which could impair an individual's ability to take protective action.
* ERPG-1 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing other than mild transient health effects or perceiving a clearly defined, objectionable odor.
EPA previously used EPRG values in 1996 (61 FR 31668,
One consequence however, of the agency using separate toxicity values for TQs (based upon IDLH) and toxic endpoints (based upon EPRG-2) for the RMP regulations as a whole is some inconsistency in the representation of the relative toxicities of certain substances compared to others. For example, chlorine and sulfur dioxide have relatively similar ERPG-2 toxic endpoints, 0.0087 mg/L and 0.0078 mg/L, respectively, but chlorine is listed with a reporting threshold of 2,500 pounds while sulfur dioxide has a reporting threshold of 5,000 pounds. As gases, both chlorine and sulfur dioxide have the same air dispersion factor (V) of 1. The difference in thresholds is due to the use of 1990 IDLH values, with chlorine having an IDLH (0.087 mg/L or 30 ppm), that suggests it is three times more toxic than sulfur dioxide (IDLH of 0.261 mg/L or 100 ppm). To remedy such issues,
With few exceptions, AEGL-2 values are significantly lower than LOC values for a given substance, and generally somewhat lower than the corresponding ERPG-2 value. However, this does not necessarily mean that TQs would always decrease. As indicated above, when originally developing TQs,
Alternatively, if
Adopting AEGL-2 values in place of ERPG-2 values to establish new toxic endpoints would have a more direct effect. AEGL-2 values are often, but not always, lower than the existing toxic endpoints. Where the AEGL value is lower than the current toxic endpoint for a particular substance, the new toxic endpoint would likewise be lower, and vice versa. The practical effect of changing toxic endpoints would be to change the off-site consequence analysis distance to endpoint for a given substance and release quantity. For all processes containing substances with new lower toxic endpoints, larger worst case and alternative release scenario zones would result, whereas processes containing substances with new higher toxic endpoints would have smaller off-site consequence zones. If most toxic endpoints were to either decrease or remain the same, another result would likely be that fewer regulated processes would be eligible for Program 1.
EPA requests information on the following questions regarding recalculating reporting thresholds and/or toxic endpoints using AEGLs (or EPRG values when AEGLs are not available):
a. Would revising the RMP rule to incorporate AEGL-2 and ERPG-2 values (when an AEGL is not available), as the basis for TQs and toxic endpoints make the RMP rule more protective of human health and the environment? Would it result in significant changes to the universe of RMP-regulated facilities due to potential changes in TQs? If so, what number and types of facilities would be most affected and what changes would occur?
b. The IDLH values used for setting the existing TQs are based on an exposure period of 30 minutes. If the IDLH was not available, the acute toxicity data used to determine the equivalent IDLH varied depending on the chemical and actual study, and these numbers typically ranged from 1 to 8 hours. The ERPG-2 values used for the toxic endpoints represent an exposure period of 1 hour. Given that AEGLs are established with five different exposure periods (10 minutes, 30 minutes, 1 hour, 4 hours, and 8 hours), which exposure time should be used if the AEGL is used to determine the TQs and/or toxic endpoints?
c. What should be the hierarchy for developing an alternative or equivalent LOC when an AEGL value has not been established for a toxic substance? Should ERPG values be used instead if they exist? If no ERPG value exists, should an LOC based on the IDLH value be used instead if it exists? If there is no IDLH value, how should the LOC be calculated for either the TQ or toxic endpoint? Is there an alternate method for establishing an equivalent LOC for those chemicals not having an AEGL or ERPG that will result in an appropriate TQ?
d. Currently, RMP worst-cast scenarios can be based on 10-minute or 60-minute release times. Because many AEGL-2 values are established for 1-hour, 4-hour and 8-hour exposure periods, should requirements for determining the worst-case and alternative release scenarios also incorporate four and eight hour release times using the 4-hour and 8-hour AEGL-2 values for a particular toxic chemical?</p>
e. Should
f. What would be the economic impacts of recalculating TQs as discussed above? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that
10. Program 3 NAICS Codes Based on RMP Accident History Data
When developing the RMP, the Agency scaled the regulatory requirements based on the potential risk posed by a source and the steps needed to address the risk, rather than imposing identical requirements on all sources. To this end, processes subject to RMP requirements were divided into three tiers: Programs 1, 2, and 3 (see section I.C). Eligibility for any given Program is based on process criteria so that classification of one process in a Program does not influence the classification of other processes at the source. The Agency established the most stringent RMP requirements under Program 3 for those industry sectors that represented a potentially higher risk of accidental releases.
Industry accident records represent a reasonable criterion for identifying high risk sources. If an entire industry has a long history of accidental releases, it may indicate that the materials handled and handling conditions generate a higher potential for serious releases, or that the government or industry standards applicable to that industry area are not effectively minimizing risks. Additionally, accident history associated with industry sectors was identified by
Program 3 eligibility is based in part on the NAICS associated with the covered process. /63/ The specific codes identified for Program 3 were based on an analysis of reported accident histories within industry areas, selecting those that evidenced a higher risk potential. /64/
FOOTNOTE 63 The 1996 final RMP rule based Program 3 eligibility on the old Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code system, which assigned four-digit codes to different industry sectors. However, in 1997, the
FOOTNOTE 64 EPA Report: Development of Decision Criteria For Accident History by SIC Code Approach and 100 or More Employee Approach, EPA Docket Number HQ-OAR-2004-0365,
The RMP national database now contains nearly two decades of accident history reports from covered sources, and the Agency believes that these reports represent a more comprehensive picture of the relative accident risks associated with different industry sectors regulated under the rule than was available to the Agency prior to the rule's publication. Based on these accident reports, the ten NAICS codes most frequently associated with accidents in RMP-regulated processes are 32411 (petroleum refineries), 325199 (all other basic organic chemical manufacturing), 325188 (all other basic inorganic chemical manufacturing), 22131 (water supply and irrigation systems), 42491 (farm supplies merchant wholesalers), 22132 (sewage treatment facilities), 325181 (alkalies and chlorine manufacturing), 311615 (poultry processing), 49312 (refrigerated warehousing and storage), and 32211 (pulp mills). /65/ The Agency is requesting information on the appropriateness of reevaluating the NAICS industry sectors originally identified to determine Program 3 applicability based on the collected RMP data. Specifically,
FOOTNOTE 65 We note that for purposes of categorizing RMP processes based on accident frequency, some different NAICS codes represent essentially the same type of chemical process. For example, facilities in NAICS 311615 (poultry processing) and 49312 (refrigerated warehousing and storage) generally become RMP-regulated as a result of using large anhydrous ammonia refrigeration systems. Similarly, there are several NAICS codes for RMP-regulated processes that represent bulk storage of anhydrous ammonia by agricultural chemical distribution facilities.
a. Should industry sectors represented in RMP data as those with the most accidental releases be used to update and replace the existing set of Program 3 NAICS codes with a new set?
b. How can the RMP accident history data best be used to update the current list of NAICS codes that trigger Program 3 requirements? Should the agency take into account the number of sources in each sector, or the severity of reported accidents, or other factors, in selecting updated Program 3 NAICS codes? Is the methodology used to develop the SIC/NAICS code list applicable to the RMP accident history database?
c. Would limiting the data analysis or the selection of NAICS codes to only those industry sectors represented in the RMP data provide a complete and accurate picture of high risk industry sectors?
d. Should an analysis of the RMP data be combined with an analysis of other current accident history databases to inform any revisions/updates? If so, what other databases should be used? How much weight should be given to the RMP data set in comparison to other sources?
e. Should the original NAICS codes continue to be included? Would not including the NAICS codes historically identified under Program 3 cause increase risks to those industry sectors by having them no longer subject to the more stringent measures?
f. Should an analysis of accident history data be limited to a specific time frame?
g. Would it cause confusion within the regulated community to change the list of NAICS codes for which Program 3 is required?
h. What would be the economic impacts of modifying the list of NAICS codes for which Program 3 is required? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that
11. The "Safety Case" Regulatory Model
The "safety case" regulatory model /66/ is a framework for regulating high-risk industries where owners or operators of industrial facilities are required to demonstrate to the regulator that they have reduced risks to a level that is "as low as reasonably practicable", or ALARP. In the safety case model, operators must present to regulators a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a given operating environment. This regulatory approach is used in the chemical and refining industries by some countries outside the U.S., including the
FOOTNOTE 66 http://www.csb.gov/working-papers-on-the-safety-case-regulatory-model-and-its-attributes/. END FOOTNOTE
In its
FOOTNOTE 67 At its
Completely replacing the current RMP regulation (and PSM standard) with a safety case approach would require significant changes to the existing regulatory regime for chemical process safety in
EPA requests information on the advantages and disadvantages of adopting a safety case approach to replace the RMP regulation and PSM standard, or alternatively, of incorporating aspects of the approach into current regulations or for selected categories of facilities. In particular,
a. If you own or operate any RMP or PSM-covered facilities and also own or operate facilities in countries that use a safety case regulatory regime, please describe the process of developing and obtaining approval for your safety case. How long does development and approval of a safety case take for a large petroleum refinery or chemical processing facility? What are the advantages and disadvantages of the safety case approach in comparison to the existing U.S. regulatory regime for chemical process safety? Is there any evidence that the safety case approach reduces the frequency and severity of accidental releases and near misses? If so, please provide any information, data, or studies to
b. The CSB Draft Regulatory Report on the Chevron Richmond Refinery Pipe Rupture and Fire /68/ highlights the NRC as a U.S. regulator that has established a safety case approach for licensing and oversight of commercial nuclear power plants in
FOOTNOTE 68 http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/CSB_Chevron_Richmond_Refinery_Regulatory_Report.pdf. END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 69 http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder.html. END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 70 http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1100/v29/fy2014-cbj.pdf. END FOOTNOTE
c. Is the safety case approach suitable for all RMP and PSM covered facilities, or, if adopted, should it be limited to only the most high-risk facilities, such as petroleum refineries and other high-risk chemical processing facilities?
d. What would be the economic impacts of moving to a safety case based regulatory regime for chemical facility safety? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that
12. Streamlining RMP Requirements
In addition to the items listed above,
a. Are there steps that
b. Are there steps that
c. Should
d. Is the three-tiered program level structure of the RMP regulation appropriate, or should
e. Are the accident prevention program elements clearly defined? Should
f. Are the regulatory terms and definitions contained in section 68.3 sufficiently clear? Are there additional terms that
Dated:
Assistant Administrator,
[FR Doc. 2014-18037 Filed 7-30-14;
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P
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