I-4 Ultimate: Delays, overruns and deaths plague project

Oct. 25--I-4 Ultimate's promise five years ago was that private financing and management would make Florida's largest road reconstruction project better, faster and cheaper.

Today, the 21-mile and $2.3 billion rebuilding of Interstate 4 through metro Orlando is slogging through rising costs to an uncertain finish date, with crews working day and night under the pall of repeated worker fatalities.

Some of the issues:

-- The fifth death of a construction worker last month that preliminary findings say would have been avoidable with a more cautious approach to bridge building that SGL Constructors made mandatory this month.

-- Construction consortium I-4 Mobility Partners and builder SGL falling still further behind a 2021 deadline, with the most recent estimate adding a delay from Hurricane Dorian for a total of 271 additional days needed for construction.

-- Claims for damage to vehicles and property from construction reaching almost 1,000. Nearly three-quarters have gotten no payment; a previous examination by the Orlando Sentinel found SGL often imposes an unattainable standard of proof.

-- State officials remaining silent for more than a year on the status of a bill for $100 million -- the equivalent of a very large road project -- for additional payment from I-4 Mobility Partners.

-- The scaling back this summer of a signature feature for I-4 Ultimate from an artistically soaring, curving bridge for cycling and walking over the interstate in Maitland to a straight, square tube.

"The construction process is now more than an inconvenience, it is endangering the lives of commuters, workers and visitors," said U.S. Rep. Stephanie Murphy, a Democrat whose district covers the interstate from Sanford to Orlando. "We cannot tolerate any more delays. FDOT should be working with the contractor to ensure the project is completed promptly and safely."

The I-4 Ultimate $2.3 billion cost figure is the sum of project spending as it occurs, but the total price tag with financing costs is estimated at nearly $7 billion. The $2.3 billion is being split roughly between the state and I-4 Mobility Partners.

With its investment, I-4 Mobility Partners has acquired enormously more responsibility and oversight than occurs with conventional road building. From 2014 to 2054, the consortium is to design, build, finance, operate and maintain the I-4 Ultimate stretch of interstate.

Countless drivers can't wait until the work is done, having had enough already of white-knuckle driving.

"Each time that I go on I-4, I'm praying that whoever is driving around me is familiar with the road and understands that the lanes are going to change suddenly. Even then I am unsure because how it was yesterday may not be how it is today," said Adrienne Brown-Haynes of south Orlando, who has had to repair damage to her car from driving on the road.

"I do everything I can to avoid I-4 if possible by leaving very early and taking alternate routes. But since the construction has gotten worse, there's a lot more traffic on the back roads. It feels as if everyone has the same idea to avoid I-4," Brown-Hayes said.

The project spans from north of State Road 434 in Seminole, through Orlando and to west of Florida's Turnpike in Orange County, with toll lanes being added to much of the stretch.

Payments to I-4 Mobility Partners will come from state and federals funds and tolls through 2037. Afterward, tolls are to cover payments to the consortium.

Where I-4 Mobility Partner's claim against the state for an additional $100 million fits in the financing scheme -- and how the claim is consistent with the state's assertions that I-4 Ultimate would shift the risk of cost overruns to the private sector -- remains undisclosed by state officials to the public.

"This project has been very challenging as you can imagine," said Ananth Prasad, president of the Florida Transportation Builders Association and the former Florida Department of Transportation secretary who oversaw the I-4 Ultimate deal in 2014 and remains supportive of the project.

"Just the pure escalation of costs and uncertainty of future pricing greatly outweigh the current disputes on the project," Prasad said. "Would you rather have this 20 miles done in one shot or subject commuters to the never-ending sight of orange barrels for decades."

Florida DOT officials have agreed to brief MetroPlan Orlando, the region's transportation planning agency with a board of local mayors and council members. Set for December, the presentation is to cover schedule and finances for I-4 Ultimate.

With the number of days over schedule continuing to climb, the department of transportation announced this summer that the proposed, showcase Maitland pedestrian bridge was being redesigned with more conventional features to save construction time and reduce lane closures.

Michael Garvin, associate professor of civil engineering at Virginia Tech, said he has not examined I-4 Ultimate contract specifications.

But, in general, he said, a potential downside of a public-private partnership is that a contractor or developer, when taking on myriad risks and conditions of a big job, and then confronted with setbacks, may "start to search for ways to cut losses: this situation, however, could lead to unwanted actions like changing means and methods, reducing material quality, etc."

That, in laymen's terms, Garvin said, frequently means "cutting corners."

"While transferring risks from the public to the private sector may appear to be advantageous at the outset, this can backfire, particularly if the private developer has limited means to manage or control the risks," Garvin said.

Not widely known is that the price of I-4 Ultimate includes an estimated $263 million that was meant for local road improvements.

Beginning this year, according to original project terms, the Florida DOT is scheduled to divert millions of dollars each year from state road projects in Orange, Seminole and Osceola counties to help pay for I-4 Ultimate.

Original projections put the amounts at $30 million this year, as much as $35 million in 2023 and as little as $9 million in the final year of 2030.

MetroPlan Orlando in 2013 implored state transportation officials to avoid diverting that money from local road improvements.

FDOT officials did not response to a request for an explanation of whether it will subtract $263 million from state road projects in Central Florida.

Perhaps tied to budget and schedule troubles, SGL Constructors, comprised of high-profile road builders, has had repeated failures with a core competency and essential responsibility: keeping workers alive.

Moody's Investors Service in a June credit opinion repeated a previous "negative outlook" for I-4 Mobility Partners.

The credit rating company noted the consortium already has accelerated construction work, but is experiencing above-average turnover of employees, "some of which have limited construction experience."

Documents disclosed by the department of transportation contain revealing details about a routine installation of a bridge beam, or girder, that turned disastrous on Saturday, Sept. 28.

Worker Ulises Corrales Ibarra, 37, of Venezuela died after suffering injuries from head to foot, according a medical examiner's report.

The girder picked up by a crane from a truck that Saturday night was garden-variety compared with others in the vicinity where it was to be permanently affixed: the intersection of I-4 and State Road 408.

The intersection's assemblage of bridges and ramps will rise to 120 feet; far below is bridge 246/226 as identified by investigators, where the accident occurred.

Beneath bridge 246/226 is bare ground, rather than another bridge or traffic lane that would have markedly stepped up the complexity of the installation.

After the accident, Florida DOT officials released two documents: a memorandum of preliminary accident findings and a "Girder Erection Plan" for a bridge near where the accident occurred.

What happened, according to the memo by the international engineering firm of Thornton Tomasetti, was that after the beam was lowered onto the bridge's cross arms, or substructures, the crane cables were unhooked.

The memo states that SGL specifications allows for crane release before the girder is braced into place.

"For a short period of time the girder is unbraced, supported solely on the bearing pad," the memo states. "Unfortunately, the girder in question overturned/slid." There is no memo reference to what moved the girder.

Gouges visible in the concrete substructures of the bridge indicate the girder, once it was rolled onto its side, buckled and collapsed to the ground, killing Ibarra.

According to construction experts, girders are extremely strong in an upright position but cannot support their own weight when turned sideways.

SGL announced three days after the Thornton Tomasetti memo, on Oct. 13, that "work will resume with precautionary modifications and safety measures that included expanded girder restraint procedures during installation."

The Girder Erection Plan released by DOT was for a bridge at Kaley Street where bridge construction first resumed after the accident. It states in capital letters: "AT NO TIME SHALL THE CRANE UNHOOK FROM THE GIRDER PRIOR" to temporary bracing.

SGL Constructors did not respond when asked if procedures were violated in the fatal incident installation.

Florida DOT officials did not comply with a request for a record of fatalities on its road projects, answering that such records were the responsibility of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

OSHA investigates fatalities, but state data is kept by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For all highway, street and bridge construction and at all levels of government in Florida, there were three worker fatalities in both 2013 and 2014, six in 2015, 10 in 2016 and nine in 2017, according to the agency.

The record of five fatalities on I-4 Ultimate is a grim outlier compared to other very large, contemporary road projects done by leading contractors in Florida.

The Central Florida Expressway Authority, declining to discuss its pursuit of safety in the context of I-4's tragedies, has managed enormous construction not unlike that of I-4 Ultimate, including the rebuilding and widening of its flagship State Road 408 and a huge expansion of the S.R. 408 interchange with State Road 417.

The expressway authority has recorded two worker deaths in its history, both involving drunk drivers, but none from a construction accident.

Florida's second-largest, public-private partnership road project, Broward County's I-595 Express, involved rebuilding 10 miles of that interstate, adding reversible toll lanes from the Sawgrass Expressway to Interstate 95.

The six-year project was finished on time in 2014 meeting its budget of $1.2 billion without a single worker death.

kspear@orlandosentinel.com

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