House Intelligence Committee Issues Report on Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2021 (Part 1 of 11)

WASHINGTON, Dec. 20 -- The House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee issued a report (H.Rpt. 116-565) on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 2021 (H.R. 7856), which aims to authorize appropriations for fiscal 2021 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. government, Community Management Account and Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System. The report was advanced by Rep. Adam Schiff, D-California, on Oct. 30.

Purpose

The purpose of H.R. 7856, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 (the Act), is to authorize funding for the activities of the 17 elements comprising the U.S. Intelligence Community (the IC).

Compliance With Classified Schedule of Authorizations and With Unclassified and Classified Committee Direction

Because most of the intelligence budget involves classified programs, the bulk of the Committee's explanatory and directive language for each fiscal year is found in the classified annex accompanying the bill. The classified annex also includes the classified schedule of authorizations as well as explanatory and directive language.

The classified schedule of authorizations is incorporated directly into the legislation by Section 102 of the bill. The Executive Branch shall strictly comply with all Committee direction and other guidance set forth in this report and in the classified annex.

The classified annex and classified schedule of

authorizations shall be made available for review by all Members of the House of Representatives, on conditions set by the Committee at the time of its approval of H.R. 7856.

Scope of Committee Review

The bill authorizes U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities within the jurisdiction of the Committee, including the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), the Homeland Security Intelligence Program (HSIP), and the Information Systems Security Program (ISSP). The NIP consists of all activities of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), as well as intelligence, counterintelligence and related activities conducted by: the Central Intelligence Agency; the Department of Defense, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and certain activities of the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps; the Department of Energy; the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Department of Homeland Security, including the U.S. Coast Guard and intelligence elements of DHS; Department of State; and the Department of the Treasury. The Committee has exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of these activities--and exclusive jurisdiction to study the sources and methods of the IC.

Committee Views

H.R. 7856 ensures the IC has the resources needed to compete against the Nation's strategic adversaries--like a rising China and a revanchist Russia. It invests in next-generation technologies, like artificial intelligence and high-performance computing, and promotes educational partnerships with academic institutions to increase STEM talent and diversity throughout the national security community.

The Committee also has sought to focus IC and public attention on non-traditional threats, like climate change and global pandemics. In that regard the bill makes permanent the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's Climate Security Advisory Council, which assists elements of the IC that analyze the security impacts of climate change. H.R. 7856 also mandates an annual Worldwide Threat Briefing to Congress; requires a National Intelligence Estimate on the threat of global pandemics; makes permanent an annual requirement for the IC to report on emerging infectious diseases; and directs a study on creating an advisory council on global health threats.

National security threats are increasingly diffuse, and we must take address what we are seeing every single day--from the devastating wildfires affecting the West, to hurricanes battering the Gulf coast, to the COVID-19 pandemic that has killed over 200,000 Americans.

H.R. 7856 also prioritizes the protection of civil liberties and human rights, at home and abroad. To that end, the bill imposes limitations and transparency requirements on intelligence support to domestic law enforcement responding to protests or civil disturbances. It requires a report on the People's Republic of China's intervention in Hong Kong. The legislation also reaffirms an unmet statutory requirement for the IC to produce an unclassified report on the murder of U.S.

resident and journalist, Jamal Khashoggi; and discontinues intelligence support to the Saudi-led coalition's campaign in Yemen.

We conclude with some observations about our Minority colleagues' opposition to the bill. We believe the Committee's Minority members voted "no" because a handful of the IAA's provisions are intended to address abuses related to the Intelligence Community and election security, which were committed by or involved President Trump or his allies. Our counterparts in the Minority do not seriously dispute that such incidents took place. Yet legislating to prevent them from recurring, in their view and that of the Trump Administration, is a "partisan" act requiring firm opposition.

The provisions in question advance good-government principles about which, until now, Republicans and Democrats had agreed for years. Had we proposed such provisions during any other presidency, they almost certainly would have been endorsed without reservation by all the Committee's members, for inclusion in the IAA. We hope the Minority has a change of heart and decides to support H.R. 7856 during its consideration on the floor of the House.

Committee Views Regarding China

China has used the past two decades to transform itself into a nation potentially capable of supplanting the United States as the leading power in the world. Its ascendance has been spectacular in scale and far less benign than initially expected. That has required special efforts by the U.S.

Government and the U.S. Intelligence Community. Accordingly, the Committee in 2019 commenced a "deep dive", intended to examine the IC's China activities comprehensively. The Committee intends to issue a report containing its findings and recommendations before the end of the 116th Congress; in the meantime, H.R. 7856 contains provisions developed during the Committee's study.

These proposals in part respond to the speed and nature of China's rise--which caught the West off guard. During the 1990s and 2000s the consensus in the West was that, as China became more prosperous and developed, it would also eventually liberalize at home and play a constructive role in its relations abroad. Observers convinced themselves that, among other things, leadership in Beijing had learned the "right" lessons from the reaction to the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989--and therefore would chart a reformist course. Confidence in that view was central to the decisions to admit China to the World Trade Organization and to award the 2008 Summer Olympics to Beijing.

The last decade has shown those expectations to have been deeply misplaced. Belief in the inevitability of democratic liberalism blinded Western policymakers to the Chinese Communist Party's overriding objective: seizing more and more power. In the interim, the People's Republic of China has increasingly sought to revise the international order in a way that furthers its own strategic interests and undermines those of the United States and other nations. Beijing has sought to expand its economic and political influence through its "One Belt, One Road" Initiative and the large-scale cooption of media outlets throughout the world. Militarily, China has embarked on a massive modernization drive--creating a "blue water" navy, investing heavily in hypersonic weapons, developing its own fifth-generation fighter, militarizing a series of atolls and islets in the South China Sea to strengthen its claims in the region, and building its first overseas military base in Djibouti.

Perhaps most consequential of all, China has invested--and continues to invest--great resources, technology, and political will into the creation of a post-modern authoritarian state.

The country's people are monitored around the clock through their phones and an ever-growing network of surveillance cameras equipped with facial-recognition technology. Initially fueled by stolen U.S. technology and intellectual property, these advances are now increasingly driven by Chinese innovation. Beijing's expanding technological prowess will enable the Chinese Communist Party to improve its ability to watch, and therefore control, China's population. This "digital authoritarianism" has not only been deployed at home but has also been increasingly marketed to aspiring authoritarians abroad.

Its authoritarianism is hardly the only threat emanating from China. The emergence in 2019 of a novel coronavirus in Wuhan also demonstrated the profound dangers posed by a transnational health crisis originating within China's borders.

By seeking to preserve its domestic political stability and international image--in lieu of fostering a transparent and effective approach to public health--China has placed the United States, our allies, and the world at risk. China's public response has been to obfuscate the Chinese Communist Party's role in the crisis, through the calculated promotion of fringe conspiracy theories and misinformation. The latter seek to shift blame to the United States, muddy the truth about the virus's origins, and promote the image of China as a responsible global leader. To date, the coronavirus has infected at least 31 million people and resulted in over 962,000 deaths worldwide, of which the United States has over 203,000.

The confluence of the widespread, if not yet fully understood, global impact of COVID-19, the prolonged, excessive allocation of American intelligence resources to counterterrorism, China's emergence as a global competitor, and other transnational events make this an urgent moment to assess the Nation's intelligence posture towards China; and to provide strategic guidance to the IC as it repositions itself to better understand China's domestic environment, capabilities, plans, and intentions.

To that end, the Committee undertook its "deep dive" which sought to comprehensively review the IC's posture vis-avis China. The Committee sought to assess the IC's ability to execute, with respect to China, its core mission of "collecting, analyzing, and delivering foreign intelligence and counterintelligence" to America's leaders so they can make sound decisions. In support of this charge, staff reviewed thousands of analytic assessments, spent hundreds of hours with IC officers, and visited facilities operated by over a dozen IC elements. The goals of the Committee's review were to: (1) assess the IC's performance within the six phases of the socalled "intelligence cycle"; (2) provide recommendations to increase the quality of raw intelligence reports and finished analytic products; and (3) assess the adequacy of current IC resource levels.

The Committee's central finding is that the IC has not sufficiently adapted to a changing geopolitical and technological environment increasingly shaped by a rising China and the growing importance of interlocking non-military transnational threats, such as global health, economic security, and climate change. Absent a significant realignment of resources, the U.S. government and intelligence community will fail to achieve the outcomes required to enable continued U.S. competition with China on the global stage for decades to come, and to protect the U.S. health and security. This year's bill seeks to address some of those resource challenges.

Committee Views Regarding the Middle East and South Asia

Even as the United States prioritizes meeting the unique challenges posed by China and Russia, it continues to confront a range of national security challenges in the Middle East and South Asia. The IC will continue to play an important role in addressing them.

At the same time, efforts by two successive Administrations to end the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have led the United States to seek deeper partnerships with various regional actors, especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Notwithstanding greater U.S. engagement and offers of cooperation, both countries since 2017 have pursued policies that are at odds with U.S. regional objectives--which complicate efforts at greater intelligence and security cooperation. In fact, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi went so far as to participate in a blockade of Qatar, an important U.S. partner which hosts crucial U.S. military facilities and is supporting U.S. efforts to achieve a political settlement of the war in Afghanistan.

To this end, the bill includes several provisions drafted to address some of the diplomatic, military, and economic issues at the heart of the U.S.-KSA and U.S.-UAE relationships.

It directly addresses, for example, the disastrous Saudiled military campaign in Yemen. Now in its fifth year, the war in Yemen has created new safe havens for international terrorists, provided new opportunities for Iranian meddling in the Gulf, and contributed to the creation of the worst man-made humanitarian catastrophe in the world. The Committee is concerned that the Administration's decision to bypass Congress in May 2019 and sell additional arms to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE will only exacerbate this crisis and undercut U.S. security interests. Moreover, the Committee is disturbed by the findings of the State Department Office of the Inspector General, issued in August 2020, that the Administration authorized weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE without conducting a required assessment of the potential for these sales to contribute to civilian harm. This failure compounds the Committee's longstanding concern that the Administration is ignoring and withholding from Congress credible evidence that the Saudi-led Coalition has engaged in repeated violations of the law of armed conflict, including by bombing civilians and civilian objects in Yemen.

Accordingly, the bill as approved by the Committee insists that the Intelligence Community share this information with the American people and Congress, so as to fully inform future decision-making on arms sales and ongoing Congressional investigations of whether executive branch officials violated any relevant laws and procedures when authorizing such sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In addition, the bill requires that the United States cease intelligence sharing with Saudi Arabia for the purpose of supporting the Saudi-led coalition's campaign against the Houthis in Yemen.

The past year also saw a resumption of Saudi-linked terrorist attacks on American citizens, when in December 2019 a Saudi military officer with significant ties to al-Qaeda killed three American servicemembers and wounded eight other individuals. This was the first successful foreign terrorist attack on U.S. soil since Saudi and Emirati citizens perpetrated the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Saudi and Saudi-inspired individuals have been responsible for the overwhelming number of foreign terrorist attacks against Americans over the past two decades.

With that in mind, the Committee is concerned by reports that the Saudi government is not cooperating fully with the U.S. investigation into the Pensacola attack and supports the Department of Justice's ongoing effort to fully investigate and ensure accountability for the attack. The Committee also questions the Department of Defense's June 2020 decision to resume its training of Saudi military students in the United States following only a brief review of the shortcomings in U.S. vetting procedures, and in light of indications that Saudi Arabia has not taken significant additional steps in cooperation with the United States to enhance inadequate vetting procedures. Furthermore, the Committee is concerned that the Kingdom has not taken sufficient steps to curb the propagation of extremist ideologies that inspire terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens and has directed the Intelligence Community to provide a report on this matter. Relatedly, the Committee is troubled by the Administration's continued reluctance to make available to Congress and families of the September 11 victims additional details regarding the role of Saudi nationals in those attacks. The Committee urges the Department of Justice to fully cooperate with Congressional requests and reach an accommodation for providing this longrequested information in a timely manner.

While the Administration has focused on undermining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, which had effectively constrained Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions, public reporting indicates that Saudi Arabia is developing a nuclear fuel cycle that some experts assess has no obvious purpose other than to support a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Saudi officials have previously said they want to enrich uranium domestically. Despite being a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Kingdom has refused to conclude an Additional Protocol and Saudi Arabia's crown prince has publicly stated a willingness to acquire nuclear weapons "as soon as possible" if Iran were to develop a nuclear weapon. Any clandestine Saudi push for a nuclear weapon would have grave implications U.S. interests, to include the security of U.S. partners, such as Israel, and the broader region.

In that vein, the Committee-passed bill directs the Intelligence Community to provide a detailed report assessing Saudi Arabia's undeclared nuclear activities, as well as a clear-eyed assessment of the Kingdom's willingness to forswear a domestic enrichment capability and abide by the same "gold standard" that the United States wisely required of the UAE.

Given the urgency of the issue, the Committee would urge the Intelligence Community to dedicate additional resources to scrutinizing Saudi Arabia's nuclear activities. The Committee also reaffirms Congress' longstanding view that the United States shall not conclude any civil nuclear cooperation agreements with Saudi Arabia that do not include robust safeguards and nonproliferation provisions, to include a strict prohibition against uranium enrichment.

In the economic sphere, Saudi Arabia's leadership undercut U.S. national security in March 2020 by pursuing an illconceived oil price war with Russia. The Committee is troubled by public reporting indicating that the United States lacked advanced warning of Saudi Arabia's actions, which collapsed global energy markets and contributed to a loss of tens of thousands of American jobs. The Committee hopes that in light of such tumult, the Intelligence Community would dedicate additional resources to scrutinizing Saudi Arabia's energy policy decisions.

Separately, the Committee is concerned that the UAE has moved aggressively to expand economic and technological cooperation with both Russia and China, including in the defense sphere. This appears to have contributed to a decision by the Trump Administration to send a team to UAE in August 2020 to discuss the UAE relationship with China.

Notwithstanding the potential for the UAE to share sensitive U.S. defense technology and systems with America's adversaries, the Administration has reportedly indicated a willingness to transfer to the UAE the most advanced armed and unarmed U.S. defense systems. Because of the proliferation risks and unresolved concerns about technology transfer, the Committee objects to these transfers, some of which violate and undermine the Missile Technology Control Regime. The Committee-passed bill also directs the Intelligence Community to provide a report on UAE's defense activities with China, Russia, and other peer competitors--especially with regard to unmanned aerial vehicle systems (UAVs)--and believes the Intelligence Community's assessment of the technology transfer concerns must be a factor in future decisions to transfer or not transfer these systems to the UAE.

U.S. efforts to strengthen security and intelligence cooperation with Saudi Arabia and UAE also are undermined by both countries' human rights abuses and efforts in recent years to undermine inclusive, democratic governments in the region.

Of great concern, Saudi Arabia has failed to hold accountable the Saudi officials responsible for the brutal murder of U.S. resident and journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Equally troubling, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has not provided Congress an unclassified report detailing Saudi officials' culpability for the killing, as explicitly required by the law. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has withheld this report despite a growing abundance of publicly available information, and even as it has justified the declassification of other documents requested by the President's supporters in Congress that appear to reveal sensitive U.S. intelligence sources. This apparent effort to abuse the classification process for political purposes and blatant contravention of a law supported by nearly every Member of Congress is unacceptable. The Committee has therefore been left with no choice but to direct, in the bill, the suspension of certain activities with Saudi Arabia if and until the Office of the Director of National Intelligence complies with the law and provides the unclassified report, as specified under the law.

Finally, public reporting in recent years, meanwhile, has detailed the role of UAE personnel in allegedly torturing detainees captured in Yemen, as well as efforts by entities affiliated with the Emirati government to utilize former U.S. intelligence personnel and technologies to surveil political activists. These UAE activities are not consistent with U.S.

values or national security interests. They contrast with the UAE's claims to be an open society that shares U.S. values of tolerance and respect for human rights. The Committee-passed legislation therefore directs changes to U.S. regulations and laws aimed at helping to ensure that former U.S. Intelligence Community personnel do not inadvertently aid or abet efforts by the UAE or any other country to violate the human rights and privacy of Americans or any other citizens.

Unclassified Committee Direction

Diversity and Inclusion

Significantly increasing diversity and inclusion within the IC is vital to the protection of U.S. national security. It thus long has been, and continues to be, a mission-critical priority for the Committee.

While the Committee acknowledges the marginal increase in overall representation of minorities, women, and Persons with Disabilities (PWD) in the IC, such groups are scarcely represented at pay grades above GS/GG-13, the full performance marker. At the Senior Executive Service (SES) and Senior Intelligence Service (SIS) pay levels, minorities are practically non-existent. Only a handful of individuals from diverse backgrounds occupy the top positions across the 17 IC elements. And the percentage of individuals from diverse backgrounds in the IC lags woefully behind that within other departments of the federal government, as well as the private sector.

Seeking to address such challenges, the IC has taken various steps: conducting early outreach; expanding authorities for grants to and partnerships with academic organizations from the elementary school through the collegiate levels; holding regional IC-wide recruitment events and virtual career fairs; implementing a cloud-based platform; as well as accelerating impactful security clearance reform. Senior leaders across the IC also have committed to buttressing retention, promotion, employee resource groups, and accountability programs.

Despite these efforts, the statistics continue to be bleak.

Among other things:

White males make up 84% of the IC's SIS and SES positions, despite making up 70% of the top leadership positions in the civilian labor force; The number of minorities and women serving as managers and supervisors within the IC has decreased from 2017 to 2019;

Minority departures from the IC steadily have increased from 2016 to 2019;

PWD departures from the IC increased in 2019, despite significant decreases since 2016.

Like the rest of the government, the IC must do far better.

It is imperative that the IC hire, retain, and promote diverse candidates, including those with experience and expertise in Science, Technology, Engineering, Arts and Mathematics (STEAM) fields; in analysis; and in foreign languages necessary to successful prosecution of the IC's mission.

Therefore, the Committee directs that, by no later than April 30, 2021, the Director of National Intelligence shall brief the Committee on the IC's 2020 Annual Demographics Report. Such briefing shall, like the Report itself, include the expanded reporting categories mandated by the FY2020 Intelligence Authorization Act.

Further, the Committee directs that the ODNI submit to the Intelligence Committees by June 30, 2021 a written report outlining the findings and variables that affect the IC demographics noted above, including an attachment listing the incumbents of the top three positions by IC element and demographic categories.

Finally, the Committee directs the Director of National Intelligence, by no later than June 30, 2021, to complete a comprehensive review of promotions for calendar year 2020broken down by gender, race, PWD, grade, career category, and tenure in both grade and in the federal government.

Emerging Technologies

This Committee remains dedicated to ensuring that the Intelligence Community (IC) has the resources and authorities necessary to maintain the United States' leadership in scientific and technological discovery. Therefore, the Committee directs that, no later than June 1, 2021, the ODNI, in coordination with all relevant agencies of the IC, provide to the Committee a written report that, at a minimum: 1. Proposes a plan for improved engagement with the private sector and academic institutions;

2. Proposes a plan to launch a three-year pilot of the Public-Private Talent Exchange, and annual reports to the congressional intelligence committees on progress of the pilot program;

3. Assesses the viability of a fellowship program for recent graduates of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics programs to work in the IC for a limited period of time;

4. Identifies each IC element's use of Other Transaction Authority in the previous three fiscal years;

5. Identifies any gaps or limitations in the ability of the IC to interact with academic institutions; 6. Addresses the sufficiency of the IC's relationships with the Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, and in particular with respect to strategic management and coordination among relevant IC elements which participate in the Department of Energy's Strategic Intelligence Partnership Program, to support the IC's scientific and technological research and development priorities;

7. Identifies existing areas of collaboration with foreign intelligence partners on scientific and technological research and development activities, and identifying areas for growth and any limitations preventing further collaboration;

8. Proposes a plan to improve remote and telework opportunities for the IC workforce, and specifically to make such opportunities available to individuals who have accepted an offer of employment but have not completed the security clearance process; and

9. Assesses the viability of creating an advisory board modeled after the Defense Intelligence Board.

Report to Congress on Release of Medical Records of Guantanamo Bay Detainees

The Committee is concerned that the medical records of the forty (40) remaining detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station are not being made available to the detainees or their representatives in sufficient scope or a timely fashion, including because the Executive Branch takes the position that some of the information in the records is properly classified under Executive Order 13526. The Committee is particularly concerned about claims, including by the Center for Victims of Torture and Physicians for Human Rights, that "medical needs [of detainees] are subordinated to security functions." It is important that complete medical information be made available to detainees and their representatives in a timely fashion in a way that protects any legitimately classified information.

Therefore, in order to assist its oversight of the classification of medical records, the Committee directs that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and with such heads of elements of the Intelligence Community that the Director deems appropriate, and by not later than June 1, 2021, shall submit to the Committee a comprehensive written report on the handling, dissemination, and release of Guantanamo detainee medical records.

The report shall include, at a minimum:

1. A list of every method that a Guantanamo Bay

detainee or his representative can use to request that (a) medical records be provided to the detainee or his representatives and (b) full and complete medical records be provided to the detainee or his representatives;

2. A detailed discussion of the purposes for which medical records can be released to the detainee or his representatives, including use in litigation, to inform independent medical assessments of the detainee unrelated to litigation, to enable a detainee's representatives to advocate for more effective medical care, or any other purpose;

3. Lists of (a) which of the above purposes would allow for a detainee to receive full and complete medical records, and in each case for which purposes full and complete records were provided and (b) detainees who have been provided full and complete medical records, and in each case for which purposes full and complete records were provided;

4. The number of detainees who have been provided with full and complete copies of their medical records; 5. A description of how long each process for record review takes from start to finish and potential changes that could speed up the process;

6. A step-by-step description of the process for review of detainee medical records for production to the detainee or his representatives in habeas corpus litigation;

7. A step-by-step description of the process for review of detainee medical records for production to the detainee or his representatives in military commission litigation;

8. A step-by-step description of the process for review of detainee medical records for production to the detainee or his representatives pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act;

9. A step-by-step description of the process for review of detainee medical records for production to the detainee or his representatives as part of the Periodic Review process established pursuant to Executive Order 13567;

10. A step-by-step description of the process for review of detainee medical records for production to the detainee or his representatives pursuant to any other process that could result in the provision of such records to the detainee or his representatives; 11. The risks and benefits of creating a separate process by which a detainee or his representatives can request medical records for the purpose of advocating for more effective medical and psychological care of the detainee during his continued detention;

12. A description of every basis for withholding information pursuant to any of the processes described in items 4-8, including classification, Controlled Unclassified Information, executive privilege, or force protection; and

13. A list of every category of classified information used to redact information from medical records, including an identification of which agency 'owns' the information redacted pursuant to the category.

Any step-by-step description shall include identification of who may make the request pursuant to the process, how the request is made (and to whom), a description of how records are gathered for processing, a description of each step that the records make along the way to a final releasable product (including the agency conducting the review, the specific office tasked with the review, the type of information that that office is tasked with redacting from the records), a description of who receives the records at the conclusion of the process, a description of any controls on further dissemination that the records are subject to at the end of the process, and a flow chart or other graphical depiction of the process from start to finish.

The report shall be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Program Management

The Committee supports the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) performing a limited program management or incubation role for programs which may provide unique value to the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprises. However, there is apparently limited guidance as to how or when a program may be managed by USD(I&S) or shifted to another DOD component to manage.

Therefore, the Committee directs the USD(I&S), by no later than May 27, 2021, to submit to the Committee a written plan for transitioning the management of all current programs to an appropriate DOD component within 24 months of such report's submission; to the extent USD(I&S) may wish to continue to manage a particular program, the report shall provide the committees with a justification for why its continued management of the program is warranted. The written plan should also set forth criteria that USD(I&S) will use going forward, in determining whether to manage future programs.

IC/CSA Framework

Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act and corresponding Intelligence Authorization Act directed the USD(I&S) and ODNI to create a framework to more effectively manage elements of the IC that are also Combat Support Agencies (CSAs).

While the Committee strongly supports the GAMECHANGER tool and is encouraged by its promising capabilities--which include enabling interagency lexicon, policy reconciliation and streamlining policy development--this tool alone does not fulfill the FY 2018 direction to create a framework for managing IC elements that are also CSAs.

The Committee is particularly interested in the validation and refinement of such a framework; identification of any necessary amendments to existing policies and relevant processes, authorities, command and control constructs; and the definitions underpinning the framework. Finally, the reconciliation of variances in the definitions used by the DOD and/or IC is a significant and important component of the 1626 direction and goes to the very core of congressional intent for the provision.

Therefore, the Committee directs the USD(I&S) and ODNI to present to the congressional intelligence and defense committees, by no later than March 15, 2021, a written plan of action and milestones for complete implementation of Section 1626 of the FY 2018 NDAA.

ISR Transfer Fund

The Committee is generally supportive of the flexibility provided within the Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Transfer Fund (ISR TF) and appreciated engagement by USDI&S based on previous direction in the IAA for FY 2018, 2019, and 2020. However, the Committee strongly believes that funding provided in the ISR transfer fund should be used to bolster Department of Defense ISR capabilities that directly support the National Defense Strategy.

Therefore, the Committee directs that USD(I&S) prioritize funding which may be made available from the ISR TF to accelerate or facilitate projects, platforms, and capabilities aligned with service or department strategy documents directly or indirectly supporting the National Defense Strategy.

Defense Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP) Staffing Levels The Committee supports the Department of Defense's ongoing efforts to shift its focus from counterterrorism and other missions to those involving near-peer adversaries, including China and Russia. However, many of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise's (DIE) structures remain optimized for counterterrorism and have not sufficiently adapted to reflect the Department's change in emphasis. The Committee is particularly interested in staffing levels within the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP).

Therefore, the Committee directs the USD(I&S), in coordination with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), to conduct a review of the DIAP's level of effort, expressed in terms of Full Time Equivalents (FTEs), both at DIA headquarters and at Combatant Commands. USD(I&S) shall brief the Committee by no later than November 1, 2021 on the results of this review. Such briefing shall include, at a minimum, USD(I&S)'s recommendations to balance analytic levelof-effort against the Department's current requirements, and the steps USD(I&S) intends to take within fiscal year 2022 to more effectively align FTEs against Department requirements, particularly with respect to those regarding China and Russia.

Hypersonic Aircraft

Congress has long expressed concern about the threats posed by hypersonic weapons and the imperative for the United States of rapidly developing offensive and defensive hypersonic weapons systems. The Fiscal Year 2020 Department of Defense Appropriations Conference Report includes $100,000,000 to establish a Joint Hypersonics Transition Office, and to develop and implement a roadmap for hypersonics. Further, the report accompanying H.R. 2968, the House-passed Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2020, included language encouraging Air Force research into reusable hypersonic propulsion technologies including high Mach turbines.

The Committee is also aware of ongoing private sector efforts, independently and in partnership with federal agencies and departments, to develop aircraft capable of flying at speeds even beyond Mach 5. These aircraft have the potential to enhance the IC's and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

Therefore, the Committee directs the USD(I&S), in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force and the Director of National Intelligence and by no later than March 21, 2021, to brief the Committee on:

1. The capability gaps that high Mach and hypersonic aircraft can fill;

2. An acquisition strategy for such capabilities; and 3. An overview of the roles and responsibilities for this strategy.

U.S. INDOPACOM China Strategic Initiative

The Department of Defense has sought to prioritize preparing for the current and future threats posed by near-peer adversaries, including the People's Republic of China, in the Defense Wide Review and associated planning efforts. The Committee is extremely supportive of the Department's efforts to more effectively analyze and predict Chinese decisionmaking.

The China Strategic Initiative is an effort within the Department that seeks to inform and broaden the Department's understanding of China. This program intends to provide a rigorous, thoughtful study of the strategic environment. The Committee notes that the Department will likely continue to benefit from such thoughtful analyses, which should in turn lead to more informed and judicious decision-making.

Therefore, the Committee directs the Department to analyze requested funding levels for the China Strategic Initiative across the future years defense program and to resource the program at a level commensurate with the value that the program provides to the Department.

Continues with Part 2 of 11

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