Congressional Research Service: 'U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa - An Overview' (Part 2 of 2) - Insurance News | InsuranceNewsNet

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December 14, 2023 Newswires
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Congressional Research Service: 'U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa – An Overview' (Part 2 of 2)

Targeted News Service

WASHINGTON, Dec. 14 (TNSrep) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following report (No. R46368) on Nov. 7, 2023, entitled "U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa - An Overview:"

(Continued from Part 1 of 2)

* * *

Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)

The MCC, which Congress established in 2004 (Title VI of Division D, P.L. 108-199), supports economic growth programs in developing countries that meet a range of governance and development benchmarks./33 The MCC funds two types of programs: large, five-year investments (typically amounting to several hundred million dollars) known as "compacts" that aim to address key "constraints to growth" identified during the project design phase, and smaller, shorter-term "threshold programs," that aim to help countries advance reforms to become compact-eligible.

As of September 2023, the MCC had active compacts in Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal and threshold programs in Gambia and Togo, a total MCC commitment of $1.15 billion./34 The MCC has signed compacts with Lesotho, Malawi, and Mozambique valued at an additional $1.15 billion and approved a $60 million threshold program for Kenya. It also has selected Gambia, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Zambia as eligible to develop compacts, Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal as eligible for regional (cross-border) compacts, and Mauritania as eligible to develop a threshold program.

The MCC has suspended or terminated engagement with some governments due to failure to meet governance or other criteria. Most recently, in 2023, the MCC suspended aid for Niger after a military takeover, pausing activity on an existing $442.6 million compact and preparatory work for a concurrent cross-border compact with Benin./35 The MCC had previously announced that it would "significantly reduce" funding for Benin under that joint compact due to concerns over democratic backsliding under Benin's current government./36 In 2022, the MCC paused and later terminated Burkina Faso's eligibility for MCC engagement due to a military coup, and in 2021, it discontinued development of a threshold program for Ethiopia amid the country's civil war./37

U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)/38

DFC provides developing countries with loans, loan guarantees and insurance, direct equity, and technical assistance aimed at fostering economic development and advancing U.S. economic interests and foreign policy aims. In general, DFC must prioritize projects in low-income and lower-middle-income countries to help foster economic development, with some exceptions for upper-middle-income countries when presidentially determined U.S. economic or foreign policy interests are at stake. Africa has been a leading recipient of DFC financing, historically second only to Latin America./39 During the 2022 ALS, DFC reported that its active commitments across Africa totaled more than $11 billion.40 Top investment categories in Africa include finance and insurance, energy, and natural resources.41 DFC participates in several aid initiatives in Africa, including Power Africa and Prosper Africa, and has launched its own Africa-focused programs, such as the ICT-focused Connect Africa and the 2X Africa Women's Investment Initiative./42

* * *

33 See CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues.

34 This includes an addition of $12 million to the MCC compact for Cote d'Ivoire to accommodate a one-year extension due to COVID-19-related delays. CRS calculation based on compact and threshold program data in MCC, "Where We Work," accessed September 27, 2023, available at https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work.

35 MCC, "MCC Board Suspends Assistance to Niger, Approves FY2024 Selection Criteria and Methodology Report," September 13, 2023.

36 MCC, "MCC's Board Selects Belize, Zambia for Grant Assistance," December 15, 2021.

37 MCC, "MCC Board Approves Agency's First Regional Grant Program," September 28, 2022; and "MCC's Board Selects Belize, Zambia for Grant Assistance," December 15, 2021.

38 CRS Specialist in International Trade and Finance Shayerah I. Akhtar and Analyst in Foreign Assistance Nick Brown authored this section. See CRS In Focus IF11436, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).

39 This trend dates back to DRC's predecessor agency, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).

40 DFC, "At U.S.-Africa Business Forum DFC Announces Active Commitments in Africa Top $11 Billion," December 14, 2022.

41 CRS analysis of DFC's active projects database.

42 OPIC launched Connect Africa in 2018. See DFC, "DFC to Launch Regional Team Based in Africa," July 14, 2020.

* * *

African Development Foundation (USADF)

The USADF is a federally funded, independent nonprofit corporation, established by Congress under the African Development Foundation Act of 1980 (Title V of P.L. 96-533). The USADF provides targeted grants worth up to $250,000 that typically serve as seed capital for small-scale economic growth projects. The Foundation focuses on women- and youth-led entrepreneurship, agriculture and food security, and off-grid electricity projects, and also plays a role in selected multi-agency initiatives (e.g., Power Africa and YALI).

The Peace Corps

Peace Corps Volunteers lead local programs in education, agriculture, community development, youth engagement, health, and the environment./43 As of FY2022, the Peace Corps was active in 24 African countries, and almost 45% of Peace Corps Volunteers were serving in Africa, the largest share of any region./44

International Financial Institution Assistance

The United States provides substantial additional funds for African countries via contributions to international financial institutions./45 These include replenishments, appropriated by Congress and administered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, for the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and African Development Bank. The United States plays a role in approving investments and projects by these institutions.

The Biden Administration and the FY2024 Request

The Biden Administration has maintained long-standing U.S. assistance priorities in Africa (e.g., global health, agricultural productivity, and DRG) while increasing support for climate change adaptation and mitigation, among other shifts in emphasis. U.S. assistance for Africa totaled $7.95 billion in FY2022 allocations, excluding humanitarian aid but including $337 million in supplemental economic aid provided in the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L.117-128)./46 Health assistance comprised roughly 70% of FY2022 allocations for Africa, followed by assistance to promote economic growth and respond to food insecurity. Consistent with past years, assistance for peace and security, social services (including education), and DRG programs made up the balance. FY2023 allocation data were not publicly available as of September 2023.

* * *

43 See CRS Report RS21168, The Peace Corps: Overview and Issues.

44 Peace Corps, Agency Financial Report: Fiscal Year 2022, 2022.

45 See CRS In Focus IF11902, International Financial Institutions: FY2024 Budget Request; CRS Report R41170, Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress; CRS In Focus IF11361, The World Bank; and CRS In Focus IF10676, The International Monetary Fund.

46 For supplemental assistance allocations, see State Department, CBJ for FY2024 Supplementary Tables, p. 12.

* * *

The U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit (ALS): Assistance Commitments

In December 2022, President Joe Biden hosted senior delegations from 49 African countries and the African Union (AU) for a three-day U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit (ALS). During the Summit, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan asserted that the Administration would work with Congress to "commit $55 billion to Africa over the next three years."/47 The Administration has released few details on the composition of the $55 billion figure, which appears to comprise a mix of past, requested, and prospective resources for sub-Saharan and North Africa administered by a range of U.S. departments and agencies./48 Aid commitments made at the 2022 ALS include

* Food security and health workforce aid. Among the largest financial pledges made at the ALS were President Biden's commitments to provide "an additional $2 billion" to address food insecurity in Africa,/49 and to invest $4 billion in Africa's health workforce by 2025 under a State Department- and USAID-led Global Health Worker Initiative./50

* Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA). President Biden formally announced DTA, an initiative to "expand digital access and literacy and

strengthen digital enabling environments" in Africa. A White House fact sheet stated the Administration's intention to "invest over $350 million and facilitate over $450 million in financing" for DTA./51

* African Democratic and Political Transitions (ADAPT). The Administration unveiled ADAPT, a new initiative to "provide rapid, flexible support and assistance to governments and civil society during vulnerable yet critical political transitions."/52 A White House fact sheet pledged to "invest $75 million for this initiative to counter democratic backsliding in partnership with regional bodies, governments, and civil society in support of durable political transitions."

* alumni and connect them with social impact and business investors."/53

* * *

47 White House, "Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan," December 12, 2022.

48 In a fact sheet on Summit pledges, the State Department outlines commitments by the Departments of State, Commerce, Defense, Energy, and Agriculture; USAID; MCC; USADF; DFC; and the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank, among others. See State Department, "2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit Overview," last updated September 5, 2023.

49 White House, "Remarks by President Biden at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit Closing Session on Promoting Food Security and Food Systems Resilience," December 15, 2022. An accompanying White House fact sheet set out a pledge of "$2.5 billion in emergency aid and medium to long-term food security assistance"; White House, "Fact Sheet: U.S.-Africa Partnership to Promote Food Security and Resilient Food Systems," December 15, 2022.

50 White House, "Fact Sheet: U.S.-Africa Partnership in Health Cooperation," December 13, 2022.

51 White House, "Fact Sheet: New Initiative on Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA)," December 14, 2022. The Administration requested $20 million for DTA (then referred to as "Digital Africa") in its FY2023 budget request.

52 White House, "Fact Sheet: U.S.-Africa Partnership in Promoting Peace, Security, and Democratic Governance," December 15, 2022.

53 White House, "Remarks by Vice President Harris at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit African and Diaspora Young Leaders Forum," December 13, 2022. See also the YALI website at https://yali.state.gov/.

* * *

The Administration named retired Ambassador Johnnie Carson, a former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, as Special Presidential Representative for U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit Implementation to oversee ALS outcomes./54 To date, the Administration has not comprehensively detailed what Summit goals have been met, or how much of the $55 billion total pledge has been allocated to which programs or activities. The FY2024 budget request for the State Department and USAID proposes new or increased funding for several aid initiatives pledged during the Summit, but at a total level far below the $55 billion commitment - which, as noted above, appears to include a wide range of past and planned aid and other resources for sub-Saharan as well as North Africa, administered by various U.S. departments and agencies./55 Several Members have expressed interest in continuing to monitor Summit outcomes./56

The FY2024 Aid Budget Request for Africa

The Administration requested $8.00 billion for Africa for FY2024, 0.6% more than FY2022 allocations in current (non-inflation-adjusted) dollars, and 7.3% less than FY2022 in constant (inflation-adjusted) dollars.

Health. Health assistance comprises 73% of the FY2024 request for Africa, at $5.82 billion (see Figure 7). Broadly consistent with past funding

trends, HIV/AIDS-related assistance constitutes around 65% of the health request and nearly half of all State Department- and USAID managed funding proposed for the region. Malaria would continue to be the second-largest health program area in Africa. Global health security and family planning and reproductive health would see increases compared to FY2022 allocations, alongside a large proposed cut for water and sanitation aid.

* * *

54 White House, "Statement: Special Presidential Representative for U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit Implementation," December 15, 2022.

55 State Department, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations Fiscal Year FY2024, 2023 (hereafter, CBJ for FY2024). Congressional consideration of FY2024 appropriations was ongoing as of October 2023.

56 See, e.g., remarks by Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) ranking member James Risch and SFRC Africa Subcommittee ranking member Tim Scott in SFRC, Review of the Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request for the U.S. Department of State, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 22, 2023; and letter from then-HFAC Chair Gregory Meeks to President Biden, December 21, 2022.

* * *

Health Aid for Africa: FY2024 Request vs. FY2022 Actual Allocations

HIV/AIDS: $3.80 billion (-$19 million from FY2022)

Malaria: $692 million (+$5 million)

Maternal/Child Health: $390 million (+4 million)

Family Planning/Reprod. Health: $392 million (+$51 million)

Global Health Security: $204 million (+$44 million)

Water Supply and Sanitation: $117 million (-$103 million)

Tuberculosis: $120 million (-$7 million)

Nutrition: $113 million (+$6 million)

* * *

Figure 7.The FY2024 Health Assistance Request for Africa, by Program Area

Source: CRS graphic, based on data in State Department, CBJ for FY2024.

* * *

Economic Growth. Economic growth assistance for Africa would increase by nearly 40% from FY2022 allocations, to $1.08 billion under the request. Agriculture and food security aid, channeled primarily via FTF, would increase to $487 million and remain the largest category of U.S. economic growth assistance for Africa.

Trade and investment aid would more than double, to $135 million, including $100 million for Prosper Africa. The request also includes $50 million for USAID's Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA), announced at the 2022 ALS. Environment assistance would see the largest drop of any economic growth category from FY2022, of 34%, while climate change-related aid - for adaptation, clean energy, and sustainable landscapes - would increase by 112%. The FY2024 request includes $100 million for Power Africa.

Peace and Security. The FY2024 request proposes $423 million for State Department- and USAID-administered peace and security programs in Africa, 5% less than FY2022 allocations, with decreases proposed for several program areas. As in past years, Somalia would be the single largest destination for U.S. peace and security assistance, with $219 million proposed./57

* * *

57 State Department, CBJ for FY2024, Appendix II, p. 416. The Biden Administration has again requested funding for the U.S. contribution to UNSOS under PKO, rather than CIPA (see footnote 18).

* * *

Economic Growth Aid for Africa: FY2024

Request vs. FY2022 Actual Allocations

Agriculture: $487 million (+$76 million)

Trade/Investment: $135 million (+$75 million)

Environment: $97 million (-$50 million)

ICT Services: $40 million (+$40 million)

Private Sector Productivity: $18 million (+$17 million)

Workforce Development: $10 million (-$1 million)

Modern Energy Services: $800,000 (-$9 million)

Climate Change-Related Assistance

- Adaptation: $119 million (+$69 million)

- Clean Energy: $125 million (+$60 million)

- Sustainable Landscapes: $54 million (+29 million)

* * *

PKO would continue to be the leading vehicle for State Department- and USAID-administered security assistance for Africa, with $261 million requested, not including globally managed programs./58 The regional PKO request includes $3 million to support a "modest" Countering Strategic Competitors (CSC) program, "which is targeted against strategic competitors, including but not limited to, PRC and Russian influence in Sub-Saharan Africa and intended to address the highest needs for strategic competition in Africa."/59 Djibouti is once again the only African country for which FMF is requested, with $6 million proposed, level with FY2022 allocations.

DRG. DRG aid would see the largest proportional increase of any sector, with $436 million proposed, 61% more than FY2022 allocations. The request would boost funding across all DRG activity areas. Somalia, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, DRC, and Kenya would be the leading country recipients of DRG assistance. As part of the $436 million proposal, in line with ALS pledges, the DRG request includes $25 million for the African Democratic and Political Transitions (ADAPT) initiative to support political transitions in countries yet to be publicly identified.

Education and Social Services. Total education and social services funding for Africa would see a $45 million decrease, to $234 million. Broadly consistent with past years, DRC, Mali, Senegal, Ghana, and Malawi would be the top recipients of basic education assistance in Africa. The higher education request includes $20 million in USAID Africa Regional funding for YALI./60

* * *

Peace and Security Aid for Africa: FY2024 Request vs. FY2022 Actual Allocations

Strengthening Mil. Partnerships/Capabilities: $287 million (-$3 million)

Counter-Terrorism: $53 million (+$8 million)

Citizen Security/Law Enforcement: $27 million (-$14 million)

Weapons Security/Explosive Remnants of War: $22 million (-$5 million)

Conflict Mitigation/Stabilization: $22 million (-$3 million)

Transnational Threats/Crime: $7 million (-$7 million)

Combatting Weapons of Mass Destruction: $2 million (-$1 million)

Counter-Narcotics: $1 million (near flat-line)

Trafficking in Persons: $0.5 million (-$1 million)

* * *

DRG Aid for Africa: FY2024 Request vs. FY2022 Actual Allocations

Good Governance: $138 million (+$60 million)

Civil Society: $119 million (+$40 million)

Rule of Law: $79 million (+$45 million)

Pol. Competition/Consensus Building: $40 million (+$17 million)

Media and Free Flow of Information: $26 million (+$2 million)

Human Rights: $24 million (+$2 million)

* * *

58 These include TSCTP ($33 million in PKO requested) and GPOI ($71 million in PKO requested), both included in the request for the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

59 State Department, CBJ for FY2024, Appendix II, p. 417. According to the request, "dedicated PKO - complemented by global Countering PRC Influence Fund FMF - will enable the flexibility to choose the best account for the project in the year of appropriation given the different advantages and authorities of PKO and FMF."

60 The request includes an additional $26 million for YALI via the State Department Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

* * *

Table 1. The FY2024 State Department and USAID Request for Africa, by Account

Source: State Department, CBJ for FY2024, Appendix II, "Operating Unit by Objective, Program Area, and Account" tables, pp. 455-484.

* * *

Outlook and Issues for Congress

Assistance for Africa is one among several considerations for Congress in the context of the FY2024 SFOPS appropriations process. Heavily weighted toward health programs, with the balance dedicated mostly to long-standing economic development and security priorities, the Biden Administration's FY2024 aid budget request for Africa resembles, in level and scope, recent-year allocations for the region, although it would also make several changes. For example, funding for DRG programs and most economic growth assistance (including climate change aid) would increase relative to FY2022 allocations, while funds for water and sanitation and environment programs would decline. The request also includes funding for several ALS commitments, including $40 million for the Administration's digital connectivity initiative, DTA, and $25 million for ADAPT, which aims to support political transitions in the region.

Global and regional developments are likely to continue to shape Congress's approach to U.S. assistance for Africa. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Gaza war, for instance, have generated demands on U.S. engagement in other regions. Global competition with Russia and China has also become a justification and focus for some aid programs in Africa. Members may continue to consider whether - and with what (if any) changes - to reauthorize PEPFAR, the leading vehicle for U.S. aid for Africa in the past two decades. The 118th Congress also may help determine the future of AGOA (P.L. 106-200, as amended), which is to expire in September 2025; though not an aid program per se, AGOA directs the executive branch to conduct certain trade and investment assistance programming in Africa. Within the region, the expansion of Islamist insurgent threats in several countries and a string of military coups have prompted increased congressional scrutiny of U.S. security cooperation and counterterrorism programs.

As Congress sets its priorities for FY2024 assistance for Africa and continues to oversee U.S. programming in the region, Members may also consider a range of broader issues, including

Scale and Balance. Members may debate whether U.S. assistance to Africa is suitably balanced among programmatic sectors given the scope of U.S. priorities and interests in the region. Successive Administrations have articulated a diverse range of development, governance, and security objectives in Africa - for example, the Biden Administration's Africa Strategy cites "open societies," "democratic and security dividends," and environmental and climate adaptation objectives as top priorities - even as U.S. assistance for the region remains largely weighted toward health programs. Some Members and executive branch officials have advocated additional funding for other U.S. priorities, such as such as promoting democracy, fostering economic growth, supporting education, or strengthening security./61 Others have defended the relative allocation of funding for health programs vis-a-vis other U.S. assistance for Africa, arguing, for example, that U.S. health assistance has been particularly effective or appreciated in the region./62 More broadly, some Members and advocates have called for a reorientation of U.S. engagement in Africa to deemphasize assistance in favor of a greater emphasis on trade and investment to promote development in Africa./63

Geostrategic Competition and U.S. Influence. Amid mounting U.S. policymaker concern regarding China's and Russia's activities in Africa, some in Congress have questioned whether U.S. assistance is adequately targeted to promote U.S. influence vis-a-vis global competitors. Among other issues, some Members have voiced concern that African leaders and publics may view China's engagement more positively than that of the United States, due in part to China's record of investment in high-profile infrastructure projects in the region./64 In turn, some Members have advocated for increased U.S. support for infrastructure development in the region./65 Some Members have simultaneously probed the extent to which U.S. assistance is effectively addressing Russian "malign influence" in Africa, including the role of Russian private military companies in the region./66 As it considers the FY2024 request, Congress might, for instance, consider what role U.S. aid might play in geostrategic competition in Africa, as well as assess the status and focus of the ongoing Countering Strategic Competitors (CSC) program in the region.

Transparency and Oversight. Definitive accounts of U.S. aid allocated for specific African countries, or for particular programs in the region, are seldom made public and in some cases may not be readily available to Congress upon request. As Administration budget documents and congressional appropriations bills do not fully disaggregate funding by country or region, allocation data in annual State Department Congressional Budget Justifications may understate (in some cases, substantially) the amount of assistance allocated for Africa, or for a given African country. Obligation and disbursement data captured in the public ForeignAssistance.gov database may provide a more granular view into actual funding flows for particular countries and activities, but may not capture all global and regional program funding. Such data also are not disaggregated by year of appropriation, which may obscure policy changes or choices.

* * *

61 See, e.g., remarks by then-Rep. Karen Bass in House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Global Human Rights, FY2022 Budget and U.S.-Africa Relations, hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., December 1, 2021. In late 2022 testimony before HFAC, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee stated that "there's a lot of money earmarked for health [programming in Africa]. Also, education. I think we would benefit from more resources in the democracy area that would help us address the issues of [democratic] backsliding" in the region. See remarks by Assistant Secretary Phee in HFAC, "Assessing the Biden Administration's U.S. Strategy Toward SubSaharan Africa," 117th Cong., 2nd sess., November 17, 2022.

62 See, e.g., remarks by Sen. Mike Rounds in Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, FY2023 Budget Request for Africa, hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., July 27, 2022.

63 See, e.g., Office of Sen. Dick Durbin, "Durbin, Boozman, Inhofe, Booker, Cardin Introduce Bipartisan Bill To Increase U.S. Exports To Africa," press release accompanying introduction of S. 1022 (117th Cong.), March 25, 2021.

64 See, e.g., remarks by Rep. Michael McCaul in HFAC, "The State of American Influence in 2023: Great Power Competition and Persistent Crises in an Era of Budget Constraints," 118th Cong., 1st sess., May 17, 2023; and remarks by Sen. Robert Menendez in SFRC, "Review of the FY2024 United States Agency for International Development Budget," 118th Cong., 1st sess., April 26, 2023.

65 See, e.g., remarks by Sen. Chris Van Hollen in SFRC Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, "FY2023 Budget Request for Africa," hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., July 27, 2022.

66 See, e.g., remarks by Sen. Rounds in SFRC Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, FY2023 Budget Request..., and remarks by Rep. John James in HFAC Subcommittee on Africa, Examining the Fiscal Year 2024 State and Foreign Operations Budget Request for Africa, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 22, 2023.

* * *

Gaps in region- and country-level allocation data may partly reflect the preservation of flexibility in U.S. assistance programs, as in the case of humanitarian aid. At the same time, Congress has not imposed country allocation reporting requirements evenly across U.S. foreign assistance programs. For instance, while DOD "global train and equip" assistance is subject to congressional notification and reporting requirements that capture information on country and security force unit recipients and assistance to be provided, there is no analogous reporting requirement comprehensively governing State Department-administered security assistance./67 Congress has acted to enhance oversight of U.S. security assistance for Africa. Section 6502 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) imposed new notification and reporting requirements associated with PKO assistance, for example./68 The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program Act of 2022 (Division AA, P.L. 117-103), in addition to establishing TSCTP in statute, instituted new congressional notification and reporting requirements on funding allocated under the program.

Restrictions on U.S. Assistance. U.S. assistance to certain African countries is subject to legal restrictions pursuant to provisions in appropriations measures or other laws. Some provisions are country-specific, while others prohibit or condition various types of aid to any country that fails to meet certain conditions relating to governance, human rights, and other issues. Statutes establishing such conditions often accord the executive branch the discretion to designate countries for sanction or waive accompanying restrictions. Congress may continue to debate the effectiveness of such restrictions as it oversees and assesses executive branch implementation. Related laws and considerations include:

* Section 7042 ("Africa") of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) Appropriations Act, 2023 (Division K of P.L. 117328), which prohibits appropriated funds from being provided to the governments of South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, with certain exceptions. In addition, Section 7042 places conditions on certain types of IMET programming for governments in Africa's Great Lakes region.

* Section 7008 in annual SFOPS appropriations legislation (most recently, Division K of P.L. 117-328), which restricts certain U.S. assistance following a coup d'etat.69 As of September 2023, Section 7008 was in effect with regard to Burkina Faso (due to a coup in 2022), Guinea (2021), Mali (2020), and Sudan (1989). Congress granted authority to the executive branch to waive Section 7008 restrictions for the first time in FY2023, subject to congressional consultation and notification. Some Members continue to debate the impact and effectiveness of Section 7008, including the level of flexibility it provides to the executive branch regarding the application of restriction.

* The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA, P.L. 105-292, as amended), which sets out a list of punitive actions, including aid restrictions, to be imposed on "Countries of Particular Concern" (CPCs) whose governments engage in or tolerate "particularly severe" religious freedom violations./70 Such punitive measures are subject to a waiver or referral to existing sanctions on the country. Most recently, in 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken designated Eritrea as a CPC - referring the country to existing sanctions - and placed CAR on the Special Watch List. Some Members have criticized the Biden Administration's decision not to list Nigeria as a CPC./71

* * *

67 On U.S. counterterrorism activities in Africa and associated oversight challenges, see Testimony of Alexis Arieff, CRS Specialist in African Affairs, before the House Oversight Subcommittee on National Security, U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Challenges in Africa, 116th Cong., 1st sess., December 16, 2019.

68 Congress modified these requirements under Section 5594 of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263).

69 See CRS In Focus IF11267, Coup-Related Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid Appropriations and CRS Insight IN11854, "An Epidemic of Coups" in Africa? Issues for Congress.

70 CRS In Focus IF10803, Global Human Rights: International Religious Freedom Policy.

71 In the 118th Cong., H.Res. 82 would call for Nigeria to be re-designated as a CPC, among other provisions.

* * *

* The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA, P.L. 106-386, as amended) and related legislation, which restrict "nonhumanitarian, non-trade related assistance" and certain other engagement for governments that the State Department determines do not meet minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons, subject to a waiver./72 In its 2023 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report, the State Department designated Chad, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, and South Sudan as Tier 3 (worst-performing). President Biden partly waived associated assistance restrictions for all six countries./73

* The Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (CSPA, Title IV of P.L. 110-457, as amended) and related legislation, which restrict certain security assistance for countries in which state security forces or state-backed militia have recruited or used child soldiers./74 In its 2023 TIP report, the State Department listed CAR, DRC, Eritrea, Mali, Rwanda, Somalia, and South Sudan per the CSPA. President Biden partly waived associated restrictions for CAR, DRC, and Somalia./75

The so-called "Leahy Laws" restrict individual units or members of foreign security forces who have been credibly implicated in a "gross violation of human rights" from receiving most kinds of State Department- and DOD-administered security assistance, subject to certain exceptions./76 The executive branch does not regularly publicize information on which units or individuals have been prohibited from receiving U.S. assistance pursuant to these laws.

Country Ownership. Most U.S. aid for Africa is implemented by nongovernment or multilateral actors - such as humanitarian organizations, non-profit groups, private contractors, and U.N. agencies - rather than by African governments. Congress may thus debate the extent to which U.S. aid enables African governments to take the lead in addressing their country's development, security, and governance challenges. Providing aid through nongovernment actors may enable the delivery of assistance in contexts where a government may be unable or unwilling to provide services, and may also help the United States better oversee the use of funds in countries where there may be a risk of diversion by the government. It may be debated, however, whether this mode of delivery adequately equips partner-country authorities to take responsibility for service provision, and whether it may limit U.S. influence or leverage with governments in recipient countries. Members also may consider the merits and status of the Biden Administration's enhanced emphasis on increasing the share of U.S. aid that is implemented by local partners (e.g., African-led organizations) as opposed to U.S.- and other internationally based actors./77

* * *

72 CRS In Focus IF10587, Human Trafficking and U.S. Foreign Policy: An Introduction.

73 White House, "Memorandum on Presidential Determination with Respect to the Efforts of Foreign Governments Regarding Trafficking in Persons," September 29, 2023.

74 CRS In Focus IF10901, Child Soldiers Prevention Act: Security Assistance Restrictions.

75 White House, "Presidential Determination and Certification With Respect to the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008," 88 Federal Register 66671, September 27, 2023.

76 See CRS In Focus IF10575, Global Human Rights: Security Forces Vetting ("Leahy Laws"), by Michael A. Weber.

77 Speech by USAID Administrator Samantha Power, November 4, 2021, available at https://www.usaid.gov/newsinformation/speeches/nov-4-2021-administrator-samantha-power-new-vision-global-development.

* * *

Possible Unintended Consequences. Analysts and advocates have raised concerns over potential unintended consequences of U.S. aid for African countries. For instance, some critics of foreign assistance generally allege that such aid may create market distortions or dependencies./78 Other commentators have argued that U.S. aid may legitimize or strengthen authoritarian regimes in the region. According to one observer, for example, PEPFAR spending in countries with autocratic governments "reduces pressure on the recipient states to deliver services, thereby creating opportunities for them to shift funds to projects that serve elite interests."/79 In a response to this critique, former U.S. health officials argued that PEPFAR has had positive impacts on governance in Africa, in addition to the success it has achieved in the fight against HIV/AIDS./80

Some lawmakers have questioned whether providing security aid to governments with poor human rights records may strengthen abusive militaries and contribute to poor governance./81 Amid a wave of military coups in Africa since 2020, some led by personnel who previously took part in U.S. training programs, some Members also have questioned whether U.S. training may have empowered coup leaders, or how U.S. assistance could be adjusted in light of such events./82 Proponents of U.S. security assistance may contend that aspects of such engagements - such as military professionalization and related training - enhance security sector governance and civil-military relations, and may thus improve human rights practices by partner militaries./83 Members continue to debate the appropriate approach to U.S. engagement with military regimes and other undemocratic governments in Africa./84

* * *

78 For a critical assessment of foreign assistance in Africa, see, for example, Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009).

79 Jon Temin, "Fight AIDS in Africa, Not Democracy," American Purpose, June 22, 2022.

80 Deborah L. Birx and William R. Steiger, "Fighting AIDS in Africa Does Help Democracy," American Purpose, July 25, 2022.

81 See, e.g. letter from Representatives Ilhan Omar, Karen Bass, and Sara Jacobs to Secretary Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin pertaining to Cameroon, March 9, 2022; letter from Senators Cory Booker and James Risch to Secretary of State Blinken pertaining to Uganda, March 4, 2021.

82 See, e.g., remarks by Rep. Sara Jacobs in House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Development, International Organizations, and Global Corporate Social Impact, "Improving the United States' Ability to Prevent and Stabilize Conflict: Global Fragility Act Implementation," 117th Cong., 2nd sess., May 11, 2022, remarks by Sen. Chris Van Hollen in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance," 117th Cont., 2nd sess., March 10, 2022; and remarks by Sen. Mike Rounds in SFRC, "Instability and the State of Democracy in the Sahel and the U.S. Policy Response," hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 12, 2022.

83 For one evaluation of U.S. security assistance in Africa, see Stephen Watts et al. Building Security in Africa: An Evaluation of U.S. security Sector Assistance in Africa from the Cold War to the Present, 2018.

84 See Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Instability and the State of Democracy in the Sahel.

* * *

The report is posted at: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46368

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