Civil Rights Groups Join Housing Industry and Affordable Housing Advocates to Urge Reconsideration of Proposed Capital Rules That Would Have 'Devastating Impact' on First-Time Homebuyers
A diverse group of civils rights organizations, affordable housing leaders, and housing industry trade groups joined forces to urge that a new bank capital proposal be reconsidered. Twenty-seven organizations signed the letter to banking regulators, including the
The group said the proposed rule, known as the Basel III Endgame, "will lead to reduced credit availability for all types of real estate buyers and undermine economic growth. Worse, if these standards are adopted, they will have a devastating impact on our efforts to increase homeownership in communities of color and disadvantage all LMI, first-time, and, in particular, first-generation homebuyers of all races who do not have the benefit of multi-generational wealth or higher than average incomes."
The letter urges the regulators, the
The groups also raised concerns about the potential disparate impact on Black and Latino borrowers, particularly with the proposed dramatic increase in capital requirements for low downpayment mortgages, asserting that this move contradicts the
The letter also said that the proposed rule would undercut the
LIST OF GROUPS WHO SIGNED THE LETTER
National Housing Conference AmeriHome Mortgage Bank Policy Institute Eden Housing Enact Holdings, Inc. Faith And Community Empowerment (FACE) Guild Mortgage Habitat for Humanity International Homeownership Council of America Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) Low Income Investment Fund Manufactured Housing Institute Mortgage Bankers Association NAACP National Affordable Housing Management Association National Association of Home Builders of the
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Founded in 1931, the
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To: The Honorable
The Honorable
The Honorable
We are writing on behalf of the
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule for joint consideration by the
The significant increase in capital needed to support homeownership for higher loan- to-value (LTV) owner-occupied home mortgages will distinctly disadvantage homebuyers who do not have the benefit of multi-generational wealth or higher than average incomes, an outcome that is wholly inconsistent with the
Layering on additional standards begs the question of analytical justification for such a large increase. Banks have consistently been deemed to be well capitalized and well positioned to deal with stress./1 The proposed rule fails to account for the reforms that have bolstered the health, safety, and soundness of the mortgage finance system over the past 15 years, reforms that resulted in a mortgage ecosystem that is vastly different than the one this regulation seems to be responding to./2 Given these noted improvements in market fundamentals and our reasoning outlined in this letter, we urge you to maintain the agreed upon Basel III international standards rather than adopting additional stricter policies that would cause undue harm to
It should also be noted that the issue of mortgage credit risk was not a factor in any of the recent bank failures. The failures were caused by a lack of hedging of interest rate risk for holding long term fixed rate assets, like mortgage-backed securities and
We respectfully request that you reconsider additional capital requirements beyond the Basel III framework that may impact underserved communities. Only in cases where there is clear and compelling evidence that additional capital is required to protect consumers, should increases to the Basel III thresholds be exceeded. The proposed rule, in our view, does not provide that evidence.
The stricter credit requirements proposed in this
Compounding the shortcomings of the proposed higher capital levels is the rule's failure to give proper credit for the role of private mortgage insurance (PMI) or reinsurance, which enables affordable and sustainable mortgage credit for borrowers without large down payments and has undergone a vital transformation since the global financial crisis. In 2022 alone, private mortgage insurers helped more than 1 million households purchase or refinance a home. Sixty-two percent of these purchasers were first-time homebuyers and 34% had incomes below
The
Bank participation in mortgage lending fills a market gap for mortgages for low- and moderate-income (LMI) borrowers that otherwise would not qualify for loans that traditionally serve that market, such as loans backed by the GSEs, the
The
It is imperative that the agencies also recognize the downstream impacts of these additional capital standards on the overall housing and mortgage market, including IMBs, affordable housing developers, community developers, community banks, and other industry stakeholders. We appreciate that the proposal maintains the current risk weights for multifamily mortgages. There remains a persistent need for more housing units, particularly affordable housing units, that can only be met by purposeful efforts to increase supply. Despite the risk weight for multifamily mortgages being maintained, we are concerned that changes to acquisition, development, and construction lending might impact multifamily development, which is already seeing reduced interest given the current rate environment./16 To help address the affordable housing supply deficit, we also urge the regulators to apply a lower risk weighting of 50% to Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) properties, our nation's primary tool for financing the development and preservation of affordable housing. This threshold is consistent with what is available to statutory multifamily mortgages, more accurately reflects the risks of LIHTC investment, and would support investment in affordable housing at a time of staggering need.
Mortgage servicing remains the core of housing finance sustainability, which ultimately helps keep people in their homes. A mortgage servicing asset (or right) is created when the originating lender sells a mortgage but retains the right to service the loan and collect a servicing fee that is part of the note rate. Banks create MSRs when they sell loans they have originated (or purchased) in the secondary market; they can also acquire MSRs from other servicers. Any regulatory discouragement of servicing sends a concerning signal to banks that is counter to the progress made since the Great Recession. This proposal reimposes a 10% cap on the amount of MSRs that can count toward a large bank's tier one common equity. Banks must maintain punitive dollar- for-dollar capital on the value of MSRs that exceed the 10% cap.
Importantly, in addition to collecting payments and passing them through to investors, servicing activities involve critical home retention and loss mitigation functions, communicating the options to the borrower if they fall behind on their payments. Lowering the MSR cap to 10% could lead to diminished MSR demand, liquidity, and valuations, and consequentially higher borrower interest rates./17 Banks have already significantly retreated from the mortgage servicing business in response to the 2013 changes to
This reduction of appetite from banks will push more market share into IMBs and other originators. The issue is concentrated further by the fact that the proposal makes it more difficult for IMBs to support the mortgage market through impacts on both MSRs and warehouse lines of credit. According to an analysis from the
When mortgage markets experience stress and borrowers struggle to make their payments, as often coincides with any national economic downturns, IMBs will need to rely on banks for funding to keep the market functioning. Buyers of MSRs would soon become sellers under this reduced cap, driving down the value of the primary asset of IMBs. We urge the regulators to maintain the current 25% cap to avoid this strain on both MSRs and warehouse lending for IMBs that could further stress the market and create unnecessary liquidity pressures. Moreover, this shift will further concentrate more of the market share with IMBs, creating additional imbalances in contradiction to the goal of the regulations.
Under the proposal, there is further concern regarding assigned risk weights to mortgage warehouse lines of credit, which cover the period between the origination of a loan by an IMB and its subsequent sale or securitization in the secondary market. The proposed rule - without explanation - increases the "credit conversion factor" on warehouse lines of credit - effectively doubling the amount of capital that must be retained against the undrawn portion of the line. The higher capital requirements do not correlate with the actual risks associated with the underlying mortgage loans backed by the lines, and could raise the costs or discourage banks from offering them altogether./21
Regulators should also note the irony of enacting capital requirements that undercut these broader efforts after just finalizing CRA regulations meant to address lending inequities across the
The proposed rule would have a disparate impact on Black and Latino borrowers./23 High-LTV mortgages are particularly important for first-time borrowers, especially borrowers of color who may have lower wealth due to centuries of discriminatory housing policies. Analysis shows that the racial/ethnic distribution of income groups continues to disproportionately advantage White households. The homeownership rate for White households making 80% and below area median income is 58%, while that number is only 30% for Black households, 36% for Latino households, and 45% for Asian households./24
In fact, the
There is further argument that such a sliding scale based on factors that coincide with lending to Black and Latino borrowers is sufficient to constitute a fair housing violation. Under the Fair Housing Act, federal regulatory agencies are required to assess policy changes for their potential to discriminate against or exacerbate negative outcomes for protected classes under the Act. Rather than affirmatively further fair housing, this approach may negatively impact homeownership opportunities for all protected classes. A fair lending analysis must be conducted prior to enactment in order to prevent any Fair Housing Act concerns of pushing consumers into forced choices.
Outside of mortgage markets alone, the rule would likely impact lending in the rural space where CRA-driven investment could be reduced. Raising capital standards discourages lending and reduces credit availability through downstream impacts, which will likely be felt first and foremost by lower income businesses and underserved groups who are often overrepresented as borrowers with riskier loans. This means that an LMI small business owner who previously could have been funded through CRA-driven investment may not see that investment because community development initiatives under CRA will be stressed or negated. Given how recently the CRA regulation was updated and the impending two-year implementation period that will shift the lending dynamics of banks, it is particularly risky to make additional changes while a new market equilibrium is being tested.
Such a significant increase in capital standards under the Basel III Endgame proposal will lead to reduced credit availability for all types of real estate buyers and undermine economic growth. Worse, if these standards are adopted, they will have a devastating impact on our efforts to increase homeownership in communities of color and disadvantage all LMI, first-time, and, in particular, first-generation homebuyers of all races who do not have the benefit of multi-generational wealth or higher than average incomes. We as an industry share these common concerns should the stricter capital standards be applied on top of Basel III, and urge the regulators to reconsider these standards before they further harm the housing market.
Respectfully,
AmeriHome Mortgage
Faith And Community Empowerment (FACE)
Guild Mortgage
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Footnotes:
1
2 Contributor, A. B. J. G. (2023,
3
4 Goodman, L., & Zhu, J. (2023, September). Bank Capital Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: A Look at the Provisions Affecting Mortgage Loans in Bank Portfolios.
5 Kaul, K., & Goodman, L. (2018, August). What, if anything, should replace the QM GSE patch?
6 Kaul, K., & Goodman, L. (2018, August). What, if anything, should replace the QM GSE patch? https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98949/2018_10_30_qualified_mortgage_rule_fina lizedv2.pdf
7 GSE Aggregate Data.
8 Q3 2023 Private Mortgage Insurer 10-Q Filings.
9 Statement of
10
11
12
13 Goodman, L., & Zhu, J. (2023, September). Bank Capital Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: A Look at the Provisions Affecting Mortgage Loans in Bank Portfolios.
14 Testimony of the Mortgage Bankers Association
15 Anton, A. (2023,
16
17 Statement of
18 Goodman, L., & Lee, P. (2014,
19 Freedman, A., Covas, F., & Dionis, G. F. (2020,
20 Bank Regulators Are Taking Too Narrow a View of Mortgage Risk, by
21 Statement of
22
23
24 See id.
25 See id.
26
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