House Ways & Means Committee Issues Report on Control Unlawful Fugitive Felons Act
Excerpts of the report follow:
I. SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND
A. Purpose and Summary
H.R. 2792, as amended, the "Control Unlawful Fugitive Felons Act," as ordered reported by the
B. Background and Need for Legislation
Under the 1996 welfare reform law, fugitive felons and probation and parole violators were made ineligible for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. Similar provisions were also included in the
In addition to being an important program integrity measure, this policy had the added benefit of helping law enforcement find thousands of criminals who had been evading the law. A 2007 report by the
1Social
However, a series of court cases during the mid- to late- 2000's determined that SSA's enforcement of the law was too broad, primarily questioning SSA's interpretation of "actively fleeing". As a result of these cases, SSA only discontinues benefits to those who have escaped from prison or are avoiding imprisonment, significantly reducing the impact of the policy.
H.R. 2792 restores the original intent of the 1996 law, revising current law to discontinue benefits for individuals who are "the subject of an arrest warrant . . ." compared to the previous language of "fleeing to avoid" arrest, which was the main legal challenge.
H.R. 2792 applies only to felony charges, or a crime carrying a minimum term of one or more years in prison. This policy does not intend to punish individuals convicted of misdemeanors, such as outstanding parking tickets.
As a result of the court cases, SSA is now required to provide additional notice to individuals and the opportunity for them to establish "good cause" for not suspending benefits, protecting SSI recipients. If SSI benefits are suspended incorrectly, SSA has processes in place to restore benefits quickly.
C. Legislative History
Background
H.R. 2792, the "Control Unlawful Fugitive Felons Act," was introduced on
Committee hearings
On
Committee action
II. EXPLANATION OF THE BILL
Section 1:
PRESENT LAW
No provision.
EXPLANATION OF PROVISION
This Act may be cited as "Control Unlawful Fugitive Felons Act of 2017".
REASON FOR CHANGE
The Committee believes that the short title accurately reflects the policy actions included in the legislation.
EFFECTIVE DATE
These provisions are effective upon enactment.
Section 2: Revisions to Provisions Limiting Payments of Benefits to Fugitive Felons Under Title XVI of the Social Security Act
(A) FUGITIVE FELON WARRANT REQUIREMENTS
PRESENT LAW
Under current law, a person is not eligible for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits during any month in which the person is "fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction" for a crime which is a felony, or in a state that does not classify crimes as felonies, punishable by death or imprisonment of more than one year (commonly referred to as the fugitive felon prohibition).2 A similar prohibition exists for Social Security Old-Age, Survivors, and
2Section 1614(e)(4)(A) of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. Sec. 1382(e)(4)(A)].
3Section 202(x)(1)(A)(iv) of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. Sec. 402(x)(1)(A)(iv)].
4Section 804(a)(2) of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. Sec. 1004(a)(2)].
5Sections 1631(a)(2)(B)(iii)(V) [for SSI], 205(j)(2)(C)(i)(V) [for OASDI], and 807(d)(1)(E) [for SVB] of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1683(a)(2)(B)(iii)(V), 405(j)(2)(C)(i)(V), and 807(d)(1)(E)].
Prior to
6Martinez v. Astrue, No. 08-CV-4735 CW (
4901: escape from custody;
4902: flight to avoid prosecution or confinement; and
4999: flight-escape.7
7Social
EXPLANATION OF PROVISION
This subsection would change the fugitive felon provision for SSI payments and SSI representative payees only by removing all references to a person fleeing to avoid prosecution or punishment. Under this subsection, a person would be ineligible for SSI benefits (or to serve as an SSI representative payee) if the person was subject to an arrest warrant for a crime that is a felony, or in a state that does not classify crimes as felonies, punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year, regardless of any consideration of whether or not the person was fleeing. This subsection would essentially codify the SSA's policy in effect before the Martinez settlement.
(B) PROBATION AND PAROLE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
PRESENT LAW
Under current law, a person is not eligible for SSI, OASDI, or SVB benefits during any month in which the person is "violating a condition of probation or parole imposed under federal or state law."8 This prohibition also applies to a person serving as an SSI representative payee, but not a representative payee for any other
8Sections 1611(e)(4)(A)(ii) [for SSI], 202(x)(1)(A)(v) [for OASDI], and 804(a)(3) [for SVB] of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1382(e)(4)(A)(ii), 404(x)(1)(A)(v), and 1004(a)(3)].
9Section 1631(a)(2)(B)(iii)(V) of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. Sec. 1683(a)(2)(B)(iii)(V).
Prior to
5011: parole violation;
5012: probation violation;
8101: juvenile offenders--abscond while on parole;
8102: juvenile offenders--abscond while on probation;
9999: with an offense charge symbol of probation or parole violation;
"blank:" with an offense charge symbol of probation or parole violation; and
any other four-digit code, except 4901, 4902, or 4999, with an offense charge symbol of probation or parole violation.
In 2010, the
10Clark v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2010).
11Social
12Sections 1611(e)(5) [for SSI] and 202(x)(
EXPLANATION OF PROVISION
This subsection would change the probation and parole violation suspension provision for SSI benefits and SSI representative payees only. The requirement that a person be violating a condition of his or her probation or parole to be ineligible for benefits would be changed to the requirement that the person merely have a warrant for a probation or parole violation. This subsection would essentially codify the SSA's policy in effect before the Clark decision.
(C) DISCLOSURE
PRESENT LAW
Under current law, the SSA is required to disclose to any federal, state, or local law enforcement officer, upon request and if the location or apprehension of the beneficiary is within the officer's official duties, the current address, Social Security Number, and photograph (if applicable) of an individual receiving SSI or OASDI benefits. This disclosure is to be made if the officer notifies the SSA that the beneficiary is (1) fleeing to avoid prosecution or custody after conviction for a crime that is a felony (or in a state that does not classify crimes as felonies, punishable by death or imprisonment of more than one year) or (2) violating a condition of his or her probation or parole.12
12Section 1611(e)(5) [for SSI] and 202(x)(
EXPLANATION OF PROVISION
This subsection would expand this provision to require the SSA to also disclose to law enforcement the current address, Social Security Number, and photograph (if applicable) of an individual who would be receiving SSI benefits if not for the fugitive felon or probation and parole prohibitions.
REASON FOR CHANGE
The Committee believes that these provisions will restore the original intent of The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, to discontinue Supplemental Security Income benefits for individuals who are "the subject of an arrest warrant" compared to the previous language of "fleeing to avoid" arrest.
The original intent emphasized that assistance through the SSI program is intended for the aged, blind, and disabled, and that those with outstanding arrest warrants for a felony or probation or parole violators should not be supported through federal benefits. These measures aim to improve cooperation between states, SSA, and law enforcement officials in locating and apprehending these individuals.
It makes little sense to the Committee to limit the scope of this common sense restriction to only those who are actively on the run from law enforcement, and to not apply it as well to those who may no longer be actively on the run because they have successfully evaded law enforcement and their responsibilities under the law.
H.R. 2792 prohibits SSI benefits to any individual who is the subject of: (1) an outstanding arrest warrant for a felony, or (2) an outstanding arrest warrant for violating a condition of prohibition or parole imposed under federal or state law. These provisions only apply to felony charges, or a crime carrying a minimum term of one or more years in prison. It is not the intent of this policy to punish individuals convicted of misdemeanors.
In addition, the Committee expects SSA to continue and improve certain aspects of the implementation of this provision. Currently, SSA provides an "advance notice" to recipients containing information on why SSA is suspending payments and where, why, when the warrant was issued. This allows the individuals to use the period of time before payments are suspended to resolve the matter and to protest the decision to suspend payments. During this protest, the individual may also apply to SSA for a "good cause" exception to the suspension, adding an additional layer of protections for SSI recipients. Specifically, SSA may continue SSI payments to an individual whose criminal offense was non-violent and not drug related, not charged with a felony crime since the warrant was issued, and if law enforcement reports it will not act on the warrant. In addition, if recipients meet the above criteria and lacks the mental capacity to resolve the warrant, which includes, but is not limited to, those in a nursing home or mental treatment facility, SSA may continue to provide SSI payments without any disruption.
If for some reason
EFFECTIVE DATE
These provisions are effective on
III. VOTES OF THE COMMITTEE
In compliance with the Rules of the
An amendment in the nature of a substitute was offered by Chairman Brady and adopted by voice vote (with a quorum being present).
The amendment by
(TABLE OMITTED)
The amendment by
(TABLE OMITTED)
The amendment by
(TABLE OMITTED)
The amendment offered by
(TABLE OMITTED)
The bill, H.R. 2792, was ordered favorably reported to the
(TABLE OMITTED)
IV. BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE BILL
A. Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects
In compliance with clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
B.
In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
C. Cost Estimate Prepared by the
In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
U.S.
Hon.
Chairman,
Dear Mr. Chairman: The
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is
Sincerely,
Director.
Enclosure.
H.R. 2792--Control Unlawful Fugitive Felons Act of 2017
Summary: H.R. 2792 would, beginning in calendar year 2021, expand the number of people who are considered "fugitive felons" and who would therefore be ineligible for benefits under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.
CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 2792 would decrease direct spending by about
CBO estimates that enacting the legislation would not increase net direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2028.
H.R. 2792 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated budgetary effects of H.R. 2792 are shown in the following table. The effects of this legislation fall within budget functions 550 (health) and 600 (income security).
(TABLE OMITTED)
Basis of estimate: The
Under the Social Security Act, a person is not eligible for SSI payments during any month in which the person is "fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction" for a crime that is a felony or during any month in which the person is "violating a condition of probation or parole imposed under federal or state law." SSA originally interpreted this provision to prohibit payments to any recipients with an active arrest warrant for a felony or for a violation of parole or probation. Following two court cases (Martinez v. Astrue in 2009 and Clark v. Astrue in 2010), SSA adjusted its policies and now suspends payments only when the warrant is for "crimes of flight," such as escape from custody or flight to avoid prosecution. (Similar prohibitions on payment exist for Old-Age, Survivors, and
H.R. 2792 would amend the Social Security Act to essentially reinstate, for SSI recipients, the policy of suspending benefits for all people with active warrants for felonies or violations of probation or parole. The bill would take effect in calendar year 2021.
Based on data provided by SSA about the number of payments that were withheld when SSA prohibited payment to all people with the relevant types of arrest warrants and the number that are withheld under current policy, CBO estimates that the bill would reduce the SSI monthly caseload by roughly 30,000 recipients. CBO projects that the affected individuals would lose federal payments that are, on average, 10 percent higher than the average federal SSI payment. The withheld monthly benefits would average about
Most SSI recipients are automatically eligible for Medicaid, which is a joint federal-state program that pays for health care services for low-income individuals. Under H.R. 2792, individuals who would no longer receive their SSI benefits also would stop receiving Medicaid benefits under their eligibility for SSI. However many of those people would be eligible for other reasons. CBO estimates that about three quarters of the people who would stop receiving SSI benefits under H.R. 2792 would be able to retain their Medicaid eligibility under other criteria that have the same average federal matching rate as for those who are eligible for SSI (about 57 percent). Therefore, CBO does not expect any change in federal Medicaid spending for the most of the individuals who stop receiving SSI benefits under the bill. Of the remaining one quarter of people affected by the bill, CBO estimates that most would gain eligibility through the Affordable Care Act's optional state expansion of Medicaid coverage. At least 90 percent of the cost for people in that eligibility group is paid for by the federal government. The additional federal costs for those people would be larger than the federal savings generated from the small number of people who would not be able to qualify for Medicaid under other criteria and would thus lose all access to Medicaid under the bill. CBO estimates that, on net, federal Medicaid spending would increase by
Pay-As-You-Go considerations: The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 establishes budget-reporting and enforcement procedures for legislation affecting direct spending or revenues. The net changes in outlays that are subject to those pay-as-you-go procedures are shown in the following table.
CBO ESTIMATE OF PAY-AS-YOU-GO EFFECTS FOR H.R. 2792 AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON
(TABLE OMITTED)
Increase in long-term direct spending and deficits: CBO estimates that enacting the legislation would not increase net direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2028.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: H.R. 2792 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
Estimate prepared by: Federal costs:
Estimate approved by:
V. OTHER MATTERS TO BE DISCUSSED UNDER THE RULES OF THE HOUSE
A. Committee Oversight Findings and Recommendations
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
B. Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives
With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
C. Information Relating to Unfunded Mandates
This information is provided in accordance with section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. No. 104- 4). The Committee has determined that the bill does not contain Federal mandates on the private sector. The Committee has determined that the bill does not impose a Federal intergovernmental mandate on State, local, or tribal governments.
D. Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff Benefits
With respect to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the
E. Duplication of Federal Programs
In compliance with clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
F. Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings
In compliance with Sec. 3(i) of
VI. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
VII. DISSENTING VIEWS
Over 110 national, state, and local groups representing seniors, people with disabilities, children, and families have contacted the Committee to warn us that H.R. 2792 is a cruel bill that could have catastrophic consequences for some of our most vulnerable citizens. In addition, civil right groups strongly oppose the bill because it would magnify the serious racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic inequities in our criminal justice system.
We agree that dangerous criminals should not be supported by public benefits while fleeing justice. However, under current law, the
Law enforcement also informs SSA when it is unable to arrest individuals who are actual fugitives charged with fleeing or escaping. When they do, SSA terminates benefits. That is current law.
Despite the title of the bill, the seniors and people with severe disabilities who would be harmed by this bill are not felons, as the Chairman acknowledged at our markup. They are people who have been accused of a felony, or accused of a parole or probation violation. They have not been tried or convicted of the offense underlying the warrant. In many instances, they are not even accused of committing a felony, as probation can result from a misdemeanor offense alone.
In
The Majority's only answer to the clear danger that this bill would cut off the last lifeline for people in nursing homes, individuals with dementia or other cognitive impairments, and those at risk of being homeless was to cite the very limited discretionary authority already in existing law for the Commissioner of
Past experience with this policy was that many vulnerable individuals who pose no danger to the community, and who often were not even aware that warrants for long-ago, alleged offenses still (or ever) existed, lost benefits they needed to survive. Despite this, the Majority failed to hold a hearing on H.R. 2792 to examine the problem they are trying to solve or learn about potentially harmful consequences before moving to enact this bill.
If the Majority had held a hearing, they would have learned that, in the past, individuals who lost benefits under this policy included individuals who had dementia or severe intellectual disability; who were confined to wheelchairs and tethered to oxygen tanks; who years ago were charged with theft of
Therefore, we opposed H.R. 2792.
Ranking Member.
----------
Had I been present for the vote on reporting H.R. 2792 out of the Committee, I would have voted No.
Member of
ADDITIONAL DISSENTING VIEWS
In addition to the overall concerns outlined by the Ranking Member that H.R. 2792 would harm poor seniors and people with disabilities, we express deep concerns that this bill: (1) directly contradicts the constitutional presumption of innocence; (2) deprives individuals of due process and lowers the legal standard for deprivation of government benefits based on a mere accusation rather than conviction; (3) increases the likelihood of errors in termination of SSI benefits; (4) magnifies the deep inequities in our criminal justice system based on race, ethnicity, and income; and (5) decreases the overall safety of our communities.
H.R. 2792 assumes all individuals accused of a crime and issued an arrest warrant for a felony or for a violation of a condition of probation or parole are guilty. This directly contradicts the constitutional presumption of innocence and deprives individuals of due process via adjudication of guilt or innocence based on a simple accusation rather than a conviction. The conviction--not an accusation of a crime-- should be the predicate for the loss of benefits. The denial of due process then deprives the individual of government benefits based on accusations rather than conviction, in direct contradiction of volumes of case law.
In addition, the denial of due process based on accusation--rather than conviction--increases the likelihood of termination errors, which the adjudication process could have addressed. Multiple federal, state, and organization studies demonstrate the inaccuracies of criminal justice databases. For example, a 2016 Minnesota Law Review article focused on the inaccuracies of criminal justice data bases and noted the lack of evidence of accurate arrest warrant information in state and local databases. A 2015 report by the Government Accountability Office noted that an
Further, the denial of due process based on accusation rather than conviction increases the likelihood of harm to individuals who are racial/ethnic minorities and/or poor, harm that the adjudication process could have limited The racial and ethnic biases of the criminal justice system are well- documented, including the following examples discussed during Committee markup:
A 2015 report by the
A 2009
The denial of due process based on accusation--rather than conviction--also criminalizes poverty. Increasingly, costs associated with the criminal justice system have escalated dramatically causing disproportionate harm to individuals with limited financial resources. No uniform threshold for a felony exists, giving states wide latitude to define offenses involving relatively low monetary values as criminal felonies. A report by the
Under H.R. 2792, these individuals would lose SSI benefits due to such alleged violations. In contrast to the Majority's assurances during markup that only individuals charged with violent offenses or costly financial theft could have felony arrest warrants or violations of probation or parole, we remain deeply alarmed that the classification of small property crimes or non-payment of fees and fines could easily result in the loss of SSI benefits to the elderly and disabled without due process, consistent with the harm caused when SSA terminated benefits for outstanding arrest warrants in the past.
By denying the right and protections of due process, this legislation contradicts the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Despite these concerns, the Majority rejected every and all amendments to protect vulnerable SSI recipients against disparate harm based on income or race/ethnicity. Specifically, the Majority rejected an amendment requiring the Commissioner of
Further, the Majority claimed that the very limited authority given to the Social Security Commissioner under current law to issue "good cause exemptions" was sufficient to prevent unfair and hardship-inducing loss of benefits. That authority provides 35 days between notification of intent to terminate benefits and actual benefit termination for persons with extremely limited financial resources who are severely disabled or elderly, and who may no longer live in the jurisdiction where the warrant was issued. The timeline is impractical and unfair. Resolving errors within the criminal justice system is a long-process that typically must be done in the geographic jurisdiction of the court and necessitates legal counsel.
In the past when SSA applied the arrest-warrant termination standard, many affected individuals were unaware of outstanding arrest warrants in other states, the resolution of which required travel and long wait times for court dates. Given that SSI is only available to people who are low-income elderly and disabled, 35 days is insufficient time for individuals with limited financial resources, poor health, and mental or physical impairments to hire counsel and resolve complicated criminal justice problems, even if the Commissioner were able to act on all the exemption requests for people unfairly targeted in a timely manner.
Given these concerns, we strongly oppose H.R. 2792. This mean-spirited legislation will: (1) deprive government benefits for poor, elderly, and disabled individuals in direct contradiction of the constitutional presumption of innocence; (2) deny these vulnerable adults due process and lower the legal standard for deprivation of government benefits based on a mere accusation rather than a conviction; (3) increase the likelihood of wrongful termination; (4) magnify the deep inequities in our criminal justice system based on race, ethnicity, and income; and (5) decrease the overall safety of our communities. Passing this bill would result in devastating consequences for the individuals affected and those who love and care for them.
John Lewis.
Excerpts of the report follow: https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/115th-congress/house-report/316/1?r=5
Infectious Disease Society Issues Statement on Graham-Cassidy Healthcare Bill
Sen. McCain Issues Statement on Health Care Reform
Advisor News
Annuity News
Health/Employee Benefits News
Life Insurance News