House Science, Space & Technology Subcommittee Issues Testimony From RAND Corporation
"Good morning Chairman Comstock, Ranking Member Lipinski, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I thank you for the opportunity to testify about
Introduction
"Since the establishment of the
"In my remarks today, I would like to place federal R&D efforts for agricultural biodefense efforts in context. To do this, I will develop several themes. First, federal agriculture research must be considered within a broad spectrum of global biological threats, from emerging infectious disease to the deliberate use of biological pathogens. Second, agriculture security is an issue of both national and economic security. Third,
"Biodefense R&D serves as a hedge against the wide variety of growing threats to the agricultural sector. It should be thought of as a necessary, yet costly, insurance policy to protect this vital industry. Funding the
Global Biological Threats
"The agriculture and food sectors of the
"The range of biological threats facing the agricultural industry continues to grow. Emerging infectious diseases (EID)7 have continued to spread across the globe, and the number of diseases becoming endemic in
""Socio-economic, environmental and ecological factors" have fueled the spread of EID. In a study analyzing 335 EID events between 1940 and 2004, such events were determined to be "significantly" increasing. Of great importance to the agricultural sector, 60.3 percent of these diseases are zoonotic--diseases with a nonhuman animal source--and 71.8 percent originated in wildlife. These statistics combine to imply that the
"Global travel and an increasingly mobile population (both human and livestock) highlight the potential for foreign animal disease to rapidly spread, spreading diseases that have never been in or have been eradicated in
"African Swine Fever (ASF) is a viral hemorrhagic fever; some strains are considered to have a 100-percent mortality rate. ASF has occurred in
"A host of other zoonotic diseases are of concern to the agriculture sector and bear scrutiny. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) infections in 2014 and 2015 resulted in 223 cases of HPAI in domestic flocks in 15 states and the culling of 48 million chickens, turkeys, and other poultry to halt the spread of the disease.10 The Ebola outbreak from 2014 to 2016 affected ten countries (including
"Changing climate patterns cause changing disease patterns for humans, plants, and animals. One example of a changing disease pattern is the Zika virus, a zoonotic disease spread by mosquitoes that has the potential to cause birth defects and long-term neurological effects in affected populations. The Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus mosquitoes, which are the known vectors of the disease, are now endemic to almost half of the continental
"Equally concerning is the potential for the deliberate introduction of these diseases or bioterrorism. Such an event would have serious national security and economic effects.
A National Security and Economic Security Issue
"The Amerithrax attacks in 2001 caused a serious reevaluation of the potential for deliberate use of a biological pathogen to inflict harm, kill people, and even destroy economies. The mailing of five anthrax-laden letters through the
"In considering the potential for an agricultural bioterror attack, one must remember that opportunity and malicious actors coexist in what could be a dangerous combination should such actors decide to attack agricultural targets. One analysis assessed that FMD-endemic countries collectively contain three-quarters of the world's population.17 Furthermore, the nature of many zoonotic diseases is such that little planning or weaponization would be required to perpetrate such an attack. In the case of FMD or ASF, only an exchange of fluids containing the virus would be necessary to cause such an outbreak. Finally, as much of the focus has been on human bioterrorism, this leaves agro-bioterrorism as a perceived soft target.
"Recognition of the biological attack threat became so pervasive that in the 2005 Homeland Security Planning Scenarios, four of the 15 scenarios were directly related to a bioterror attack (a fifth was a natural outbreak of pandemic influenza). Particularly noteworthy, two of the scenarios involved attacks on the agriculture and food system (terrorists infecting livestock at specific locations and terrorists contaminating food with anthrax in processing facilities).18
"The economic impact of an agricultural biological incident would include direct loss of crops, livestock, and assets; secondary losses in upstream and downstream markets; lost export markets; significant price effects; and an overall reduction in economic growth. It would also require the unplanned expenditure of resources for response and recovery. Secondary and tertiary effects include long-term environmental problems (the need to bury/lime the killed animals) and social and political impacts, such as reduced confidence in government, reduced confidence in food safety, and social disruption resulting from fear.
"In the
"More recently, a
"The HPAI outbreak was costly for the poultry industry, with turkey and laying hen losses estimated at nearly
"Both experience and estimates indicate the potential for adverse national and economic security outcomes from a biological incident, either naturally occurring or deliberate. Entire industries could be devastated, and recovery from such an event could take years even in the best of cases.
"International public health and security institutions provide the basis for
"The global "One Health" concept recognizes that human health, animal health, and the environment are inextricably related.24 These linkages allow for better understanding of the complex relationships between humans, animals, and the environment, in many cases allowing earlier disease identification in one sector by observing the spread of disease in another sector. For example, understanding which strains are circulating in the flyways of the avian populations can assist in predicting which strains of seasonal influenza are likely to be most prevalent in humans.25
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"United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, established in 2004, mandates "all states shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes."27
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"The security of our agriculture and food production systems is critical to our economic, social, political well-being, and security. Given this broad array of interests, a wide range of stakeholders have direct and indirect interests in agricultural biodefense.
"The public health and security institutions collectively have served as foundations for numerous
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Footnotes:
1 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of the
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5 Food-related industries include forestry, fishing, and related activities; food, beverages, and tobacco products; textiles, apparel, and leather products; food and beverage stores; and food service, eating and drinking places.
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17 T. J. D. Knight-Jones and
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20 Oklahoma Agriculture Food and Forestry, "At What Cost? 2001 and 2007 Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak United Kingdom," undated.
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23 Greene, 2015.
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27 UNODA, "
28 United States Code, Title 18, Section 2332a, Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1996.
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