Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change Amending Its Fees…
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Self-Regulatory Organizations;
Citation: "79 FR 52079"
Document Number: "Release No. 34-72923; File No. SR-
Page Number: "52079"
"Notices"
August 26, 2014.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) /1/ of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Act") /2/ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder, /3/ notice is hereby given that, on
FOOTNOTE 1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 2 15 U.S.C. 78a. END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 3 17 CFR 240.19b-4. END FOOTNOTE
I.
The Exchange proposes to amend its fees for non-display use of NYSE OpenBook, NYSE Trades, and NYSE BBO, and to establish fees for non-display use of NYSE Order Imbalances, operative on
II.
In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The text of those statements may be examined at the places specified in Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant parts of such statements.
A.
1. Purpose
The Exchange proposes to amend its non-display fees for NYSE OpenBook, NYSE Trades, and NYSE BBO, to establish such fees for NYSE Order Imbalances, and to establish managed non-display services fees for NYSE BBO, operative on
The Exchange established the current non-display and managed non-display services fees for NYSE OpenBook, NYSE Trades, and NYSE BBO in
FOOTNOTE 4 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 69278 (
Under the proposal, non-display use would continue to mean accessing, processing, or consuming an
FOOTNOTE 5 "Redistributor" means a vendor or any person that provides a real-time
The Exchange is proposing to expand the types of uses considered Non-Display Use to also include non-trading uses. In addition, the proposal would specify that Non-Display Use would include any trading use, rather than only certain types of trading, such as high frequency or algorithmic trading, as under the current fee structure. Under the proposal, examples of Non-Display Use would include any trading in any asset class, automated order or quote generation and/or order pegging, price referencing for algorithmic trading or smart order routing, operations control programs, investment analysis, order verification, surveillance programs, risk management, compliance, and portfolio management. The Exchange believes that non-trading uses benefit data recipients by allowing users to automate functions, achieving greater speed and accuracy, and in turn, for example, reducing costs of labor to perform the functions manually. This approach would address the difficulties of monitoring and auditing different types of trading versus non-trading uses of the data and the burden of counting devices used for non-trading purposes under the current fees.
Proposed Changes to Non-Display Fees
The Exchange proposes to amend the fee structure applicable to Non-Display Use of NYSE OpenBook, NYSE BBO, and NYSE Trades and to establish such fees for NYSE Order Imbalance. Specifically, the Exchange proposes certain changes to the three categories of, and fees applicable to, data recipients.
Under the proposal, Category 1 Fees would apply when a data recipient's Non-Display Use of real-time market data is on its own behalf as opposed to use on behalf of its clients. This proposal represents an expansion of the application of Category 1 Fees, which currently apply solely to the Non-Display Use of real time market data for the purpose of principal trading, to usage of such data for non-trading purposes.
Under the proposal, Category 2 Fees would apply to data recipients' Non-Display Use of real-time market data is [sic] on behalf of its clients as opposed to use on its own behalf. This proposal also represents an expansion of the application of Category 2 Fees, which currently apply solely to trading activities to facilitate a customer business, to usage of such data for non-trading purposes. As under the current fee, if a data recipient's use of
FOOTNOTE 6 See 2013 Release, supra note 4, at 20976. END FOOTNOTE
The Exchange believes its proposal to apply Category 1 Fees and Category 2 Fees to Non-Display Use of market data for non-trading purposes would address the difficulties of monitoring and auditing trading versus non-trading uses of the data and the burden of counting devices used for purposes of applying the per-device fees. As discussed in more detail in the 2013 Release, /7/ the ability to accurately count devices and audit such counts creates administrative challenges for vendors, data recipients, and the Exchange.
FOOTNOTE 7 See 2013 Release, supra note 4, at 20975. END FOOTNOTE
Under the proposal, Category 3 Fees would apply to data recipients' Non-Display Use of real-time market data for the purpose of internally matching buy and sell orders within an organization, including matching customer orders for data recipient's own behalf and/or on behalf of its clients. This category would apply to Non-Display Use in trading platform(s), such as, but not restricted to, alternative trading systems ("ATSs"), broker crossing networks, broker crossing systems not filed as ATSs, dark pools, multilateral trading facilities, exchanges and systematic internalization systems. Currently, Category 3 Fees apply where a data recipient's non-display use of market data is, in whole or in part, for the purpose of providing reference prices in the operation of one or more trading platforms. The Exchange believes its proposed revision to its description of the data recipients to whom Category 3 Fees apply is more precise because it focuses on the functions of internally matching orders.
In addition, the Exchange is proposing to change the application of Category 3 Fees to data recipients that also use data for purposes that give rise to Category 1 and/or Category 2 Fees. Currently, a data recipient is not liable for Category 3 Fees for those market data products for which it is also paying Category 1 and/or Category 2 Fees. /8/ Under the proposal, a data recipient's Non-Display Use of real-time market data for Category 3 purposes would require such data recipient to pay Category 3 Fees in addition to any Category 1 Fees or Category 2 Fees it is required to pay for Non-Display Use of market data.
FOOTNOTE 8 See 2013 Release, supra note 4, at 20976. END FOOTNOTE
There will continue to be no monthly or other reporting requirements for data recipients' Non-Display Use. However, the Exchange continues to reserve the right to audit data recipients' Non-Display Use of
Data recipient that receive real-time
FOOTNOTE 9 As described in more detail in the Statutory Basis section, in order to modulate the overall fee increase that could apply, if a firm subject to Category 3 Fees has more than three platforms, it would only be required to declare three platforms. If a data recipient only subscribes to products for which there are no non-display usage fees, e.g., NYSE Realtime Reference Prices, then no declaration is required. END FOOTNOTE
Proposed Changes to Fees for Managed Non-Display Services
The Exchange also proposes to change the fees for managed non-display services for NYSE OpenBook and NYSE Trades and establish managed non-display service fees for NYSE BBO and NYSE Order Imbalances. Managed non-display services fees would apply, as they do currently, where data recipients' non-display applications are hosted by an approved third party. /10/ To be an approved third party, the third party must manage and control the access to real-time
FOOTNOTE 10 See 2013 Release, supra note 4, at 20976. END FOOTNOTE
The managed non-display services fee would only apply if a data recipient is receiving real-time
FOOTNOTE 11 See supra note 5. END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 12 The Unit-of-Count Policy is described in the 2013 Release, supra note 4, at note 10 and accompanying text. END FOOTNOTE
A data recipient of real-time
Comparison of Current Fees to Proposed Fees
The chart below compares the proposed changes to current monthly fees: GOES
Data feed Current fee Proposed fee NYSE OpenBook Non-Display$5,000 $6,000 . Category 1 NYSE OpenBook Non-Display$5,000 $6,000 . Category 2 NYSE OpenBook Non-Display$5,000 , or$0 if Category$6,000 , capped at Category 3 1 or 2 fees paid$18,000 . NYSE OpenBook Managed$2,000 $2,400 . Non-Display NYSE BBO Non-Display$1,500 , or$0 if Category$1,500 , capped at Category 3 1 or 2 fees paid$4,500 . NYSE BBO Managed n/a$300 . Non-Display NYSE Trades Non-Display$2,000 $3,000 . Category 1 NYSE Trades Non-Display$2,000 $3,000 . Category 2 NYSE Trades Non-Display$2,000 , or$0 if Category$3,000 , capped at Category 3 1 or 2 fees paid$9,000 . NYSE Trades Managed$700 $1,000 . Non-Display NYSE Order Imbalances n/a$2,000 . Category 1 NYSE Order Imbalances n/a$2,000 . Category 2 NYSE Order Imbalances n/a$2,000 , capped at Category 3$6,000 . NYSE Order Imbalances n/a$200 . Managed Non-Display
2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with the provisions of Section 6 of the Act, /13/ in general, and Sections 6(b)(4) and 6(b)(5) of the Act, /14/ in particular, in that it provides an equitable allocation of reasonable fees among users and recipients of the data and is not designed to permit unfair discrimination among customers, issuers, and brokers.
FOOTNOTE 13 15 U.S.C. 78f(b). END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 14 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4), (5). END FOOTNOTE
The Exchange believes that charging for non-trading uses is reasonable because data recipients can derive substantial value from such uses, for example, by automating tasks so that they can be performed more quickly and accurately and less expensively than if they were performed manually. The Exchange also notes that
After further experience, the Exchange also believes that it is more equitable and not unfairly discriminatory to eliminate the distinction for non-trading versus trading uses in light of the significant value of both types of uses. The Exchange notes that because non-display fees are flat fees, the expansion to cover non-trading uses could only result in a fee increase for a data recipient that is using the data solely for non-trading purposes and is only subject to per-device fees; at this time, the Exchange has not identified such a data recipient. Based on data available to the Exchange, all data recipients use the data for at least one trading purpose, and therefore the changes to the fees that they will pay under the proposal would not be due to the elimination of the distinction between trading and non-trading uses. The Exchange further notes that based on Proposed Declarations submitted to date, some users have declared no non-display use, and as such the proposed changes would have no impact on them.
The Exchange believes that it is reasonable to require annual submissions of the Proposed Declaration so that the Exchange will have current and accurate information about the use of its market data products and can correctly assess fees for the uses of those products. The annual submission requirement is equitable and not unfairly discriminatory because it will apply to all users.
The Exchange believes that requiring Redistributors to provide monthly reports of data recipients that are receiving the Managed Non-Display service is reasonable because as a matter of practice, the Exchange already has been requiring such reporting pursuant to the Exchange's right under the vendor and subscriber agreements to request such information, and there is no indication that this has been burdensome for Redistributors. The reporting requirement is equitable and not unfairly discriminatory because it will apply to all Redistributors and help to ensure that ultimate data recipients are receiving data in accordance with the Exchange's rules.
The Exchange believes that the proposed fee increases of
FOOTNOTE 15 See 2013 Release, supra note 4, at 20977. END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 16 See also Exchange Act Release No. 69157,
The fee increases are also reasonable in that they support the Exchange's efforts to regularly upgrade systems to support more modern data distribution formats and protocols as technology evolves. For example, the Exchange will begin to make its proprietary data products available over both its existing distribution channel as well as the XDP protocol later this year.
Charging a separate fee for Category 3 data recipients that already pay a fee under Category 1 or 2 is reasonable because it eliminates what is effectively a discount for such data recipients under the current Fee Schedule and results in a more equitable allocation of fees to users that derive a benefit from a Category 3 use, and as such is not unfairly discriminatory. The current fee can be viewed as having an effective non-display fee cap of
The proposed non-display fees for NYSE Order Imbalance are reasonable because they reflect the valuable non-display uses of this data feed for recipients and will be easier for the Exchange to administer than counting devices, as is required under the current Fee Schedule. The fees are equitable and not unfairly discriminatory because they will apply to all data recipients that choose to subscribe to the NYSE Order Imbalances feed.
The proposed monthly fees of
FOOTNOTE 17 NASDAQ offers a Managed Data Solution that assesses a monthly
The proposed increase in the NYSE Trades Managed Non-Display fee from
FOOTNOTE 18 See id. END FOOTNOTE
The fees are also competitive with offerings by other exchanges, which structure and set their fees in a variety of ways. For example, NASDAQ professional subscribers pay monthly fees for non-display usage based upon direct access to NASDAQ Level 2, NASDAQ TotalView, /19/ or NASDAQ OpenView, which range from
FOOTNOTE 19 NASDAQ disseminates its Net Order Imbalance Indicator for the NASDAQ Opening and Closing Crosses and NASDAQ IPO/Halt Cross as part of the TotalView product. END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 20 See NASDAQ Rule 7023(b)(4). END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 21 See NASDAQ Rule 7039(b). END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 22 Alternatively, Phlx charges each professional subscriber
FOOTNOTE 23 See NASDAQ OMX BX Rule 7023(a)(2). Alternatively, BX charges each professional subscriber
FOOTNOTE 24 See supra note 18. END FOOTNOTE
The Exchange also notes that all of the products described herein are entirely optional. The Exchange is not required to make these proprietary data products available or to offer any specific pricing alternatives to any customers, nor is any firm required to purchase any of the products. Firms that do purchase non-display products do so for the primary goals of using them to increase revenues, reduce expenses, and in some instances compete directly with the Exchange for order flow; those firms are able to determine for themselves whether any specific product such as these are attractively priced or not.
Firms that do not wish to purchase the data at the new prices have a wide variety of alternative market data products from which to choose, /25/ or if the non-display data products do not provide sufficient value to firms as offered based on the uses those firms have or planned to make of them, such firms may simply choose to conduct their business operations in ways that do not require those data products. The Exchange notes that broker-dealers are not required to purchase proprietary market data to comply with their best execution obligations. /26/ Similarly, there is no requirement in Regulation NMS or any other rule that proprietary data be utilized for order routing decisions, and some broker-dealers and ATSs have chosen not to do so. /27/
FOOTNOTE 25 See supra notes 18-24. Because NYSE BBO and NYSE Trades are subsets of the consolidated core data offered by the CTA and CQS, customers may choose to purchase those consolidated data products or free delayed data instead. END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 26 See In the Matter of the Application of Securities Industry And Financial Markets Association For Review of Actions Taken by Self-Regulatory Organizations, Release Nos. 34-72182; AP-3-15350; AP-3-15351 (
FOOTNOTE 27 For example,
The decision of the
In fact, the legislative history indicates that the
Id. at 535 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-229 at 92 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 323). The court agreed with the Commission's conclusion that "
FOOTNOTE 28 NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 535. END FOOTNOTE
As explained below in the Exchange's Statement on Burden on Competition, the Exchange believes that there is substantial evidence of competition in the marketplace for proprietary market data and that the Commission can rely upon such evidence in concluding that the fees established in this filing are the product of competition and therefore satisfy the relevant statutory standards. In addition, the existence of alternatives to these data products, such as consolidated data and proprietary data from other sources, as described below, further ensures that the Exchange cannot set unreasonable fees, or fees that are unreasonably discriminatory, when vendors and subscribers can select such alternatives.
As the NetCoalition decision noted, the Commission is not required to undertake a cost-of-service or ratemaking approach. The Exchange believes that, even if it were possible as a matter of economic theory, cost-based pricing for non-core market data would be so complicated that it could not be done practically or offer any significant benefits. /29/
FOOTNOTE 29 The Exchange believes that cost-based pricing would be impractical because it would create enormous administrative burdens for all parties, including the Commission, to cost-regulate a large number of participants and standardize and analyze extraordinary amounts of information, accounts, and reports. In addition, and as described below, it is impossible to regulate market data prices in isolation from prices charged by markets for other services that are joint products. Cost-based rate regulation would also lead to litigation and may distort incentives, including those to minimize costs and to innovate, leading to further waste. Under cost-based pricing, the Commission would be burdened with determining a fair rate of return, and the industry could experience frequent rate increases based on escalating expense levels. Even in industries historically subject to utility regulation, cost-based ratemaking has been discredited. As such, the Exchange believes that cost-based ratemaking would be inappropriate for proprietary market data and inconsistent with
For these reasons, the Exchange believes that the proposed fees are reasonable, equitable, and not unfairly discriminatory.
B.
The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will impose any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. An exchange's ability to price its proprietary market data feed products is constrained by actual competition for the sale of proprietary market data products, the joint product nature of exchange platforms, and the existence of alternatives to the Exchange's proprietary data.
The Existence of
The market for proprietary data products is currently competitive and inherently contestable because there is fierce competition for the inputs necessary for the creation of proprietary data and strict pricing discipline for the proprietary products themselves. Numerous exchanges compete with one another for listings and order flow and sales of market data itself, providing ample opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish to compete in any or all of those areas, including producing and distributing their own market data. Proprietary data products are produced and distributed by each individual exchange, as well as other entities, in a vigorously competitive market. Indeed, the
FOOTNOTE 30 Press Release,
Moreover, competitive markets for listings, order flow, executions, and transaction reports provide pricing discipline for the inputs of proprietary data products and therefore constrain markets from overpricing proprietary market data. Broker-dealers send their order flow and transaction reports to multiple venues, rather than providing them all to a single venue, which in turn reinforces this competitive constraint. As a 2010 Commission Concept Release noted, the "current market structure can be described as dispersed and complex" with "trading volume . . . dispersed among many highly automated trading centers that compete for order flow in the same stocks" and "trading centers offer[ing] a wide range of services that are designed to attract different types of market participants with varying trading needs." /31/ More recently, SEC Chair
FOOTNOTE 31 Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 61358 (
FOOTNOTE 32 Mary Jo White, Enhancing Our
If an exchange succeeds in its competition for quotations, order flow, and trade executions, then it earns trading revenues and increases the value of its proprietary market data products because they will contain greater quote and trade information. Conversely, if an exchange is less successful in attracting quotes, order flow, and trade executions, then its market data products may be less desirable to customers using them in support of order routing and trading decisions in light of the diminished content; data products offered by competing venues may become correspondingly more attractive. Thus, competition for quotations, order flow, and trade executions puts significant pressure on an exchange to maintain both execution and data fees at reasonable levels.
In addition, in the case of products that are distributed through market data vendors, such as
Joint Product Nature of Exchange Platform.
Transaction execution and proprietary data products are complementary in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of the execution service. In fact, proprietary market data and trade executions are a paradigmatic example of joint products with joint costs. The decision of whether and on which platform to post an order will depend on the attributes of the platforms where the order can be posted, including the execution fees, data availability and quality, and price and distribution of their data products. Without a platform to post quotations, receive orders, and execute trades, exchange data products would not exist.
The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing, maintaining, and operating the exchange's platform for posting quotes, accepting orders, and executing transactions and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both products and the joint costs it incurs.
Moreover, an exchange's broker-dealer customers generally view the costs of transaction executions and market data as a unified cost of doing business with the exchange. A broker-dealer will only choose to direct orders to an exchange if the revenue from the transaction exceeds its cost, including the cost of any market data that the broker-dealer chooses to buy in support of its order routing and trading decisions. If the costs of the transaction are not offset by its value, then the broker-dealer may choose instead not to purchase the product and trade away from that exchange. There is substantial evidence of the strong correlation between order flow and market data purchases. For example, in
Other market participants have noted that proprietary market data and trade executions are joint products of a joint platform and have common costs. /33/ The Exchange agrees with and adopts those discussions and the arguments therein. The Exchange also notes that the economics literature confirms that there is no way to allocate common costs between joint products that would shed any light on competitive or efficient pricing. /34/
FOOTNOTE 33 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 72153 (
FOOTNOTE 34 See generally
Analyzing the cost of market data product production and distribution in isolation from the cost of all of the inputs supporting the creation of market data and market data products will inevitably underestimate the cost of the data and data products because it is impossible to obtain the data inputs to create market data products without a fast, technologically robust, and well-regulated execution system, and system and regulatory costs affect the price of both obtaining the market data itself and creating and distributing market data products. It would be equally misleading, however, to attribute all of an exchange's costs to the market data portion of an exchange's joint products. Rather, all of an exchange's costs are incurred for the unified purposes of attracting order flow, executing and/or routing orders, and generating and selling data about market activity. The total return that an exchange earns reflects the revenues it receives from the joint products and the total costs of the joint products.
As noted above, the level of competition and contestability in the market is evident in the numerous alternative venues that compete for order flow, including 12 equities self-regulatory organization ("SRO") markets, as well as various forms of ATSs, including dark pools and electronic communication networks ("ECNs"), and internalizing broker-dealers. SRO markets compete to attract order flow and produce transaction reports via trade executions, and two FINRA-regulated Trade Reporting Facilities compete to attract transaction reports from the non-SRO venues. /35/
FOOTNOTE 35 FINRA's Alternative Display Facility also receives over-the-counter trade reports that it sends to CTA. END FOOTNOTE
Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain the aggregate return that each platform earns from the sale of its joint products, but different trading platforms may choose from a range of possible, and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of recovering total costs. For example, some platforms may choose to pay rebates to attract orders, charge relatively low prices for market data products (or provide market data products free of charge), and charge relatively high prices for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms may choose a strategy of paying lower rebates (or no rebates) to attract orders, setting relatively high prices for market data products, and setting relatively low prices for accessing posted liquidity. For example,
FOOTNOTE 36 This is simply a securities market-specific example of the well-established principle that in certain circumstances more sales at lower margins can be more profitable than fewer sales at higher margins; this example is additional evidence that market data is an inherent part of a market's joint platform. END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 37 See "LavaFlow--ADF Migration," available at https://www.lavatrading.com/news/pdf/LavaFlow_ADF_Migration.pdf. END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 38 The Exchange notes that a small number Category 3 non-display data recipients could be using the market data strictly for competitive purposes (e.g., other exchanges and ATSs) or for business purposes unrelated to trading or investment (e.g., Internet portals that wish to attract "eyeballs" to their pages primarily generate advertising revenue for themselves). The Exchange does not believe that the proposed fees will impose any unnecessary burden on these competitors or other businesses. END FOOTNOTE
Existence of Alternatives
The large number of SROs, ATSs, and internalizing broker-dealers that currently produce proprietary data or are currently capable of producing it provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data products. Each SRO, ATS, and broker-dealer is currently permitted to produce and sell proprietary data products, and many currently do or have announced plans to do so, including but not limited to the Exchange, NYSE MKT, NYSE Arca,
The fact that proprietary data from ATSs, internalizing broker-dealers, and vendors can bypass SROs is significant in two respects. First, non-SROs can compete directly with SROs for the production and sale of proprietary data products. By way of example,
FOOTNOTE 39 See supra notes 18-24. With respect to order imbalances, the Exchange further notes that other venues trade
Those competitive pressures imposed by available alternatives are evident in the Exchange's proposed pricing. As noted above, the proposed non-display fees are generally lower than the maximum non-display fees charged by other exchanges such as NASDAQ, Phlx, and BX for comparable products. /40/
FOOTNOTE 40 Id. END FOOTNOTE
In addition to the competition and price discipline described above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly contestable because market entry is rapid and inexpensive. The history of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants that swiftly grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms and proprietary data producers: Archipelago,
FOOTNOTE 41 See supra note 38. END FOOTNOTE
In establishing the proposed fees, the Exchange considered the competitiveness of the market for proprietary data and all of the implications of that competition. The Exchange believes that it has considered all relevant factors and has not considered irrelevant factors in order to establish fair, reasonable, and not unreasonably discriminatory fees and an equitable allocation of fees among all users. The existence of numerous alternatives to the Exchange's products, including proprietary data from other sources, ensures that the Exchange cannot set unreasonable fees, or fees that are unreasonably discriminatory, when vendors and subscribers can elect these alternatives or choose not to purchase a specific proprietary data product if the attendant fees are not justified by the returns that any particular vendor or data recipient would achieve through the purchase.
C.
No written comments were solicited or received with respect to the proposed rule change.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for Commission Action
The foregoing rule change is effective upon filing pursuant to Section 19(b)(3)(A) /42/ of the Act and subparagraph (f)(2) of Rule 19b-4 /43/ thereunder, because it establishes a due, fee, or other charge imposed by the Exchange.
FOOTNOTE 42 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A). END FOOTNOTE
FOOTNOTE 43 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(2). END FOOTNOTE
At any time within 60 days of the filing of such proposed rule change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings under Section 19(b)(2)(B) /44/ of the Act to determine whether the proposed rule change should be approved or disapproved.
FOOTNOTE 44 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(B). END FOOTNOTE
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:
Electronic Comments
* Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
* Send an email to [email protected]. Please include File Number SR-NYSE-2014-43 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
* Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary,
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NYSE-2014-43. This file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and printing in the
For the Commission, by the
FOOTNOTE 45 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12). END FOOTNOTE
Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2014-20703 Filed 8-29-14;
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
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