House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Hearing
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Chairman Frelinghuysen, Ranking Member Visclosky, and distinguished members of the Committee, I am honored to represent more than 600,000 active and reserve Sailors, Navy Civilians, and their Families, especially the 48,000 Sailors who are underway on ships and submarines and deployed in expeditionary roles, around the globe today.
As the chartlet below shows, 104 ships (36% of the
I would like to begin this statement by describing for you the guidance that shaped our decisions within the President's Budget for FY 2015 (PB-15) submission. I will address the
Strategic Guidance
The governing document for PB-15 is the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR uses the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) as a foundation and builds on it to describe the
The QDR's updated strategy is built on three pillars: Protect the Homeland, Build Security Globally, and
In order to improve its ability to meet the nation's security needs in a time of increased fiscal constraint, the QDR also calls for the Joint Force to "rebalance" in four key areas; (1) rebalancing for a broad spectrum of conflict, (2) rebalancing and sustaining our presence and posture abroad, (3) rebalancing capability, capacity, and readiness within the Joint Force, and (4) rebalancing tooth and tail. To satisfy these mandates of the QDR strategy, the
Overview
When I appeared before the
Passage of the BBA and the topline it sets for FY 2015, together with the fiscal guidance provided for this submission provide a level of funding for the
In the PB-15 submission, we assess that the
* Include 308 ships in the Battle Force n1, of which about 123 will be deployed. This global deployed presence will include more than two carrier strike groups (CSG) and two amphibious ready groups (ARG) deployed, on average. It is similar to the presence provided by PB-14.
* Provide "surge" capacity of about three CSG and three ARG, not deployed, but ready to respond to a contingency.
* Deliver ready forces to conduct the DSG primary mission Deter and Defeat Aggression, but with less margin for error or ability to respond to unforeseen or emergent circumstances, compared to PB-14.
* Conduct, but with greater risk, the DSG primary mission Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges against a technologically advanced adversary compared to PB-14. This is principally due to slower delivery of new critical capabilities, particularly in air and missile defense, and overall ordnance capacity.
* Provide increased ship presence in the
In order to ensure the
Additional challenges are on the horizon. In the long term beyond 2019 (the end of the PB-15 FYDP), I am increasingly concerned about our ability to fund the Ohio Replacement ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program--our highest priority program--within our current and projected resources. The
Where we are today
Before describing our FY 2015 submission in detail, I will discuss the
The impact of the continuing resolution and sequestration reductions in FY 2013 compelled us to reduce afloat and shore operations, which created an afloat and shore maintenance and training backlog. We were able to mitigate some of the effects of this backlog through reprogramming funds in FY 2013 and Congressional action in FY 2014 to restore some funding. Impact to
* Cancellation of five ship deployments and delay of a carrier strike group (CSG) deployment.
* Inactivation, instead of repair, of USS Miami beginning in
* Reduction of facilities sustainment by about 30% (to about 57% of the requirement).
* Reduction of base operations, including port and airfield operations, by about 8% (to about 90% of the requirement).
* Furlough of civilian employees for six days.
Shortfalls caused by FY 2013 sequestration still remain in a number of areas. Shipbuilding programs experienced
In FY 2014,
* We are able to fully fund our FY 2014 shipbuilding plan of eight ships.
* We are able to protect research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) funding to keep the Ohio Replacement Program--our top priority program--on track.
* We are able to fund all
In our readiness programs,
* Fund all ship maintenance.
* Fund all required aviation depot maintenance.
* Fully fund ship and aircraft operations.
The remaining
Our strategic approach: PB-15
In developing our PB-15 submission, we evaluated the warfighting requirements to execute the primary missions of the DSG. These were informed by current and projected threats, global presence requirements defined by the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP), and warfighting scenarios described in the Combatant Commanders' operational plans and Secretary of Defense-approved Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS). To arrive at a balanced program within fiscal guidance, we focused first on building appropriate capability, then delivering it at a capacity we could afford. Six programmatic priorities guided us:
First, maintain a credible, modern, and survivable sea-based strategic deterrent. Under the New START Treaty, the Navy SSBN force will carry about 70% of the US accountable deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2020. Our PB-15 request sustains today's 14-ship SSBN force, the Trident D5 ballistic missile and support systems, and the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) system. The Ohio-class SSBN will retire, one per year, beginning in 2027. To continue to meet US Strategic Command presence and surge requirements, PB-15 starts construction of the first Ohio Replacement SSBN in 2021 for delivery in 2028 and first deterrent patrol in 2031.
Second, sustain forward presence of ready forces distributed globally to be where it matters, when it matters. We will utilize cost-effective approaches such as forward basing, forward operating, and forward stationing ships in the
Third, preserve the means (capability and capacity) to both win decisively in one multi-phase contingency operation and deny the objectives of-or impose unacceptable costs on-another aggressor in another region. In the context of relevant warfighting scenarios, we assessed our ability to provide more than fifty end-to-end capabilities, also known as "kill chains" or "effects chains." Each chain identifies all elements needed to provide a whole capability, including sensors, communications and networks, operators, platforms, and weapons. PB-15 prioritizes investments to close gaps in critical kill chains, and accepts risk in capacity or in the rate at which some capabilities are integrated into the Fleet.
Fourth, focus on critical afloat and ashore readiness to ensure "the force" is adequately funded and ready. PB-15 (compared to a BCA revised caps level) improves our ability to respond to contingencies ("surge" capacity) by increasing the readiness of non-deployed forces. However, it increases risk to ashore readiness in FY 2015, compared to PB-14, by reducing facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization (FSRM) and military construction (MILCON) investments. This reduction adds to backlogs created by the deferrals in FY 2013 and FY 2014, exacerbating an existing readiness problem.
Fifth, sustain or enhance the
Sixth, sustain a relevant industrial base, particularly in shipbuilding. We will continue to evaluate the impact of our investment plans on our industrial base, including ship and aircraft builders, depot maintenance facilities, equipment and weapons manufacturers, and science and technology researchers. The government is the only customer for some of our suppliers, especially in specialized areas such as nuclear power. PB-15 addresses the health of the industrial base sustaining adequate capacity, including competition, where needed and viable. We will work closely with our industry partners to manage the risk of any further budget reductions.
Stewardship Initiatives. Another important element of our approach in PB-15 included business transformation initiatives and headquarters reductions to comply with Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) direction. In order to maximize warfighting capability and capacity, the
Our PB-15 request also achieves savings through significant headquarters reductions, placing us on track to meet the 20% reduction by FY 2019 required by SECDEF fiscal guidance. We applied reductions to a broader definition of headquarters than directed, achieving a savings of
What we can do
As described earlier, PB-15 represents some improvement over a program at the BCA revised caps, but in PB-15 we will still face high risk in executing at least two of the ten primary missions of the DSG in 2020. The 2012 Force Structure Assessment n2 (FSA) and other
1. Provide a Stabilizing Presence. Our PB-15 submission will meet the adjudicated presence requirements of the DSG. By increasing the number of ships forward stationed and forward based, PB-15 in some regions improves global presence as compared to our PB-14 submission. The
* Provides global presence of about 123 ships, similar to the aggregate number planned under PB-14.
* Increases presence in the
* "Places a premium on US military presence in-and in support of-partner nations" in the
* Continues to "evolve our posture" in
* Will provide "innovative, low-cost and small-footprint approaches" to security in
3 Under revised Battle Force accounting guidelines, the
2. Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (CT/IW). We will have the capacity to conduct widely distributed CT/IW missions. This mission requires Special Operations Forces, expeditionary capabilities such as Intelligence Exploitation Teams (IET), and specialized platforms such as two AFSB and four littoral combat ships (LCS) with embarked MH-60 Seahawk helicopters and MQ-8 Fire Scout unmanned air vehicles. PB-15 adds capacity for this mission by procuring a third mobile landing platform (MLP) AFSB variant in FY 2017 for delivery in FY 2020.
3. Deter and Defeat Aggression. FSA analysis described the ship force structure required to meet this mission's requirement: to be able to conduct one large-scale operation and "simultaneously be capable of denying the objectives of-or imposing unacceptable costs on-an opportunistic aggressor in a second region." According to the FSA, the
4. Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations. The
5. Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) Challenges. Compared to PB-14, our overall power projection capability development would slow, reducing options and increasing our risk in assuring access. The reduced procurement of weapons and slowing of air and missile defense capabilities, coupled with joint force deficiencies in wartime information transport and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), will cause us to assume high risk in conducting this DSG mission if we are facing a technologically advanced adversary. PB-15 makes results in the following changes to air and missile defense capabilities (versus PB-14):
*
* The F-35C Lightning II, the carrier-based variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, is scheduled to achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) between
* All components of an improved air-to-air kill chain that employs infrared (IR) sensors to circumvent adversary radar jamming will be delayed one year. The Infrared Search and Track (IRST) Block I sensor system will field in 2017 (versus 2016) and the improved longer-range IRST Block II will not deliver until 2019 (versus 2018).
* Improvements to the air-to-air radio frequency (RF) kill chain that defeats enemy jamming and operates at longer ranges will be slowed, and jamming protection upgrades to the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet will be delayed to 2019 (versus 2018).
However, PB-15 sustains our advantage in the undersea domain by delivering the following capabilities:
* PB-15 procures 56 P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft over the FYDP, replacing the legacy P-3C Orion's capability.
* Continues to procure two Virginia-class SSN per year through the FYDP, resulting in an inventory of 21 Virginia-class (of 48 total SSN) by 2020.
* Continues installation of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) combat system upgrades for DDG and improved Multi-Function Towed Arrays (MFTA) for DDG and CG. Both installations will be complete on all DDG forward based in the
* All of our P-8A and ASW helicopters in the
* The LCS mine countermeasures (MCM) mission package, which employs unmanned vehicles and offboard sensors to localize and neutralize mines, will complete testing of its first increment in 2015 and deploy to the Arabian Gulf with full operational capability by 2019.
* The LCS ASW mission package, which improves surface ASW capability by employing a MFTA in concert with a variable depth sonar (VDS), will still field in 2016.
* Additional Mk 48 Advanced Capability (ADCAP) heavyweight torpedoes, restarting the production line and procuring 105 Mod 7 torpedoes across the FYDP. The restart will also provide a basis for future capability upgrades.
6. Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction. This mission has two parts: (1) interdicting weapons of mass destruction as they proliferate from suppliers, and (2) defeating the means of delivery during an attack. PB-15 will meet requirements for this mission by providing sufficient deployed CSG, ARG, and surface combatants, as well as SEAL and EOD platoons, to address the first part. For the second part, BMD-capable DDG exist in sufficient numbers to meet adjudicated GCC presence requirements under the GFMAP, and can be postured to counter weapons delivered by ballistic missiles in regions where threats are more likely to emanate. That said, missile defense capacity in some scenarios remains a challenge and any reduction in the number of BMD-capable DDG raises risk in this area.
7. Operate Effectively in Space and Cyberspace. Our PB-15 submission continues to place priority on cyber defense and efforts to build the
8. Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent. This mission is the
9. Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities. PB-15 will maintain an appropriate capacity of aircraft carriers, surface combatants, amphibious ships, and aircraft that are not deployed and are ready for all homeland defense missions.
10. Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations. Our analysis determined that a global presence of two ARG and nine JHSV is sufficient to conduct these operations. Our PB-15 submission will support this level of presence.
Manpower, Modernization, Warfighting Capability, and Readiness
The following paragraphs describe more specific PB-15 programs actions that result from our strategic approach and influence our ability to conduct the missions required by the DSG:
End Strength. PB-15 supports a FY 2015
Shipbuilding. Our PB-15 shipbuilding plan combines the production of proven platforms with the introduction of innovative and cost effective platforms in order to preserve capacity while enhancing capability. Simultaneously, we will sustain efforts to develop new payloads that will further enhance the lethality and effectiveness of existing platforms and continue mid-life modernizations and upgrades to ensure their continued relevance. We will continue to field flexible, affordable platforms like AFSB and auxiliary ships that operate forward with a mix of rotational civilian and military crews and provide additional presence capacity for certain missions requiring flexibility, volume, and persistence. PB-15 proposes:
* Funding for 14 LCS across the FYDP (three per year in FY 2015 - 2018 and two in FY 2019). However, in accordance with SECDEF direction, we will cease contract negotiations after we reach a total of 32 ships (12 procured in the PB-15 FYDP). Per direction, we will assess LCS' characteristics such as lethality and survivability, and we are studying options for a follow-on small surface combatant, and follow on flight of LCS.
* Two Virginia-class SSN per year, maintaining the planned ten-ship Block IV multi-year procurement (FY 2014 - FY 2018).
* Two Arleigh Burke-class DDG per year, maintaining the ten-ship multi-year procurement (FY 2013 - 2017). PB-15 procures ten DDG (three Flight IIA and seven Flight III) in the FYDP. The first Flight III DDG, which will incorporate the advanced Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), will be procured in FY 2016 and delivered in FY 2021.
* An additional AFSB variant of the
* Three T-AO(X) fleet oilers (in FY 2016, 2018, and 2019, respectively).
* Advanced procurement requested in FY 2019 to procure one LX(R) amphibious ship replacement in FY 2020.
Additionally, to comply with fiscal constraints, our PB-15 submission delays delivery of the second Ford-class CVN, USS John F. Kennedy (CVN 79) from FY 2022 to FY 2023.
Aviation. PB-15 continues our transition to the Future Carrier Air Wing, which will employ manned and unmanned systems to achieve air, sea, and undersea superiority across capability "kill chains." We will also continue to field more advanced land-based maritime patrol aircraft (manned and unmanned) to evolve and expand our ISR, ASW, and sea control capabilities and capacity. To further these objectives while complying with fiscal constraints, PB-15:
* Continues plans to transition the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fleet from production to sustainment with the final 37 aircraft procured in FY 2013 and scheduled for delivery in FY 2015. Likewise, the final EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft will be procured in FY 2014 and delivered in FY 2016. We are forced to assume the risk of moving to a single strike fighter prime contractor due to fiscal constraints.
* Maintains IOC of the F-35C Lightning II between
* Maintains initial fielding of the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye and its NIFC-CA capability in FY 2015. Due to fiscal constraints, we were compelled to reduce procurement by ten airframes over the FYDP with four CVW completing transition to the E-2D by 2020, versus the preferred six in PB-14.
* Continues development of the Unmanned Carrier Launch Surveillance and Strike System (UCLASS), a major step forward in achieving integration of manned and unmanned systems within the CVW. UCLASS remains on a path to achieve Early Operational Capability (EOC) within four to five years of contract award, which is projected for FY 2015.
* Continues to transition to the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft from the legacy P-3C Orion. However, we were compelled by fiscal constraints to lower the final P-8A inventory objective from 117 to 109 aircraft. The warfighting requirement remains 117, but we can only afford 109.
* Continues development of the MQ-4C Triton land-based unmanned ISR aircraft. However, technical issues delayed the low-rate initial production decision from FY 2015 to FY 2016. Together with fiscal constraints, this reduces procurement of MQ-4C air vehicles in the FYDP from 23 to 16. Triton will make its first deployment to the Pacific in FY 2017. The multi-INT version will start fielding in 2020.
* Aligns the MQ-8 Fire Scout ship-based unmanned helicopter program to LCS deliveries. Fiscal constraints and global force management (GFM) demands on our surface combatants compelled us to remove options to conduct dedicated ISR support to Special Operations Forces (SOF) from DDG and JHSV, but Fire Scout-equipped LCS can be allocated to Combatant Commanders by the GFM process to support this mission. This decision reduces procurement of MQ-8 air vehicles across the FYDP by 19.
* Continues our maritime Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting (ISR&T) transition plan to deliver increased ISR persistence by the end of FY 2018 and exceed the aggregate capability and capacity of our legacy platforms by the end of FY 2020. However, as we transition from legacy platforms like the EP-3E Aries II, fiscal constraints will compel us to take moderate risk in some collection capabilities over the next few years.
Modernization. In parallel with recapitalization, PB-15 continues modernization of in-service platforms. Flight I and II of the Arleigh Burke-class DDG began mid-life modernization in FY 2010, and will continue at the rate of 2 hulls per year (on average) through FY 2016. In FY 2017, we will begin to modernize Flight IIA DDG in parallel with Flight I and II in order to do so closer to the midpoint in the Flight IIA's service lives and increase return on investment. This will also increase operational availability and BMD capacity sooner than a serial, "oldest-first" plan. Nine of twelve
The
PB-15 also proposes to induct three
We appreciate the additional funding and expanded timeframe given by
To mitigate a projected future shortfall in our strike fighter inventory while integrating the F-35C, PB-15 continues the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) for the legacy F/A-18A-D Hornet. With SLEP modifications, some of these aircraft will achieve as much as 10,000 lifetime flight hours, or 4,000 hours and 16 years beyond their originally-designed life.
Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare. In addition to the actions described earlier in the statement to improve air and missile defense and sustain our advantage in the undersea and information domains, our program enhances our ability to maneuver freely in the electromagnetic spectrum, while denying adversaries' ability to do the same. It maintains our investment in the Ships' Signals Exploitation Equipment (SSEE) Increment F, which equips ships with a robust capability to interdict the communications and targeting elements of adversary kill chains by 2020. It delivers upgraded electromagnetic sensing capabilities for surface ships via the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Block 2 that will deliver in 2016. PB-15 then begins low rate initial production (LRIP) of SEWIP Block 3 in 2017 to add jamming and deception capabilities to counter advanced anti-ship cruise missiles. To enhance CVW capabilities to jam enemy radars and conduct other forms of electromagnetic spectrum maneuver warfare, PB-15 maintains our investments in the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ). NGJ will provide the EA-18G Growler with enhanced Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) capabilities for conventional and irregular warfare. The current ALQ-99 jammer, which has been the workhorse of the fleet for more than 40 years, will not be able to meet all requirements in challenging future environments.
Mine Warfare. Mines are a low-cost, asymmetric weapon that can be effective in denying US forces access to contested areas. To enhance our ability to counter mines in the
Precision Strike. Our precision strike capabilities and capacity will be critical to success in any foreseeable future conflict. Accordingly, PB-15 funds research and development for the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) through FY 2018 to increase Virginia-class SSN Tomahawk missile capacity from 12 to 40 missiles, mitigating the loss of capacity as Ohio-class guided missile submarines (SSGN) begin to retire in 2026. These efforts will support the option to procure the VPM with Block V of the
Anti-Surface Warfare. To pace improvements in adversaries' long-range anti-ship cruise missiles and maritime air defenses, PB-15 implements a plan to deliver next-generation anti-surface warfare (ASuW) capability. The program maintains current ASuW capability inherent in the Harpoon missile, Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) C-1, and Mk 48 ADCAP torpedoes. In the near term, we are pursuing options to develop an improved, longer-range ASuW capability by leveraging existing weapons to minimize technical risk, costs, and development time. Additionally, PB-15 funds enhanced ASuW lethality for LCS by introducing a surface-to-surface missile module (SSMM) in FY 2017. PB-15 accelerates acquisition of the next-generation Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), fielding an early air-launched capability on the Air Force B-1B Lancer bomber in FY 2018 and integration with the F/A-18E/F in FY 2019. Additionally, PB-15's restart of Mk 48 ADCAP production and acquisition of 105 Mod 7 torpedoes over the FYDP enhances submarine ASuW capacity and provides a basis for future capability upgrades.
Forward Presence. PB-15 continues our DSG-directed rebalance to the
In our PB-15 submission, we seek to maximize our presence in the
To capitalize on this advantage, our PB-15 program continues the move of
The Optimized Fleet Response Plan (O-FRP). In addition to maximizing forward presence by basing ships overseas, our PB-15 submission also takes action to maximize the operational availability and presence delivered by units that deploy rotationally from
The legacy FRP employed units on repeating cycles about 30 months in length that were divided into four phases: maintenance, basic training, integrated (advanced) training, and sustainment. Scheduled deployments of notionally six to seven months were intended to take place in the sustainment phase, and the units' combat readiness was maintained for the remainder of the sustainment phase to provide "surge" capacity for contingency response.
Over the past few years, continuing global demand for naval forces coupled with reduced resources has strained the force. Continued demand in the
The O-FRP responds to these schedule pressures and simultaneously makes several other process and alignment improvements to more effectively and efficiently prepare and deploy forces. Our analysis concluded that a 36-month deployment cycle (versus about 30 months) with scheduled deployments of up to eight months (versus six to seven months) is the optimal solution to maximize operational availability while maintaining stability and predictability for maintenance and training. Beyond scheduling, the O-FRP increases cohesiveness and stability in the composition of the teams we prepare for deployment by keeping the same group of ships and aircraft squadrons together in a CSG through successive cycles of training and deployment. The O-FRP also takes actions to make maintenance planning more predictable and maintenance execution more timely and cost-effective. It takes parallel steps in training by closely aligning the many inspections and exercises that units must complete in a predictable, rationalized sequence.
Our PB-15 submission implements the O-FRP beginning in FY 2015 with the Harry S. Truman CSG, and will implement it in all other CSG and surface combatants as they prepare for and execute their next deployments. The O-FRP will subsequently be expanded to amphibious ships (ARG) and we are studying the desirability of expanding it to submarines and other unit types in the future.
Fleet Readiness. A central challenge in delivering the best
Despite the reduction in funding below levels planned in PB-14, PB-15 strikes this balance and the result is a program that delivers sufficient readiness to meet our GFMAP presence commitments and provide sufficient "surge" capacity for contingency response.
As part of our efforts to sustain fleet readiness,
Going forward, PB-15 funds
Readiness and Investment Ashore. To comply with fiscal constraints, we are compelled to continue accepting risk in shore infrastructure investment and operations. PB-15 prioritizes nuclear weapons support, base security, child development programs, and air and port operations. PB-15 funds facilities' sustainment to 70% of the DOD Facilities Sustainment Model, and prioritizes repair of critical operational facilities like piers and runways, renovation of inadequate barracks, and improving the energy efficiency of facilities. Less critical repairs to non-operational facilities will be deferred; however, this risk will compound over years and must eventually be addressed.
Depot Maintenance Infrastructure. Due to fiscal constraints, the
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). PB-15 continues to fund environmental restoration, caretaking, and property disposal at
Health of the Force
Compensation Reform and Quality of Service. PB-15 addresses readiness by applying an important concept: quality of service. Quality of service has two components: (1) quality of work, and (2) quality of life. Both are intrinsically tied to readiness. At work, the
Over the last several years,
Personnel costs for military and civilian personnel make up about half of
When my Senior Enlisted Advisor (the Master Chief
* Increases in travel funding for training.
* Expansion of the
* Improvement in training range and simulation capabilities, simulated small arms training, and other shore-based simulators and trainers for surface ship and submarine personnel.
* Additional aviation spare parts.
* Enhancements to aviation logistics and maintenance.
* Enhancements to surface ship depot maintenance.
* Increasing financial incentives for Sailors serving in operational capacities at sea.
* Increasing retention bonuses.
* Enhancing Base Operating Support (BOS) funding to improve base services for Sailors and their families.
* Restoring of
* Military construction projects for five barracks and a reserve Navy Operational Support Center (NOSC).
* Improving berthing barges in
* Increasing support to active commands by Selected Reserve (SELRES) personnel, thereby reducing workloads on active duty personnel.
* Implementing an information technology (IT) solution that enables Reserve personnel to remotely access Navy IT resources in support of mission objectives.
* Increasing funding for recapitalization projects at our flagship educational institutions.
For the same reasons we support reform of pay and other benefits, the
Enduring Programs. Along with the plans and programs described above, I remain focused on enduring challenges that relate to the safety, health, and well-being of our people. In
Sexual Assault. The
Sustaining a world-class response and victim advocacy system remains a top priority; preventing sexual assaults from occurring is an imperative. Our strategy focuses on creating a climate where behaviors and actions that may lead to sexual assault, as well as sexual assault itself, are not tolerated, condoned or ignored. This multi-faceted approach focuses on command climate; deterrence; and bystander intervention. To prevent more severe crimes in the continuum of harm, we are concentrating our leadership efforts on ending the sexist and destructive behaviors that lead up to them. Our metrics indicate that Sailors are reporting unacceptable behavior and that commands are taking it seriously.
We will continue to measure, through surveys and reports, prevalence data, command climate and perceptions of leadership support, investigation length, and victim experience with our response and investigative system. We also measure key statistics about the investigative and adjudication process itself, such as length of time from report to outcome, as we continue to ensure a balanced military justice system for all involved. These metrics will be utilized to further improve and refine our prevention strategy, as well as inform a
Every Sailor and Navy Civilian deserves to work in an environment of dignity, respect, and trust. We hold our leaders accountable for creating a command climate that promotes these basic principles and thereby reduces the likelihood of an environment where sexual harassment might occur. We are strengthening our sexual harassment prevention policy by separating it from Equal Opportunity and aligning it with previous SAPR policy amendments, which have resulted in increased trust in our system to report incidents.
When sexual assaults do occur, we ensure the victims' rights and preferences are respected throughout the investigative and disposition processes. In
However, work remains to be done. Despite 80% of Sailors reporting confidence in the
We greatly appreciate
Suicide. Another critical problem we are focused on is suicides. Suicides in the
Resilience. Our research shows that a Sailor's ability to steadily build resilience is a key factor in navigating stressful situations. Education and prevention initiatives train Sailors to recognize operational stress early and to use tools to manage and reduce its effects. Our Operational Stress Control (OSC) program is the foundation of our efforts to teach Sailors to recognize stressors in their lives and mitigate them before they become crises. In the past year, we expanded our training capacity by 50% and increased OSC mobile training teams (MTT) from four to six. These MTT visit each command within six months of deployment and teach Sailors resiliency practices to better manage stress and avoid paths that lead to destructive behaviors.
In addition, we are strengthening support to Sailors who are deployed in unfamiliar surroundings. We have started a program to assign trained and certified professionals as Deployed Resiliency Counselors (DRC) to our largest ships, the CVN and LHA/D. DRC are credentialed clinical counselors that can assist or provide support to Sailors who are coping with or suffering from common life events, common life stressors, and discrete traumatic events that may include sexual assault. This initiative extends the reach of
One avenue by which we instill character and ethics in our leaders is by teaching ethics education and character development in the
Family Readiness Programs. Family readiness is fully integrated into our
This past year, our Family Advocacy program (FAP) has implemented the DoD Incident Determination Committee (IDC) & Clinical Case Staff Meeting (CCSM) model
Other career and retention support services include the family employment readiness program, personal financial management, and the legislatively mandated Transition Goals, Plan, Success program to assist separating Sailors. Increased stress and longer family separations have amplified program demand and underlined the importance of these support programs and services to ensure the psychological, emotional and financial well-being of returning warriors and their families. Financial issues are still the number one cause of security clearance revocation and our financial counselors have noted an increase in the number of Sailors entering the Service with debt, including student loan debt. We continually monitor the environment for predatory lending practices targeting Service Members and families.
Auditability. To be good stewards of the funding appropriated by
Conclusion
We believe it is vital to have a predictable and stable budget to develop and execute an achievable program to conduct the ten primary missions outlined in the DSG, and support the pillars and "rebalance" called for in the QDR.
PB-15 proposes the best balance of
n1 It should be noted that the
The following table illustrates the differences between new and old Battle Force accounting guidelines:
Today FY 2015 FY 2020
PB-15: New Guidelines 290 284 308
PB-15: Old Guidelines 284 274 302
n2 Consistent with other "ship counts" in this statement, the regional presence numbers described in this section are not directly comparable to those used in previous years due to the Battle Force counting guidelines revision.
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